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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this research is to assess an emerging public-law concern: the review of the 
administrative actions of a host state in investment arbitration. This research examines 
the extent to which the principles of domestic administrative law can be used as a legal 
reference for investment arbitrators to address and resolve the legal issues presented in 
regulatory disputes that are resolved by means of investor-state treaty arbitrations 
(ISTAs). In arriving at an answer to this particular question, two factors are considered: 
(i) the use of administrative law principles as a part of the unitised nature of the law 
that governs the ‘state of law’ of any democratic society; and (ii) the current crisis of 
legitimacy that the investor-state treaty arbitration system is facing. 
 
The thesis begins with a comparative analysis of the French and British administrative 
legal systems as representatives of the two most important legal traditions of the 
Western world (civil law and common law, respectively). This comparison identifies 
the common institutions and principles that are domestically used by host states to 
determine the legal and regulatory relationship between private actors and their public 
administrations (i.e., the state). It continues with conceptual and critical assessments of 
international investment treaties (IITs) and ISTAs, respectively, and identifies and 
analyzes the legal principles that have been developed in the international arena and 
have been used to settle international (regulatory) disputes between host states and 
private investors/actors.  
 
Additionally, this thesis continues with an arbitral practice review to identify the factual 
statements that arbitral tribunals have included in their arbitral awards and which can 
be framed within the scope of the main principles of administrative law previously 
identified. This is achieved by taking into consideration one of the main features of the 
current investor-state arbitration system which is the use of this mechanism to settle 
regulatory disputes at an international level. This latter feature is considered to be (i) 
analogous to domestic administrative adjudication that provides (ii) legal mechanisms 
to resolve regulatory disputes between host states and private individuals when (iii) the 
public authority of the host state is compromised. Finally, this thesis reflects upon the 
current investor-state arbitration system and identifies the current political, 
international and academic concerns that are affecting the legitimacy of this arbitral 
system. 
 
Given the analogy between the public law functions of the ISTA mechanism and the 
domestic administrative review mechanisms, both parallel levels of state regulatory 
review have been designed to protect private individuals from the unlawful or arbitrary 
conduct of the (host) state. The investment arbitration system has been designed as a 
temporary forum to provide private individuals with a special tool to challenge the 
domestic rights and privileges of the host state at the international level. This particular 
point shows, amongst other aspects, that investment arbitrators are arbitrators of law 
rather than arbitrators of equity since they are mainly required to assess the domestic 
regulation of the host state in accordance with the international standards of treatment 
 xi 
contained in an IIT and in accordance with the applicable law chosen by the IIT’s 
contracting parties in order to determine the state’s international responsibility. 
 
This study finds that neither Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) nor the Arbitration Rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCINTRAL) impedes or 
prevents investment arbitrators from applying some principles of domestic 
(administrative) law to ISTAs when domestic regulatory issues are at stake. A guideline 
as to what domestic (administrative) law principles should be applied to international 
regulatory investor-state disputes in conjunction with some international investment 
obligations has not been adequately studied in international law. Hence, the application 
of these principles to international regulatory disputes has been left to the discretion of 
investment arbitrators. 
 
Finally, due to the current concerns and questions surrounding the current arbitral 
system, it could be affirmed that now is the right time to initiate the practice of 
referring to these domestic (administrative) law principles in international regulatory 
disputes. Conversely, the reluctance of investment arbitrators to refer to this particular 
source of law can be regarded, in the long-term, as a contribution to the current crisis of 
legitimacy that the international investment arbitration system is facing. 
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 1 
‘The common principles of the principal administrative law 
systems are in my view an important point of reference for 
the interpretation of investment treaties…’  
 
T.W. Wälde – Thunderbird v. Mexico  
December (2005) – Separate Opinion. 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
a. Background to the study 
 
In the last two decades, there have been increasing political, international and academic 
concerns
1
 – especially in developing countries – regarding the interaction between (i) 
the proliferation and use of International Investment Treaties (IITs) as a mechanism to 
protect foreign investments and (ii) the exercise of the host state’s sovereign rights to 
regulate their economic activities as a mechanism to protect their public welfare.
2,3
 One 
of the main concerns arises due to the perception that some countries (mainly 
developing countries) have on the effects that some international investment standards 
and arbitral awards have had over the exercise of host state’s sovereign power to adopt 
new policies and regulations.  
 
Further concerns also arise, on the one hand, when a host state wants to invoke its 
domestic regulatory power on grounds of public interest
4
 to protect public welfare and 
this consequently affects foreign investors’ interests. On the other hand, other concerns 
                                                 
1
 See infra, Chapter VI for more details. 
2
 According to Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) Thomson West, USA 2004, Public welfare is ‘a 
society’s well being in matters of health, safety, order, morality, economics, and politics.’ 
3
 Republic of South Africa’s Government Position Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework 
Review – June 2009 <http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-lateral_policy.pdf> (Last visit 03/10/2009). See also A. 
Sheppard, and M. Hunter, Introduction: An Overview of the Relationship Between Courts and Investment 
Treaty Arbitration in F. Ortino, A. Sheppard, and H. Warner, Investment Treaty Law – Current Issues Volume 
1 (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London 2006), on page 153; and T.W. Wälde, 
“Equality of Arms” in Investment Arbitration: Procedural Challenges in Arbitration Under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), on page 162. 
4
 According to Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) Thomson West, USA 2004, Public interest can be 
defined as ‘the general welfare of the public that warrants recognition and protection’.  
 2 
arise when basic principles that govern the regulatory power of the host state are not 
sufficiently considered by investment arbitrators in international regulatory disputes 
due to the fact that the application of these principles has been traditionally carried out 
by domestic courts. This latter point gives rise to questions  concerning the  coexistence 
of some legal principles: (i) the well-known international legal principle which 
establishes that ‘a [state] may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty’;5 (ii) the substantive principles of 
international investment law; and (iii) the principles related to the exercise of a host 
state’s regulatory power, such as the principles of domestic (constitutional and 
administrative) law. The problem which arises from the coexistence of these principles 
can be one of the reasons of why -from the year 2000 onwards- the emphasis in 
investment arbitration has shifted to public law matters due to the interpretation of 
international investment obligations (particularly the fair and equitable treatment 
standard (FET standard)) alongside regulatory issues of the host state’s conduct. 
 
Within this context, the use of investor-state treaty arbitration (ISTA) as a mechanism 
to address and attempt to resolve international regulatory disputes
6
 (i.e., disputes 
between a host state and a foreign investor arising from the exercise of the host state’s 
public authority within its territory
7
) has played a significant role in the public law 
arena. In this regard, this arbitral mechanism has been used to ‘interpret’8 the exercise 
of such public authority and the national law of host states in accordance with the 
                                                 
5
 See Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, on page 331. 
6
 This concept is understood as ‘… [A] disagreement over the existence of a legal duty or, over the extent and 
kind of compensation that may be claimed by the injured party for a breach of such duty or right.’ Definition 
taken from <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/legal-dispute.html> (Last visit 04/10/2009). 
7
 G. Van Harten, and M. Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 
EJIL (2006) Vol. 17 No. 1, 121-150, on page 125. 
8
 ‘The Arbitrators rule on the legality of state conduct, evaluate the fairness of governmental decision-making, 
determine the appropriate scope and content of property rights, and allocate risks and costs between business 
and society’. See Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 7. 
 3 
principles of international investment law, in particular with the FET standard. These 
questions of interpretation concerning the state’s regulatory power have traditionally 
been resolved by domestic courts through judicial review and by the application of 
various legal remedies applicable to Acta Jure Imperii (acts by right of dominion/public 
acts) and to areas traditionally in the public domain (domaine reserve).
9
 
 
A significant level of importance has been attached to the fact that IITs and ISTAs are 
also being used by foreign investors to challenge how the regulatory power of host 
states interferes in the performance of their long-term investments and how these 
administrative actions violate in consequence the provisions of a BIT. These long-term 
investments are related to and affect various sensitive and strategic sectors in the host 
states, such as oil and gas activities, mining concessions and construction.
10
 In fact, 
these activities are considered to be of immense strategic importance for most host 
states in terms of their economic stability and public welfare. For this reason, it has 
been argued that the protection of these activities requires preserving legal flexibility 
within the host state to adopt future economic measures in the aforementioned areas 
and other critical areas of public interest.
11
  
 
The justification and raison d’être for ISTAs is to create a venue for foreign investors 
to bring a claim against the host state, at the international level, for the violation of any 
substantive principle established in a specific IIT or in investment law. Examples of 
these principles are: fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, and most-
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., A.G. Adaralegbe, Concurrent Jurisdiction Between Treaty and Domestic Tribunals: An 
Examination of Jurisdiction-Regulating Mechanisms Within the Investor-State Treaty Arbitration System and 
Their Effectiveness (CEPMLP, University of Dundee, PhD Thesis, 2009). 
10
 See Sub-sections entitled ‘Reactions of developing countries’ and ‘Moving to a law based on need’, on 
pages 350-353 in M. Sornarajah, A law for need or a law for greed?: Restoring the lost law in the 
international law of foreign investment, Int Environ Agreements (2006) 6:329-357. <HeinOnline> (Last visit 
29/10/2009). 
11
 See Sub-sections entitled ‘Reactions of developing countries’ and ‘Moving to a law based on need’, on 
pages 350-353 in Sornarajah, supra note 10.  
 4 
favoured-nation treatment. Usually, the majority of these types of claims are brought 
before an International Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with the rules of the ICSID 
Convention
12
 or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
13
  
 
Regarding the application of arbitral rules, it has been stated that most arbitral tribunals 
have carelessly applied standard methods and procedures, familiar to them from 
commercial
14
 arbitration
15
 where the rules are designed to be applied to disputes 
between private parties on commercial matters, particularly when the tribunal lightly 
dismisses the interests at stake.
16
 In this regard, a principle of public law, in particular 
of administrative law, namely the principle of the supremacy of the host state’s public 
interest, seems to be discarded and overridden in regulatory disputes by a principle of 
private law such as the principle of party autonomy.  
 
Commenting on this method, some scholars have emphasised that commercial 
arbitrators tend to see investment arbitration as just another type of commercial dispute 
between two equal parties.
17
 In this regard, it is important to draw attention to the fact 
that investment arbitrations are largely involved with international regulatory disputes 
                                                 
12
 ‘The purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment 
disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention.’ Article 1(2).  
‘The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). The primary purpose of ICSID is to provide 
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes between states and investors. It 
was opened for signature on March 18, 1965 and entered into force on October 14, 1966.’ 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=
AboutICSID_Home> (Last visit 07/10/2009). 
13
 Adopted by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 28 April 1976. 
14
 In this regard, it is important to point out that the ICC, as the main International body that deals with 
arbitration, expressly states that ‘ICC activities cover a broad spectrum, which range from arbitration and 
dispute resolution to making the case for open trade and the market economy system, business self-regulation, 
fighting corruption and combating commercial crime’ (Emphasis added). See 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html> (Last visit 30/09/2009). 
15
 See Sornarajah, supra note 10. See also T. Wälde, Review of the Book on Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
Public Law by Van Harten, G., (Unpublished), on page 24. 
16
 G. Cordero Moss, Commercial Arbitration and Investment Arbitration; Fertile Soil or False Friends? in 
Reinisch et. al., The Future of International Investment Law, Pages 724-781 (2009), on page 792. 
17
 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford Monographs in International Law, 
Oxford University Press, UK 2007), on page 6.  
 5 
between a host state, relating to the exercise of its regulatory power, and a foreign 
investor, for the consequent infringement of his rights. It is opportune to highlight here 
that apart from the previously mentioned regulatory disputes which currently constitute 
one of the reasons for the exercise of jurisdiction by ICSID tribunals which is based 
mainly on arbitration clauses in IITs and is activated by the direct exercise of the host 
state conduct as state-regulator, there is another important type of dispute. There are 
purely contractual disputes which exist, this type of dispute was formerly the main 
reason for ICSID arbitration, and  mainly involved the host state’s conduct as state-
contractor and were based on arbitration clauses in investment contracts. The analysis 
and study of this latter type of investment arbitration is beyond the main scope of this 
thesis. 
 
International regulatory disputes contrast with commercial arbitrations, which can be 
characterised as private contractual disputes either between private parties or between 
public entities and private individuals.
18
 It has been pointed out that the commercial 
arbitration mechanism is considered ‘inappropriate’ for resolving ‘public policy’ 
disputes.
19
 
 
The private law approach taken in some regulatory investment disputes seems to be  a 
result of a reluctance to acknowledge at the international level the application of 
domestic legal principles related to the host state’s public authority and regulatory 
power by applying principles of international investment law and principles of 
economic and commercial law exclusively. Hence, aspects of principles of domestic 
                                                 
18
 S. Wilske, M. Raible, and M. L. Markert, International Investment Treaty Arbitration and International 
Commercial Arbitration – Conceptual Difference or only a “Status Thing”? 1 Contemp. Asia Arb. 213 (2008) 
<HeinOnline> (Last visit 29/10/2009), on page 215. 
19
 J. E. Alvarez, Chapter Five: The Once and Future International Investment Regime, ITA Academic 
Council, Malibu, January 15-16, 2011, on page 7. See also International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. 
The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) December 2006 – Separate Opinion. 
 6 
law, in particular constitutional and administrative law, which are of great importance 
and influence in some legal systems, are disregarded in certain regulatory matters by 
these international investment tribunals. Principles of constitutional and administrative 
law are of great importance in some legal systems (i) in matters of the public interest; 
(ii) for the balanced contribution of public commitments; (iii) in the limitation of 
economic rights, and, (iv) in the exercise of the public authority in areas of strategic 
importance.
20
 
 
Additionally, within this context, it has been said that ISTAs tend to be considered by a 
large section of the arbitration community as private clubs.
21
 Moreover, it has also been 
stated that such clubs are mainly dominated by arbitrators with strong influences from 
the legal systems of capital-exporting countries (home states) where the notion of a free 
market prevails in juxtaposition to that of the capital-importing countries (host states) 
which are accustomed to the frequent exercise of their public authority, public interest 
and public welfare.
22
  
 
In practice, areas of public law that are related to the state’s regulatory power, such as 
constitutional and administrative laws, have been expressly disposed of or ignored in 
the arbitration process by some international arbitrators. In fact, this reluctance to refer 
to public law in the arbitration process prevents an awareness of legal principles that 
are more sensitive in other legal systems. Perhaps this may be why, from a political 
                                                 
20
 A. Ledo Nass, Los Antecedentes y las Fuentes del Arbitraje International in Ciclo de Conferencias sobre El 
Otro Lado del Arbitraje de Inversiones; PDVSA La Tahona (Caracas, July 2009), pages 177-208. 
21
 See Sornarajah, supra note 10, on pages 341 and 348. See also S. Wilske, and M. Raible, The Arbitrator as 
Guardian of International Public Policy? Should Arbitrators Go Beyond Solving Legal Issues? in C. A. 
Rogers, and R. P. Alford, The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press, UK, 2009), on page 
258. 
22 
See Sornarajah, supra note 10, on pages 341 and 348. 
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point of view, international arbitration practices have been rejected, most notably in 
various developing countries.
23
  
 
Evidence of such a reluctance to acknowledge or ignorance of national legal principles 
in investment regulatory disputes can be found in various cases. For example, in  
Metalclad v. Mexico (Final award - 2000), where the arbitral tribunal stated that ‘…the 
Municipality [of Guadalcazar] acted outside its authority’ because it ‘…denied the local 
construction permit…’ to Metalclad24;  CCA and Vivendi v. Argentina (Final award - 
2007) where the arbitral tribunal stated that the case involved ‘illegitimate sovereign 
acts, …’ 25; Waste v. Mexico (Final award - 2004) where the arbitral tribunal stated that 
‘[t]he mere fact that a separate entity is majority-owned or substantially controlled by 
the state does not make it ipso facto an organ of the state.’ 26;  Perenco v. Ecuador 
(Decisión sobre Medidas Provisionales - 2009) where the tribunal highlighted that the 
sovereign power of state can be hampered by an ICSID tribunal when it grants 
provisional measures
27
; and Thunderbird v. Mexico (Separate Opinion - 2006) where 
the arbitral tribunal pointed out the risk of considering any minimum misconduct by an 
official as a violation of a BIT provision.
 28
 All these issues highlighted by these arbitral 
tribunals are related to domestic administrative law. Consequently, public law issues 
are of considerable importance in the development and study of international regulatory 
disputes. 
 
                                                 
23
 N. Gamboa Morales, Consideraciones sobre la práctica arbitral internacional: Un tema de Reflexión, 2 
Revista Internacional de Arbitraje (Enero-Junio 2005) 96-123, on page 102. 
24
  Metalclad Corporation v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1) August 30, 2000 – 
Final Award. 
25
  CAA and VIVENDI v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) August 20, 2007 – Final Award. 
26
  Waste Management, Inc v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3) April 30, 2004 – 
Final Award. 
27
  Perenco Ecuador LTD v. Republica del Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/6) May 8, 2009 – Decision sobre Medidas Provisionales. 
28
  International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules) December 2005 – Separate Opinion. 
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Within ISTAs, it has been stated that conflicts between domestic public law principles, 
particularly those deriving from constitutional and administrative laws, and 
international public law principles, predominantly those from international investment 
law, might be difficult to resolve except by ‘pragmatic temporary accommodations’ 
according to some authors.
29
  
 
One of the main reasons for this conflict seems to be because the parties involved in an 
international regulatory dispute come from different countries, and consequently have 
different perspectives on the law and on the role and nature of arbitral tribunals. An 
additional reason for this conflict may be due to the fact that some arbitral tribunals 
consider the domestic conduct of the state to be a ‘fact’.30  
 
Nonetheless, taking into consideration the need to balance the state-investor 
relationship, which might be essential for the future and effectiveness of investment 
agreements, one way to improve this balance is by starting to recognize and consolidate 
the public law principles that are in conflict (domestically and internationally),
31
 and 
consequently having investment arbitrators apply them to settle international regulatory 
disputes. Applying domestically developed administrative law principles to 
international regulatory disputes can lead to a different approach being developed. In 
fact, as will be emphasised in chapter V of this thesis, from around 2000 public law 
matters have become important to investment arbitrator due to the application of the 
FET standard in investment arbitration. From the author’s point of view, such domestic 
administrative law principles have not been sufficiently applied to regulatory disputes 
                                                 
29
 B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, and R. B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, Vol. 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (Summer/Autumn 2005), on page 30.  
30
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules) January 26, 2006 – Final Award, on paragraph 27. See also Z. Douglas, The International Law of 
Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press, UK, 2009), pages 69-72. 
31
 See A. Van Aaken, Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological 
Proposal Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies -  Volume 16, Issue 2, Summer 2009, pages 483-512. 
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owing to the fact that ISTAs were formerly considered to form a part of the private law 
system (i.e., ISTAs were influenced by the procedural framework and enforcement 
structure of international commercial arbitration as a private model of adjudication).
32
  
 
In this context, and considering that public international law is inspired by domestic 
public law and in particular by some principles of administrative law,
33
 the lessening of 
the conflict between principles will bring more legitimacy to the expanding system of 
ISTAs.
34
 The use of these domestic legal principles at the international level
 
can be a 
solution to finding acceptable solutions within the unique international forum of ISTAs 
as a mechanism that mainly revolves regulatory disputes.
35
 This will be so particularly 
if it is argued that the preservation of the future of foreign investment clearly calls for 
the need to use local resolutions.
36
  
 
Moreover, a state acts at the national and international levels in accordance with the 
principles of public (international and national) law, which are – in essence – the state’s 
natural rule of justice.
37
 With the exception of domestic courts, ISTAs are currently the 
most important and direct common forums to settle disputes between host states and 
private individuals, including the review of the regulatory conduct of the former.
38
  
 
                                                 
32
 J. D. M. Lew, L. A. Mistelis, and S. M. Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, London, New York, 2003). See also Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 7, on 
pages 125-127. 
33
 See S. Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, Vol. 68 Law and Contemporary 
Problems (Summer/Autumn 2005), on page 121. 
34
 ‘Legitimacy is property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on 
those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being 
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.’ (Emphasis added). See T. M. 
Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford University Press, UK 1990, on page 24. 
35
 See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 34, pages 53-54; See also Cassese, supra note 38.  
36
 See P. Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard, ICLQ vol 55, July 2006, 527-558. <www.HeinOnline.com> (Last visit 
29/10/2009/), on page 557. 
37
 P. Cane, Administrative Law (Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, UK 2004), on page 134. 
38
 Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration – UNCTAD Series on International 
Investment Policies for Development – UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 2010, on page 1. 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf > (Last visit 12/04/2011). 
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Nevertheless, IITs are signed only by and among sovereign states in accordance with 
their internal interests and with the protection of their public welfare to the fore, and 
along with a view to continuously improving their economic development.
39
 These 
sovereign states act in their public law capacity at the international level as the main 
subjects of public international law.
40
 Therefore, their international agreements and 
international obligations should be mainly interpreted in accordance with the precepts 
of public international law, in particular with the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. However, within this context, one may ask whether principles 
of domestic law are excluded from the above-mentioned international law premise 
when regulatory issues related to the domestic conduct of the state need to be evaluated 
in investment arbitration. 
 
For this reason, it has been said that IITs cannot be seen as a type of ‘[investment] 
insurance’41 – a guarantee or protection against bad business decisions.42 Furthermore, 
they should not be considered to be a mechanism that categorically protects the 
investors’ legal interests over those of the state.43 It must be taken into account that a 
foreign investment cannot totally be isolated from the general economic situation of the 
                                                 
39
 See, e.g., the preamble of the Venezuela-Vietnam BIT; the Venezuela-Belarus BIT; the Venezuela-Barbados 
BIT; the USA-Argentina BIT; the USA-Ecuador BIT; the USA-Panama BIT; the Colombia-Peru BIT; the 
Colombia-Switzerland BIT; the Colombia-UK BIT; the Colombia-Spain BIT; the Colombia-Chile BIT; and 
the Colombia-Cuba BIT. 
40
 Contemporary Public International Law has recognized, with distinct powers and purposes from the states, 
some international organizations as proper subjects of international law such as the United Nations, European 
Union, the Organization of American States, etc. See Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174. Additionally, International law does not prohibit 
individuals from being recognized as subjects of international law. However, it will depend on the 
circumstances. Examples of these circumstances are the development and recognition of human rights and the 
humanitarian treatment of the victims of war in international law See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law (Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), chapter 25. 
41
 CMS Gas Transmision v. Republica Argentina quoted by F. Godoy, El Caso Argentino: protección de 
inversiones v. facultades soberanas, 2 Revista Internacional de Arbitraje (Enero-Junio 2005) 124-154, on page 
134; See also Muchlinski, supra note 41.  
42
 In this regard, three major duties of investors have been identified: (i) a duty to refrain from unconscionable 
conduct; (ii) a duty to engage in the investment in light of an adequate knowledge of risk, and (iii) a duty to 
conduct business in a reasonable manner. See also Muchlinski, supra note 41.  
43
 R. Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’L L. & Pol. 953 (2006), on page 970; See also Z. Douglas, Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and Methanex, Arbitration International, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2006). 
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host state.
44
 In fact, this is precisely where the question arises concerning where to 
draw the line between the protection of foreign investments and the exercise of 
sovereign powers of the host state. 
 
Having addressed the issue, from the perspective of applying the ‘appropriate’45 legal 
principles to international regulatory disputes, this author is of the opinion that more 
attention should be afforded to the principles which are inherent to the host state’s 
regulatory conduct. This suggestion includes the reference to those legal principles 
contained within domestic (constitutional and administrative) law, in conjunction with 
principles of public international law, including the principles of international 
investment law. This referencing exercise could be materialized by taking into account, 
as some authors have pointed out, the analogy that exists between international 
regulatory disputes and domestic administrative law.
46
 Understanding this analogy 
would probably help to improve and balance the relationship between host states and 
foreign investors.  
 
In conclusion, with regard to these premises, it is important to highlight here the 
fundamental questions that may be posed by public-law lawyers: (i) the legal nature of 
ISTAs; (ii) the legal principles applied to them; (iii) the exercise of the host state’s 
regulatory power; and (iv) interpretation,
47
 i.e., the manner in which international 
arbitrators interpret and apply these legal (international and domestic) principles to 
ISTA
48
, as a mechanism that largely deals with international regulatory disputes. 
 
                                                 
44
 See Godoy, supra note 46, on page 134.  
45
 It has been asserted that ‘the law which governs this instrument is public international law and not private 
law, since the law governing the arbitration is treaty law rather than contract law’. See Van Harten, supra note 
17, on page 128.  
46
 See Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 7, on page 121.  
47
 See Douglas, supra note 48, on page 38. 
48
 It is argued that ‘…arbitrators interpret and apply public law with limited court supervision…’. See Van 
Harten, supra note 17, on page 5.  
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b. Objective of the study and research questions  
 
The main objective of this research is mostly confined to examine the extent to which 
the principles of domestic administrative law can be used as a legal reference for 
investment arbitrators in addressing and resolving the regulatory issues presented at 
ISTAs. In arriving at an answer to this particular question the following will be 
considered: (i) the use of administrative law principles as a part of the unitised nature of 
the law that determines the ‘state of law’ of any democratic society; and (ii) the argued 
current crisis of legitimacy that the investor-state treaty arbitration system is facing.
49
  
 
For this purpose, the present research is undertaken by way of a comparative analysis 
of the French and British administrative legal systems. The aim of this comparison is to 
identify the common institutions and principles that are domestically used by host 
states to determine the legal and regulatory relationship between private actors and 
their public administrations (i.e., the state).  
 
Special consideration is given to the exercising of the host state’s public authority in 
areas of economic interest as well as those principles related to legal mechanisms that 
are internally used to adjudicate any national regulatory dispute between the state and 
economic actors.  
 
Furthermore, conceptual and critical assessments are expanded upon with regard to 
IITs and ISTAs, respectively. The main purpose of these assessments is to identify and 
analyze the principles that have been developed in the international arena and have 
been used to settle international (regulatory) disputes between host states and private 
investors/actors.  
                                                 
49
 See B. Kingsbury, and S. W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State 
Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality in S. W. Schill, International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, UK 2010), on page 75. 
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Additionally, an arbitral practice review is carried out in order to identify the factual 
statements that arbitral tribunals have included in their arbitral awards which could be 
framed within the scope of the main principles of administrative law previously 
identified.
50
 This exercise is performed by taking into consideration that the current 
investor-state arbitration system -as a mechanism that largely deals with regulatory 
disputes- is (i) analogous to domestic administrative adjudication that provides (ii) legal 
mechanisms to address regulatory disputes between host states and private actors, 
including foreign investors when (iii) the public authority of the host state may be 
compromised. 
 
Finally, a reflection on the current investor-state arbitration system is given with the 
aim of identifying the political and academic concerns that are affecting the legitimacy 
of this arbitral system. 
 
For the purpose of conducting this research, the following questions are tabled: 
 
Main research question: 
To what extent can institutions and principles of administrative law 
be applied to investor-state treaty arbitrations? 
 
Subsidiary questions: 
Which institutions and principles of administrative law can be 
applied to investor-state treaty arbitrations? 
 
Why are institutions and principles of administrative law important 
in the interpretation of the investor-state treaty arbitrations? 
 
As previously mentioned, to answer these questions, this research consists of three 
major parts: (i) the comparative analysis of the most common institutions and 
                                                 
50
 Understanding this as the ‘Principium est primun’, i.e., that which acts as the origin of what follows. See A. 
Moles Caubet, El Principio de Legalidad y sus Implicaciones (Publicaciones del Instituto de Derecho Publico, 
Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas – Venezuela 1974). 
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principles that have been developed domestically in the French and British 
administrative legal systems; (ii) the identification and study of the principles which 
have been applied by international arbitrators in investment treaty disputes; (iii) the 
review of the arbitral practice used in a sample of arbitral awards, and reflections on 
these legal principles and ISTAs as a mechanism that largely deals with international 
regulatory disputes. Splitting the research into three main parts identified the most 
significant findings, which guided the research to an elaborate and fully-documented 
conclusion.  
 
In addition, the domestic administrative legal institutions and principles are examined 
as a reference benchmark, and this is compared to the institutions and principles from 
international investment law in order to potentially demonstrate that a more balanced 
outcome may be attained than under the current arbital practice.  
 
This research is structured upon the identification and analysis of the institutions and 
principles that have been established and developed by scholarly literature as well as 
the principles that have been created by national courts decisions and investment 
arbitration awards.  
 
c. Importance of the study 
 
Some of the most important requirements for this type of public law research are found 
in current arbitral practice. For example, in a separate opinion in Thunderbird v. 
Mexico (2006), it was stated that ‘[t]he common principles of the principal 
administrative law systems… are an important point of reference for the interpretation 
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of investment treaties’.51 In the same arbitral arena, it can be also evidenced how 
investment tribunals are resorting to domestic law sources to support their decisions, 
albeit in a conservative but progressive manner.
52
  
 
Furthermore, as a consequence of the current results of the investor-state arbitration 
practice as a mechanism that largely deals with regulatory disputes at the international 
level, an important group of scholars have also expressed their concerns about the 
expanding international arbitration system and the adjudication of public law matters at 
the international level.
53
 The expansion of this system also seems to be suffering a 
crisis of legitimacy. In this respect, as a way to mitigate the growing crisis of 
legitimacy of this system, this group of scholars has also suggested that the application 
of principles deriving from municipal law to this type of international regulatory 
dispute would be a preferred way of protecting the host state’s national welfare. In 
particular, it has been said that this exercise could provide a mechanism to establish a 
framework of predictability and stability between states and investors.
54
 
 
Within this context, the application of public law principles to treaty-based regulatory 
disputes plays an important role in the current perception of the relationship between 
domestic (constitutional and administrative) law (of the host state) and international 
                                                 
51
 See, e.g., International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules) December 2006 – Separate Opinion, paragraph 28. 
52
 See, e.g., Mobil Corporation et al v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case ARB/07/27) June 10, 
2010 – Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 81; Azurix Corp. v. la Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12) July 14, 2006 – Final Award, paragraph 67; Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. 
The Republic of Ecuador (London Court of International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467) July 1, 
2004 – Final Award, paragraphs 58 and 137; and, Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The 
Republic of Albania (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21) July 30, 2009 – Final Award, paragraph 69. 
53
 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime dated August 31, 2010 – Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University (Toronto, Canada) – York University Website 
<http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/ > (Last visit 26/11/2010). 
54
 Dolzer, supra note 48, on page 1. 
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investment law (relevant to foreign investors).
55
 In particular, it can be taken into 
consideration that domestic law principles should be examined by investment 
arbitrators to determine whether a given host state’s regulatory conduct has been 
adjusted not only to the obligations imposed by an IIT, in particular to the FET 
standard, but also to these domestic law principles.
56
 Supporting this opinion, this is 
why it has been said that there is a current debate about reconciling public policy 
concerns with IITs.
57
 
 
For this reason, it could be assumed that the application of administrative law 
principles developed domestically to international regulatory disputes can help in 
finding common ground between the two legal positions held by the host states and 
foreign investors. On the one hand, the host state can (i) protect the public welfare and 
exercise its public authority as a ‘Paterfamilias’58 representing the public interest of its 
people and (ii) guarantee – at the same time – the legal protection of those individuals 
who have economic interests within its territorial frontiers. On the other hand, the 
common ground may help to reduce (i) the perceived host state’s reluctance to 
negotiate and conclude new IITs as well as (ii) their rejection of the current 
international arbitration practices.
59
  
 
In this respect, considering that investments directly involve the economic interests of 
the host state and on many occasions the host state’s public authority, the author thinks 
that the applicable legal regime that governs those interests should mainly be the 
                                                 
55
 W. Burke-White, and A. Von Staden, The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-State 
Arbitrations in S. W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University 
Press, UK 2010), pages 689-720. 
56
 See Dolzer, supra note 48, on page 955. 
57
 See Wilske, Raible and Markert, supra note 18, on page 220. See also Republic of South Africa’s 
Government Position Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review – June 2009, supra note 
3.  
58
 A. Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law (The University of Georgia Press, Athens and London 1991), 
on page 9. 
59
 SGS v. Philippines, quoted by Z. Douglas, see supra note 35, on page 85. 
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principles of public law, including domestic constitutional and administrative legal 
principles, which are at the heart of any state’s actions.  
 
Nevertheless, other scholars think that, when the host state concludes investment 
treaties with other states, in order to improve the economy within its territory, this 
process will exclusively involve the application of principles of private law, e.g., the 
immutable principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ (agreements must be kept) and the 
principle of ‘party autonomy’ and it leaves aside other principles of law such as 
principles of public law. Controversially, based on the previous assumption, there is 
even a group that argue that the investors’ interests override those of the state.60 
 
Some authors, pursuing a more balanced approach, have considered that IITs and 
ISTAs need to provide a fair equilibrium between the protection of foreign inventors 
and the host state’s economic and social objectives,61 i.e., the protection of its public 
welfare through the exercise of its regulatory power. Thus, many of the rights involved 
in ISTAs are largely concerned with public law matters and this draws the distinction 
between investment arbitration and commercial arbitration.
62
  
 
The main concern regarding the two opposing positions is how to best attain an 
adequate equilibrium between the interests of private actors and those of the state, 
including the exercise of its public authority.
63
  
 
The necessity to balance these two perspectives is essential for the future success and 
effectiveness of investment treaties. In fact, it has been asserted that ISTAs need to 
                                                 
60
 See Dolzer, supra note 48, on page 970.  
61
 See Sornarajah, supra note 10.  
62
 See C. Brower, W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration (The Goff Lecture 2007) Arbitration 
International, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2008). <www.HeinOnline.com> (Last visit 29/10/2009). 
63
 See G. Peele, The Rule of Law in Britain Today (Constitutional Reform Centre and the Hughenden 
Foundation, UK 1987). 
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operate in an effective manner in order to reach an acceptable degree of political 
legitimacy.
64
 
 
Based on this last observation, it can be said that even though treaty-based regulatory 
disputes have been considered to act as a mechanism to internationally settle a dispute 
between a host state and a foreign investor, the ‘ordinary’ forum used to deal with this 
kind of regulatory dispute has frequently been the domestic legal system.
65
 For this 
particular reason, it has also been stated that international regulatory disputes are legal 
mechanisms that are analogous to domestic administrative law,
66
 specifically to judicial 
review relating to governmental acts, i.e., a form of international judicial review.
67
 
Previously, there were concerns about the interpretation and use of these legal 
mechanisms due to the manner in which arbitrators decided issues regarding the host 
state’s public policy in arbitral awards. There is a kind of ambiguity that has led arbitral 
tribunals to interpret IITs and ISTAs as a way of expanding the comparable standards 
under customary international law as well as domestic public law.
68
 For example, it has 
been argued that investment arbitrators have (i) ruled on the legality of state (domestic) 
conduct; (ii) evaluated the fairness of governmental decision-making; (iii) determined 
the appropriate scope and content of property rights; and, (iv) allocated risks and costs 
between business and society.
69
 These latter points have been traditional areas of study 
in administrative law. 
 
One factual example of an arbitral tribunal ruling on state conduct can be specifically 
found in Metalclad v. Mexico (2000). In this case the arbitral tribunal stated that (i) 
                                                 
64
 See Muchlinski, supra note 41. 
65
 See, e.g., Adaralegbe, supra note 9. 
66
 See Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 7.  
67
 See Thunderbird v Mexico (2006), supra note 56. 
68
 See Van Harten, supra note 17, on page 82.  
69
 See Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 7, on page 147.  
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‘…the exclusive authority for siting and permitting a hazardous waste landfill resides 
with the Mexican federal government…’ and (ii) ‘…the Municipality [of Guadalcazar] 
acted outside its authority’ because it ‘…denied the local construction permit…’ to 
Metalclad. Another factual example can be found in Occidental v. Ecuador (2004) 
where the arbitral tribunal stated, when ruling upon a taxation matter, that Ecuador 
failed to provide a stable and predictable regulatory framework in terms of changing 
Ecuador’s tax law.  
 
This case law serves to illustrate how arbitral tribunals have ruled on the regulatory 
conduct of the state without clearly distinguishing between areas which are traditionally 
the public domain (domaine réservé)
70
 of the state such as Acta Jure Imperii (i.e., acts 
by right of dominion/public law acts) and Acta Jure Gestionis (i.e., acts by right of 
management/private law acts). The former has traditionally been decided by domestic 
courts or by the International Court of Justice as it involves matters of a state’s 
sovereign rights. Meanwhile, the latter could be decided by investment arbitral 
tribunals for dealing with acts of management imputable to the state, i.e., (i) legal 
matters that do not relate to the state’s sovereignty and (ii) the waiving of the principle 
of jurisdictional state immunity. In this regard, it is opportune to quote Prof. Dolzer 
who says ‘[d]epending upon how [arbitral tribunals interpret and apply] all areas of 
domestic law affecting foreign investment’, the arbitral tribunals will be dealing, in one 
way or another, with areas which are traditionally the domaine réservé
 
of the said 
state.
71
 
 
As previously mentioned, some academics have asserted and emphasized that treaty-
based regulatory disputes are purely about public law matters since the public 
                                                 
70
 See Dolzer, supra note 48, on page 964. 
71
 Ibid., on page 964. 
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authorities are the main ones who have legitimacy and delegated power to exercise the 
host state’s regulatory activity and protect the public welfare.72 Other scholars have 
pointed out that the best way to face this legal debate internationally (between foreign 
investments and the exercise of public authorities by host states on the grounds of 
protecting the public welfare) is through the elaboration of a comparative framework 
on principles of public law, which should be the first port of call.
 73
  
 
To this end, with the elaboration of such a comparative framework, investment 
arbitrators and scholars could rely on an academic reference that can subsequently be 
applied to regulatory disputes in preference over commercial arbitration concepts upon 
which most arbitrators subconsciously rely.
74
 For example, this occurred in the 
Thunderbird v Mexico case when one of the arbitrators insisted, in a separate opinion, 
that, based on ‘presumptions and other rules of evidence’ (despite the arbitral tribunal’s 
stated stance that it cannot rely on presumptions or inferences), the existence of a 
‘solicitud [written request], oficio [formal response] and subsequent conduct’ gave rise 
to legitimate expectations for the Claimant. By making this assumption, the Arbitrator 
ignored the content and application of other very important principles of administrative 
law, such as the principle of legality. In this respect, it is of the utmost importance to 
point out that within the public law sphere there are principles of administrative law, 
known as principles of legality and principles of unauthorised delegation, that assert 
that a public authority is allowed to do what is expressly established by law. This is 
juxtaposed to the principle of private law known as the principle of party autonomy, 
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which provides that an individual is allowed to do what is not expressly forbidden by 
law.  
 
In summary, the importance of the administrative law principles to the relationship 
between the state and individuals (both nationals and foreigners), has been 
underestimated for many years.
75
 Thus, there is a general assumption that 
administrative law is mainly related to a state’s actions and its bureaucracy, and that 
IITs and ISTAs are mainly related to foreign investment protection. However, it can be 
said that the current arbitral practice could require that investment arbitrators rely more 
on their administrative law culture when dealing with regulatory disputes. Professor M. 
Sornarajah pointed out that‘[t]he attempt to import into [investment] treatment 
standards, the whole body of principles of administrative review, into the arbitration of 
investment disputes through the fair and equitable standard, is a visible factor’.76  
 
d. Literature Review77 
 
Due to the increasing consideration that the FET standard has been given by arbitral 
tribunals -in particular from the year 2000 onwards- investment arbitrations have 
shifted to public law issues in order to resolve investor/state regulatory disputes. This 
particular arbitral approach has consequently resulted in the fact that literature in the 
field  has also started  to discuss this shift.    
 
In this regard, the development of this latter approach has called for a review of the 
host state’s administrative powers by arbitral tribunals. This approach has also been of 
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special importance for scholars and practitioners in the area. Based on the above-
mentioned development, the expanding scholarly literature on this subject has shown 
that there is a debate relating to two main areas: (i) administrative law based on notions 
of domestic host states’ public authority and host states’ public interest, and (ii) 
investment law based on notions of foreign investors’ interests and investment treaty 
arbitration.  
 
Specifically, within these areas, there are two further sub-areas, the first of which states 
that commercial arbitrators tend to see regulatory disputes (investment arbitrations) as 
‘just another type of commercial dispute between two equal parties…’78 and 
consequently they review the host state’s regulatory conduct.  
 
The second sub-area conversely states that (i) foreign investors are not on an equal 
level with host states and (ii) that host states and foreign investors may not be on an 
equal level either in international law or in domestic law in terms of the host state’s 
right of exercising its public authority or the commitment to protecting its public 
welfare.
79
 
 
A vast amount of scholarly literature exists on the legal aspects of IITs and the 
application of international investment law principles to ISTAs. There is a dearth of 
scholarly literature concerning the new tendency to consider ISTAs as regulatory 
disputes and addressing their similarity to certain domestic administrative law 
mechanisms. However, it seems that a detailed study has not been written on the 
application of the domestically developed administrative law principles to ISTAs which 
should be considered as a mechanism that largely deals with regulatory disputes. A 
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requirement for studies like the present one, seems to be flourishing currently in order 
to act as an alternative to fill the gap that exists in arbitral practice due to the lack of 
guidelines addressing the unilateral/regulatory power of the state at the international 
level. This gap seems to be affecting the relationship between states and foreign 
investors.
80
 
 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned areas (administrative law; regulatory power of the 
state, investment and investment law) are related to this research. There are three 
emerging arguments to improve the relationship and develop these areas: 
 
1. Analogy of ISTAs with domestic administrative law 
 
The recent and rapid development of investment treaty arbitrations has indicated that 
some scholars study these issues from a public law perspective.
81
 Scholars have argued 
that investment treaty arbitration ‘…is best analogized to domestic administrative law 
rather than to international commercial arbitration, especially since investment 
arbitration engages disputes arising from the exercise of public authority by the state as 
opposed to private acts of the state.’82  
 
Additionally, it has also been stated that ‘…by obliging states to arbitrate disputes 
arising from sovereign acts, investment treaties establish investment arbitration as a 
mechanism to control the exercise of public authority. For this reason, in particular, 
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‘investment arbitration is best analogized to domestic administrative law.’83 (Emphasis 
added). 
 
It has further been asserted that ‘[One of the] subject-matters of investment [treaty] 
arbitration is [resolving] a regulatory dispute arising between the state (acting in a 
public capacity) and an individual who is subject to the exercise of public authority of 
the state’84 (Emphasis added). 
 
Hence, the abovementioned extracts serve to emphasize the same idea of how to create 
a rule of coexistence between the exercise of a host state’s public authority 
(administrative law) and foreign investments (investment law). This need seems all the 
more pressing due to the fact that IITs and ISTAs are affecting more critically 
important areas in the host states in a more complex and detailed manner.
85
  
 
The presumption of such an analogy between ISTAs as a mechanism that mostly deals 
with regulatory disputes and administrative law (judicial review and another legal 
remedy) is a contribution to the correction of any divergence from the appropriate 
models of investment protection in the interest of reaching or awarding a fair and 
equitable solution between the parties to a dispute.
86
 This is especially the case if this 
international regulatory dispute can be resolved by the application of not only 
principles of international investment law, but also of principles of public 
(administrative) law. For this reason, it is opportune to mention here that the present 
research has developed on the particular presumption of considering international 
regulatory disputes analogous to some domestic administrative law institutions. 
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2. ISTA as a species of global administrative law (GAL )87 
 
The internationalization of some branches of domestic law such as international 
criminal law, international environmental law, international investment law, 
international economic law
88
 – as a part of global governance89 and as a product of the 
active and inevitable participation of states in the global economy – has also lead to the 
materialization of another branch of law known as ‘global administrative law’90 or lex 
administrativa.
91
 Global administrative law is understood as ‘a set of transnational rules 
whose main objective is to deal with the consequences of globalization in different 
areas, such as international trade; finance; telecommunications; security; environment 
and intellectual property, amongst others’.92 
 
Recently it was indicated that one of the elements which contributed to this 
materialization of a new branch of law was the creation of ICSID and the proliferation 
of IITs and ISTAs. This occurred in the 1990s and was a means of promoting the 
participation of foreign investors in host states’ local economies.93  
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At the same time, this materialization has created a new kind of international forum to 
deal with the legal differences that arise between host states and investors. This is 
especially so when the host state – rightly or wrongly – exercises its regulatory power 
within its territory and by doing so may – directly or indirectly – affect investors’ 
interests.  
 
Some authors consider that ISTA is ‘[a] semi-autonomous international adjudicative 
body that reviews and controls state conduct in the public sphere’. They also state that 
ISTAs are part of the state’s public system which can also be considered a species of 
global administrative law.
94
 For this reason, they argue that the phenomenon of 
globalization ‘has led to the formation of complex governing arrangements at domestic, 
regional and international levels’ and these arrangements have given rise to 
‘international and regional bodies equipped with a broad range of regulatory powers’. 
This latter argument constitutes a new institutional configuration which is currently 
better known as ‘global administrative law’. 
 
Based on the previous observation, this can also be assumed that ISTA together with 
IITs may also consider to be incorporated as part of the public system of the state. This 
latter aspect may also be deemed to be a further element which has encouraged the 
emergence of global administrative law (see Annex A for a methodological 
explanation). 
 
In this respect, within the context of this research, it is important to mention here that 
ISTAs need to be well thought-out because they have been created as a ‘special’ and 
temporary international forum to openly adjudicate upon the exercise of public 
authority of the host state involved. However, ISTAs do not seem to be formed with the 
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intention of creating autonomous and independent international organizations in charge 
of solving investor/state regulatory disputes. The possible of creating an international 
court is summarized in the next sub-section. 
 
Nonetheless, it has to be emphasized that global governance and global administrative 
law are two new elements of increasing importance that have an inherent and primary 
relationship (verging on interdependence) with a state’s behaviour relating to foreign 
investors.
95
  
 
Finally, it needs to be emphasized that global administrative law seems to have a closer 
relationship with the branch of administrative law that mainly regulates the structure 
and operation of international organizations and their activities. Examples of these 
organizations are the WTO and ICSID. They establish rules of coexistence between the 
contracting states’ sovereign conduct about the tendency for investment, trade and 
services.
96
 These international organizations are also known as international 
administrations which operate parallel to domestic public administrations.
97
 The 
validity of this latter assumption is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, it is 
opportune to highlight here that the previously mentioned assumption differs 
considerably from the main scope this research which is confined to the identification 
of those principles and institutions of domestic administrative law that have existed in 
domestic law for over seventy-five years in  private individual/state regulatory disputes 
at a local level. These disputes can also be used as a source to understand and deal with 
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the legal nature of international regulatory investment disputes arising from the 
domestic exercise of the host state’s regulatory power.98  
 
3. The creation of an international investment court  
 
The idea of creating an international investment court has recently emerged.
99
 This idea 
has been proposed to create a unique way of dealing with legal disputes between host 
states and foreign investors.
100
 Various authors have considered this creation to be an 
alternative mechanism to the current investment arbitrations.
101
 This alternative 
mechanism is based on the following concerns: the consideration of ISTAs as (i) non-
permanent tribunals; (ii) implying large, expensive and unforeseeable arbitral 
procedures; (iii) with occasionally contradictory awards; and, (iv) non-appealable 
decisions.  
 
The creation of this international court may be considered completely unnecessary and 
in violation of the principles of unity of the state and its governmental apparatus of 
imparting justice. This is especially true if the argument of some scholars concerning 
the jurisprudential development of this type of investment tribunal is taken into 
account. This will mainly depend on the methodology that applies equally to 
(international or national) regulatory disputes and how the relevant rules of investment 
law and public law, including administrative law, are interpreted.
102
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Conversely, some scholars have shown their support for the idea of creating this kind of 
investment tribunal.
103
 Perhaps this support may be based on the probability of creating 
an international legal forum in which one either seeks to expressly apply those 
principles that are in fact reflected in domestic law or in global administrative practices, 
or one seeks to allow more homogenous arbitral awards to be granted.  
 
Nevertheless, one of the main concerns with the creation of this investment court is 
how to apply or adopt these eventual global administrative practices and principles to 
the area of ISTA and multilateral relations, in which it has been said administrative law 
is currently rudimentary or non-existent.
104
 In this regard, it has been stated that ‘[r]ules 
governing a state’s unilateral acts in international law have never been codified and 
remain controversial on a certain number of points.’105 The previous quotation 
illustrates the suggestion of J.E. Alvarez about the application of these principles (of 
administrative law) to multilateral relations may go beyond where many states want to 
go.
106
 Additionally, the creation of an international investment appellate system has 
also been proposed.
107
 Nonetheless, the analysis and study of creating an international 
investment court, as well as the creation of an appellate system, are beyond of the scope 
of this study.  
 
In summary, many authors have written about IITs from the perspective of the 
protection of foreign investments and the application of international investment law in 
investment arbitrations. Notwithstanding, other authors have recently pointed out the 
need to view investment treaty arbitrations from the host state’s view point, in order to 
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reach or award a fair and equitable solution between host states and foreign 
investors.
108
 However, a detailed analysis is yet to be conducted with regards to 
applying administrative law principles to ISTA as a mechanism that largely deals with 
regulatory disputes. 
 
This gap in scholarly literature concerning the coexistence of administrative law 
principles, international investment law principles and ISTAs, highlights a need in legal 
practice and academia since ‘…a comparative public law framework… has not been 
well developed…’109 in this area. For this reason, the main strategy of this research is to 
contribute a coherent and consistent analysis of this gap to academic debate and legal 
practice. As previously mentioned, this will help to improve and balance the 
relationship between host states and foreign investors.
110
  
 
e. Analytical Framework  
 
The idea of considering international regulatory disputes settled by means of ISTAs as 
similar to the legal remedies found in domestic administrative law may give rise to 
questions concerning; (i) the existence of this analogy; (ii) the contribution of this 
analogy to the understanding of ISTAs legal nature; and (iii) how the ‘appropriate’111 
applicable principles of law should be referred to, interpreted and applied by 
international arbitrators when dealing with international regulatory disputes. (See 
Annexes A and B)  
 
Specific questions arise as to what extent, which way and why administrative law 
institutions and principles can be used as a reference to the analysis of international 
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regulatory disputes. This is especially so considering the existing analogy between 
treaty-based regulatory disputes and some administrative law institutions and 
principles, such as domestic judicial review and other available legal remedies.  
 
In this regard, an academic approach is taken. This academic approach uses as a 
reference those principles and institutions domestically developed through national 
laws and/or domestic cases, related to a similar kind of regulatory dispute between a 
host state and a private actor (including foreign investors). This approach is of 
academic interest as well as a practical professional tool. 
 
Scholars, such as Professor R. Dolzer, have argued that the direct beneficiaries of IITs 
and ISTAs are foreign investors, since IIT and ISTA are mostly conceived to encourage 
and protect investors’ interests.112 However, others suggest that even though they see 
IITs and ISTAs as mechanisms that directly benefit the nationals of the contracting 
states, they consider that IITs are also conceived to protect the states’ interests.113  
 
With reference to this last argument, two issues arise: (i) concerning the conflict 
between the nature of foreign investment participation and the host state’s public 
authority, as well as the protection of its public welfare and any eventual international 
legal dispute; and (ii) regarding which legal principles
114
 should be applied to any 
eventual regulatory controversy by international arbitrators acting as temporary and 
‘special judges’ with ad hoc competence on a state’s public authority or regulatory 
power. In other words, it could be said that this process creates a kind of temporary 
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‘supranational tribunal’. Within this context, it is why it has been said that ‘[d]epending 
upon how [arbitral tribunals interpret and apply] all areas of domestic law affecting 
foreign investment’, the international responsibility of the state will be more or less 
compromised.
115
 
 
In the foregoing context, there are two critical considerations: the applicable principles 
chosen by the parties when they conclude a specific private contract (private law 
sphere) e.g., commercial acts; and the applicable principles to a specific state 
(investment) agreement (public law sphere) e.g., investment treaties. Thus, special 
consideration of the principles that are being applied to ISTAs by the international 
arbitrators should be given when deciding a case related to a regulatory dispute, 
especially since such a case would involve a review of matters of public policy of the 
host state in accordance with international standards of treatment, in particular with the 
the FET standard,. 
 
The comparative analysis of ISTAs with the French and British administrative legal 
systems, as the representatives of the two major legal systems of the Western world, 
brings more legitimacy to the present study. It also allows for the allocation of ISTAs 
within the respective state’s legal system. This exercise can be undertaken by 
assimilating these ISTAs which should be considered to be mechanisms that largely 
deal with international disputes within the domestic judicial review and applying legal 
remedies that a host state already has in place to deal with regulatory disputes with 
private actors.  
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In this regard, it is important to highlight the existence of legal mechanisms that the 
host state has, such as administrative adjudication
116
 (i.e., a dispute judged by public 
administration) and judicial review
117
 (i.e., a dispute judged by a court). These two 
main models could offer a comparative view of the relevant and similar principles in 
these legal systems in relation to regulatory disputes, even though they may also have 
some different principles distinguishing them. 
 
Related to this issue, common principles of administrative law that are based on the 
most important legal principle of public law, i.e., the ‘principle of legality’, can then be 
considered and applied to treaty-based regulatory disputes to reach or award a fair and 
equitable solution for the parties involved.  
 
There are a variety of different principles that exist simultaneously within the French 
and British administrative legal systems which can be useful when dealing with an 
international legal dispute that encompasses the regulatory conduct of the host state. 
These principles include (i) the principle of legality; (ii) the principle of the public 
administration’s discretionary power; (iii) the principle of proportionality; (iv) the 
principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations; (v) the principle of equality 
before the law; (vi) the principle of the public administration’s good faith; and (vii) the 
principle of the duty to give reasons, amongst others.  
 
It can be stated that the coexistence and interaction between this set of domestic law 
principles and the set of principles of investment law represents a major task for public-
law lawyers. For example, investment law principles in terms of fair and equitable 
treatment, national treatment as well as most-favoured-nation treatment seem to be 
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either in constant conflict or to be merely coexisting with those above-mentioned 
principles of domestic administrative law when the regulatory conduct of the state 
needs to be reviewed by investment arbitrators at the international level. Evidences of 
such conflict and peaceful coexistence can be found in the sample of more than forty 
cases used in Chapter V of this research. These cases largely concern situations where 
the legality of a state’s regulatory conduct was under the scrutiny of the arbitrators and 
was examined against principles of investment law, in particular against the FET 
standard.  
 
Another issue of relevance to consider are notions of administrative law that may vary 
between the French and British administrative legal systems. For example, in the 
Anglo-Saxon world, especially in Britain,
118
 the notions of state, public law and public 
or general interests are different
119
 from those which exist in the French legal system. 
These notions are the fundamental pillars of administrative law.
120,121
  
 
With regard to public law, the principles applied to any legal dispute concerning the 
regulatory power of the state is judged in the British administrative legal system by 
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judges under ordinary jurisdiction, such as the jurisdiction used in civil and criminal 
cases.
122
 However, in the French administrative legal system it is judged by ‘special 
judges’ and under a special jurisdiction known as ‘contentious-administrative 
jurisdiction’. Under the presumption of an equal legal status between a host state and a 
foreign investor in any jurisdiction, one may consider taking into account the influence 
of these two different approaches on the interpretation and application of the 
aforementioned institutions and principles to treaty-based regulatory disputes. Rather 
than being viewed as a dispute between two equal parties, ISTA as mechanism that 
largely deals with regulatory disputes should be treated as a unique forum which is part 
of the system of administration of justice of the state.
123
 
 
Considering the various aspects of the two domestic legal systems and between these 
legal systems and investment law, questions may arise about (i) the institutions and 
principles that have been domestically developed and how they contribute to 
understanding some IIT provisions and international regulatory disputes; and (ii) how 
one could distil common principles that might be applicable to international regulatory 
disputes disputes. Once again, the question may be asked: what rules and principles 
should be applied to an international regulatory dispute raised between a host state and 
a foreign investor?  
 
Finally, this thesis contributes to the current debate by providing a comparative 
analytical framework of the common institutions and principles that have been 
developed domestically in the French and British administrative legal systems. This 
thesis addresses how those institutions deal with a comparable problem at the domestic 
level and how their approach can be of use in understanding and interpreting ISTAs 
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 See Cane, supra note 42, pages 11-12. 
123
 See Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 7, on page 148.  
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features, which mainly deal with legal disputes regarding the exercise of the regulatory 
power of the state but at the international level. 
 
f. Methodology 
 
The present study is confined to considering legal issues arising from international 
regulatory disputes (see Annex A). For this reason, this study, through a legal research 
project, was designed to be undertaken by way of a comparative analysis of the legal 
institutions and principles of the French and British administrative legal systems. 
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that the French system is a part of the civil law 
tradition inspired by Romano-Germanic law and the British system is a part of the 
common law tradition inspired by English law. These are the two major legal systems 
that have been adopted in several countries as a legal heritage, especially in the 
Western world, in contrast to other legal traditions such as the Socialist and Islamic 
legal systems.  
 
It is of equal importance to highlight here that when the present thesis refers to the 
French administrative legal system, it not only refers to the legal system in France, but 
also to other countries that have been influenced by it, such as Spain, Italy and the 
majority of Latin American countries. Similarly the British administrative legal system 
not only refers to the countries that form the United Kingdom, but it also refers to other 
countries that have been influenced by the common law tradition such as the United 
States of America, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, to name but a few. 
 
The selection of these two systems relies on the influence that they have had on the 
idea of the public administration’s legal institutions and rules, not only on the legal 
systems of their former colonies but on other legal systems as well. Here it is important 
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to stress that the legal complexities and details that form part of the above-mentioned 
administrative legal systems are excluded from this study to avoid a tedious thesis. This 
research has been conceived with the idea of providing the reader with a general picture 
of the main and most relevant characteristics and principles of both above-mentioned 
administrative legal systems.  
 
Based on the comparative analysis, the present thesis also studies the influence that 
these systems have had on the way in which internal regulatory disputes are resolved. 
The importance of this comparative analysis relies on the fact that the administrative 
practice and judge-made law must also be taken into consideration due to the similarity 
between the institutions, characteristics and principles of these systems with the ISTA 
which are considered to be mechanisms that largely deal with international disputes . In 
this particular case, this kind of regulatory dispute (as a mechanism to ascertain the 
existence of a legal duty or right at the national or international level) can be used as 
grounds for the protection of, and to guarantee, the principles of justice. 
 
In this comparative analysis, the task is facilitated by the identification and study of the 
common institutions and principles that fall within the scope and assessment of this 
study. The main aim of this comparative analysis is to understand how these 
institutions and principles might work together and produce similar effects in different 
jurisdictions, in particular to treaty-based regulatory disputes. By means of this 
comparative analysis, issues related to the exercise of a host state’s regulatory power, 
the settlement of domestic regulatory disputes provide the elements by which the 
function and practice of the current ISTA system can be better understood. 
 
The examination of this study is based on three themes:  
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(i) A comparative analysis of the most common institutions and principles 
related to the exercise of regulatory authority by the host state that have 
been developed domestically and exist in the French and British systems 
(considering their long historical tradition) in order to identify the common 
institutions and principles that are being used and applied by states in any 
internal regulatory dispute (Chapter II);  
 
(ii) A comparative analysis of IITs and ISTAs as a mechanism that is 
increasingly used to judge the host state’s regulatory conduct at the 
international level. The main purpose of this part is to identify the principles 
and characteristics that have been developed in the international arena and 
have been used mainly to settle regulatory disputes between host states and 
foreign investors. The author believes that it will help to emphasize the 
consequently ‘unbalanced’ outcome that might have existed between them 
as a result of a conceptually-flawed framework adopted by the arbitral 
tribunals (i.e., the misconception of investment arbitration as a commercial 
dispute rather than implicating the public law function of the host state or 
regulatory dispute) (Chapters III and IV) ; and, 
 
(iii) Finally, a review of arbitral practice and deductive reflection framework are 
built on those common principles of administrative law and investment law 
that can coexist or conflict in the application of ISTAs as a mechanism that 
considerably deals with the governmental conduct of the host state at the 
international level (Chapters V and VI). 
 
The documents analyzed in this research include both national and international legal 
instruments currently in force in the French and British administrative legal systems, as 
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well as those in force in other countries such as America, Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia. The principles that have been developed by scholarly literature as well as the 
principles that have been underscored by arbitral awards have also been used for this 
purpose.  
 
As mentioned above, all these documents, as well as this research, are analyzed from 
the perspective of the exercise of host-state public authority, with special emphasis on 
the regulation of economic activities. The relevant scholarly literature was reviewed 
with the idea of discarding unnecessary details (a typical characteristic of public law 
books) to avoid making the present research repetitive and irrelevant. In fact, the 
wording of this study has been drafted with the intention of creating a doctoral thesis 
using simple language. The author is aware that it is almost impossible to address all 
aspects of this complicated topic in a 300-page document.  
 
g. Structure 
 
The thesis has been divided into three main areas of research. The first area is 
developed by Chapter II, which has been designed as a general introduction to the 
research topic in order to provide background information on differences and 
similarities between the French and British constitutional and administrative legal 
systems. The main purpose of this comparative study is to establish the fundamental 
institutions and principles that exist in these two systems and which govern the public 
administration and its regulatory power. It also contains a description of internal legal 
mechanisms that are domestically used to settle regulatory disputes between public 
administration and private actors. Finally, the research results in a comparative analysis 
of the principles that have been developed domestically and are currently applied by 
states in their domestic administrative law systems. 
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The second area of this research is addressed by Chapters III and IV. Chapter III 
provides a conceptual framework of IITs that allows for the identification of their main 
features as well as their adoption within the classical sources of the public international 
law. In this respect, a theoretical and specific framework is also constructed on those 
substantive principles of international investment law in order to create common 
ground between the previous chapter, the present chapter and the following one in 
terms of analysing the area under review. This elaboration focuses on the use of 
administrative law principles and substantive principles of international investment law 
by international arbitrators, considering the current expansion of investment arbitration 
as a kind of public law adjudication. 
 
Chapter IV provides a critical assessment of investment treaty arbitrations as (i) a 
common juridical arena that largely resolves core questions of public law and policy; 
and (ii) as a means of increasing their use as a kind of public law adjudication. The 
analytical assessment enriches the current debate on the public law nature of the ISTAs 
as a mechanism that mostly deals with international regulatory disputes, balancing the 
two different approaches (states’ and investors’ points of views), that are the object of 
study currently. Special consideration is given to the role that the consent of the state to 
arbitrate as well as its role in the different stages of the arbitration process in 
determining the mechanism of enforcement. An assessment is also undertaken on the 
political-socio-economic causes of investment disputes in order to introduce a factual 
basis that will certainly enrich the present research.  
 
The third area of this study is addressed in Chapters V and VI. Chapter V provides a 
descriptive chapter on how arbitral tribunals have dealt with regulatory issues at the 
international level. Chapter V includes an arbitral practice review, the main objective of 
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which is the assessment of arbitral awards to identify factual situations that can be 
deemed to fall under the scope of the administrative law principles identified in Chapter 
II. Here, the interrelation between investment treaty arbitration and principles of 
international law and administrative law regarding investment and the exercise of a 
state’s public authority and regulatory power are addressed. This chapter puts the ideas 
that were theoretically discussed in the previous chapters into practice.  
 
Chapter VI encourages a reflective framework on the current investor-state treaty 
arbitration system and the possibility of applying administrative law principles to this 
system. This chapter mainly covers those political, international and academic concerns 
that have surfaced in relation to the alleged legitimacy crisis this arbitration system is 
facing. The chapter continues with providing an idea of how to minimize and avoid the 
imbalance in the relationship between states and investors. Finally, this chapter 
introduces some temporary solutions to the legitimacy crisis as the best way of 
imparting justice and protecting the state of law at both the national and international 
levels. 
 
At the end of each chapter, a separate summary has been provided to link one chapter 
with another in the interest of guiding and providing the reader with continuity, thus 
giving a consolidated and comprehensive understanding of the study. 
 
Finally, Chapter VII, the concluding chapter of this research, has been divided into two 
sections. The first section sets out the summary of the problem, main findings and 
conclusions from the exercise carried out in the previous chapters; and the second 
section provides the main contribution, limitations, further research and a final 
reflection upon the topic. 
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CHAPTER II 
INSTITUTIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEMS. 
 
a. Introduction 
 
Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648,
1
 the notion of the state power (sovereignty), its 
role as ‘an organization whose main objective is to ensure the pacific coexistence of its 
people’, and, its role as the guardian of its peoples’ rights, has been a highly debated 
issue in the public-law sphere. In addition to this it has also been the subject of constant 
discussion and scrutiny by its national and foreign inhabitants.
 2
 
 
A special concern is the exercise of a state’s powers and functions3 and the coexistence 
of these powers and functions with the fulfilment and accomplishment of a state’s aims. 
This is particularly so within the context of promoting and protecting a state’s social 
objectives which results in a prima facie improvement in national welfare.
4
  
 
It has been pointed out that the continuous internal political battles between the social-
economic aspects of the state as guarantor of its peoples welfare and of the state’s 
burden of generating economic income to build a wealthy national economy, have 
                                                 
1
 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Revised Student Edition, Cambridge University Press, UK 2002).  
2
 M. García-Pelayo, Derecho Constitucional (Quinta Edición, Colección Textos Jurídicos Universitarios, 
Manuales de la Revista de Occidente, Madrid), on page 19. See also F. J. Goodnow, Comparative 
Administrative Law (Volume I, Bibliobazaar, G.P. Putman’s Sons, New York – London, 1897), on page 3. 
3
 In this regard, it has been suggested that the state only has one juridical personality. For more details, see J. 
Vélez García, Los Dos Sistemas del Derecho Administrativo – Ensayo de Derecho Publico Comparado 
(Institución Universitaria Sergio Arboleda, Colombia 1994), pages 30-31. 
4
 Professor Brewer Carias has identified the various aims of a Contemporary State; (i) aims in policy and 
general administration; (ii) aims in economic growth; (iii) aims in social development; and (iv) aims in 
structural development and territorial management. See A. R. Brewer Carias, Estudios de Derecho Publico – 
Tomo I (3ª Edición, Ediciones de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad de Central de 
Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela 1984), pages 129-142. See also R. Scott, and P. B. Stephan, The Limits of 
Leviathan – Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law (Cambridge University Press, UK 
2006), on page 30. 
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given rise to the need to continuously adopt new regulations to guarantee transparent 
relationships between the state and individuals and economic stability.
5
  
 
Accomplishing such a level of transparency and economic stability requires that the 
aims of the state and its future plans and activities are clearly identified and reviewed 
constantly.
6
 In relation to the latter point, scholarly literature has classified and divided 
the activities of the state into functions (i.e., functions or powers of the state).
7
 
 
These functions or powers of the state are divided – based on the Montesquieu 
doctrine
8
 – into three major functions: the legislative function (i.e., ‘law-making’, being 
the creation, amendment or repealing of the law);
9
 the judicial function (i.e., ‘law-
adjudicating’, being the hearing and decision of justiciable cases as well as 
interpretation and enforcement or avoidance of the law);
10
 and the executive function 
(i.e., ‘law-executing’, being the sole authority and responsibility to administer – in 
accordance with the law – the state bureaucracy known as public administration).11  
 
Nonetheless, as far as this research is concerned, it is of the utmost importance to 
highlight that the attainment of state aims is mainly achieved through the government 
(i.e., the executive power including its public administration power) and its 
‘governmental acts’12 (i.e., the public administration actions), which convert state 
                                                 
5
 See Republic of South Africa’s Government Position Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy 
Framework Review – June 2009 <http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-lateral_policy.pdf> (Last visit 03/10/2009). 
6
 Professor R. Dolzer, Presentation on Lex Petrolea, Seminar on Dispute Resolution in the International Oil & 
Gas Business – plus a special session on Boundary Disputes in the Energy Sector (organized by ICDR and 
AIPN), 19-21 April 2010, Houston, Texas. 
7
 See Vélez García, supra note 3, on page 197. 
8
 It has been said that the doctrine of separation and limitation of powers of the state was a lesson that 
Montesquieu learned from the English philosopher John Luke who had declared there to be a separation of 
state powers, such as the legislative power and the executive power. John Luke perceived the separation of 
powers to reduce the absolutism which reigned in those days. See Vélez García, supra note 3, pages 394-395. 
9
 Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) Thomson West, USA 2004. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 In the context of this thesis ‘governmental acts’ refers to the meaning of ‘administrative acts’. See A. Moles 
Caubet, El Principio de Legalidad y sus Implicaciones (Publicaciones del Instituto de Derecho Publico, 
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conduct into a physical and tangible reality.
13
 Appreciation of these physical and 
tangible state actions are demonstrated and compiled through the dynamic branch of 
public law titled ‘administrative law’, whose official birth goes back to the nineteenth 
century, in France.
14
  
 
The essence of administrative law, as a fundamental governing feature of any 
administrative legal system, goes beyond the simple regulations of the relationships 
between the organs of the state. It also applies to the interaction between public 
administration and private individuals, which has become known in France as ‘la 
transparence de l’administration’ (administrative transparency).15  
 
Indeed, administrative law, as a branch of public-law that helps to embody the spirit of 
public administration, gives effect to the principle enshrined in the Montesquieu 
doctrine, relating to the separation of state functions (powers) and consequently their 
limitation, in particular by protecting the individual’s rights from the abuse of power by 
the state. In this regard, it is of special importance to introduce and emphasize the 
statement made by Leon Duguit, which states that ‘the reality of the state is none other 
than the relationship between rulers and governed citizens’.16  
 
As far as the present study is concerned, this relationship between the public 
administration and private individuals cannot be understood without taking into 
                                                                                                                                              
Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas – Venezuela 1974), pages 25-28. See also A. 
W. Bradley, and K. D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Fourteenth Edition, Pearson Longman, 
England 2007), on page 259; and L. Neville Brown, and J. Bell, French Administrative Law (Fifth Edition, 
Oxford University Press, UK 2003), pages 138-139. 
13
 See Goodnow, supra note 2, on pages 1, 4 and 5; and Vélez García, supra note 3, on page 198.  
14
 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 725. See also Blanco’s decision (TC 8 February 1873), 
quoted by Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 5. 
15
 See Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 30. 
16
 See Vélez García, supra note 3, on page 181. 
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consideration the most relevant institutions and principles of domestic public law, 
which form the foundation of state rules regarding natural justice.
17
  
 
The best way to become familiar with these principles (from the author’s point of view) 
is by comparing the major administrative legal systems of the world which are, for the 
purposes of this study, the French and British legal systems as they are the 
incontestable origins of the two main legal traditions of the world (namely the civil and 
common law traditions).  
 
Throughout this comparison, one is able to identify and understand the institutions and 
principles that have had – either directly or indirectly – juridical influence on other 
legal systems of the world. In this context, it has been said that ‘the development of a 
certain legal system could be conducted by learning from another legal systems’.18  
 
In brief, this chapter will identify, describe and compare the common institutions and 
principles of domestic public law applicable to both the French and British 
administrative legal systems. Special reflection will be given to constitutional and 
administrative laws and to those institutions and principles that are related to the 
interaction between the state (through the exercise of its public administration) and 
private individuals; encompassing those principles applicable to their relationships and 
controversies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 See P. Cane, Administrative Law (Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, UK 2004), on page 134. See 
also Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, pages 206-216. 
18
 D. Barak-Erez, The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Law 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 477 (2008-2009), on 
page 478.  
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b. A preliminary remark 
i. Main legal systems  
 
It is important to emphasize that the different types of legal systems around the world 
have played a crucial part in the historical development of legal principles within the 
major legal systems of the world.
19
  
 
These legal systems mainly fall within three different types of legal traditions:
20
 (i) the 
civil law tradition (i.e., a derivation of the ancient Roman law which is primarily 
codified law); (ii) the common law tradition (i.e., a creation of the early centralisation 
of the courts in England by Henry II which is still predominantly case law); and; (iii) 
the socialist law tradition (i.e., also a codified system but based on Marxist-Leninist 
ideas of the fundamental principal of ‘from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs’).21 Nonetheless, there are other equally important legal systems 
in the world, such as Islamic law and Communist law, however they are less relevant to 
the current study. 
 
Within this context, it can be stated that the French administrative law system is one of 
the most significant representatives of the civil law tradition, in the same way that the 
British administrative law system acts as a representative of the common law tradition. 
These two main legal systems were exported to other countries either by the free 
                                                 
19
 C. Elliott, E. Jeanpierre, and C. Vernon, French Legal System (Second Edition, Pearson Longman, England 
2006), on page 1. See also H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Fourth Edition, Oxford University 
Press, UK 2010). 
20
 For more details about the differences between ‘legal families’ and ‘legal traditions’; see P. De Cruz, A 
Modern Approach to Comparative Law (Kluwer, Deventer – Boston 1993), pages 27-40. See also J. H. 
Merryman, La Tradición Jurídica Romano-Canónica (Fondo de Cultura Económica, México 2008), on pages 
15-23; and C. B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction 41 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 1083 (2008). 
21
 See De Cruz, supra note 20, on page 27.  
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adoption of the system or by its imposition on the former colonies during the time of 
conquest.  
 
ii. The importance of adopting these legal systems 
 
One of the most important reasons for drawing attention to the classification of legal 
systems is based on the idea that they are beginning to merge at a balancing point using 
cases and codes. This is despite the fact that civil law still relies on principles 
established by a statute; and the common law seems to rely on the case law 
mechanism.
22
  
 
However, in terms of this research, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that, due 
to the uncodified nature of the dynamic administrative law under both respective 
systems, principles of administrative law have been developed through the case law of 
both systems. This is a common element which can be of interest for the development 
and cross-fertilization of principles of one system into another.  
 
With this mind, it is necessary to readdress the idea that ‘[Despite the fact that] legal 
systems have the same basic [administrative] problems and solve them by quite 
different mechanisms; they very often arrive at similar results’.23 Here, it is of crucial 
importance to point out that despite the fact that these legal systems have different 
mechanisms, in order to seek a solution to specific legal situation, they may also use 
different approaches to solve legal problems. The inquisitorial and adversarial 
procedures that exist within civil and common law traditions, respectively, serve to be 
                                                 
22
 The process of codification means ‘the settling down of rules of existing law, in a comprehensive and 
ordered form and the approval of the resulting text by a law-determining agency’. I. Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law (Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), on page 29.  
23
 See De Cruz, supra note 20, on page 37; B. Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common-Law 
World (New York University Press, New Jersey 2006), on page 113; and Patrick Glenn, supra note 19. 
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an illustration of this.
24
 Similarly, it has been also pointed out
25
 that the teleological 
method used in the civil law system and the literal method used in the common law 
system may also affect the outcomes of a legal debate.
26
 In any case, with regard to 
this, it may be assumed that these different approaches may produce solutions having 
different outcomes that can be used as precedent or as a principle in administrative law 
practices in later cases. As a result of applying such different approaches the 
responsibility of the state may be compromised.
27
 
 
Within these main legal traditions, it is imperative to consider the notion of ‘general 
principles of law’ since they may differ in each legal system.28 In particular, the 
emerging process of cross fertilization of these principles may consequently encourage 
all legal systems to be focused on the idea of state transparency in order to safeguard 
the essential principles of individual rights, such as the right to life, freedom and 
property.
29
 
  
One key aspect, from a legal view point, is – as emphasized above – the exportation of 
legal principles from one legal system to another, which has been happening since the 
era of colonisation, and is now being adapted to local conditions (i.e., the production of 
plurality of laws).
30
  
                                                 
24
 See Merryman, supra note 20, pages 80-95; Schwartz, supra note 23, pages 132-135; and Picker, supra note 
20, pages 1127-1130. 
25
 T. W. Wälde, Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples in Reinisch et. al., The Future of 
International Investment Law, Pages 724-781 (2009), on page 746. See also Brownlie, supra note 22, pages 
635-636; and, F. G. Jacobs, and S. Roberts, The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law (United Kingdom 
National Committee of Comparative Law, Sweet & Mexwell, London 1987), pages 55-55. 
26
 Special consideration should be given to A. W. Bradley’s argument that the fact that ‘British membership to 
the European Union directly affects our [British] approaches to interpretation, since in most European legal 
systems the methods of legislative drafting and the rules of statutory interpretation are very different to those 
in Britain’. See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, pages 18-19; and Picker, supra note 20, pages 1088-1089. 
27
 See Picker, supra note 20, on page 1088.  
28
 See Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 304.  
29
 See A. E. Pérez Luno, Los Derechos Fundamentales (Novena Edition, Temas Clave de la Constitución 
Española, Tecnos, Madrid, 2007). See also Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 675. 
30
 See De Cruz, supra note 20, on page 31. See also Merryman, supra note 20; G. Shalev, Administrative 
Contracts 14 Isr. L. Rev. 444 (1979); H. Mairal, Government Contracts under Argentine Law: A Comparative 
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One vivid and current illustration of this can be found in the influence of the 
jurisprudence the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Legal principles developed in the 
decisions of the ECJ and of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have also been 
adopted by the member states.
31
 Another example of this level of influence can be 
found in the principles developed by the French Civil Code of 1804 which were then 
adapted by the countries of Continental Europe and subsequently, by former European 
colonies.
32
 Furthermore, a similar situation applies to those principles from the 
common law tradition, such as the centralisation of the courts and case law in England, 
which were also exported to the former British colonies during the existence of the 
British Empire. 
 
In brief, despite the adoption or influence of foreign legal principles in a given legal 
system, there is a common problem related to these above-mentioned legal systems. 
This is basically summarised by Professor H. W. R. Wade when he presents his 
concern as to ‘how… the power is governed by law’, i.e., the principle of the ‘rule of 
law’ which is a legacy of the English and French revolutions in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.
33
  
 
In this context, the best manner to understand a given legal system and its influence on 
legal systems of other countries is through the analysis of their constitutional law 
framework. This framework establishes the minimum basis of any democratic society 
and its state of law.  
                                                                                                                                              
Overview 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1716 (2002-2003); and, G. Langrod, Administrative Contracts 4 Am. J. Comp. 
L 325 (1955). 
31
 See Elliott, Jeanpierre and Vernon, supra note 19, on page 79. 
32
 The French legal system has been based on: (i) the Civil Code of 1804; and (ii) the Council of State which 
was created to control the governmental conduct. See Elliott, Jeanpierre and Vernon, supra note 19, on page 5; 
and Mairal, supra note 30, on page 1717. 
33
 Professor H. W. R. Wade quoted by Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 1. See also Bradley and 
Ewing, supra note 12, pages 93-106. 
 50 
 
c. Constitutional legal system 
 
As a foundation of any administrative legal system, there should be a constitutional 
legal system, with a constitution either in written or an unwritten form.
34
 This 
constitutional legal system establishes the framework and foundations of the existence 
of a state of law.
35
 Traditionally, this legal regime is carried out through the law 
contained within the constitution. This law may either be a rigidly enacted law (e.g., as 
in France) or a loosely enacted law (e.g., as in the United Kingdom). The constitutional 
regime of a state reflects its structure as well as provides a vivid expression of its 
juridical and political order.
36
  
 
Furthermore, it also could perhaps be a reflection of the legal tension that may exist 
between the norms and the reality of the said state since it basically provides the 
fundamental principles that govern the state, its structure and powers (i.e., the 
fundamental law
37
).
38
 
 
In this regard, it also separates the norms into acts by right of dominion that belong to a 
state known as Acta Jure Imperii (i.e., sovereignty/acts of authority) and in acts by right 
of management that belong to a state known as Acta Jure Gestionis (i.e., private law 
acts of public administration/commercial acts). 
 
                                                 
34
 As already mentioned, it has been argued that constitutional regimes were conceived to determine the clear 
division, function and limit of the state’s powers in opposition to the absolutism exercised by the monarch 
until the eighteenth century. See García-Pelayo, supra note 2, on page 27. Basically, it has been asserted that 
the constitutional regime took place ‘as a result of the American and French revolutions’. See also Bradley and 
Ewing, supra note 12, on page 5. 
35
 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, UK, 2004), on page 20. 
36
 See García-Pelayo, supra note 2, on page 22.  
37
 The origin of this term seems to emanate from France. It was used in England under the reign of Henry VIII 
as a mechanism to address and resolve political frictions between the King and parliament. Nonetheless, the 
meaning of this term still refers to the inviolability of the constitutional norms and to the existence of the state 
itself. See García-Pelayo, supra note 2, on page 25. 
38
 Ibid., on page 382.  
 51 
It is within this context that, L. Neville and J. H. Bell stated that ‘the understanding of 
the constitutional history of the country can help to have a better appreciation of the 
administrative law and its divergence with the other branches of law such as civil law’. 
 
Constitutional law is nevertheless defined according to K. C. Wheare as ‘the whole 
system of government of a country, the collection of rules which establish and regulate 
or govern the government’.39  
 
These statements infer a common legal principle that exists between the French and 
British constitutional systems, despite their different legal origins and constructions. 
This common legal principle is the principle of delegated legislation, which is granted 
to the executive branch of government by parliament as a representative of the will of 
the nation. This power is granted with the idea of providing the administration with 
powers to regulate (through rule-making authorities as administrative acts) upon 
specified circumstances (known as secondary or subordinate legislation or delegated 
regulatory power of public administration).
40
 
 
This delegated regulatory power also determines to some extent the validity of the act 
of public administration which must be performed within the principles within the 
constitutional regime, i.e., the principle of legality mainly. In fact, transgressions 
against this principle can consequently be adjudicated by the ‘respective judge’.41  
 
Moreover, it is also necessary to point out here that despite the fact that legislative acts 
are the immediate execution of principles established by the constitutional regime, it 
has been said that the judicial and executive powers, respectively, are equivalent to the 
                                                 
39
 K. C. Wheare; quoted by Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 4. 
40
 The British system ‘is founded partly on acts of parliament and judicial decisions, and partly on political 
practice and partly upon their own activities’ See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, pages 4 and 674.  
41
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immediate enforcement and better development of legislation. Consequently this 
prompts the fulfilment of constitutional principles (such as those relating to the Magna 
Carta).
42 
It may be considered that the spirit of the constitutional regime is to make sure 
that the principles are adhered to in order to prevent abuse, for example by the arbitrary 
use of a certain power.
43
  
 
As J. Velez Garcia pointed out, the distribution of powers within a state does not seek 
their equalization. Conversely, this equilibrium seems to be exercised, as mentioned 
above, by the executive (government).
44
 This distribution of powers represents a 
limitation of competences between each power. This limitation is governed by 
principles of law.
45
 The limitation and judicial control of executive power within the 
constitutional regime, either through special jurisdiction
46
, as in France, or through 
ordinary jurisdiction, as in the United Kingdom, is governed by legal principles duly 
recognized by all (civilized) nations.
47
  
 
One of the reasons for this limitation and judicial control is based on the need to annul 
the aggrieving act or compensate the potential aggrieved individual. Under these 
circumstances, various legal mechanisms in the respective legal systems are relied 
upon.
48
  
 
In summary, it can be said that both the French and British constitutional systems: (i) 
define and limit the government’s structure and powers; (ii) establish the foundation for 
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a relationship between the state and the individual; and (iii) guarantee the fundamental 
rights of individuals.
49
  
 
i. The Constitution: division of powers 
 
As was mentioned above, any constitutional legal system basically reflects an organic 
and functional structure in which ‘a state is subject to law’ and ‘the role of law and 
government in society’50 represents the centre of gravity. That is, that constitutional 
mandates have supreme and effective validity over the ‘regular’ laws of parliament 
(statutory law) and regulations and acts of public administration (administrative acts).
51
 
 
The day-to-day activity of the state (i.e., government), under both the French and 
British legal systems, is performed by the executive branch, which is carried out by the 
public administration.
52
 Despite the task facing the public administration, it is not easy 
for the public administration to coexist with other powers or functions of the state.  
 
As already mentioned, the classical division of powers (i.e., legislative, judicial and 
executive powers) of the state was first established by the Montesquieu doctrine. These 
separations of powers are mainly found in a constitutional legal system, and 
interestingly, there has been constant shifting between these powers.
53
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A specific concern has emerged in the infinite political debate regarding ‘the 
cohabitation’54 and the supremacy of one power over the other. This can be seen, for 
example, in the competing importance of doctrines such as the doctrines of ‘supremacy 
of the administration’;55 of ‘judicial supremacy’56 or of ‘supremacy of the 
parliament’.57  
 
Additionally, there is a concern about preserving the correct functions of these 
institutions by trying to avoid the overlap of their functions and by trying to conserve 
each institution’s function in its proper place.58 Nevertheless, the main idea behind this 
concern is to avoid ‘a concentration of power in the hands of any organ of 
government’, despite the fact that the significance of the separation of powers is often 
minimised.
59
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Ibid., pages 23-25.  
55
 This principle consists of the superior relationship that the public administration has with private 
individuals. See H. Rondon de Sanso in Teoria General de la Actividad Administrativa (Hildegard Rondon de 
Sanso, Caracas 1995), pages 43-77. 
56
 This principle is based on Marbury v. Madison (1803) which established the supremacy of the American 
Supreme Court of Justice with regard to any conflict between the constitution and legislation. See Vélez 
García, supra note 3, on page 413. See also W. F. Fox, Understanding Administrative Law (Second Edition, 
Legal Text Series, Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. New York 1992), pages 33-37. 
57
 This is defined by A. W. Bradley as ‘a rule which governs the relationship between the courts and the 
legislature, namely that the courts are under the duty to apply the legislation made by Parliament and may not 
hold an act of Parliament to be invalid or unconstitutional’. Nonetheless, one of the problems of this principle 
is due to the fact that ‘the absence of a written constitution [in the United Kingdom] is widely considered to 
make it difficult and even impossible for the courts to be entrusted with the protection of such rights against 
legislation by Parliament.’ See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on pages 7 and 55.  
On the other hand, under the French legal system, at the moment of constituting the fifth republic, one of the 
main concerns of General de Gaulle and the old parliament was to clearly separate the executive power (i.e., 
the President of the Republic) from the legislative power in order to avoid any overlap between both powers 
(General de Gaulle’s speech, on 16 June 1946). See Elliott, Jeanpierre and Vernon, supra note 19, on page 18. 
58
 One reason for this overlap can be found in the explanation given by A. W. Bradley which states ‘[i]n 
considering these aspects of separation, it needs to be remembered that complete separation of powers is 
possible neither in theory nor in practice.’ See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 87. See also García-
Pelayo, supra note 2, on page 156 
59
 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 81.  
 55 
ii. Objectives, fundamental rights and guarantees 
 
Modern constitutionalism would not exist without fundamental rights and guarantees 
which basically determine the basis of ‘the state of law’.60 Most of these primary 
fundamental rights and guarantees (i.e., equality; freedom of conscience; belief, 
association and expression; the presumption of innocence, amongst other) originated 
from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 21 August 1789.
61
 
 
The main objective of constitutionalism – apart from delineating the states philosophy 
on its internal organization as well as that defining the general parameters – is to 
safeguard people’s rights and the state’s structure.62 In this regard, it has been said that 
‘fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words’.63  
 
Additionally, modern constitutionalism and fundamental rights and guarantees have a 
double function. The subjective function is mainly to act as a guarantee to individual 
rights; and, the objective function amounts to the fulfilment of the states aims, which 
are established or embodied within the constitutional regime.
64
 These two functions 
also guarantee the existence of ‘the state of law’, which is based on the existence of the 
fundamental rights and guarantees. It has been argued that when the operation of the 
‘rule of law’ is more rigorous, the level of protection afforded to the fundamental rights 
and guarantees is greater.
65
 Nevertheless, it is important to stress that even in the most 
‘perfect’ legal framework and ‘rule of law’, there may exit continual infringements and 
violations of fundamental rights and guarantees.  
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In this respect, under both the French and British legal systems, a common element is 
the state’s arbitrariness or abuse of power to the detriment of such rights and guarantees 
belonging to private individuals. This kind of state administrative action can be 
provoked either by the exercise of state objectives (i.e., the protection of the public 
interest) or by the exacerbation of economic objectives (i.e., the reclamation of the 
rights acquired).
66
 These rights and guarantees are normally grouped into: personal, 
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.  
 
The majority of these principles and rights have been subjected, in one way or another, 
to certain legal limitations (mainly through delegated legislation) in order to guarantee 
the coexistence of both the private individual’s rights and the protection of the national 
welfare (i.e., as a mechanism to balance the individualist and collectivist approaches).
67
  
 
In summary, as will be seen later, there are legal mechanisms in place, (i.e., regulatory, 
jurisdictional, and institutional guarantees) to protect the individual’s rights from the 
abuse of state power. These legal mechanisms or guarantees are thought to protect and 
enforce these principles, and the rights have been mainly entrusted to the courts.
68
 The 
exercise or protection of these fundamental rights has also been entrusted to public 
administration to act as a guarantor of the state of law in a given society. This 
administrative function is summarized in the following sub-section. 
 
d. Administrative legal system, public administration and public authority 
 
Traditionally, constitutionalism is completed and extended, as previously mentioned, 
by the branch of public law known as ‘administrative law’ since this branch of law 
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develops those principles embodied in the constitution, in a detailed manner.
69
 Such 
development is achieved through what is known as the ‘administrative legal system’.70  
 
This system exists, in one way or another, within every state structure. Although each 
state structure has its own unique characteristics and problems, ultimately, they each 
have the same final social aims and results: the protection of the national welfare.
71
 
This ‘administrative legal system’ is not exclusive to only one legal system, i.e., the 
French administrative legal system;
72
 it also refers to parallels evident in the British 
administrative legal system.
73
  
 
A common feature of both the French and British administrative law systems is that the 
state or the Crown, through its domestic public law and in most cases through the 
‘administrative law’ branch, achieves the fulfilment of social aims in order to fulfil its 
mission of protecting its national welfare.  
 
The role of the ‘administrative legal system’ as ‘the honest man that must behave 
properly towards individuals’ is ruled and governed by administrative law. This law is 
understood as the set of norms that are conceived to regulate the organization, 
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functions, activity, procedures, duties, rights, liability, and recourses that operate within 
a state’s structure.74  
 
One of the most notable aspects of these two administrative legal systems is their 
activities that are intended to satisfy the concrete public needs in immediate, direct, 
practical, objective and specific forms.
75
  
 
The administrative activity of the state does have one special characteristic that can be 
shown which is based on the domestic rules and on the premise of ‘the superior 
relationship that the administration has with individuals’ (i.e., on the grounds of the 
general public interest).
76
 Apart from regulating relations between various organs of 
government and public bodies, the public administration also regulates, based on the 
aforementioned principle of public administration superiority, the relationships between 
unequal parties (e.g., an organ of government, on the one hand, and the private 
individual on the other).
77
  
 
One of the characteristics that differs the most between the French and British 
administrative legal systems relates to the entity that exercises the regulatory power on 
behalf of the state. In France, this regulatory power is mainly exercised by ministries 
while in Britain it is mainly exercised by regulatory agencies. A further difference 
relates to the jurisdiction that is applied to an administrative dispute.
78
 For example, 
under the French system any dispute related to regulatory power of public 
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administration is addressed by special courts (i.e., the contentious-administrative 
jurisdiction) whereas under the British system the issue is resolved by the ordinary 
courts.
79
  
 
Nevertheless, both systems have, amongst other legal aspects, one similarity, which is 
that they basically provide for legal mechanisms to settle disputes, or they review 
public administration decisions before turning to the jurisdictional legal remedies. For 
example, in the French system, a great proportion of the legal mechanisms used to 
resolve administrative problems have taken the form of a forum to create – in a 
jurisprudential manner – a set of principles, norms and rules that are compiled with-, in 
administrative law. These judge-made rules may appear to be similar to the British 
system due to the fact that one of the main legal sources of the British system is case 
law.  
 
Furthermore, another similarity is that the functions of public administration are 
exercised in accordance with the ‘principle of legality’ which produces legal 
consequences to the conduct of the public administration. Basically, this principle 
provides legal grounds for acts of the public administration in accordance with ‘the 
state of law’. In other words, this requirement of legality gives rise to three main 
consequences: (i) the exercise of the public administration’s activity within the limits 
and procedures established by the law; (ii) the judicial control over the activities of 
public administration; and, (iii) the liability attributed to public administration for those 
damages that its acts may cause to individuals.
80
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One principal aspect regarding the state’s behaviour is the concern about where to draw 
the line between public and private law functions with regard to public administration 
activities, since it is a difficult task for jurists to determine where the dividing line is.
81
  
 
Another important legal aspect regarding the administrative legal system is, as 
mentioned above, the concept of liability attributed to the public administration. This 
liability basically tries to counterbalance the privileges that the public administration 
enjoys at the expense of the protection of individual rights.
82
 In this regard, De 
Laubadére pointed out that ‘it cannot be assumed that the autonomy of administrative 
law is always to the benefit of the administration…’ 83  
 
In addition to this liability, there is the ‘attribution of [a] legal or judicial personality’ 
afforded to the public administration which makes it subject to individual 
responsibilities before various persons (a natural person or a legal person such as 
corporations or groups).
84
 In accordance with administrative law, the public 
administration is an ‘artificial person’.85  
 
For this reason, any relationship with the administration represents a declaration of its 
will to create legal relationships, conclude contracts, increase patrimony, and be liable 
and justiciable. The personification of the public administration is a primary and sine 
qua non characteristic of administrative law.
86
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In any case, it is of utmost importance to highlight that it has been asserted that the 
state is an abstraction
87
 (‘something’)88 that exercises functions. As a consequence, it 
creates the need to determine the liability of the state in accordance with the principle 
of delegated power, which is ultimately based on the principle of the unitary 
sovereignty of the state.
89
  
 
i. Main administrative legal systems and characteristics 
 
For the purpose of this research, the main administrative legal systems are grouped into 
two regimes: the Continental administrative legal regime, and the Anglo-Saxon 
administrative legal regime, as they have both influenced legal regimes belonging 
France and Britain, respectively.
90
 
 
The Continental administrative legal regime is expressed in the legality of the 
administrative activities and the principle of civil responsibility, attached to public 
administration, and is derived from the exercise of said activities.
91
  
 
Moreover, it does not only cover the activities of the state with its individuals, but also 
the presumption of legality of any state conduct. Therefore, it has generally been 
argued that the state, with regard to its power, is also subjected to the law. The notion 
of the state being subject to the law also embraces principles of a special branch of law 
known as administrative law.
 92
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This Continental doctrine has been led or promoted by the French administrative legal 
system and, under this influence, the doctrine has been incorporated into other national 
administrative legal systems albeit obviously having some typical small differences 
such as differences which are apparent in the concept of ‘public services’ in France; 
and in the concepts of ‘public power’ (öffentliche Gewalt) and of the ‘general clause’ 
(Generalklaussel)
93
 in Germany.  
 
The Anglo-Saxon administrative legal system consists of a doctrine whose origins go 
back to the reforms undertaken by the British Parliament in 1833 through the enactment 
of various acts such as the Factory Act, Poor Law Act, Corrupt Practices Act, 
Education Act, and many others.
94
  
 
Throughout this period of reform, other acts were also enacted, such as those giving the 
government ‘delegated power’. This delegation of legislation conferred some wide-
ranging powers upon the British government (ministers) to regulate through statutory 
rules and orders.  
 
Similarly, other acts confer ‘quasi-judicial’ powers on administrative tribunals that 
have been created by statute.
95
 Under this approach, it needs to be emphasized that 
another relevant legal aspect related to the British administrative legal system is found 
in the Crown’s responsibility for the exercise of the administration activities carried by 
the government on its behalf.
96
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Nevertheless, disregarding the increasing tendency to delegate power to the British 
government, the predominant principle of the ‘rule of law’ still exists. This establishes 
the foundation of highly important principles, such as the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy and of the application of the common law (Dicey’s influence) to all 
individuals (including the civil servants), as well as their obedience to the ordinary law 
of the state.
97
  
 
Unlike under the French system, regular courts in Britain are in charge of 
administrating justice, therefore these courts are in control with regard to the legality of 
an administration activity. These court competences are based on the principle that 
British constitutional law is not the source, but the consequence of an individual right.
98
 
This doctrine has been influential and has made its way to other legal systems such as 
those of America, Australia, and New Zealand.  
 
However, the legal systems, which have been influenced by the British system, have 
some slight differences. For example, in the USA the concept of administrative law is 
more extensive with regard to public interest services and activities and their subjection 
to the respective administrative regulation. In fact, in the USA, unlike in Britain, the 
courts can control the constitutionality of the law.
99
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ii. Concepts of public administration and public authority 
 
The term ‘administration’ comes from the Latin word ‘ad y admistrare’ which means 
‘to serve’.100 In other words, it involves the function of serving individuals or satisfying 
the general interest, i.e., it mainly covers the executive function of the state.  
 
The word ‘administration’ has been used in two different ways. The objective meaning 
refers to ‘the activity, task or functions of the state’. On the other hand, there is the 
subjective meaning that refers to ‘the body or group of entities or organs in charge of 
exercising the activity or function of the state’. 101 
 
In keeping with this line of thinking, J. Rivero defines public administration (referring 
to the objective meaning) as ‘the activity through which the public authorities seek, 
depending on the case, if necessary, the prerogatives of the public power, towards the 
satisfaction of the necessities of public interest.’102 
 
Similarly, the Black Law Dictionary defines public authority (subjective meaning) as 
‘[The] government at national, regional and other level that performs public 
administrative functions under national law, including duties, activities or services to 
safeguard the Public Welfare’.103 
 
iii. Schools of thought on the objective of public administration 
 
The main objective of public administration is the satisfaction of the general interest 
belonging to the state’s people which constitutes its dominium proprium.104 However, 
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within the doctrine there is no clear division between the objectives and functions of 
public administration.  
 
The main notion comes from the idea of public administration as the state’s way of 
reaching its social objectives in accordance with the law (this line of thought originates 
from the German school led by Otto Mayer). Further to this, there is also the notion of 
the public administration as a state activity capable of creating the law (this idea 
originates from the Austrian School led by Hans Kelsen and Adolf Merkl).  
 
Additionally, there is also a debate between the notion of the public administration as a 
guarantor and provider of a state’s public services (the school of Bordeaux led by Leon 
Duguit) and the notion of the public administration as the entity that exercises the 
public power (i.e., public authority) and provides public services (the school of 
Toulouse led by Maurice Hauriou).  
 
Finally, there is the notion of the public administration as the guarantor of the public 
interest (the Italian school led by Massimo Severo Giannini) and the notion of the 
public administration as the entity that creates norms and is the self recipient of it at the 
same time (this comes from the Spanish School led by Garcia de Enterria y 
Fernandez).
105
    
 
iv. Relationship with the public administration  
 
One of the principal aspects related to the relationship between the public 
administration and private individuals is the determination of the ‘liability of the 
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administration’, which requires that the public administration be recognised as an 
artificial person.
106 
 
 
In this regard, liability is determined by the legal performance of the administration’s 
conduct in accordance with the rule of law. This rule provides a basis for judicial 
control through the ‘administrative justice system’ (i.e., the effectiveness of the 
principle of legality).
107 
 
 
Regarding the relationship between individuals and the public administration, the 
relationship can be determined in a simpler way: (i) unilateral (i.e., administrative acts) 
and (ii) bilateral (i.e., administrative contracts).  
 
It is important to emphasize as a preliminary consideration that, whatever the 
relationship that exists between the public administration and individuals, the public 
administration is empowered to create unilateral rights and obligations for individuals, 
within a determined legal framework. These obligations and rights are binding upon 
individuals, with or without their consent and this is realised in the form of: decrees, 
regulations and byelaws. These examples are created within the extensive power of the 
state and the prerogatives of the Crown.
108
  
 
This considerable power of the state is based on the grounds of the administration’s 
necessity to take ‘any measures to preserve public order, even in spite of laws 
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French system through the Blanco decision in 1873, whereas under the British system the notion of 
irresponsibility of the government was abolished through the Crown Proceeding Act of 1947. This Act had 
entitled individuals to sue the administration for damages in tort or contracts. See Neville Brown and Bell, 
supra note 12, on page 183; and Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 670. 
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 Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 670. See also, C. Sarria Olcos, Justicia Administrativa en 
Colombia, Jornadas Colombo-Venezolanas de Derecho Publico, Universidad Externado Colombia (1995), 
pages 921-974., on page 50. 
108
 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, pages 784-815; and Shalev, supra note 30, on page 457. 
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protecting personal liberty, the right of assembly or the right of freedom of 
expression’.109  
 
In addition, it is also important to highlight that although the public administration is 
empowered to create unilateral obligations and rights that are binding on individuals, 
individuals are nevertheless entitled to request that any unlawful or arbitrary decision 
deriving from the public administration be challenged and adjudicated by the proper 
public administrative institution (i.e., administrative tribunals) or by judicial power 
(i.e., courts).  
 
o Parties 
 
The parties to any possible relationship with the public administration are determined 
by norms that are enacted by law in order to protect the public or private interest. In 
this respect, these norms establish determined behaviour, and grant powers to 
individuals in order to exercise or protect their rights.  
 
For example, such parties can be grouped into two categories (i) the administration 
itself (i.e., the government at the national, regional and other levels that perform public 
administrative functions under national law
110
), and (ii) individuals with juridical 
capacity (i.e., national or non-national citizens; corporations or groups that may have an 
interest with the administration).
111
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109
 See Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 221. 
110
 See definition of ‘Public Authority’.  
111
 This is understood as ‘the capacity or power of presenting determined enquiries for services [passive 
subject] or presenting legal remedies [active subject]’. For more about individuals and juridical capacity, see 
Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, supra note 91, on page 377.  
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o Administrative Acts 
 
Currently, there is a debate concerning the ambiguity and imprecision of the terms 
‘legislative’, ‘administrative’ and ‘judicial’ acts. The definition of ‘administrative acts’ 
can vary from one system to another in terms of its meaning and scope.
112 
Furthermore, 
its definition can also be determined as a consequence of the public administration’s 
submission to a regime of law (i.e., principle of legality).
113
  
 
Nonetheless, for the purpose and limitation of this research, ‘administrative acts’ can be 
understood as ‘those acts that emanate from the administration in execution or 
concretion of the mandate of law’.114  
 
Within this context, unlike the French system, under the British system administrative 
acts are referred to as ‘official acts’, even though the terminology related to each almost 
has the same meaning.
115
  
 
Similarly, in both legal systems, despite their different origins and terminologies, 
administrative acts have the same aim: regulating both the public administration’s and 
the private individual’s behaviour, providing public services and protecting the public 
interest. This main aim gives grounds to those unilateral acts that are commonly 
imposed upon the individuals in pursuit of protecting the public interest. That is to say, 
                                                 
112
 As previously mentioned, one of the main characteristics of administrative law is that it has been developed 
by case-law; through which the notion of an administrative act has been also shaped. See Cane, supra note 75, 
on page 13. 
113
 See Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, supra note 91, on page 431; and, Bradley and Ewing, supra note 
12, on page 657. 
114
 See Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, supra note 91, on page 432. 
115
 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 660; and Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 
157. 
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this type of action may imply a change in the legal situation of individuals without their 
consent.
116
  
 
These unilateral acts can be grouped into two major acts: (i) individual acts 
(requisition, expropriation); and (ii) collective acts (regulatory acts i.e., governmental 
decrees, ministerial regulations and local byelaws).  
 
On the other hand, the acts of the public administration can also be classified in 
accordance with number of parties involved, e.g., unilateral acts such as the regulatory 
acts, and bilateral acts such as state or administrative contracts.  
 
It is important to highlight that one element to be taken into consideration is that the 
determination of the legal nature of the state or government’s acts should be determined 
through the organ that issues the act (e.g., legislative, judicial or executive powers) and 
not through the material content of the function that is performed.
117
 
 
Under some administrative legal systems such as the British, French, Venezuelan and 
American legal systems, administrative acts such as regulatory acts (i.e., as product of 
delegated legislation) may need to be submitted to a process of consultation with the 
people.
118
  
 
The main purpose of this consultation process is (i) to avoid any kind of arbitrariness; 
(ii) to create a balance between the administration’s and the nation’s interests; (iii) to 
create an enriching process aimed at improving the administration’s efficiency; and (iv) 
                                                 
116
 See Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 246; Picker, supra note 20, on page 1090; and Cane, 
supra note 75, on page 17. 
117
 See Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, supra note 91, on page 53. 
118
 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 681. 
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to take advantages of the input by the people, which may help to improve the 
administration’s own experience.119 
 
In addition, it is important to draw attention to the fact that, apart from the normal 
process of adopting an official act, there is also an exceptional way to adopt an act, 
which happens as a result of an omission by the administration. This omission is known 
as silence on the part of the public administration.
120
 For example, this administrative 
silence, under the French administrative legal system, constitutes a rejection of an 
individual’s petition to the administration. This rejection can also, as a consequence, 
result in an administrative act, and may therefore be justiciable.  
 
Another aspect which should be taken into consideration is the importance of the 
(formal) form of any justiciable administrative act. Within this context, the (formal) 
form, apart from procedural rituals that include the validity of the enforceable decision 
regarding its effects, also constitutes a guarantee to preserve an individual’s rights. 
These forms are considered in accordance with the ‘principle of legality’.  
 
There exists a wide range of administrative procedures around the world that have not 
been put into practice homogenously, even within the legal system of the most 
developed countries. Consideration must be given to the fact that civil servants may 
face undefined situations in terms of the scope of the norm to be promulgated.
121
 For 
example, under the American administrative legal system, it has been stated that ‘the 
interpretation of civil servants… constitutes a formed body of experience and judgment 
to which the courts and litigants must properly go in order to guide them.’122 
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 See Vélez García, supra note 3, on page 264.  
120
 See Sarria Olcos, supra note 107, on page 946. 
121
 See Vélez García, supra note 3, pages 21 and 257. 
122
 Case Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944), quoted by H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Second Edition 
Oxford University Press, Great Britain 1994), on page 261. 
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o Administrative Contracts 
 
The notion of ‘administrative contracts’123 also varies from one jurisdiction to another. 
This notion has been found to be more developed in some jurisdictions than others. For 
example, the French notion of an administrative contract is far more developed than the 
notion of a government contract under British law.
124
 
 
Particular examples of this distinction can be found in variations that range from the 
regulation of complex transactions to aspects related to the public law scope of the 
contract, such as its subject and finality. Similarly, the variation in notions may also 
range from the nature of the parties involved (i.e., relationship between public 
entity/public entity or public entity/private individuals) to the governing law that may 
apply to the parties and the contract.  
 
The latter aspect may involve elements of private law (i.e., which gives the 
predominant criteria under the British system, despite the limited prerogative of the 
Crown on the premise that she cannot hamper her freedom of executive action by 
contract
125
), or of public law (e.g., which gives the predominant criteria under the 
French system).
126
 Within this context, it is important to clearly distinguish – following 
the French Doctrine – between pure administrative contracts (e.g., those contracts 
preponderantly subject to autonomous legal norms such as administrative 
                                                 
123
 With regard to this particular point, it has been asserted that ‘the distinction between the notion that 
administrative contracts are subject to public law and the notion that administrative contracts are subject to 
private law has been based on the debate of French organic criteria and distribution of competences between 
the administrative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction. Furthermore, this distinction has been based on 
polemic positions between the application of private law and the application of a specialist area of law such as 
Administrative Law to these kinds of contracts. Nevertheless, the dividing line between these two positions 
has been difficult to ascertain even nowadays and despite the private law origin of administrative contracts’. E. 
Garcia de Enterria quoted by A. R. Brewer-Carias, Contratos Administrativos (Editorial Jurídica Venezolana, 
Caracas – Venezuela 1992), on page 41. 
124
 ‘The English law on public contracts is far less developed than that in France’. See Neville Brown and Bell, 
supra note 12, on page 212; Mairal, supra note 30; and Shalev, supra note 30. 
125
 See Shalev, supra note 30, on page 457; and Langrod, supra note 30, on page 332. 
126
 See Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12. 
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law/governmental contracts) and those contracts of a private law nature that relate to 
the public administration (e.g., those contracts of private law/commercial contracts).
127
  
 
For the purpose of this research, the present study will be limited to the analysis of 
those pure administrative contracts between the public administration (i.e., the state) 
and individuals.
128
 To this end, administrative contracts can be defined as ‘those 
contracts that, due to their frequent use for public objectives or for the concrete finality 
of public service reached, are subjected to a mix private-public law regime, but they are 
predominantly public law regarding the execution, performance and extinction of 
contracts’.129  
 
With regards to this latter definition, a common aspect of administrative contracts can 
be identified. This aspect is the one based on the subjection of this type of contract to 
the legal nature and determination of its own public law object in an agreement which 
can be patrimonial or non-patrimonial.
130
 Additionally, it is appropriate to emphasize 
that this public law contract-object under negotiation will subsequently subject the 
legality of the agreement to the application of principles of administrative law. Finally, 
its validity could be challenged before any administrative or regular court.
131
  
 
Despite the fact that administrative acts and/or contracts (e.g., leasing agreements) have 
some private law characteristics, it is important to stress that one of the main non-
private-law characteristics they have is the incorporation (expressly or tacitly) of 
considerable powers in favour of the state into the administrative act/contract of the 
                                                 
127
 For a detailed explanation on the distinction between commercial and governmental contracts, See Brewer-
Carias, supra note 123, on page 11; Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 202; and Shalev, supra 
note 30, pages 448-452 
128
 See Shalev, supra note 30, on page 446. 
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 See Brewer-Carias, supra note 123, on page 51; and, Shalev, supra note 30, on page 451. 
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 See Brewer-Carias, supra note 123, on page 24. 
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 The long-standing discussion regarding the difficulty of drawing the dividing line between those aspects 
that are governed by private law and those that are governed by public law is still relevant today. See Bradley 
and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 670. 
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state.
132
 These exorbitant powers are understood as those unilateral actions used by the 
administration to guide, modify, interpret, breach, sanction and/or finish the contractual 
relationship.
133
 
 
Additionally, these extensive powers are considered to be a part of the public 
administration’s unilateral power that can be exercised on grounds of protecting the 
public welfare and public interest. Nonetheless, the exercise of these powers has to be 
carried out by the administration with the due observance of standards of legality. For 
example, it has been said that such exercise of power may imply that ‘decisions are 
lawful even if no private individuals are affected except as members of the public at 
large.’134  
 
It is also important to point out Mr. G. Vedel’s argument which states that ‘such 
exorbitance, in reality does not mean that they can be illicit in private contracts, [this is] 
unusual and unlikely’.135  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the impact of these administrative powers 
on individuals may be to their benefit, but also sometimes they may be to their 
detriment.
136
 For this reason, it is also important to emphasize here that the exorbitant 
level of power does not have a similar configuration in the context of civil or 
commercial law, i.e., in private law.
137
 For example, under the French system, 
administrative contracts are referred to as ‘essentially an arrangement between unequal 
parties that makes courts carefully examine [to what extent] an arrangement is a truly 
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 See Mairal, supra note 30, on page 1717; Sarria Olcos, supra note 107, pages 921-974; and 
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 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 658. 
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bilateral act and therefore a contract, or [to what extent] it is really a unilateral 
administrative decision to which the other party has merely given his assent’.138 This 
compares with the British system, in which the notion of administrative contracts and 
the administration’s regulatory power ‘remains unclear’.139  
 
Nevertheless, there is a temporary solution for this unclear position under both British 
and French laws due to the fact there is an increasing tendency to harmonize this 
subject. For example, under the European Community Directives, parameters have 
been established in order to outline the conditions that are necessary to arrange public 
contracts in areas such as works, procurement and service.
140
  
 
In relation to the applicable legal regime enabling the administration to conclude 
public-law contracts, it is of importance to stress that administrative contracts are (in 
one way or another) subject to a common and uniform regime of public law and 
therefore to legal processes that are perceived to materialize the administration’s will 
(i.e., pre- and post- formalities that vary from one jurisdiction to another). However, it 
is an accomplished fact that the public administration, as a party to a contract, needs to 
give its express and indubitable consent to conclude a given administrative contract.
141
  
 
Furthermore, it is up to the administration to decide on whether to conclude contracts 
that are predominantly governed either by private law or by public law and whether 
these contracts need to fulfil certain determined formalities.
142
 Firstly, there is a 
subjective element related to the participation of any state’s entities in a given juridical 
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 Ibid., on page 202. 
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 ‘Until the Local Government Act 1988, English Law did not have much in the way of formal national 
legislation or case-law on the awarding of government contracts. Government practice, reinforced by audit, 
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Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 205.  
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 Ibid., on page 205. 
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 See Brewer-Carias, supra note 123, pages 75-97; and Langrod, supra note 30, on page 327. 
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relationship. Secondly, there is the condition of validity of the contract which mainly 
refers to questions relating to the capacity and competence of the parties,
143
 the 
consent,
144
  the object,
145
  and the cause
146
 of the contract (i.e., implying the restriction 
of the contractual principle of freedom of contract).
147
 Thirdly, administrative contracts 
include a subordination element in terms of the superior relationship that the 
Administration has with individuals
148
 which is based on the administration’s duty to 
protect the public interest. Fourthly, there is also a mix of the private-public law regime 
that may be applicable to administrative contracts and which subsequently largely 
depends on the appropriate law (i.e., private or public law).
149
 
 
The due observance of these formalities in order to materialize the administration’s will 
(i.e., rules regarding competence, administrative proceedings, budget estimations and 
public tenders)
150
 will also depend on the legal principles applied in a certain 
jurisdiction. Ultimately, under whatever circumstances an administrative contract needs 
to be concluded, its formalities must comply with the principle of legality.  
 
The consideration of administrative contracts as an arrangement essentially between 
unequal parties (French doctrine), gives rise to the question of why the public 
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 It is important to point out that there the principles of administrative law (public law) known as Principles 
of Legality and of Unauthorised Delegation which provide that a public authority is allowed to do what is 
expressly established by law (i.e., principle of competence). This compares to the principle of private law 
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administration has such a higher and unassailable position before private individuals 
(Dicey’s doctrine).  
 
The main answer to this concern is founded upon one of the most important objectives 
of the state, i.e., the idea of protecting the public interest and promoting national 
welfare. As mentioned above, this idea gives rise to excessive powers (i.e., unilateral 
actions) in favour of the administration to guarantee its aims and objectives.
151
 Their 
application even goes beyond those contractual relationships that are predominantly 
dominated by private law (e.g., in the case of expropriation).
152
  
 
Within this context, several doctrines or theories have emerged relating to the 
performance of the public administration’s unilateral power, which should be exercised 
in favour of the public interest, which must prevail over the interest of particular 
individuals and even over the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be 
kept).
153
 Nonetheless, these doctrines or theories have been viewed with a certain 
distrust when they are embodied within civil law contractual agreements, since they 
infer a tendency to abuse the position of dominance by one of the parties.
154
  
 
Such doctrines or theories are as follows: (i) doctrine of the contractual equilibrium and 
modification (i.e., the power of the public administration to redefine the character of a 
service provided, which needs to be done in accordance with the necessity of meeting 
the changing needs of the public interest and subsequently, the consideration of the 
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contract’s equilibrium);155 (ii) the doctrine of Fait du prince156 or factum principis (i.e., 
it is the exorbitant power par excellence which expresses the famous ius variandi and it 
is known as the act of state);
157
 (iii) the theory of risk or liability without fault (i.e., the 
‘principle of the equality of all citizens in bearing public burdens’);158 and, (iv) the 
theory of Imprévision
159
 (i.e., the supervening circumstances that may arise after the 
formation of the contract and that go beyond the parties’ control, such as matters of 
inflation or monetary depreciation).  
 
However, despite the application of these doctrines, the aggrieved individual is entitled 
to damages and compensation for the actions taken by the administration, especially 
those that may affect the equilibrium of the contracts. Nonetheless, an individual 
cannot allege wrongfulness or question the legality of the administration’s unilateral 
action to modify the contract,
160
 except if it was done without due observance of the 
law.  
 
In summary, as L. Neville Brown stated, ‘the mere fact that the administration is a 
party to a contract does not make it necessarily a pure administrative contract’. It will 
depend on the particular characteristics of each individual contract, based on the mix of 
the private-public law regime applicable to it, in order to determine whether it 
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 See Brewer-Carias, supra note 123, on page 202; Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 676; and 
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constitutes a pure administrative contract, or a private contract. This distinction will 
also determine the justiciable nature of such contracts and therefore the competent 
jurisdiction and court.
161
  
 
v. Public administration and economic issues of public interest 
 
The ideas put forward in the previous sub-section also apply to one of the most 
important facets of the public administration. This facet is related to the dual role of the 
state within its national socio-economic aspects: that is to say, the state’s role as a 
regulatory entity (i.e., as a rule-making authority/state-regulator) and its legal 
prerogatives, on one side, and, the state’s role as an entrepreneur (i.e., as a contracting 
party or as a partner of individuals/state-contractor), on the other.
162
  
 
It is here that the question about the coexistence between the various natures of 
administrative activities and the limitation of economic freedom arises.
163
 This is 
especially so when the exercise of the said economic freedom is limited by the state.
164
 
This limitation requires the administration to take into consideration those limitations 
proposed by the state, through administrative (sub-legal)
165
 or legislative (legal) acts on 
grounds of public interest and in accordance with the law.
166
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The nature of this ‘limited right’ concerning economic freedom and the rule of law 
deserves special reflection since the state’s main goal is to primarily guarantee the 
continuity of its public services and to maintain a good level of social welfare.
167
  
 
Consequently, the public administration has to ensure, as mentioned above, the 
satisfaction of the people’s needs. This assurance also involves safeguarding the 
exercise of economic regulation or deregulation of the administration. This exercise 
subsequently makes individuals come in to contact ab initio with civil servants rather 
than with judges.
168
  
 
Within this context, such a guarantee or satisfaction of people’s needs is accompanied 
in terms of the public administration activities with all those prerogatives established 
expressly by law.
169
  
 
A remarkable example of the state’s regulation (either considered as legislative or 
administrative interventionism)
170
 regarding economic issues on grounds of public 
interest is found during the financial crisis of 2008, when it was argued that ‘[the] 
government creates markets, and markets can exist only with regulation’.171 
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the legislator could decide by statute to exclude all 
or some aspects of certain public services and therefore grant these services to private 
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operators (e.g., services of gas, water, electricity). This exercise is known as the 
privatization of the state’s activity.  
 
Notwithstanding, it is important to highlight here, despite the existence of the principles 
of mutuus consensus (mutual consensus) and mutues disensus (mutual dissention), the 
prerogatives of the administration are not all excluded from the privatized activities.
172
 
On the contrary, it is sufficient for the public administration that the public interest is 
involved in this privatized activity in order for it to exercise its legal prerogatives. This 
exercise can be carried out by the administration even within the inter-party contract as 
can happen in the cases of expropriation and of fiscal measures.
173
  
 
Thus, international investment law litigants may express their concern about the legal 
protection of an individual’s economic-rights in the event of economic regulation or 
deregulation.
174
 However, the response to this concern is found in the international 
legal premise, which guarantees that any potential controversy shall be decided mainly, 
by ordinary courts or administrative courts, in accordance with the principles that are 
applicable to determined contractual or administrative agreements. This guarantee will 
also be carried out by domestic tribunals, except if otherwise agreed, in accordance 
with the legal framework of their jurisdictions (e.g., under ordinary jurisdiction in the 
British system or the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in the French system).  
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vi. Public administration and management and control of natural 
resources. 
 
In many countries, natural resources imply notions of sovereignty,
175
 property and 
ownership;
176
 and to some extent the notion of Jus Cogens.
177
 The ownership of natural 
resources and activities relating to them have been legally ‘reserved’ to the state as 
state-owner in the majority of the producing countries’ legal systems for reasons of 
national expediency.
178
 This legal reserve has been performed by states either through 
an express provision in the constitution or through enacted statutes. This reserve 
embraces essential elements of a law of ordre public (public policy). 
 
‘Reserve’, or ‘publicatio’179 in Spanish, is the denomination that is given to specific 
goods and/or activities which cannot be freely used or exercised by individuals (i.e., it 
excludes or limits the principle of economic freedom).
180
 In other words, these goods 
and/or activities are reserved for the exclusive use or exercise by the state.  
 
However, despite this, it is noteworthy to mention here that a legal reserve can either be 
absolute or relative. Activities relating to natural resources may represent a ‘relative 
reserve’ in some countries such as Venezuela since they may allow, to some extent, for 
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 This is the fundamental element of nationalization. As the French Constitutional Council stated in 19 
January 1984, ‘nationalization “implies the transfer of a company’s property as a consequence of a decision 
taken by the Public Authority which individuals must obey ”.’ Quoted by Hernández González, supra note 
163, on page 482. 
180
 See Rondón de Sanso, supra note 176, pages 66-68; and Hernández González, supra note 163, on page 157. 
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the participation of private individuals within the monopolistic market through different 
legal schemes.
181
  
 
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the fact that a private individual is 
granted a given concession or similar instrument does not necessarily mean that he/she 
is entitled to freely exercise his/her rights, but that he/she can do so only in accordance 
with those boundaries established by the law and the respective contract.  
 
In fact, it has been said, that under this ‘legal reserve’, sovereignty, as well as 
ownership, allow the state-owner to exercise its rights without compromising their 
entitlements. For example, if a state-owner decides to conclude a contract with a private 
investor to exploit its land, it does not mean that the state loses the ownership of the 
land. On the contrary, it has been argued that the state-owner only yields the use of land 
temporarily.
182
  
 
Additionally, it has also been said that if this premise were applied to subjective rights, 
the applicable regime would be even more severe in terms of public powers (i.e., 
including the public administration’s prerogatives),183 which are – at the same time– 
integrated parts within the concept of sovereignty of the state.
184
 For example, when a 
state-owner makes an agreement with private individuals, through any entity of its 
public administration as state-contractor, either of a public law or private law nature, to 
use its goods and resources, it can only act if the law has empowered the official to do 
so. Therefore, the exercise of these rights does not mean that the sovereignty of the 
state is being compromised.  
 
                                                 
181
 Mainly through petroleum licences; production sharing agreements; joint ventures; and, operating services 
contracts. See Cameron, supra note 175, pages 10-20; and Sornarajah, supra note 164, pages 69-71. 
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 See Rondón de Sanso, supra note 176, on page 411. 
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 See Pérez Luno, supra note 29, on page 26. 
184
 See Rondón de Sanso, supra note 176, pages 411-416. 
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Conversely, if the state-owner acted through its public administration, without the 
express delegation of the law, the act would be vitiated and its declaration of will 
would not produce any effect.  
 
Natural resource exploitation agreements commonly have a singular characteristic, 
which is that when a private individual is contracting with a sovereign state, the said 
private individual must be aware that his/her co-contracting party (i.e., the sovereign 
state) is a public entity vested with public powers. Therefore, the state-owner possesses 
discretionary or exorbitant powers.
185
  
 
As mentioned before, these faculties are part of the sovereign power of the state 
because they are derived from the necessity to satisfy the superior interest of the state 
which is under the protection of the state.
186
     
 
e. Public administration, settlement of disputes and administrative justice  
 
 
The materialization of the legal relationship between the public administration and 
individuals is manifested through the existence of a formal administrative act 
(including administrative contracts) which is issued by an entity belonging to the public 
administration. This relationship also creates legal expectations for each party in terms 
of balancing the social objectives of the state with the private interests of individuals.
187
 
 
These administrative acts and contracts, according to the respective law, need to follow 
some essential legal formalities known as administrative procedures.
188
 In the case that 
such acts or contracts do not follow these procedures, they run the risk of being 
                                                 
185
 See Schrijver, supra note 175, on page 292. 
186
 See, e.g., the legal classification of the petroleum reservoir in Rondón de Sanso, supra note 176, on page 
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187
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188
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quashed by a court.
189
 The function of the system of administration of justice requires 
the existence of this sine qua non legal requisite (i.e., the voidable administrative act as 
a consequence of Acta Jure Imperii of the state) to activate the ‘administrative justice 
system’.190 
 
Under both administrative legal systems, the ‘administrative justice system’ represents 
a mechanism to control and review public decisions (i.e., those acts of Jure Imperii
191
) 
related to protecting the interests of both state and individuals. The tension between the 
states interest and the individuals’ interests requires a certain discretionary power from 
decision-makers at the moment of balancing these two positions.
192
 This kind of 
disagreement is known as a ‘regulatory dispute’.  
 
Both legal systems have the same major problems, i.e., regulatory disputes as a 
consequence of the justiciable aspect of those acts emanating from public authorities 
and their effects on individuals.  
 
The justiciable nature of these acts has additionally created an extended forum to 
adjudicate administrative matters; this is a mechanism that is used to control the 
administration’s actions.193 This mechanism of control can be carried by a public law 
adjudicator; either through an administrative review where the proper administration 
resolves the dispute (i.e., an internal/internal review e.g., public enquiries or an internal 
                                                 
189
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 Some Acts of Jure Imperii require other legal mechanisms to be reviewed i.e., those acts that are intimately 
related to the notion of sovereignty. For example, in the UK, acts of parliament cannot be reviewed by courts 
whereas in France, these acts can be reviewed, but only by the Constitutional Council.  
192
 See Cane, supra note 75, on page 12. 
193
 For a detailed explanation of the differences between the nature of a tribunal and court; See Cane, supra 
note 75, pages 2-5; and Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 9. 
 85 
review e.g., administrative tribunals) or, through judicial mechanisms, where these 
administrative matters are reviewed by courts (i.e., an external review).
194
 
 
The legal structures of the French and British judicial systems have substantial 
similarities with regards to civil and criminal jurisdictions, but less in terms of 
administrative jurisdictions. For example, in France, the contentious administrative 
function is exercised by the Executive through the Council of State, whereas in Britain, 
the Executive does attend some administrative disputes, but only those non-contentious 
ones which are not ‘ripe’195 enough to be submitted to the courts. 196  
 
Moreover, the common aim of these two administrative legal systems is based on the 
need to exercise judicial protection of individuals. This judicial protection implies that 
administrative actions that have emanated from the administration by the exercise of its 
powers have put the rights of individuals at risk. Such powers of the administration are 
derived from enacted delegations (i.e., delegated power).  
 
For this reason, it is said that these acts are subject to judicial control: hence the main 
idea is to guarantee that the acts in question do not trespass into the domain left to 
parliament, or constitutional principles or general principles of law.
197
  
 
It is the responsibility of the judges to distinguish between and define matters of public 
law and matters of private law in order to determine their competence over the legal 
issues in dispute. For example, this task is entrusted to the tribunal of conflict in 
                                                 
194
 This is understood as the action of reviewing the administrative acts which have emanated from a particular 
entity belonging to the administration. This compares with the action by the original decision-making entity to 
internally review those acts which have emanated from it. For more about the differences between internal 
review and external review; See Cane, supra note 75, on page 7. 
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note 12, on page 14.  
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France. To this end, it may be said that the administration of justice is, in terms of 
public law, a sensitive task for judges because they need to find the right equilibrium 
between the interests of the state and those of individuals. 
 
In summary, it is important to point out that, within the relevant scholarly literature of 
administrative law, two major legal principles can be found which apply to the 
administration’s activities or decisions: i) the principle of legality which obliges the 
administration to act in accordance with the law; and ii) the principle of liability which 
establishes the administration’s responsibility for any damages caused to an individual, 
and therefore establishes the need to compensate the aggrieved individual.
198
 
 
i. Administrative review (internal revision)  
 
As a preliminary comment, it is important to accentuate that administrative review 
refers to those legal mechanisms that are provided by the legislator to challenge those 
acts deriving from the administration which may have aggrieved individuals (i.e., 
internal revision) before the same executive power.
199
 In contrast, as will be seen later, 
there are legal mechanisms that are designed by the legislator to challenge such acts but 
they may be challenged before a different state power, such as the judicial branch (i.e., 
external revision).
200
  
 
Here it is also important to clarify that despite the fact that the Council of State in 
France is part of the executive power, its judicial functions in terms of administrative 
adjudication (external review) can be compared to the judicial control exercised in the 
British system. For this reason, the juridical functions of the Council of State will be 
addressed in the next sub-section.  
                                                 
198
 Ibid., pages 175-261. 
199
 See Cane, supra note 75, on page 7. 
200
 For more details about internal and external reviews, see Cane, supra note 75, pages 6-16. 
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Additionally, it is also important to point out that within the administrative review 
mechanisms; there is also the doctrine of minister judge (i.e., a kind of internal-internal 
review).
201
 This particular administrative mechanism basically gives individuals the 
chance of inquiring/complaining before the competent minister, as the original 
decision-maker, about certain decisions that were originally taken by him.
202
 For 
example, in the French system, it is carried out by legal remedies such as administrative 
recourses of reconsideration or revision and in the British system it is carried out by 
public inquiries. In some legal systems, these proceedings need to be exhausted before 
resorting to courts to resolve a legal matter
203
 (see e.g., the American theory of 
‘ripeness’).204 
 
On the other hand, despite the debate between the Montesquieu doctrine on the division 
of powers and the constant shifting between the powers,
205
 there are ‘quasi-judicial’206 
mechanisms available to resolve regulatory disputes between the state and individuals. 
These special mechanisms are located within the proper bureaucratic structure of the 
executive power such as the administrative tribunals in the British system.
207
 It has 
been argued that these administrative tribunals have independence in terms of judicial 
jurisdiction.
208
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Within this context, judicial independence refers to the separation of the judicial review 
from the public entity whose decisions they are entrusted to review. Despite this, the 
review is still being taken by the same branch of power (e.g., the executive branch), 
instead of being reviewed by another branch of power, such as the judicial branch.
209
 
 
This legal mechanism of administrative review, i.e., by administrative tribunals is more 
of a British legal phenomenon that a French one.
210
 Under the French system, the 
mechanism of administrative arbitration provided by law as a non-jurisdictional 
mechanism to resolve controversies between the public administration and individuals 
is a similar mechanism to British administrative tribunals.
211
 Here, it is important to 
point out that these legal mechanisms are not used as often as the administrative 
tribunals in the United Kingdom (UK).  
 
The existence of these administrative tribunals depends upon the promulgation of given 
acts of parliament.
212
 Their main aim is to ‘hear and decide [regulatory] disputes on a 
court-like basis’.213 Therefore, on account of this, their decisions are considered as 
‘quasi-judicial’ acts, because these tribunals act as a non-judicial entity, (i.e., ‘a species 
of court’214), despite the fact that they are recognised as part of ‘the machinery of 
justice’.  
 
It has been argued that the functions of such tribunals are viewed as a kind of 
penetration of the jurisdictional function belonging to the judicial branch into public 
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administration and as a complementary mechanism to administer justice, even 
following the proper rituals of common justice.
215
 In fact, it has also been argued that 
they operate with the supervision of the superior civil courts.
216
  
 
In this regard, due to the fact that these administrative tribunals form a part of the 
executive power and despite their alleged judicial independence, they need to apply, to 
some extent, questions of administrative policy (i.e., those points that contravene the 
public interest and public welfare) to the solution.
217
 Therefore, they allow the 
administrative judges to apply a wide range of aspects related to the public interests.
218
 
Obviously, with regard to this, one may be concerned with the idea of combining ‘in 
one and the same body the two functions of implementing rules and adjudicating 
disputes about their implementation’.219,220  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that British administrative tribunals are completely 
different, in terms of their nature and functions,
221
 to their French counterpart, 
tribunaux adminitratifs.
222
 Firstly, ‘the French system is founded on the use of separate 
administrative courts whereas the British system relies heavily on the superior civil 
courts’.223 Secondly, within the previous argument, it has been stated that while the 
British system is conceived to be ‘an adjudicating agency outside the ordinary courts 
and having a jurisdiction limited to some specific sphere of administrative activity’224 
(emphasis added); the French system has a ‘general judicial control over administrative 
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action’ (emphasis added), which represents a special jurisdiction under the control of 
the Council of State.
225
  
 
It is of importance to highlight here that, in most of the countries which are influenced 
by the French administrative legal system, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is 
paradoxically part of the judicial power. 
 
In conclusion, decisions taken by these administrative tribunals are subject to judicial 
review in the respective jurisdictions. Within this context, some scholars have classified 
these decisions as decisions of primary jurisdiction,
226
 being those decisions which 
emerge from the administration itself. This is in contrast to the secondary jurisdiction 
or De Novo Review
227
 which refers to those controversies that are resolved by courts as 
a consequence of reviewing cases decided by the primary jurisdiction.
228
  
 
One final key legal point is related to the non self-enforcing nature of primary 
jurisdiction decisions which mostly need to be resolved before a judge in order to 
become enforceable, unless the affected party decides to comply with it voluntarily.
229
 
 
ii. Judicial review (external revision)  
 
In juxtaposition to the administrative review process is the judicial review process. 
Judicial review refers to those legal mechanisms that are provided by the legislator to 
                                                 
225
 The appearance of this special jurisdiction is mainly based on the famous French Law 16-24 August 1970, 
which states in article 13: ‘Judicial functions are distinct and will always remain separate from administrative 
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challenge public administration decisions, but before a different state power such as the 
judicial power (external review).  
 
In order to activate judicial control as part of the ‘administrative justice system’ of the 
state, the existence of a determined voidable administrative act or executive decision 
emanating from a given governmental body, including administrative tribunals, is 
necessary.
230
  
 
In this regard, there are public law remedies such as judicial review, right to appeal, 
ombudsmen, etc., that work as a mechanisms to guarantee individual rights. One 
example of these public law remedies is the British idea of judicial review, which 
basically refers to ‘judicial control of public-decision making in accordance with rules 
and principles of administrative law’.231  
 
The result of this legal remedy is based, unless there is no suitable alternative remedy 
(e.g., the right to appeal) which can resolve the problem, on the grounds of illegality, 
irrationality, or unfairness.
232
  
 
Additionally, the result is finally, but not always, materialized through public or private 
law orders (i.e., forms of relief
233
) such as: quashing orders,
234
 prohibiting orders,
235
 
mandatory orders,
236
 declarations,
237
 injunctions,
238
 and damages.
239
 The same 
functions and results of reviewing the administration’s decisions are pursued under the 
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French system
240
 through public law remedies such as le contentieux de l’annulation;241 
le contentieux de pleine jurisdiction;
242
 le contentieux de l’interprétaton;243 and le 
contentieux de la répression.
244
 Nevertheless, the final objective of these different legal 
mechanisms or remedies is, despite their different functions, to pursue a declaration of 
the administration’s acts as invalid, unlawful, null, or void.  
 
The operation of this reviewing system is mainly activated ‘when an individual seeks to 
review the legality of a decision taken by a public authority or a specialized tribunal 
and the court must in exercise of this supervisory jurisdiction [as secondary 
jurisdiction] decide whether to uphold or set aside the decision’.245 It is also activated 
when an individual seeks compensation as a consequence of the governmental liability 
for the unlawful or arbitrary decisions taken which infringe the rights of an 
individual.
246
  
 
As an administrative review mechanism, judicial review is another, perhaps the most 
important reviewing forum to control the administration’s actions, because the most 
essential function of the judiciary is to protect individuals against unlawful or arbitrary 
acts of the government.
247
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In this regard, the judicial control of executive action is based on grounds of the 
principle of legality
248
 which means ‘[the presupposition of] the existence of judges 
who [must] impose the administration [to obey] to the law’.249  
 
Nonetheless, the remarkable difference between the French and British systems arises 
from the type of judges who decide the regulatory dispute and the law that they should 
apply.
250
 On the one hand, under the French system, the regulatory dispute is reviewed 
mainly by special judges and a special body of law such as the judges of the 
administrative-contentious jurisdiction and the norms of public law. On the other hand, 
under the British system, the regulatory dispute is reviewed by ordinary civil courts in 
accordance with judge made law and the principles of private law.
251
  
 
Another legal aspect of the French system is the predominant inquisitorial-adversarial 
nature of the court procedures through which the court will pursue an independent 
investigation of law and allow for the opportunity to hear the other party’s position. 
This stands in stark contrast to the British civil court proceedings, which are 
predominantly adversarial. However, it is important to highlight here that both legal 
systems have the same final objective of administering justice.
252
 
 
Under both legal systems, administrative court procedures
253
 can be generally divided 
into four procedural steps: (a) commencement of proceedings,
254
 (b) instruction,
255
 (c) 
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judgment, and (d) execution. However, it is important to note that before commencing 
any judicial process, it is necessary to consider the reviewable nature of the 
administrative act (see theory of ‘ripeness’256) to allocate it within the area of special 
jurisdiction if applicable.  
 
Furthermore, besides this essential and conditional requirement, certain conditions must 
be met before the judge can proceed to evaluate the merits of the case. These conditions 
are: (i) the nature of the act under review; (ii) the role of the ‘prior decision’ (primary 
jurisdiction’s decision); (iii) the locus standi (sufficient interest257) of the plaintiff; (iv) 
the absence of parallel relief; and, (v) the time limits for commencing proceeding.
258
  
 
As a final remark, it should also be stressed that another important legal characteristic 
of the judicial review proceedings is the fact that there must be an absence of parallel 
relief,
259
 i.e., by a way of exception; the judicial review is applied to certain 
circumstances where alternative remedies do not exist.
260
  
 
This principle of the absence of parallel relief is homogenously applied within both 
legal systems. This refers to the existence of other suitable legal resolutions available 
under the British system, such as right to appeal and ombudsmen, and to other 
administrative resources that are available under the French system to challenge the 
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public authority’s decision within administration itself, such as the method of 
reconsideration and revision.
261
 
 
iii. Administrative justice 
 
In the last fifty years, administrative justice has evolved in harmony with the 
development of administrative law.
262
 Within this context, it can be seen that the 
discussion on the generic scope of administrative justice has been basically divided into 
two species: (i) justice within the public administration; and, (ii) justice of the public 
administration.
263
  
 
The first is understood as a set of institutions whose main objective is to ensure the due 
observance of the law within public administration. The second represents one of the 
public functions of the state, which has as its main objective the application of 
administrative norms to disputes between the public administration and individuals 
towards activating judicial control.  
 
Despite the alleged contradictio in terminis of the name administrative justice,
264
 its 
definition may vary slightly from one jurisdiction to another in terms of the applicable 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the core theme and notion of administrative justice is still the 
same with regard to rendering the principle of legality effective and ensuring its due 
observance. This exercise can be carried out through the principles and resolutions 
available to aggrieved individuals to challenge the administration’s decisions, before 
the administration itself, before traditional judicial control action is taken.
265
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The British Tribunal, Court and Enforcement Act 2007, defines administrative justice 
as ‘the overall system by which decisions of an administrative or executive nature are 
made in relation to particular persons, including – (a) the procedures for making such 
decisions, (b) the law under which such decisions are made, and (c) the systems for 
resolving disputes and airing grievances in relation to such decisions’.266 Similarly, as 
part of the continental administrative legal regime, Otto Mayer stated that ‘due to its 
nature, administrative justice concerns the delivery of decisions by the public 
authorities of the administrative organization.’267 
 
Now, taking into consideration the notion of administrative justice and the fact that the 
public administration is subject to the principle of legality, as are its actions, it is the 
public administration itself that would have the primary interest in amending its own 
mistakes before it is exposed to the censure of judges.
268
  
 
In this regard, it used to be argued that the French administrative system favoured the 
administration whereas the British administrative system provided better protection to 
individuals.
269
 However, currently this distinction between the systems seems to be 
merging through the idea that ‘general rules set up a tension between social objectives 
and individual interests, decision-makers, in exercising judgement and discretion, are in 
a position to resolve this tension in various different ways, favouring either the social 
objective of the rule on the one hand, or the interest of an affected individual on the 
other.’ 270 
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In summary, there is a tendency to consider administrative justice as ‘a separate part of 
the justice system in its own right’271 as well as to classify justice in three categories: 
administrative justice, legislative justice and judicial justice, despite the unique and 
incontestable notion of justice as ‘the first virtue of social institutions’.272 
 
f. Principles of administrative law 
 
It has been said that principles of law in general are mandatorily observed by the public 
administration throughout the exercise of its powers.
273
 For this reason, disregard for 
these principles by the administration or any tribunal or court compromises the legality 
of its decisions, and consequently gives rise to its liability if a private individual is 
aggrieved.
274
  
 
Despite the fact that much of substantive law regulating public administration is 
currently expanding towards the tendency to be contained in legislation – often 
consolidated into codes or acts – the majority of the principles of administrative law, 
under both legal systems, have been predominantly created in case law due to the 
process of induction from the judicial practice of the administrative tribunals and 
courts.
275
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In this regard, it has been said that before the enormous proliferation of administrative 
norms and decisions, as well as the lack of a homogenous and unanimously admitted 
criteria, the influence of principles of law has similar authority to the law.
276
  
 
Furthermore, it has been also argued that the validity and applicability of the legal 
premise: ‘the law reigns, but the judicial precedent governs’, is more likely to be 
applied to administrative law through principles of law than can be achieved in any 
other branch of law.  
 
On the other hand, it has been stated that judges are neither creators of law nor 
interpreters of general principles of law, but that they guarantee the due observance of 
the concrete precept of the law.
277
 So, as E. Letourneur said: ‘the administrative judge 
is not a creator of norms, but he is, as any judge, subjected to the law; however when he 
applies unwritten general principles, he does so in accordance with the intention and 
spirit of the lawmaker’.278  
 
Hence, administrative law principles are created and sustained by dynamic 
administrative law decisions (i.e., through administrative or judicial reviews). In fact, 
these principles are vividly applied to day-to-day public administration activity as well 
as to the judicial control of the public administration decisions.  
 
One of the main problems with the principles of administrative law is the difficulty that 
it represents for public law lawyers a need to draw a line or boundary between the 
scope of each of these principles. It is due to the interconnected nature of these 
principles, mainly their interrelation with the principle of legality, that it is quite 
                                                 
276
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difficult for any legal expert to carry out a study of the boundaries of these principles 
within a few pages. Nonetheless, in this sub-section the author will try to summarize 
and draw the dividing line between the main principles of administrative law. 
 
Additionally, as far as this research is concerned, it is important to highlight that, 
despite the fact that these administrative law principles are not codified or compiled in 
a single text but are split into many different legal instruments, this research is 
nevertheless intended to identify the most relevant principles of administrative law that 
have been recognized and applied to administrative law controversies. It is not the 
intention of this study however to create an exhaustive and detailed account of the 
principles of administrative law. 
 
i. Principle of legality 
 
The principle of legality is the foundation or pillar of any legal system that is 
represented either though the ‘government according to law’ or through the ‘rule of 
law’ from where other legal principles consequently derive or emanate.279 For 
Example, in R v Foreign Secretary ex p Bancoult,
280
 it was stated that the national 
constitution  represented the foundation of the rule of law. It was also pointed out the 
there is a need for public administration to rely on an express delegation of power to 
regulate on specific issues to avoid accusations of illegality and/or abuse of power.  
 
The meaning of this principle varies from the legal context where it is interpreted, e.g., 
it will depend upon the legal system – whether it is a socialist state or a judicial state.281 
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Nonetheless, despite this difference, the main aim of this principle mainly refers to the 
‘fact that the administration must be compelled to observe [and obey] the law’.282 That 
is to say, that every simple act of the administration at any level is subject to this 
principle.
283
 For example, the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice, in its decision 
00218 (Tamanaco Advertising, C.A. v. Ministry of Infrastructure) states that ‘the 
conduct of the administration must be subordinate to the law’.284  
 
With regard to this premise, it has been said that the practical meaning of this principle 
is based on the hierarchical character of the rules of law (i.e., M. Hauriuo’s doctrine on 
the principle of legality as a ‘legal set of laws and regulations’).285 For example, in R. v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Pierson,
286
 it was stated that the 
principle of legality ‘applies with equal force to protect substantive basic or 
fundamental rights’. As mentioned before, this premise basically repeats the obligation 
of the government to act according to law otherwise its actions will not be valid. 
 
In this regard, Hauriuos’s doctrine can be better understood through Hans Kelsen’s 
legal pyramid which establishes a hierarchical relationship between higher (i.e., the 
Constitution) and lower (i.e., administrative acts) norms in which, according to the 
level of their location, the lower norm must respect the higher one. Nevertheless, 
whatever the position of the legal act, it is an indubitable part of the ‘legal set of law 
and regulations’.287 For example, in R v Lord Chancellor it was stated that ‘[a 
constitutional right] cannot be abrogated by the state save for a specific provision in an 
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Act of Parliament, or by regulations whose vires in main legislation specifically confers 
the power to abrogate’.288 
 
Regarding the principle of legality as ‘principium est primun’ (i.e., a proposition with 
value of an axiom from which other principles derive), its application is imposed to any 
act that is entrusted to the judicial control of judges.
289
 Moreover, the public 
administration, as part of the state unit, is also compelled to observe the principle ‘tu 
patere legem quam ipse fecisti’290 which basically requires the administration to respect 
the law that it created itself.  
 
Additionally, when this principle refers to the fact that the administration’s acts must 
respect the law that is above it, it embraces two points. Firstly, the act must be in 
accordance with the dispositions that are directly related to it, mainly including the 
conditions of jurisdiction and the form that may condition the validity of the act. 
Secondly, the act, by its very nature, must respect the superior law applicable to the 
same subject. To this end, the act cannot contradict the superior law, either in an 
express or implicit manner; it can only complement and adapt them either to concrete 
situations, or apply them to a particular case.
291
 For example, in R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department,
292
 it was stated that ‘fundamental rights cannot be 
overridden by general or ambiguous words’. 
 
It is important to highlight in relation to this situation that in private law, individuals 
can do whatever is not prohibited by law, whereas in public law and in accordance with 
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the principle of legality the administration can only carry out acts that the law 
permits.
293
  
 
Despite the same final aim and meaning of the principle of legality under both the 
French and British systems, i.e., the activity of government acting through law; it is 
important, by a way of illustration, to point out that under the British system the 
principle of legality known as ‘government according to law’ is a part of the concept of 
the ‘rule of law’ which even goes beyond the principle of legality.294  
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that administrative law ‘is wholly inconsistent with the 
rule of law’ with regard to the concept of the dual role of the state, which basically 
rejects the dualistic quality of the administration of justice.
295
  However, as previously 
mentioned, the distinction and implication of the rule of law is not more than ‘the pure 
and indubitable subjection of everyone to the law’, which, in the end, has the exact 
scope as the principle of legality as it exists in the French system.
296
  
 
Furthermore, some authors have said that the fundamental point of this distinction is 
found in the vestiges of Dicey’s doctrine about the rule of law and his resistance to the 
Droit Administratif (Administrative law).
297
 Nonetheless, this may provide grounds for 
a legal discussion that goes beyond the main scope and purpose of this research.  
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ii. Principle of the public administration’s discretionary power 
 
The Barron’s Law Dictionary defines the word ‘discretion’ as ‘the reasonable exercise 
of a power or right to act in an official capacity; involves the idea of choice’.298 In this 
context, it is noteworthy to mention here that in Roberts v Hopwood
299
 it was stated 
that ‘the discretion conferred upon the council by the statute was not an uncontrolled 
discretion and must be exercised reasonably’. 
 
In this regard, any act of the administration is subject to at least two minimum 
conditions that are imposed by law. The first is related to the capacity of the public 
administration, i.e., the competent authority to dictate the act. The second is based on 
the aim pursued by the public administration, i.e., the fact that such aim must be 
grounded in the public interest.
300
  
 
This principle is an extension of principle of legality that applies to all elements of the 
administration’s activities, especially regarding the legal capacity of the public 
administration. This legal capacity is founded upon and derived from another principle 
known as ‘authorised delegation’. In other words, this latter principle basically imposes 
on the public administration through the conditions established in a determined 
legislative act, the obligation of deciding in a certain way (i.e., discretion) with due 
observance of law.
301
 For example, in Bushell v Secretary of State for the 
Environment,
302
 it was stated that ‘in exercising… discretion, as… exercising any other 
administrative function, [officials] owe a constitutional duty to perform it fairly and 
honestly and to the best of their ability…’ 
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It has been said that the exercise of this discretion is not contradictory to the principle 
of legality.
303
 Conversely, it is based on the idea of promoting the public interest and 
also giving the public administration a certain flexibility to adapt its performance to 
those vivid, dynamic and changing realities it has to face, particularly in cases that 
could not have been foreseen.  
 
This adaptation to the current needs of public administration is known as the ‘principle 
of opportunity’. However, this exercise can incur some extra limitations of power by 
the administration. This extra limitation of power is known as the abuse of power of the 
administration (i.e., d’ excés de pouvoir304 in France and ultra vires305 in Britain).  
 
The grounds for the determination of validity of a given administrative action carried 
out by excess of power must be – in any case – based on and in accordance with the 
law. This determination of validity also involves the pre-established conditions that 
were enacted to allow the administration to exercise such vested discretion and 
flexibility (i.e., freedom to appreciate or discretionary power).
306
  
 
Following the British administrative doctrine on discretionary power which states that 
‘in exercising discretion, an official or public body may (intentionally or inadvertently) 
make a decision or embark on action which the court considers to be unlawful’307, there 
are also other related principles which can be found, that may give grounds for the 
review of such action by the court.  
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For example: (i) the principle of irrelevant considerations which is based on the fact 
that a decision-maker may or may not take ‘into account factors that in law are 
irrelevant or leaves out of account relevant matters’;308 (ii) the principle or improper 
purposes which refers to the ‘malice or personal dishonesty on the part of the officials 
making the decision’;309 (iii) the principle of error of law that compels the 
administration to ‘direct itself properly on the law or its decision may be declared 
invalid’310; (iv) the principle of unauthorised delegation (delegatus non potest 
delegare); which is applicable to those cases where a public entity tries to sub-delegate 
on grounds of its discretion to another entity the power that was entrusted to it by a 
determined statute;
311
 and, (v) the principle of unreasonableness (irrationality) that 
refers to the decision of a judge to set aside an official decision because it was ‘so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it’, known is Britain 
as the ‘Wednesbury’ principle.312 
 
iii. Principle of proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality currently represents the most common cause for 
challenging a public administration decision and it is an expanding legal argument that 
is used in order to challenge ‘a discretionary policy choice made by the 
administration’.313 For example, in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
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Civil Service,
314
 the need to analyze this principle was emphasized. That is to say, 
following the obiter dicta set out in this case, the principle may become a separate 
ground of review in the future. Nonetheless, under the British system, subsequent 
decisions have rejected the principle of proportionality as a separate ground for judicial 
review where human rights were not involved.
315
 
 
In fact, this principle is not only connected to the principle of legality, but also to the 
principle of discretionary power of public administration (i.e., fairness).
316
 An 
explanation of this linking process is found in the idea that ‘if [an] action to achieve a 
lawful objective is taken in a situation where it will restrict a fundamental right, the 
effect on the right must not be disproportionate to the public purpose sought to be 
achieved’.317 For example, in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury 
Corp,
318
 the role of the court was questioned with regard to the application of this 
principle. It was stated that ‘where a public authority making a decision had only taken 
into account the matters it ought to have taken in to account, the court could still 
interfere with the decision where it was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority 
could ever come to it’. 
 
In this situation, it was said that this principle ‘requires a certain portion or balance 
between the administrative measure taken and the aim to be achieved’.319 Indeed, this 
                                                                                                                                              
1052, quoted by Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, pages 37-5, 234 and 235. See also P. Craig, EU 
Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, UK 2006), on page 658. 
314
 [1985] AC 374 (House of Lords) 
315
 See, e.g., R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 (House of Lords) 
and Sommerville v Scottish Ministers [2008] S.C (H.L) 45 : (House of Lords). 
316
 J. A. Usher, General Principles of EC Law (European Law Series, Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 
England 1998), on page 37. 
317
 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 737. 
318
 [1948] 1 KB 223: (Court of Appeal). 
319
 See Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, on page 233. 
 107 
principle seems to represent a premise which states that ‘proportionality of a measure is 
something different from its necessity’.320  
 
An example of this argument can be found in Decision 01202, Aserca Airlines v. 
Ministry of Infrastructure, of the Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela. In this case, when the court referred to the 
proportionality of a penalty given to the Claimant by the Ministry, it stated that ‘the 
principle of proportionality orders that the measures adopted by an administrative body 
must be proportional to the facts performed by the infringer’. In the same regard, the 
court also states that ‘the principle of proportionality constitutes an exigency for the 
administration to appreciate a priori the factual situation and the aim pursued by the 
norm’.321 A similar example is also found in decision 00481, PDL Construcciones, 
C.A. v. Servicio Nacional de Contrataciones, of the same chamber of the Venezuelan 
Supreme Tribunal. In this particular case, when the tribunal referred to the 
discretionary power of the administration to grant provisional measures, it stated that 
‘the prudential activity of the administration must be subject to the principle of 
proportionality.’322  
 
For a better understanding of this latter statement, it can be useful to understand W. 
Jellinek’s example and his own explanation on the idea of necessity and proportionality 
in which he proposed a double scale of gravity:  
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Gravity of the 
situation 
Gravity of the 
measure 
10 10 
9 9 
8 8 
7 7 
6 6 
5 5 
4 4 
3 3 
------- ------- 
2 2 
1 1 
0 0 
Source:  Rivero, J., (1984). 
  
According to this graph, it is stated that the gravity of the situation is equal to the 
sacrifice that the community would have to make if the measure were not adopted. In 
other words, the gravity of the measure is the sacrifice of the rights related to the 
individual to whom the measure is applied. The gradation must be parallel (so an 8 
corresponds an 8) and the measure is necessary. Below a certain grade of gravity, for 
example, the principle ‘de minimis non curat praetor’ (law does not care about trivial 
things) is applied; i.e., regarding the measures, the exercise of the authority is no longer 
necessary.
323
 
 
Further to this, it has also been argued that in a democratic society, it is necessary that 
the adoption of any public administration measure must comply with the restrictions 
that are prescribed by law, and also that such an adoption must be accepted for 
specified public purposes.
324
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Moreover, where a right is restricted on the grounds of public interest, such a restriction 
‘must be necessary and proportionate to the damage which the restriction is designed to 
prevent’.325  
 
Additionally, it has been said that the principle of proportionality is not a consequence 
of the fundamental right to freedom, but a consequence of the principle of legality.
326
 
Therefore, this principle represents ‘the delimitation through appreciation of the 
authority’s sphere’. It has been said that the application of this principle can be done 
either through general criteria (in absence of law) or through express mandate of the 
law.
 327 
 
 
iv. Principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations 
 
The principle of legal certainty refers to the necessary protection of an individual’s 
rights before any discretionary act of the administration.
328
 In this regard, for example, 
the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice, in its decision No. 3180 (TECPICA, C.A. 
v. Venezuela) of the Constitutional Chamber, asserted that ‘legal certainty refers to the 
quality of the juridical system. That is to say, it implies the certainty of the norms and 
their application’. Similarly, the same tribunal states that ‘[this principle] pursues the 
existence of legitimate expectation of the people of the country in their juridical system 
and its subsequent application’. Finally, the tribunal states that ‘this principle embraces 
the acquired rights of the people which cannot be infringed arbitrarily when the law is 
required to be changed by another law or amended’.329  
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This principle also refers to the individual’s belief that he/she may have ‘a justified 
expectation to obtain from another person, a favourable abstention or declaration to 
his/her interests’.330 In this particular situation, the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice states, in Decision 3057 (Seguros Altamira v. Venezuela) of the Constitutional 
Chamber, that ‘this principle implies the legitimate expectation of private individuals 
that the state will act in the same manner as it has been acted, before in relation to a 
similar circumstances’.331 Following this same line of thought, in R v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners,
332
 it was stated that ‘the doctrine of legitimate expectation is rooted in 
fairness but fairness is not a one-way street. It imports the notion of equitableness, of 
fair and open dealing, to which the authority is as much entitled to as the citizen’.  
 
In this regard, the conduct that gives rise to the expectation is not only constitutes 
actions, but also certain abstentions and refusing manifestations or voluntary omissions 
(e.g., rules related to the introduction of new norms, to the stability of juridical 
situations, to the principle of participation, to the exercise of discretionary power, to the 
contractual regime of the administration, and to the liability of the administration).
333
 
Furthermore, it has been said that the action by the administration must be performed in 
accordance with pre-established rules and known by the individuals (i.e., principle of 
predictability).
334
 
 
Additionally, this principle is closely connected to the principle of legitimate 
expectations (confiance légitime) and at the same time it is endowed with an aspect of 
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 A. R. Brewer Carias, Principios del Procedimiento Administrativo en America Latina (Universidad del 
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legal certainty.
335
 The protection of legitimate expectations has been well established in 
British law and has been recently recognised in French law.
336
  
 
One common point shared by the British and French systems, is that in a case involving 
the revocation of a decision the public administration may exercise its discretion but 
must take into consideration that such action ‘may not alter the decision to the 
individual’s disadvantage’.337 Furthermore, such revocation must be done on the basis 
of and in accordance with the express statutory provision.
338
 Nevertheless, there is a 
point of disagreement between these two systems related to a ‘breach of an 
assurance’.339 According to the Barron’s Law Dictionary, assurance or covenant means 
‘an agreement or promise to do or not to do a particular thing’.340  
 
In the context of this definition, under the British system, an assurance which is given 
by the administration to an individual, even though the relevant legislation does not 
expressly refer to such an assurance, may constitute a well established ground for the 
enforcement of the legitimate expectations created by such an assurance.
341
 For 
example as in R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Oloniluyi,
342
 it 
was argued that an immigration officer could not refuse to admit a Nigerian citizen 
                                                 
335
 For a detailed study of legitimate expectations in administrative law, see S. Schonberg, Legitimate 
Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, UK). See also Bradley and Ewing, supra note 
12, on page 753; Rondon de Sanso, supra note 330, on page 16; and Brewer Carias, supra note 334, pages 279-
285. 
336
 See, e.g., Entreprise Transports Freymuth (TA Strasbourg, 8 December 1994), quoted by Neville Brown 
and Bell, supra note 12, on page 235. See also Rondon de Sanso, supra note 330, on page 16. 
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 Re 56 Denton Road Twickenham [1953] Ch 51; quoted by Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 754. 
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 See Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 754. 
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 Ibid., on page 754. 
340
 S. H. Gifis, Law Dictionary (Barron’s Legal Studies, USA 1996), on page 116. 
341
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342
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because a verbal assurance had been given to her by an immigration officer which 
insured that she would be allowed to re-enter the UK. 
 
Here, one may query the relationship between the British conception of legitimate 
expectations and the possible occurrence of an illegal assurance and whether this would 
be deemed to contradict the principle of legality. Conversely, under the French system, 
any assurance given by the public administration must be enshrined in written form and 
must be in accordance with an express provision of the law, which requires the 
fulfilment of express administrative formalities and proceedings.
343
 The failure to 
adhere to these proceedings leaves the act to be quashed by the court. These principles 
of legal certainty and legitimate expectations raise ‘difficult questions as to how a court 
balances individual expectations against the necessity for official bodies to act in the 
public interest’.344  
 
Finally, an important point to be stressed in this regard is the relationship between the 
principle of legitimate expectations and the legal doctrine of ‘estoppel’ (i.e., the 
doctrine that prohibits any revocation or contradictory actions to the detriment of other 
individuals).
345
 Nonetheless, it has been said that this doctrine is not applicable to the 
public administration when it acts in accordance with its excessive powers or 
prerogatives.
346
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 See Brewer-Carias, supra note 123, pages 74-97. 
344
 See R v North Devon Health Authority, exp p Coughlan, [2001] QB 213; and, P. Craig and S. Schonberg 
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345
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Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 757. 
346
 See Rondon de Sanso, supra note 330, on page 7; Bradley and Ewing, supra note 12, on page 757; Fox, 
supra note 56, on page 182; and Shalev, supra note 30, pages 465-467. 
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v. Principle of equality before the law 
 
The principle of equality before the law emphasizes the same legal status applicable to 
all individuals (i.e., nationals and non-nationals) and the status which the public 
administration itself possesses under the conditions and circumstances established by 
the law, as well as the individual’s rights to have access to, and the opportunity to 
benefit from, public services.
347
  
 
In this respect, in Decision No 16238 of the Political-Administrative Chamber of 
Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice, it was said that true equality before the law is 
based on the idea that individuals should be subject to the same legal treatment that 
other individuals have, under the same legal circumstances and conditions (principle of 
‘vertical equality’ within the administration348).349 Similarly, in Decision 3057 (J. 
Reyes Gaterol v. Venezuela) of the Constitutional Chamber of the Venezuelan 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice, it was stated that individuals who are not in the same 
circumstances and conditions predetermined by law cannot be treated in a similar way 
because the law does not succumb to the particular interests of individuals, but the 
public interest.
350
     
 
In the past, this principle was primarily perceived to abolish the discrimination between 
the sexes and nationalities, whereas today it is acknowledged globally that the majority 
                                                 
347
 See, e.g., Decision No 16238 of 19 September 2002, Political-Administrative Chamber, Supreme Tribunal 
of Justice (Venezuela). 
348
 See Langrod, supra note 30, on page 360. 
349
 See, e.g. Decision No 16238 of 19 September 2002, Political-Administrative Chamber, Supreme Tribunal 
of Justice (Venezuela). 
350
 See, e.g., Decision No. 3057 of 01 March 2007, Constitutional Chamber, Supreme Tribunal of Justice 
(Venezuela). See also Syndicat Chretein Du Corps des Officiers de Police (CE 21 April 1972); Federation des 
Syndicats Generaux de L’Education Nationale (CE 26 June 1989); Compagnie Alitalia (CE 3 February 1989); 
quoted by Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 12, pages 230-231. 
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of legal systems currently prohibit almost any kind of discrimination.
351
 An example of 
this premise can be found in Villalba v Merrill Lynch & Co Inc and others
352
 which 
involve allegations of sex discrimination and which were heavily reliant upon the 
relevant acts which prohibit such behaviour. 
 
However, the use of this principle has constantly re-emerged when the administration 
has to face the provision and guarantee fair and equitable treatment to both nationals 
and non-nationals and has to deal with areas of the public domain.  
 
An example of the economic impact of the use of this principle by the public 
administration can be taken from the principle of equality of public burdens, i.e., the 
case when the public administration (must) decide to increase or decrease a given tax in 
order to protect or promote the national economy and the public interest, and therefore, 
the national welfare.
 353
  
 
One may say that this principle seems to be more of a constitutional principle than an 
administrative principle. Nonetheless, it becomes important to the public 
administration’s activities when it has to perform its functions under the scope of 
constitutional law precepts and the law in general.
354
 This is especially the case if it is 
pointed out that the application of this principle has some economic impacts on the 
provision of public services as well as on the fair and equitable opportunities given to 
individuals to access such services.
355
  
 
                                                 
351
 See Palasi, supra note 276, on page 573. See also Syndicat Chretein Du Corps des Officiers de Police (CE 
21 April 1972); Federation des Syndicats Generaux de L’Education Nationale (CE 26 June 1989); Compagnie 
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547 para 12. 
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 See Palasi, supra note 276, on page 563. 
354
 See Palasi, supra note 276, on page 561. 
355
 See, e.g., SA Des Grands Magasins Economiques (CE 10 February 1937); quoted by Neville Brown and 
Bell, supra note 12, on page 229. See also Palasi, supra note 273, on page 563. 
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Finally, it has to be stressed that the violation of this principle may require two basic 
elements: (i) there must be various individuals who are subjected to exactly the same 
factual conditions; and (ii) different juridical consequences must be applied to each of 
these individuals.
356
  
 
vi. Principle of the public administration’s good faith 
 
The foundation of this principle has its origin in the idea or intention of neither 
damaging anyone nor breaching the law.
357
 In this regard, courts have assumed that the 
application of this principle is an obligation for the entire administration. For example, 
in Board of Education v Rice,
358
 it was stated that ‘the Board of Education will have to 
ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts… in good faith’. If such a principle is 
adopted in such a manner, administrative acts can be vitiated. This latter observation 
was pointed out in Roberts v Hopwood where it was stated that ‘bad faith admittedly 
vitiates the [public administration’s] purposed exercise of its discretion’. 
 
In administrative law, this principle is found in the transparent relationship between the 
state (public administration) and individuals. It has been said that both public 
administration and an individual’s acts must be inspired by the respect for the principle 
of good faith as well in relation to the principle of equity.
359
  
 
Similarly, it has also been argued that the major idea behind any public 
administration’s decision is the duty to obey the law.360 In other words, as a 
consequence of the expanding development of the public administration’s decisions, 
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 Decision 02-1589 of 19 December 2003, Constitutional Chamber, Supreme Tribunal of Justice 
(Venezuela). 
357
 See Rondon de Sanso, supra note 330, on page 21; Usher, supra note 316, on pages 101-103; and Shalev, 
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based on new finalities (it is good to remember here the dynamic nature of the 
administration) and social tasks, there has been an increase in the dependence of 
individuals on the administration. Therefore, this growing dependence, plus the 
limitation of freedom, can only be compensated with the wider applicability of the 
principle of good faith.
361
 In fact, it has been stated that the principle which asserted 
that ‘ignorance of law is not an excuse’ applies not only to individuals, but also to the 
administration itself.
362
 
 
To clarify this latter position, it has been stated that the applicability of the principle of 
good faith requires two determined positions: (i) a situation of trust and a formal 
appearance motivated by the conduct of the administration; and, at the same time, (ii) a 
situation of trust of the individual under the same situation of any administrative 
entity.
363
 In this regard, it is important to point out as a corollary, the global acceptance 
of the principle of bona fides semper praesumitur nisi mala adesse probetur (i.e., good 
faith is always presumed as long as the contrary is not proven).
364
 
 
vii. Principle of the duty to give reasons (motivation) 
 
The principle of the duty to give reasons (motivation) has been introduced as a general 
principle to the administration’s activities, owing to the fact that it is considered to be 
‘one of the fundamentals of good administration’.365 For example, in R. v Ministry of 
Defence Ex p. Murray
366
 it was stated that ‘while there was no general duty in law for 
decision making bodies to give reasons, in some case fairness would require that 
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363
 See Brewer Carias, supra note 334, on page 278. 
364
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365
 See,e.g., Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union and Others [1971] 2 Q.B 175. See also Neville Brown 
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reasons [should be] given’. Similarly, in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex parte Doody,
367
 Lord Mustill asked whether ‘refusal to give reasons is 
fair’ and his immediate answer was ‘no’. 
 
Keeping these statements in mind, it can be inferred that this principle mainly requires 
that ‘any administrative decisions must be accompanied by reasons’.368 This principle 
is known as pas de motivation sans texte and has been a long accepted guideline under 
both the British and French legal systems.
369
 However, this principle may not be 
applicable to certain types of administrative acts such as those inter procedural acts.
370
  
 
In this regard, it has been stated that: 
Individuals or legal persons have the right to be informed without delay of the 
reasons for individual administrative decisions which affect them 
unfavourably. To this end reasons must be given for decisions which: restrain 
public liberties or constitute a regulatory measure; impose a penalty; 
subordinate the grant of an authorization to restrictive conditions…; withdraw 
or restrict rights, set a time limit or foreclosure; refuse a benefit to which a 
person has a right if the legal conditions are met.
371
    
 
Similarly, it has been also asserted at the (European) regional level that: 
Regulations, directives and decisions adopted by the European Parliament and 
the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall 
state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals or 
opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty.
372
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In addition, it has been argued that this principle to give reasons may better equip 
individuals at the moment they challenge any administrative decision, especially if the 
legal rights of the individuals involved were infringed.
373
 For example, in decision 
00354 (J.O. Lucena Gallardo v. Ministry of Interior and Justice) of the Political-
Administrative Chamber of the Venezuela Supreme Tribunal of Justice, it was stated 
that ‘the insufficient motivation of administrative acts only gives grounds to the nullity 
of the same by private individuals who were not allowed to know in advance the legal 
foundation and facts that motivated the administration to adopt these disputed 
administrative acts’.374 A similar example is found in Decision 0859 (Maldifassi & 
CIA, C.A. v Ministry of Labour) of the same chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice, when it was stated that ‘motivation is an essential requisite of 
validity of the administrative act’.375 As Professor P. Craig pointed out, the duty to give 
reasons ‘is a salutary exercise’ because it does not only provide a more transparent 
process from the view point of aggrieved individuals, but also ensures that rationality 
of the administrative action to be taken into account.
376
  
 
Finally, it has also been said that the ‘proper and adequate’ motivation of the 
administration’s decision must also include the factual and legal sources of such a 
decision which would also constitute a guarantee of the right of defence of 
individuals.
377
 An example of this latter statement can be found in R v Civil Service 
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Appeal Board
378
 where it was stated by Lord Donaldson that ‘decision-makers shall 
give reasons’ to support their administrative or juridical decisions. 
  
g. Summary 
 
Under both the British and French administrative legal systems, the regulatory power of 
the state as state-regulator is mainly performed by the executive power (i.e., the 
government) through its public administration. Within this context, it has been 
illustrated that the relationship between private individuals and the public 
administration can be either unilateral or bilateral and can even involve excessive 
powers in favour of public administration.  
 
Additionally, despite their different legal traditions and origins, both legal systems have 
the same goals and aims. These are (i) the regulation of an individual’s relationship 
with others and with the state, and (ii) the provision of legal mechanisms to protect 
individuals from the abuse of power by the administration.  
 
These legal mechanisms exist at different levels and in different branches of the state 
(i.e., within the judicial and executive branches). These mechanisms have been 
conceived to review the administration’s actions or to resolve any regulatory dispute 
between an aggrieved individual and the administration. This controversy can arise as a 
consequence of the interplay between powers, duties and the discretion of the public 
administration.  
 
The practice of reviewing the administration’s actions has given rise, under both legal 
systems, to essential principles of administrative law that have mainly derived from 
these case law practices such as principles of: legality, administration’s discretionary 
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power, proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate expectations, equality before the 
law, the public administration’s good faith, and duty to give reasons, amongst others.  
 
On the other hand, both legal systems have created, through specific enacted laws, the 
above-mentioned legal mechanisms of review. These mechanisms of review have been 
drawn up with the idea of providing private individuals with legal mechanisms to face 
the privileges of the administration and to protect their subjective rights. This creation 
has also been done in accordance with the principle of legality. This principle allows 
judges to have a full appreciation of the supremacy-subordination relationship that 
exists between public administration and private individuals.  
 
The simple fact of having the public administration as a counterparty in any regulatory 
dispute makes the mechanism of settling disputes (i.e., internal and external reviews) 
subject to the principle of legality and to other related principles, including the 
excessive power of the administration. These principles are the natural principles 
applicable to acts of the public administration. Additionally, it can be also stressed that 
there is a common characteristic under both legal systems regarding the exercise of the 
regulatory power of the Crown in the benefit of his/her national public interest. That is 
to say that such regulatory power cannot be hampered even in the case of concluding 
public-law and private law contracts. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to highlight the dynamic and uncodified nature of administrative 
law here. It is important to point out that when attending any regulatory dispute it is 
necessary to consider the following aspects (i) the changing realities that public 
administration has to face; and (ii) the legal nature of the case law which means that the 
principle when applied to regulatory disputes may vary from case to case as no 
situation is exactly the same.  
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Based on the above premises, the next question that will be dealt with is how these 
institutions and principles of domestic administrative law can be used as a reference or 
as a guide by investment arbitrators to understand the argued analogy of international 
regulatory disputes with these domestic law principles and institutions. Additionally, 
how ISTAs deal with regulatory issues arising in the current international investment 
arbitration system. These questions will be the subject of the subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES – PUBLIC LAW 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
a. Introduction 
 
The worldwide proliferation of more than 2750
1
 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
over the last fifty years, on the one hand; as well as the coming into force of regional 
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
multilateral treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),
2
 on the other, have given 
life to the recent materialization of a new branch of law known as ‘International 
Investment Law’.3  
 
One of the main characteristics of this branch of law is the introduction of private-law 
elements into the traditional notion of public international law. One of these new 
elements is the participation of private individuals within the traditional public 
international law sphere (i.e., formerly known as the law of nations
4
). This participation 
has been allowed by sovereign states through the incorporation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) provisions which relate to private rights of action in favour of private 
individuals. This action mainly provides private individuals with a mechanism to sue 
                                                 
1
 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, The International Investment Regime, on page 81. 
2
 For more details see G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford Monographs in 
International Law, Oxford University Press, UK 2007).  
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 Doak Bishop, J. Crawford, and W. Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes – Cases, Materials and 
Commentary (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2005), pages 1-17. See also S. P. Subedi, 
International Investment Law – Reconciling Policy ad Principles (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2008), pages 7-18. 
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Union, the Organization of American States, etc. See Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 174. Additionally, International law does not prohibit 
individuals from being recognized as subjects of international law. However, it will depend on the 
circumstances. Examples of these circumstances are the development and recognition of human rights and the 
humanitarian treatment of the victims of war in international law. See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law (Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), chapter 25. 
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sovereign states before international ad hoc tribunals for the domestic adoption of a 
determined regulatory conduct, such as unilateral administrative acts as the sovereign 
state’s conduct that has violated a BIT provision.  
 
This particular mechanism
5
, used to settle legal disputes between a state and private 
individuals, has been better known as ‘investor-state treaty arbitration’ or ‘investment 
treaty arbitration’.6 
 
The selection of ISTA for this research surrenders to the idea that this particular 
mechanism which is entrusted mainly with resolving regulatory disputes and the 
current arbitral practice has created worldwide concerns (see Chapter VI) which exist  
both at national and international levels.
7
 The two main concerns have been: (i) 
investment arbitrators judging public-law and policy matters through the use of this 
arbitral mechanism; and (ii) the application of the principle of private law known as the 
principle of the party autonomy to various BIT disputes. This latter concern seems to be 
frequently used in the ISTA system by many litigants, without sufficiently taking due 
care of some elemental aspects of public (international and national) law, such as the 
public law capacity and nature of the respective sovereign contracting states and their 
international agreements such as BITs.  
 
Perhaps the frequent use of this principle of private law (i.e., party autonomy) 
surrenders to the idea that the foundations of BITs are derived from the international 
argument which asserts that public international law is also imbued as having ‘a 
                                                 
5
 Apart from investor/state treaty arbitration, which is used to resolve disputes between a state and private 
individuals, there is also the mechanism which is used to resolve possible disputes between the contracting 
parties (i.e., state/state treaty arbitration). Nonetheless, the present study focuses mainly on the public law 
nature of BITs and investor-state treaty arbitration.  
6
 See Doak Bishop, Crawford and Michael Reisman, supra note 3, pages 9-10. 
7
 See, e.g., S. Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration – Global Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2009); See also 
Van Harten, supra note 2; and M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment (Second Edition, 
Cambridge University Press, UK 2004). 
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contractual nature’.8 The legal nature of public international law has also been referred 
to as ‘a contractual system’9 which mainly highlights the legal conditions of sovereign 
contracting states such as equality and independence.
10
  
 
In accordance with these premises, within the international investment law sphere, 
there is a tendency to consider BITs as special contractual agreements between two 
sovereign states which are also completely isolated from the application of public law 
precepts in general. In fact, the main argument is that these BITs should be considered 
as a lex specialis which should leave aside the application of those rules that govern 
general matters (lex generalis).
11
  
 
With reference to the latter argument and also considering the above-mentioned 
elements of equality and independence of the contractual system, the question arises as 
to whether the contractual nature of BITs (in particular, BITs obligations) is truly and 
completely isolated from the application of institutions and principles of law in general, 
including those belonging to domestic (administrative) law.  
 
It is also relevant to highlight here that the effect of domestic (administrative) law, as a 
branch of public law that regulates a state’s behaviour domestically, can be the cause of 
some international conflicts between principles of international law and principles of 
municipal law when an international regulatory dispute is at stake. Consequently, these 
conflicts could also compromise the state’s international responsibility for the adoption 
of regulatory actions at the local level. In particular, if one considers the fact that a state 
                                                 
8
 G. Lysen, State Responsibility and International Liability of States for Lawful Acts – A Discussion of 
Principles (Iustus Forlaf Juridiska Foreningen I Uppsala, Sweden 1997), on page 177. 
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 Ibid., on page 28. 
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 Ibid., on page 28. 
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 O. M. Garibaldi, Presentation on Investment Treaties and National Laws, Seminar on Dispute Resolution in 
the International Oil & Gas Business – plus a special session on Boundary Disputes in the Energy Sector 
(organized by ICDR and AIPN), 19-21 April 2010, Houston, Texas. 
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is subject to public (international and national) law; it must act in accordance with the 
principle of legality at both a national and international level.  
 
This observation encourages study and analysis of the legal nature of international 
investment treaties (BITs) and their obligations as part of the fabric belonging to the 
above-mentioned contractual system, but to be mainly viewed in conjunction with the 
principles of public international law and some principles of domestic law. One can 
therefore ask where these BITs are to be found within a given state’s legal system. Can 
these BITs be considered to be a public law instrument? What kind of public law 
instrument are they? And, whether they have similar public law effects and 
consequences between the treaty-based state/state relationship and treaty-based 
state/investor relationship? 
 
Taking these various questions into consideration, it is important to stress that the final 
aim of this exercise will be to reach a conclusion on the legal nature of these 
international investment treaties. This will then help to determine the legal nature of the 
above-mentioned mechanism of settling disputes, i.e., the state/investor arbitration 
(which is the main aim of Chapter IV). 
 
The various assessments which have been carried out concerning the legal nature of 
BITs have been mainly done in the context of international law, until now. This is due 
to the fact that international law is considered to be of a ‘sui generis’ nature.12,13 Thus, 
this has been regarded to belong to an autonomous branch of law. This concept has 
been viewed as a mechanism to discard a priori lessons that could be learned from 
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 C. B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l 
L. 1083 (2008), on page 1086. For multiple definitions and approaches to international law see A. M. 
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Dictionary (Barron’s Legal Studies, USA 1996), on page 495. 
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many domestic legal systems around the world as it has been argued, for example, that 
‘the lessons of many legal systems around the world were simply not thought to be 
applicable to international law’14 and ‘there is little to be gained from national legal 
systems’.15  
 
Distinguished from this, the opposing idea is to visualize international law as ‘a unified 
system of rules created deliberately and explicitly by states’16 (i.e., the main subjects of 
public international law). This idea leads to the consideration of some domestic public 
law principles, e.g., principles from juridical, administrative and legislative areas; and 
their potential influence on the treaty-based state/investor relationship i.e., international 
regulatory disputes. Perhaps this can be done by referring to certain principles of 
domestic administrative law that have been conceived to deal with this type of 
relationship between a state and private individuals at the national level. Particularly, 
the conceptual and practical connections between the dynamic nature of international 
law and domestic law with regard to this state/investor relationship should be looked at 
in more detail.
17
 In this regard, public law litigants may argue that precedents would 
help to improve and enrich the international investment arbitration system at issue, 
which is currently undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. 
  
With regard to the main aim of this chapter, it is necessary to emphasize that the above-
mentioned concerns, in addition to the legal basis of this new branch of law and its 
system of investment treaty arbitration, can be mainly found – prima facie – in the 
                                                 
14
 W. E. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, in International Law in Comparative 
Perspective 25, 28 (William E. Butler ed., 1980); quoted by Picker, supra note 12, on page 1085.  
15
 Ibid., on page 1083.  
16
 See A. M. Slaughter, and S. R. Ratner, The Method is the Message 36 Stud. Transnat’l Legal Pol’y 239 
(2004), on page 239.  
17
 See Slaughter and Ratner, supra note 12, on page 18.  
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classical sources of public international law, e.g., treaties, international custom and 
general principals of law.
18
  
 
In this respect, the present chapter will study the legal nature of BITs, their effects, and 
their main provisions, and it will do so in terms of the main principles of international 
public law and from the perspective of some principles of domestic (administrative) 
law. Thus, it serves to illustrate international investment treaties as a ‘public system’ 
and as a better way of constructing law.
19
 As a final cautionary preliminary remark, the 
author considers it his remit to warn the reader that due to the size of this research, 
some points within this chapter might be considered over-generalized.  
 
b. Sources of public international law  
 
As previously mentioned, the sui generis nature of public international law
20
 and the 
lack of a centralised legislative authority at the international level has resulted in the 
necessity of distinguishing, from a theoretical viewpoint, between formal and material 
sources of public international law.
21
  
 
Due to the lack of a central legislative body, i.e., a kind of ‘international constitutional 
law making machinery’, it has been said that ‘formal sources [of law] do not exist in a 
sense in international law’.22 Therefore, despite the difficulty of maintaining the 
distinction between these two sources of law,
23
 the doctrine has consequently had to 
                                                 
18
 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Available at: <http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> (Last visit 21/11/2009). 
19
 See Sornarajah, supra note 7, on page 158. 
20
 See supra note 13. 
21
 For multiple definitions and approaches to international law see also Slaughter and Ratner, supra note 12. 
See also A. Jaffe Carbonell, Derecho Internacional Publico (Academia de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales, Serie 
Estudios 70, Venezuela 2008), on page 48; Sornarajah, supra note 7, on page 34; I. Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law (Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), on page 3; and Picker, 
supra note 12, on page 1086. 
22
 See Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 3. 
23
 Ibid., on page 3. 
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rely on the figure of material sources of law which can be understood as ‘the existence 
of rules, which, when proved, have the status of legally binding rules of general 
application’.24 (Emphasis added). 
 
In this regard, in support of this latter idea, there are international instruments or 
principles that have been created and conceived to be material sources of public 
international law in accordance with the consent of sovereign states and customary law 
belonging to the already mentioned ‘contractual system’.25 The majority of these 
principles have been codified and complied with, and are now embodied in 
international instruments in order to make them prima facie applicable (mainly) to the 
contracting parties, i.e., the sovereign states.
26
 
 
An example per excellence of these material sources can be found in the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, more specifically in Article 38.
27
 This article has been 
commonly accepted as the main foundation that establishes the principal sources of 
public international law.
28
 To this extent, Article 38 states:  
‘1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., on page 3. 
25
 Ibid., on page 3. 
26
 V. J. Tejera Perez, Investment Arbitration Within the Legal Promotion and Protection Framework in 
Venezuela, Transnational Dispute Management Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2008), on page 849. See also Brownlie, supra 
note 21, on page 13. 
27
 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Available at: <http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> (Last visit 21/11/2009). 
28
 See Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 5. 
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(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination for the rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex 
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.’ (Emphasis added). 
 
Based on content of this Article 38, it can be assumed that material sources of public 
international law may mostly be divided into three sources, namely: (i) international 
custom, (ii) general principles of law, and (iii) treaties. The present enumeration does 
not follow the hierarchical order established in the above-mentioned article. 
Conversely, this order has been adopted to give a better understanding and explanation 
of these important sources but within the context of this research.  
 
The first source is found in international custom, which plays a central role in public 
international law. International custom has been said to constitute the opinio juris of the 
international community.
29
 It can be understood ‘as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’, which also implies ‘a general recognition among States of a certain 
practice as obligatory’.30 In other words, it can be assumed that international custom is 
unwritten law, which exits and has mandatory force, even though it is not enacted in a 
specific text.
31
 Similarly, it has been said that prior to the application of any principle of 
international custom (to any state or even before the acquisition of the said mandatory 
force), it must be expressly accepted by the states involved through their consent.
32
  
 
Secondly, there are the general principles of law. They are those principles that have 
been inspired by domestic law, i.e., principles developed domestically and accepted by 
                                                 
29
 See Sornarajah, supra note 7, on page 89. 
30
 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, (Sixth Edition, 1963); 
quoted by Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 6.  
31
 See Jaffe Carbonell, supra note 21, on page 47. 
32
 See J. Vélez García, Los Dos Sistemas del Derecho Administrativo – Ensayo de Derecho Publico 
Comparado (Institución Universitaria Sergio Arboleda, Colombia 1994), on page 330; and Jaffe Carbonell, 
supra note 21, on page 237.  
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all (civilized) states.
33
 In this case, it has been said that ‘[t]he intention [of this practice] 
is to authorize the Court to apply the general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in 
so far as they are applicable to relations of States’.34 Additionally, it is believed that the 
general principles of law are a set of rules without which a legal system cannot function 
or even exist.
35
 In other words, they constitute a necessity in any legal system since 
they help to cover the inevitable lacunas that may exist in public international law. 
 
Lastly, there are the international conventions, better known as treaties. These legal 
instruments are defined by article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention
36
 as ‘international 
agreement[s] concluded between States in written form and governed by international 
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation’.37  
 
Emphasis must be put on the fact that treaties (in particular BITs) are created at the cost 
of restrictions on the contracting state’s immunity from jurisdiction, which are agreed 
upon and contained in provisions of the treaty itself.
38
 Treaties are binding by virtue of 
the will of states to be bound through a public document. Their provisions are mainly 
interpreted in accordance with the principles of the Vienna Convention. These treaties 
may also adopt interchangeable nomenclatures such ‘convention’, ‘agreement’ or 
‘protocol’.39  
                                                 
33
 This term is understood as ‘a society or country that has a well developed system of government, culture and 
way of life and that treats the people who live there fairly’. See Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/civilized_1> (Last visit 26/08/2010). See also Jaffe 
Carbonell, supra note 21, on page 100; and Lysen, supra note 8. 
34
 See Oppemheimer v. Cattermole [1973] Ch. 264; Quoted by Brownlie, supra note 21, on pages 16 and 405. 
35
 See Jaffe Carbonell, supra note 21, on page 92. 
36
 The Convention entered into force on 27 January 1980 and no less than 105 states have become parties to it. 
See Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 607. 
37
 Quoted by Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 609. 
38
 See F. G. Jacobs, and S. Roberts, The effect of Treaties in Domestic Law (United Kingdom National 
Committee of Comparative Law, Sweet & Mexwell, London 1987), on page 58 
39
 For further details on the coexistence of treaties with other sources of international law see M. E. Villiger, 
Customary International Law and Treaties – A Manual on the Theory and Practice of the Interrelation of 
Sources (Second Edition, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, Boston, 1997); P. Reuter, 
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Nevertheless, in the context of this research, it is also necessary to highlight the 
existence of the doctrinal distinction between law-making treaties (traités-
loi/vereinbarung) and contractual treaties (traités-contract/vertrag). It has been also 
pointed out that ‘this distinction refers to the substance, not the form of treaties’.40 
 
In relation to this distinction, it has been stated that law-making treaties ‘create general 
norms for the future conduct of the parties in terms of legal propositions, and the 
obligations [that] are basically the same for all parties’,41 whereas contractual treaties 
involve ‘political bilateral bargains’ whose main purpose is to attend specific needs 
between contracting states (mainly, issues of public interest).
42
  
 
It must be emphasised that IITs fall under the latter category of treaties. It has also been 
stated that one of the main obligations or commitments of the states is to internationally 
regulate their behaviour in order to guarantee that they neither overstep certain limits of 
law nor put others in danger.
43
 That is to say, it covers the obligations to avoid or 
minimize the abuse of power or ultra vires on the part of any of the contracting parties 
which may be detrimental to the interests of the other contracting state or its nationals.  
 
Here it is important to draw attention to the fact that this latter point seems to be similar 
to the domestic legal position of the state to regulate domestic state/individual 
relationships. Hence, it is important to stress that this latter domestic relationship is 
mostly  governed by principles of domestic (administrative) law. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Introduction to Law of Treaties (Kegal Paul International, London and New York, 1995); I. Sinclair, The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Second Edition, Manchester University Press, UK 1984). 
40
 See Reuter, supra note 39, on page 26. 
41
 See Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 13; and Picker, supra note 12, on page 1110. 
42
 See Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 13; and Picker, supra note 12, on page 1111.  
43
 See Vélez García, supra note 32, on page 330; and Jaffe Carbonell, supra note 21, on page 237. 
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i. Treaty-Contracts as lex specialis and the state’s international 
responsibility 
 
Despite the argument about the neither clear nor correct division of treaties between 
treaty-law and treaty-contract; an additional element regarding the distinction can be 
found. This element is the argument of considering some international treaties, such as 
BITs, as contracts
44
 (i.e., lex specialis).
45
 This element of distinction gives rise to the 
notion of contractual responsibility of the state at the international level when there has 
been an infringement of a BIT provision.  
 
In this context, it has been argued that, on the one hand, (i) contracts are conceived to 
regulate the relationship between parties,
46
 and, on the other hand, (ii) that the law of 
treaties and international responsibility have been used for different purposes other than 
regulating the traditional relationship between two subjects of the same legal nature 
(public law) and of the same legal status at an international level, such as sovereign 
contracting states.
47
 
 
With regard to the proposition concerning the private law characteristics of the BITs, it 
is noteworthy that some interesting legal elements can be found in general contract 
theory
48
 and the law of obligations.
49
 Under both theory and law, it has been recognised 
                                                 
44
 A contract is understand to be ‘an agreement between two or more individuals to constitute; rule; transmit; 
modify, or extinguish between them a legal nexus’. (Translated into English by the author). Article 1.133, 
Venezuelan Civil Code.  
45
 See Reuter, supran note 39, on page 27; and Lysen, supra note 8, on page 128. 
46
 Article 1.159 of the Venezuelan civil code establishes that ‘the contract has a force of law between the 
parties which cannot be revoked except by the mutual consent of the parties or by causes authorised by law’. 
(Translated into English by the Author). 
47
 See Lysen, supra note 8, on pages 101 and 133. 
48
 See S. Wheeler, and J. Shaw, Contract Law – Cases, Materials and Commentary (Clarendon Press – Oxford, 
1994), pages 30-118. See also J. Melich-Orsini, Doctrina General del Contrato (2° Edicion, Editorial Juridica 
Venezolana, Caracas 1993) and N. Cohen, and E. McKendrick., Comparative Remedies for Breach of 
Contract (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005). 
49
 See Wheeler and Shaw, supra note 48, pages 3-29.  
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that the violation of any contractual commitment involves an obligation to compensate 
the aggrieved party.
50
  
 
This domestic private law principle on contractual responsibility was exported into the 
international arena through the case of the Chorzow Factory, which has also been used 
as ‘the anchor upon which the responsibility of a state arising out of breach of a treaty – 
any breach – rests’.51  
 
It has also been said that ‘the implementation of that responsibility is a matter for the 
law of responsibility of States, not for the law of international treaties’.52 To put it 
another way, the responsibility of a state in breach of a treaty obligation seems to be 
activated as a consequence of the breach as though it were a breach of a private law 
contract.  
 
Regarding this latter aspect, it is crucial to point out here that the notion of a state’s 
contractual responsibility is not only based on public international law but is also 
based, in some circumstances, on principles of public domestic law This is due to the 
fact that, domestic public law is the law that gives meaning to the act of state that is 
considered wrongful at the international level. (See chapter IV and V). 
 
For this reason, the legal nature of BITs as treaty-contracts may be required to be 
revisited within this research from the perspective of some principles of (international 
and national) public law due to the fact that the argued international unlawful, arbitrary 
or discriminatory conduct of a host state is mainly based on the breach of specific BIT 
                                                 
50
 Ibid.  
51
 Quoted by S. Rosenne, Breach of Treaty (Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge 1985), on page 47. See 
also Sornarajah, supra note 7, pages 93-95; and I. Marboe, State Responsibility and Comparative State 
Liability for Administrative and Legislative Harm to Economic Interests, in S. W. Schill, International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, UK 2010), on page 380. 
52
 Rosenne, supra note 51, on page 47. 
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commitments by one of the contracting parties. Towards the end, this revision will also 
include the damage to private individuals as one of the motives which activates the 
responsibility of the state at the international level. This international responsibility will 
consequently give rise to the obligation to compensate the aggrieved party, largely in 
accordance with principles of public international law.
53
 
 
Conclusively, taking into account that (i) the contracting parties in a given treaty are 
sovereign states (i.e., main subjects of public international law);
54
 (ii) the necessity of 
having the contracting states express consent to create reciprocal commitments through 
the said treaty (i.e., full powers to negotiate, sign and seal an IIT and the creation of 
contractual rights and obligations);
55
 (iii) the activation of a state’s liability for the 
breach of the treaty provisions (i.e., law of responsibility of states); and (iv) the 
subsequent compensation for the aggrieved individual for the breach of such treaty 
provisions; a contractual and sovereign relationship clearly exists between two subjects 
of public international law.  
 
c. International investment treaties as public law instruments (treaty-
contracts) 
 
Coming back to the idea that International Investment Treaties (IITs) can be considered 
to be treaty-contracts,
56
 as previously mentioned, the question arises as to the legal 
nature of this kind of agreement, but this time within the scope of, and in consideration 
of, the main principles of public international law (particularly with reference to  the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention).  
 
                                                 
53
 For more details see Lysen, supra note 8. 
54
 See Sornarajah, supra note 7, on page 34. 
55
 In this regard, it has been said that ‘in the case of agreements between governments, full powers, in the 
sense of the formal documents evidencing these and their reciprocal examinations by the negotiators, are often 
dispensed with’ and that ‘A state is bound irrespective of international limitations by consent given by an 
agent properly authorized according to international law’. See Brownlie, supra note 21, on pages 617 and 610.  
56
 See supra note 44.  
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Thus, reaching a conclusion on the legal nature of BITs will help to determine the legal 
nature of ISTAs (the objective of Chapter IV). Subsequently, based on the final 
conclusion regarding the legal nature of ISTAs, the possibility of whether or not some 
principles of domestic administrative law (mentioned in Chapter II) can be used as 
references  in order to resolve issues arising from regulatory disputes which are settled 
by means of the above-mentioned ISTA (the objective of Chapter V) will be 
addressed.
57
  
 
The principal argument for taking this approach is based on the idea that one should 
begin the present legal analysis by taking the public law nature of the host state’s 
regulatory conduct into account. Thereafter, one should analyze whether this regulatory 
conduct has or has not affected the interests of a given investor or a group of investors. 
In some cases, if a regulatory conduct has an effect on the interests of investors this 
may or may not represent a breach of an IIT’s provisions.58  
 
In particular, this query is contextualized in the fact that the law which controls the host 
state’s regulatory conduct and the development of foreign investments is not only 
public international law, but also public domestic law. In this regard, it has been argued 
that this domestic/international law synergy is in a state of constant expansion due to 
the fact that some states (especially developing countries) hold the belief that the 
current investment scheme of IITs may help to harness their economy and aid their 
                                                 
57
 In this regard, Professor T. Wälde stated ‘The common principles of the main administrative law systems 
are in my view an important point of reference for the interpretation of investment treaties to the extent 
investment treaty jurisprudence is not as yet firmly established’. See International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v. The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) December 2006 – Separate 
Opinion. 
58
 It has been stated that ‘A state may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa’. See Azurix 
Corp. v. la Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) July 14, 2006 – Final Award. 
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development.
59
 Taking these facts into consideration, it is important to lay out the 
following issues: 
 
i. Definition of BITs 
 
As a starting point the definition and nature of BITs must be visited. The official 
definition of a treaty is contained in article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention.  
 
The Vienna Convention establishes that a treaty can be understood as:  
[A]n international agreement concluded between States in written form and  
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. 
(Emphasis added).  
 
Similarly, an additional definition of a treaty was quoted by Prof. I. Brownlie in his 
book entitled ‘Principles of Public of International Law’. He cited the 1962 provisional 
draft of the International Law Commission that defined a treaty as:  
[A]ny international agreement in written form, whether embodied in a single  
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation (treaty, convention, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, act, 
declaration, concordant, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum of 
agreement, modus vivendi or any other appellation), concluded between two or 
more States or other subjects of international law and governed by 
international law.
60
 (Emphasis added).  
 
The previous two definitions of treaty draw attention to five common elements: they 
are: (i) an international agreement, (ii) in written form, (iii) concluded between two or 
more states, (iv) embodied in one single or more instruments, and (v) governed by 
international law. These five common elements also make up the most essential 
                                                 
59
 For developing states, the right of regulation lies at the root of foreign investment policy. See Sornarajah, 
supra note 7, on pages 101, 105 and 313. 
60
 Yrbk. ILC (1962), ii 161; quoted by Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 608. See also Reuter, supra note 39, 
on page 30 who defines a treaty as ‘an expression of concurring wills attributable to two or more subjects of 
international law which has legal effects under the rules of international law’. 
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elements for the existence of civil law contracts, i.e., consent, subject-matter, and licit 
cause.
61
 
 
Regarding the definition of a BIT, it is important to include within the traditional 
definition of a treaty an additional component to the common elements. This additional 
element is the mutual and express promise of the contracting parties to materialize their 
reciprocal intentions of promoting economic cooperation to their reciprocal benefit.
62
 In 
other words, the additional element is the express introduction of aspects of a state’s 
public interest within such state-state cooperation. This is a common factor in the 
subject-matter of all BITs.  
 
Despite the fact that it has been said that ‘jurists are today less willing to accept the 
more doctrinal versions of the distinction between treaty-contract (vertrag) and treaty-
law (vereinbarung)’,63 from the author’s point of view, a BIT can be defined as a 
contractual agreement (a treaty-contract) in written form between two sovereign states 
embodied in a single agreement through which they establish reciprocal obligations in 
order to promote economic cooperation to their reciprocal benefit.
64
 This kind of 
international agreement is known within international investment law argot as a ‘lex 
specialis’.65 That is to say, it has the character of a binding and regulatory document 
between the sovereign contracting states.
66
  
 
                                                 
61
 Article 1141 of the Venezuelan Civil Code.  
62
 See, e.g., the preamble of the Venezuela-Vietnam BIT; the Venezuela-Belarus BIT; the Venezuela-Barbados 
BIT; the USA-Argentina BIT; the USA-Ecuador BIT; the USA-Panama BIT; the Colombia-Peru BIT; the 
Colombia-Switzerland BIT; the Colombia-UK BIT; the Colombia-Spain BIT; the Colombia-Chile BIT; and 
the Colombia-Cuba BIT. 
63
 See Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 637. 
64
 For an extensive explanation of the state’s role as a primary subject of international law; See Cassese, A., 
International Law (Oxford University Press, UK 2001), on pages 71-150; and Brownlie, supra note 21, pages 
57-102. 
65
 See Sornarajah, supra note 7, on page 206 
66
 See Lysen, supra note 8, on page 101. 
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This contractual state-state relationship is governed prima facie by the private law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept). It means that the 
performance of a given BIT must be conducted in accordance with certain standards, 
i.e., mutual obligations (see sub-section d) that have been previously agreed upon 
between the parties located in the BIT. As previously mentioned, the possible breach of 
these standards (i.e., obligations or duties) involves the responsibility on the part of the 
wrongdoing contracting state.
67
 These international standards should mainly be 
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention. Nevertheless, 
it has been said that a breach of an investment contract does not necessarily involve a 
breach of a treaty or vice versa.
68
  
 
ii. Legal nature of BITs 
 
When determining the legal nature of BITs, it is necessary to assert that when the 
notion of a contractual agreement is mentioned here, the traditional and classical theory 
of contract and the law of obligations is immediately referred to.
69
 Such a reference is 
mainly based on the contractual nature of BITs as a voluntary agreement.
70
  
 
Nonetheless, it raises the question about allocating these BITs within the traditional 
branches of law
71
 (e.g., private and public law).  
 
                                                 
67
 For a detailed study on state responsibility and international liability of states, see Lysen, supra note 8. 
68
 In this regard, it has been stated ‘that a breach of a contract which the state has made with a foreign investor 
does not by itself give rise to an international remedy’. See Sornarajah, supra note 7, on page 13; G. S. Tawil, 
The Distinction Between Contract Claims and Treaty Claims: An Overview, in A. J. Van den Berg, 
International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics – ICCA International Arbitration Congress (Kluwer Law 
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 In this regard, it has been said that ‘conventions, treaties and other international agreements are essentially 
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interpreted and applied. International treaty interpretation is not all that unique; it tends to reflect domestic 
legislative and contract interpretation methodologies.’ (Emphasis added). See Picker, supra note 12, on page 
1092. 
70
 See Wheeler and Shaw, supra note 48, on page 25. 
71
 See for more details Melich-Orsini, supra note 48, on pages 35-60; and A. Watson, Roman Law and 
Comparative Law (The University of Georgia Press, Athens and London 1991), pages 53-68. 
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Before moving forward, it is also necessary to focus on the fact that even though this 
research is limited in space precluding the possibility of expanding upon the wide range 
of types of contracts, the author, in order to simplify the discussion, will limit this 
research to the distinction between private contracts (i.e., private law contracts)
72
 and 
public contracts (i.e., public law contracts
73
). There is a paucity of literature on the 
application of contract theory to treaty dispositions.  
 
In relation to this point, it has been stated that ‘courts and commentators have not 
explored the application of contract theory to treaty interpretation in great depth’.74 
However, it is not the intention of this research to fill this gap in the literature. On the 
contrary, the purpose is to provide the reader with a general idea on such a point. 
 
Now, as far as this research is concerned, and being conscious of the fact that the 
meaning of most terms used in the wording of a treaty text can be variable, in addition 
to the change in country and constitution; it is of the utmost importance to point out 
that the form and content of a BIT tacitly refer to the legal requisites and elements of a 
private law contract, e.g., consent, subject-matter and licit cause.
75
 One example of the 
applicability of these private law elements to the investment arbitration system can be 
found in Desert v. Yemen (2008) where the arbitral tribunal made express reference to 
one of the factors which negates consent, i.e., duress. In this regard, the arbitral tribunal 
                                                 
72
 These types of contracts are agreements which are concluded by subjects of private law and are mainly 
governed by principles of private law, including contracts which are concluded by the state in its private 
capacity. 
73
 These types of contracts are agreements which are concluded between two or more subjects of public law, 
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concluded that the subscription to ‘the settlement agreement was signed under 
duress’.76 
 
At first glance, public contracts do not differ significantly from the form and content of 
private contracts. However, the essential elements that make private law contracts 
distinguishable from public law contracts are largely connected to (i) the subject-matter 
of the public law contract, i.e., presence of the state’s public interest (social order)77 
and (ii) the public law capacity of one or both contracting parties
78
 (i.e., the acquisition 
of the legal capacity in accordance with the principle of legality).
79
  
 
For example, if a state is acting in its private law capacity then there will be no doubt of 
the mainly commercial or private law nature of such a contract.
80
 Conversely, if a state 
is acting in its public law capacity, as it does when signing BITs, then there is a 
contract of a public law nature; and therefore, a contract relating to the public interest. 
That is to say, the public contract and its contents will be mainly subject to and 
governed by rules of public law.
81
  
 
Another aspect regarding the distinction between private-law and public-law contracts 
is a point related to the application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements 
must be kept).
82
 Here, it is important to state that in the case of BITs, the application of 
this principle is – in essence– based on the principle of legal equality among sovereign 
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states.
83
 This declaration has created a debate concerning the application of this 
principle to the double treaty-based relationship.  
 
For example, there are two types of treaty-based relationships. The first of which is 
relationship between sovereign contracting states and, the second of which the 
relationship is between one of the sovereign contracting states and a national of the 
other sovereign contracting state.  
 
Nonetheless, the public law nature of the BIT applies to both types of relationship. For 
the simple reason that the second type of relationship is a kind of secondary, subsidiary 
or indirect relationship between one sovereign contracting state (i.e., the host state) and 
a national of the other contracting state.
84
 In law, in general, there is a well-known 
aphorism which asserts that ‘the accessory follows the principal’. That is to say, the 
participation of private individuals within the state-state relationship is more like an 
open invitation to enjoy the prerogatives of the BIT, i.e., it is akin to the legal effects of 
an ‘adhesion clause’. 
 
The issue which has raised considerable debate is based on the fact that once a BIT is in 
force; it is argued that it is in force between the contracting parties, i.e., the sovereign 
states, and not between a contracting state and an investor.
85
 In accepting this 
secondary relationship as a primary treaty-based relationship, it could then give 
grounds to the argument that such an application could be interpreted as though it were 
a freezing clause related to the host state’s discretionary and regulatory power to 
introduce new regulations on grounds of the public interest. In theory, it has been stated 
                                                 
83
 See Lysen, supra note 8, on page 54. 
84
 See Van Harten, supra note 2, on page 130. 
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 142 
that, ‘the idea that a contract made by a state is defeasible in the public interest in 
demonstrably common to all legal systems’.86  
 
Additionally, as already emphasized, it has also been argued that if the state and 
individual relationship was treated as a primary based treaty relationship, one would 
argue that there is an elevation of an investor’s legal status to the rank of a state.87 The 
consequence of this elevation is that it could be beyond the scope of the traditional 
public international law notion and the possibility for an individual to bring a claim 
directly against the state.
88
  
 
Furthermore, it can be affirmed that such a legal equalization was not part of the 
primary intention of the contracting parties. In this regard, BITs are exclusively 
concluded by the main subjects of public law, i.e., sovereign states in the exercise of 
their sovereign powers. These sovereign powers are subject to the rules of public 
(international and domestic) law and their main objective is to promote economic 
cooperation to their reciprocal benefit, based on their public interest. In such a case, it 
can also be affirmed that the public interest could therefore be protected by the 
international principle rebus sic stantibus (things thus standing).
89,90
  
 
For this reason, a BIT is a public instrument but with double public law effects. That is 
to say, it has a contractual effect between the contracting states, and it has a regulatory 
effect between the host state and the nationals of the other contracting party. (See infra 
sub-section c) viii. Analogy with some principles of domestic administrative law). 
                                                 
86
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conduct of the host state, the above-mentioned principle of rebus sic stantibus cannot be invoked because of 
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 143 
 
Additionally, it can be said that BITs, as treaty-contracts, are public law instruments (in 
some cases assimilated to contracts of national interest
91
), that are enforceable due to 
the negotiation, intention and consent of the sovereign contracting states. This public 
nature is mainly based on: (i) the public nature of the parties (ratione personae) and (ii) 
the public nature of subject matter of the treaty (ratione materiae).
92
  
 
Finally, as will be seen later, under current practice, a breach of a BIT’s provisions 
makes the host state contracting parties subject primarily to the application of public 
international law principles as well as those standards that are contained in the treaty 
itself.
93
 The question here will now be, to what extent this legal application of standards 
(in particular the application of the FET standard) is completely isolated from the 
application of some principles of domestic administrative law, including  the notion of 
public interest, when international regulatory disputes are at stake. 
  
iii. Historical evolution of BITs 
 
Before embarking on a general description of the historical evolution of IITs and their 
main foundations, it is necessary to go back in time to the fifteenth century when the 
treaties of Westphalia were signed. This event marked the formal emergence of an 
international agreement between states; including the emergence of bilateral treaties 
that were signed by the pairs of states concerned.
94
 However, it could be suggested that 
                                                 
91
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bilateral treaties can even go further back to when the pharaohs in Egypt wanted to 
protect their trading interests from merchants from other countries.
95
 
 
Returning to the present, it could be said that, despite the fact that a long list of 
historical events that have determined the historical evolution of IITs is possible, along 
with a long list of international agreements that have been signed over the history 
between states,
96
 those treaties of ‘friendship, commerce and navigation’ were signed 
from the seventeenth century onwards.
97
 It has been said that the FCN treaties 
represented the starting point of the current bilateral investment treaty since they ‘may 
indicate a linkage between trade and investment’.98 The content of these treaties ranged 
from aspects related to the treatment of aliens, to the freedom of worship and travel 
within the host state.
99
 
 
Furthermore, it is also important to point out that it was during the middle of the 
nineteenth century when the Triepel theory on the distinction between treaty-law 
(Vereinbarung) and treaty-contract (Vertrag) emerged.
100 
The main objective of this 
distinction referred to the substance of the treaties, and not to their form.
101
 
 
The contemporary history of BITs as agreements of long duration
102
 starts with the 
historical signing of the first Bilateral Investment Treaty that was concluded in 1959 by 
Germany and Pakistan
103,104
 (it recently celebrated its 50 years anniversary).
105
 Since 
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then, there has been rapid growth in the number of BITs to over 2750. It has been 
argued that such an increase has been due to the lack of funds for economic 
development; recession in the developed economies; and the changes in policy.
106
  
 
Perhaps the relevance and importance of mentioning these points is due to the fact that, 
even though there has been an increase in the number of BITs, a number of these have 
been various failed attempts to conclude multilateral agreements on investment, e.g., 
Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA).
107
 Similarly, it has been said that the 
signing of this kind of agreement ‘would significantly curtail [host states’] control over 
their domestic regulatory space’.108  
 
Since the Second World War,
109
 the political bargaining and legal ideology behind the 
signing of BITs has been perceived to be a practice which stabilizes those above-
mentioned principles and elements related to investment, which are undertaken by 
corporations, as well as the freedom to establish within the host state’s territory.110 It 
has been said that these principles and elements were created by international customs 
in order to contribute to the investment sector in the future.
111
  
 
In fact, this practice has given rise to the concept of a lex specialis referring to the two-
party-agreement mechanism to create a regulatory relationship between contracting 
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states in order to minimize the uncertainty that has dominated international law, in 
particular with regard to the protection of foreign investment.
112
 
 
In the 1960s, due to the yo-yo effect of state policies and the world economy, the 
United Nations, as a worldwide international organization, through the International 
Law Commission, adopted the 75-draft-article-document on the law of treaties, which 
later constituted the basis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
113
 The 
main aspects of this Convention were: (i) the recognition of the existence of some 
principles of law; (ii) the limitation of this convention to treaties concluded by and 
between states; (iii) the limitation of the convention to ‘material breach’; and (iv) the 
scope of limitation of the convention; which is to say, that it would not deal with: (a) 
treaties between states and organizations, or between two or more organizations; (b) 
questions of state succession; (c) the effect of war on treaties.
114
  
 
Similarly, within the context of the treaty provisions, the Permanent Court of Justice 
through its decision in the Chorzow Factory case introduced the notion of international 
state responsibility, which was a result of a refusal by the state to fulfil a treaty 
obligation.
115 
 
 
This responsibility has been constructed with the concept of the diplomatic protection 
of citizens abroad in mind. This is due to the fact that the theory of state responsibility 
to aliens was based on the idea that ‘injury to the alien is an injury to his home state’.116 
                                                 
112
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This is why it has been said that ‘the root of international law on foreign investment 
lies in the effort to extend diplomatic protection to the assets of the alien’.117 
 
In summary, the rapid increase in the number of BITs is mainly due to the advantage of 
signing this type of special ad hoc agreement between contracting parties and due to 
the failure of states to finalise multilateral agreements.
118
 Additionally, it has been said 
that due to the far-reaching consensus of states on the standards of treatment towards 
aliens on the part of the host state, ‘a considerable tension’ has emerged between the 
developed and developing countries regarding the exercise of the host state’s regulatory 
conduct, the application of state responsibility and the need to promote and protect 
investments.
119
  
 
iv. Main characteristics of BITs 
 
The main characteristics of BITs can be principally divided into two categories: (i) 
essential characteristics, i.e., those without which the BITs would not exist; and (ii) 
characteristics of form (structure), which relate to those characteristics which do not 
necessarily determine the existence of a BIT and may vary from one document to 
another.
120
 
 
Within essential characteristics, it is important to mention: (i) the contractual nature of 
the BIT, i.e., an agreement (e.g., a public law instrument); (ii) its form which must be in 
writing; (iii) the legal nature of the contracting parties which must be two sovereign 
states (i.e., subjects of public law with full powers to negotiate, sign and seal a BIT
121
); 
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(iv) the formality that requires the BIT to be embodied in a single instrument; (v) the 
governing law that refers to international and national laws; (vi) the establishment of 
reciprocal obligations (standards of treatment); and (vii) the declaration of the main aim 
of the contracting parties, i.e., the promotion of their economic cooperation in terms of 
the reciprocal benefit to them, e.g., issues of public interest of the contracting states (as 
part of the BIT’s subject matter). 
 
The characteristics relating to form (structure)
122
 can be summarised as: (i) the 
preamble that mainly states the aims of the BIT; (ii) the list of basic definitions as an 
identification of types of property to be protected, (including the ‘controversial’ 
definition of ‘investment’123 and the elements related to the nationality of foreign 
investors); (iii) the admission and protection of foreign investors; (iv) the description of 
the respective standards of treatment or rights (i.e., obligations) to be given to the 
contracting parties and their national investors, e.g., fair and equitable treatment of 
investors; repatriation of profits; compensation for damages, etc; (v) the mechanisms 
established to settle disputes between the contracting parties and between a contracting 
party and nationals of the other contracting party (including consultation and 
negotiation) and the applicable law and proceedings rules; and (vi) the dispositions 
related to the effectiveness, duration, extension, and termination of the BIT.
124
     
 
v. Concept of foreign investment 
 
One of the most important and sensitive characteristics to a BIT is the definition of 
‘foreign investment’ or ‘investment’. Nevertheless, this concept may vary from treaty 
                                                 
122
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to treaty. It will depend on the intention and the bargaining power of the contracting 
states. However, this aspect is certainly defined and embodied in the majority of BITs.  
 
For example, the USA-Argentina BIT (1994) defines ‘investment’ as follows:  
[E]very kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as 
equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes without 
limitation: (i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as 
mortgages, liens and pledges; (ii) a company or shares of stock other interests in 
a company or interests in the assets thereof; (iii) a claim to money or a claim to 
performance having economic value and directly related to an investment; (iv) 
intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: literary and 
artistic works, including sound recordings, inventions in all fields of human 
endeavour, industrial designs, semiconductor mask work, trade secrets, know-
how, and confidential business information, and trademarks, service marks, and 
trade name; and (v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licences and 
permits pursuant to law.  
 
One of the problems with this type of definition is that it has been defined ‘as broadly 
as possible’.125 Thus, it is not an easy task for investment arbitrators to determine the 
number and nature of investments that are involved under the scope of a given BIT.
126
 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to point out that one of the inevitable aspects of a definition of 
investment is the incorporation of long-term investment agreements, which have been 
simultaneously assimilated into the notion of investments of public interest, since they 
may impact or benefit the host state economy.
127
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This incorporation has been mainly due to the contribution that this type of long-term 
investment contract has to the host state’s development and, consequently, to the 
coexistence of this type of agreement with a host state’s public interest.128 This 
clarification is given due to the fact that public investments are slightly different from 
those short-term private or commercial agreements, which are typically identified with 
the trading of goods and services.
129
 In this regard, it is opportune to point out the 
Salini test which mainly highlights the four main elements required by a foreign 
investment to be considered as an investment for purposes of the ICSID Convention: 
they are (i) a contribution, (ii) a certain duration over which the project is implemented, 
(iii) a sharing of operational risks, and (iv) a contribution to the host State’s 
development.130  
 
Another of the most common characteristics related to the definition of investment is 
found in the preamble of these BITs. This characteristic essentially refers to the real 
intention of the contracting parties. That is to say, the preamble consolidates, in one 
way or another, the acknowledgment of a common public interest in the contracting 
parties, based on the belief that, through the promotion and protection of investments, 
BITs also generate a synergy which stimulates economic initiative and increases the 
welfare and prosperity of both states involved.
131
 
 
Within this context, a foreign investment has been defined as  
[The transference] of tangible or intangible assets from one country into  
another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under the 
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total or partial control of the owner of the assets
132
, (emphasis added) in order 
to cooperate in promoting the economic objectives of the host state.
133
  
 
Furthermore, another crucial element of this definition is also found in the concepts of 
direct management and control of the assets by the investing company.
134
  
 
This critical element helps to draw the dividing line between foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio investment. It has been said that the former is an example of the 
need to have the authorized presence of the investor in the host-state territory, whereas 
the latter allows participation but without the presence of the investor.
135
 The 
distinction between these two concepts also helps to determine the extent of 
international host-state liability for the possible losses suffered by an aggrieved 
individual. In this regard, it has been said that it may also require taking into 
consideration the little-known fact that the nature of the financial and commercial risk 
of portfolio investment could be settled via domestic legal mechanisms.
136
  
 
Nevertheless, the discussion about the inclusion or omission of portfolio investment in 
the concept of investment requires further research and explanation. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this research. Moreover, the importance of the inclusion or 
omission of such an item in the definition of investment depends on the intention and 
consent of the contracting states and to the due observance of their enabling powers 
granted by their internal laws.
137
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As previously mentioned, this research will only refer to the concept of direct foreign 
investments, which are destined to increase welfare and prosperity within the 
contracting states.
138
  
 
vi. The contracting states of BITs  
 
One of the most essential characteristics of BITs is that they are consensual 
agreements,
139
 i.e., two legal persons are required.
140
 
 
In this case, two sovereign states are required. These states are subjects of public law
141
 
(at national
142
 and international
143
 levels). With regard to the public law nature of the 
contracting parties, it has been said that they are ‘[entities] capable of possessing 
international rights and duties and have the capacity to maintain [their] rights by 
bringing international claims’.144  
 
Such capacity is linked to the following concepts: (i) ‘capacity to make claims in 
respect of breaches of international law’; (ii) ‘capacity to make treaties and agreements 
valid on the international plane’; and, (iii) ‘the enjoyment of privileges and immunities 
from national jurisdictions’.145 Following these ideas, neither national individuals nor 
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foreign investors can be considered to be traditional subjects of public international 
law.  
 
In this regard, it is important to stress that it is clear that the state and individual public 
law relationship is based on the public law nature of one or both of the contracting 
parties, in addition to the public law capacity with which they act and the public 
interest involved. It will also be important to determine the public law nature of the 
agreement as a whole. For example, in the present case of BITs, the public law nature 
of the agreement is not only determined by the public law nature of one of the 
contracting parties, but also by the public law nature of both contracting parties. 
 
Finally, as in any contractual relationship, the contracting parties to a BIT have their 
interests and their conflicts. Both positions are addressed in the following sub-sections 
in a general manner. 
 
o Contracting state’s interests 
 
The main interest on the part of the contracting states is mainly found in the preamble 
of a BIT. In the preamble, the contracting parties express their mutual intention in the 
majority of BITs, the main aim or interest is (i) the promotion of economic cooperation 
between the contracting parties; (ii) the reciprocal benefit to both parties; and (iii) the 
protection of their national investors and their investments.
146
  
 
Generally speaking, it can be assumed that the economic cooperation in question is 
centralised in areas of the parties’ public interest (e.g., construction, transportation, 
exploitation of natural resources, etc). Hence, this type of cooperation is basically 
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destined to improve the development or welfare of one of the parties (i.e., the host 
state) and to benefit the other party’s nationals.147 
 
o Contracting state’s conflicts 
 
It is necessary to mention from the outset that any conflict between contracting parties, 
resulting as a consequence of the breach of a BIT provision, should be settled through 
treaty-based arbitration in accordance with the rules of international law in particular 
with the provisions of the Vienna Convention (material breach).
148
 Nevertheless, 
conflicts are a result of the double law effect of BITs. For example, the public law 
effect between contracting states and the public law effect between the host state as a 
contracting party and an investor of the other contracting party. The latter case, in 
essence, largely refers to an investor/host-state regulatory conflict when the host -state 
exercises its public power and breaches a given BIT’s provisions. 
 
Such investor/state regulatory conflict has, as a consequence, a different problem 
related to the contractual conflict between contracting states, particularly if the vague 
notion of FET standard is taken into consideration. Conversely, this is a regulatory 
problem or conflict that mainly arises when a host state needs to exercise its regulatory 
power which, as a consequence, impacts upon the investor’s interests.149 This problem 
is similar to the domestic regulatory conflict that takes place when the public 
administration exercises its public authority and in doing so affects the interests of 
private individuals.
150
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Thus, it has been argued that this conflict may create a kind of contradictory picture for 
two main reasons: (i) the interest of the host state to attract investment, on the one 
hand, and, (ii) the urgent need of the host state to regulate the country’s activities in 
order to protect the national welfare, on the other hand.
151
  
 
It is within the context of the dual-role of the host state that the legal international 
investment apparatus starts to work and conflicts with domestic (administrative) law 
principles.
152
  
 
In relation to this conflict, it is appropriate to mention here, with regard to the exercise 
of a host state’s regulatory power and the treaty-based state-investor relationship, the 
application of the well-known principle of domestic administrative law (existing in 
both French and British administrative legal systems). This principle establishes that 
the Crown or the state cannot hamper her/its freedom of executive action by contract.
153
  
 
This latter point is completely different to the traditional debate between the 
coexistence of the international principle which states that ‘a [state] may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law [including its domestic (administrative) law principles] as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.154,155 For further explanation of this 
latter argument see sub-section ix) analogy with some principles of domestic 
administrative law. 
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page 13. 
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o The need to include conflict mechanisms in order to settle 
BIT disputes. 
 
As in any contractual relationship, the contracting parties always seek to have legal 
remedies in place before a breach of contract takes place.
156
 In this regard, the primary 
interest of the contracting states to a BIT is to settle their differences or conflicts in 
advance through diplomatic channels and/or in an amicable manner.
157
  
 
It is relevant to note that the contracting states have decided to incorporate various 
mechanisms to settle their differences into the BIT structure. These mechanisms range 
from consultation; negotiation; to arbitration (see e.g., graph 1).
158
  
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011.
159
 
 
In relation to arbitration, there are two different levels to address in BIT disputes.
160
 For 
example, the first level has been drawn up for matters concerning disputes between 
contracting states. The majority of BITs establish generally that:  
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Any dispute between the contracting parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the BIT which is not resolved through consultations or other 
diplomatic channels, shall be submitted, upon the request of either contracting 
party, to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in accordance with the 
applicable rules of international law.
161
 (Emphasis added) 
 
The second level has been drawn up for investment matters related to disputes between 
one contracting party and the national or company of the other party, i.e., ‘investment 
disputes’. The majority of BITs also establish in a general way that:  
[I]n the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute should 
initially seek a resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute 
cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned may choose to 
submit the dispute… for settlement by binding arbitration to [ICISID or 
UNCITRAL rules].
 162
 (Emphasis added) 
 
It must be emphasized that both levels are neither hierarchal nor instance levels. They 
are just independent mechanisms that have been conceived to deal with the possible 
failure of one of the contracting states to fulfil their obligations (standards of 
treatment), which have been mutually agreed by the contracting states in a given IIT.
163
 
Thus, under the idea that a breach of contract requires compensation, it has been 
generally assumed that in the case of a state’s failure to achieve the said standards, 
compensation must be negotiated and/or paid to the aggrieving state.
164
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This is an appropriate context in which to recall the idea that the mechanism to settle 
disputes resulting from the violation of BIT provisions is known as ‘investment treaty 
arbitration’.165 Similarly, the investment treaty arbitration tribunal has also been 
regarded as an ad hoc and temporary tribunal.  
 
Furthermore, despite the argument that ‘international arbitration… lies in the idea of 
neutrality between states, and not between investors and states’,166 this mechanism has 
been considered to address disputes not only between states (contractual disagreement) 
but also between a contracting state and a national investor of the other contracting 
state (mainly regulatory disagreements). The incorporation of individuals into this 
system has been based on the suspicion that ‘domestic tribunals would not provide 
objective justice to a foreign investor’.167  
 
As mentioned above, these contractual and regulatory disagreements give rise to two 
levels or two types of settlement of disputes between parties, i.e., state-state arbitration 
and state-investor arbitration
168
 (see e.g., graph 2). 
 
 
 
                                                 
165
 The Legal Dictionary defines arbitration as ‘… the submission of legal controversies, by agreement of the 
parties thereto, to persons chosen by themselves…’ See S. H. Gifis, Law Dictionary (Barron’s Legal Studies, 
USA 1996), on page 30. 
166
 See Van Harten, supra note 2, on page 131. 
167
 Similarly, it has also been said that ‘[i]nvestors attempt to keep issues out of the national courts [of host 
states] by appropriate clauses on jurisdiction in the case of a dispute and on choice of applicable law’. See 
Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 545; and Sornarajah, supra note 7, on pages 149 and 250. 
168
 This is a special mechanism for the foreign investor to seek remedies for their injured rights which have 
been established by a given treaty. Sornarajah, supra 7, on page 13. 
State State 
National National 
Graph 2 
State-State 
Arbitration 
State-Investor 
Arbitration 
Level One 
Contractual Disagreement 
Level Two 
Regulatory Disagreement 
 159 
It is in relation to this topic that the question about the legal nature of this second-level 
mechanism of settling disputes arises. In other words, this question refers to whether 
this investment treaty arbitration mechanism can be compared to any public legal 
resolutions that are available in a given domestic legal system, particularly if the legal 
nature of international regulatory disputes is taken into consideration. Can the arbitral 
tribunal when settling regulatory issues be compared to those tribunals or courts that 
exist within the structure of a given domestic legal system? If one takes into 
consideration the public law nature of the contracting parties (sovereign states), the 
public law nature of the agreement (BITs); and the public law nature of the BIT’s 
subject matter (promotion of economic cooperation to their reciprocal benefit), then the 
answers to these questions will be found in the functions of this (voluntarily state-state 
agreed) investment tribunal.  
 
Notwithstanding, attention must be given to the fact that the main idea of arbitration as 
a mechanism to settle disputes between contracting states and their nationals is mainly 
based on the idea of promoting and protecting the investment flow between them.
169
 
Accordingly, the regulatory nature of an arbitral issue of a given investment dispute 
will depend largely on the public law subject matter of the said investment, on the 
regulatory conduct of one of the contracting parties (i.e., the host state), and how such a 
regulatory conduct undermines the main objective of a given BIT and its provisions.
170
 
In fact, it has been said that in the end: ‘[t]he enforcement of international law depends, 
to a significant extent, on state self-regulation’.171 
 
Another aspect of importance regarding this point is the one related to the principle of 
state immunity. This is limited by the contracting states when they decide to conclude a 
                                                 
169
 Ibid., on page 256. 
170
 Ibid., on page 256. 
171
 See Picker, supra note 12, on page 1090. 
 160 
given BIT.
172
 Consequently, at the moment that a state decides to conclude a treaty 
(including a BIT), it is surrendering part of its immunity of jurisdiction. This idea is 
fundamentally based on two principles that are related to state immunity.  
 
As Professor Sornarajah pointed out, these two principles are (i) the maxim ‘par in 
parem non habet imperium’ (i.e., a sovereign state cannot exercise jurisdiction over 
another sovereign state), and (ii) the principle of ‘non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of the other states’.173  
 
Additionally, another principle that can be incorporated into the two previous ones is 
the fundamental procedural principle that states ‘no one should be judge of his own 
cause’.174 Based on these principles, the contracting parties have been mutually 
convinced to agree on submitting their treaty-based disputes to treaty-based arbitration 
as a way of creating a neutral forum. Thus, they have agreed to create a kind a 
temporary ‘supranational tribunal’ to deal with disputes arising from a particular BIT. 
 
An additional element regarding investment treaty arbitration and state immunity is the 
debate on the distinction of those state acts by right of dominion (i.e., Acta Jure 
Imperii) and those state acts by right of management (i.e., Acta Jure Gestionis). It is has 
been said that the latter case denies the immunity from jurisdiction by assimilating 
these acts to those acts of commercial nature.
175
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Nevertheless, the concern arises at the moment when investment arbitrators are faced 
with one or both types of these acts, as they may therefore be required to review the 
nature and effects of these acts.  
 
Consequently, it has been said that this kind of investment arbitral practice exposes ‘the 
democratic legitimacy of arbitral tribunals’ since they exercise an ‘extensive 
supervisory control over decisions of judicial and administrative organs of states’.176  In 
this particular regard, it has also been said that there could be ‘some wide interpretation 
of state consent’ because the investment arbitral tribunal is required to pronounce on 
issues of public interest.
177
  
 
It has been pointed out that ‘a satisfactory mode of application of the principle of 
restrictive immunity has yet to be developed’.178 Perhaps one of the reasons is the 
difficulty of reconciling the notion of absolute immunity with the notion of public 
policy.
179
 In fact, within this context, the tradition so far has been that any regulatory 
dispute between an individual and the state is subject to the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts.
180
 
 
As a final remark, these treaty-based dispute-solving mechanisms, including 
arbitration, have been considered to be neutral mechanisms and an alternative to 
domestic courts settling BIT disputes.
181
 However, this will also depend on the will of 
the contracting parties. In some cases, before a treaty violation takes place, the parties 
may have agreed to exhausting local remedies before resolving the dispute through a 
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treaty-arbitration (known as the ‘fork-on-the-road’ provision).182 Finally, most arbitral 
proceedings have been agreed to be subject to and governed by procedural rules of the 
ICSID and UNCITRAL.
183
 
 
vii. The location of international investment treaties within a 
state’s legal system  
 
Under the premise that ‘treaties are made to be performed’,184 the best manner to locate 
BITs within a given state’s legal system is through the traditional international theories 
of monism and of dualism. These positions have emerged from the idea that dualism 
considers there to be a total separation between the national juridical order and the 
international juridical order (Triepel’s school), whereas monism does not recognise 
such a separation (Kelsen and George Scelle’s school).185 
 
It has been argued that the relationship between municipal law and international law 
represents a clash between these two theories.
186
 This clash is mainly based on the 
subject matter of both national and international laws. This is to say that while public 
international law (formerly known as the ‘law of nations’) mainly regulates the 
relationship between sovereign states, municipal law, in comparison, is mainly 
applicable to the relationship between the state, i.e., the executive power, and its 
citizens.
187
 This particular point requires special attention when account is taken of the 
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fact that a BIT, as any international agreement, reduces the scope of immunity of the 
contracting parties involved.
188
 
 
Furthermore, unlike the monist theory, under the theory of dualism, a BIT needs to be 
incorporated into the state’s legal order through the approval of the National Congress 
or Assembly in order for it to become enforceable. One of the main arguments of doing 
this, as pointed out by the doctrine, is the presence of municipal law and its position of 
priority in application by municipal courts in case of conflict with international law.
189
 
Conversely, the monism theory simply assumes the supremacy of international law 
‘even within the municipal sphere’.190  
 
Following the idea of applying municipal law to ensure the correct application of some 
treaty obligations, a concern presents itself about the coexistence of the state’s 
regulatory power (state’s control) and those rights and obligations (standards of 
treatment, in particular the FET standard) that are stipulated for the direct benefit of 
individuals in BITs.
191
 It has been asserted that ISTA is described as ‘a unique 
internationalized arm of the governing apparatus of states, one that employs arbitration 
to review and control the exercise of public authority’.192 Additionally, it has been 
stated that ‘[s]uch [coexistence] has raised and continues to raise a number of practical 
problems’193 and that this problem ‘… also lies behind the theoretical debates on the 
dualism and monism’.194 
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In any case, one may assume that such coexistence could be significantly improved if 
one takes into consideration that, due to the diffuse and vague nature of the FET 
standard at the international level, municipal law contains a good reference of legal 
principles, which could be used in resolving international regulatory disputes .
195
 To 
support this idea, it has recently been stated that ‘[t]he connection of domestic legal 
systems is immediately apparent when considering… [public international law] 
sources.’196  
 
As a complementary element to this coexistence, it is important to draw attention to the 
fact that once foreign individuals and their properties have entered a given state’s 
jurisdiction, both are primarily subject to the law of the host state.
197
 (See the following 
sub-section viii: Submission of individuals to this legal system).  
 
Additionally, despite the argument concerning the supremacy of international law over 
municipal law, customary international law has recognised that an entrance of foreign 
individuals and their properties into a given state is largely governed by the sovereign 
prerogatives of that state.
198
 It has even been pointed out that ‘it is up to each State and 
its Constitution to ensure the correct application of treaties’.199 
 
In summary, the application of these two theories, and the effects of BITs, depends 
greatly on those general principles and practices that are a key factor not only in 
international law, but also in a given constitutional and administrative legal system. 
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Thus, the question now is whether the legal principles of domestic administrative law 
can be applied to some of the rules relating to the breach of BIT provisions, and 
perhaps to ascertain whether these principles can be applied to the mechanisms 
provided by the contracting parties to settle state/investor disputes, in particular, 
regulatory disputes. Further to this, it must be established in which ways these 
mechanisms can be applied. 
 
viii. Submission of individuals to this legal system 
 
As a general idea, based on the principle of legality, everyone is subject to the rule of 
law. For this reason, it has been said that a BIT limits ‘the sovereign right of a state to 
subject investors to its domestic administrative legal system’.200 That is to say, a BIT 
establishes the minimum international standards of treatment which determines the 
legality of the regulatory conduct of the host state. These standards of treatment 
represent a kind of limitation to the state’s regulatory power and the manner in which a 
foreign investor must be treated within the territory of a certain host state.  
 
Based on the concept of the contractual nature of BITs, it can be affirmed a priori that 
the states, as contracting parties, are subjects and are subjected primarily to the treaty’s 
provisions because of their express consent (i.e., lex specialis) and then subsequently to 
the law in general (i.e., lex generali).
201
  
 
However, based on the idea of considering BITs as international regulatory instruments 
and their respective incorporation into the state’s legal system (dualism theory), there 
are questions concerning the two types of submissions. Firstly, the contractual 
submission is the one that exclusively governs the relationships between the contracting 
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parties, i.e., sovereign states (public international law). Secondly, the regulatory 
submission is one that applies to the relationship between one of the contracting parties 
(i.e., the host state) and private individuals (i.e., foreign investors who are the direct 
beneficiaries of a BIT) (public international and national laws). (See Graph 3). 
 
 
In the latter circumstance, the relationship cannot be assimilated into the contractual 
submission for two main reasons: (i) due to the unequal legal status of a state and a 
private individual, and (ii) due to the fact that private individuals are automatically 
subject to the treaty provisions as well as to the exercise of public authority in the host 
states.
202
 Conversely, this regulatory submission can be compared to the regulatory 
submission that exists within the domestic state/individuals regulatory relationship (see 
also graph 4) (i.e., it is regulated primarily by administrative law principles). In fact, it 
is in accordance with domestic law that private individuals acquire their legal capacity. 
However, despite this legal capacity, they still lack the power to negotiate treaties. 
Therefore, for this reason, it can be affirmed that both states and individuals are not 
only subject to BITs provisions, but also subject to the law in general i.e., lex generalis 
(international law and national laws).  
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Generally speaking, they are all obliged to obey the law. This obedience is mainly 
founded, amongst other principles, on the maxim which states that ‘ignorantia juris 
non excusat’ (i.e., ignorance of law is not an excuse), consequently drawing awareness 
to the content and effects of the law.
203
  
 
Moreover, obedience to the law is also due to the idea that states have been vested with 
a monopoly of coercive power and, therefore, they are empowered to affect the lives 
and rights (on grounds of the public interest) of those individuals (nationals and 
foreigners) that are in their territorial frontiers.
204
 This is also based on the fact that 
laws and regulations are imposed on individuals from outside their personal sphere, due 
to the fact that norms are adopted by public authorities as part of the state’s public 
system. These norms have been adopted to be obeyed by individuals within the 
framework of the principle of legality.
205
 
 
In the specific case of BITs, when an investor takes the decision of entering, in 
accordance with the principles established by public international and national laws,
206
 
the frontiers of a given host state, he/she is conscious that both he/she and his/her 
property are subject to the national law of that state.
207
 This is to say, the regulatory 
submission of an investor to the host state’s national law is not only done in accordance 
the principle of legality, but also with those legitimate interests of both the host state 
and the investor (including social and economic interests).
208
 Consequently, it has been 
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said that ‘[i]nternational law also has to respond to these changes [ in interests]’.209 
Otherwise, there could be potential problems due to the fact that, ‘the characterization 
of the investor-state relationship’ could ‘alter the nature of the rights and duties of 
states’.210 Moreover, it is of importance to highlight that BITs, their effects, and the 
waiver of state sovereignty in favour of their provisions, are not excluded from these 
observations.  
 
Obviously, the application of these observations, in the case of BITs, will heavily 
depend on the consent of the contracting states as a pre-requisite to create mutual 
obligations at both national and international levels. For example, sometimes, in 
treaties, the parties expressly provide provisions through which they recognise and 
respect the regulatory power of the host state. Evidences of this latter point can be 
found in the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty; in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) Draft Investment Chapter (June 2012) and in the Draft Model 
Norwegian Bilateral Investment Treaty (2007). However, areas of regulation belonging 
to the contracting states, such as, health and safety, labour and safety and 
environment
211
 are excluded from the scope of the application of the above-mentioned 
documents. Additionally, a wider exception is found in the Asean Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA)(2012) where the contracting states right to regulate  is 
extended to areas such as public morals; public order; protection of human, animal or 
plant life; health; safety; taxes; protection of national treasures of artistic, historic and 
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archaeological value; and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and 
financial services.
212
 
 
A similar position has also been adopted through the formula of protecting investments 
only if they have been ‘made in accordance with the laws, policies and regulations’ of 
the host state.
213
 Here the question will be whether the investor, as a direct beneficiary 
of a BIT, also needs to give his/her consent to be protected by a BIT’s provisions or 
whether it can be understood that the investor is just another individual who is subject 
to this legal relationship and therefore, is subject to the state’s legal system. In any 
case, it has been asserted that ‘states are becoming more like individuals in domestic 
systems, and international law is becoming more like domestic legal systems’.214  
 
Apart from following the dualism theory which establishes that a treaty must be 
promulgated like legislation in order to have the force of legislation, it can be assumed 
that the regulatory submission of individuals to the national law represents the current 
debate about the binding nature of treaties for courts and individuals, and the inclusion 
of other non-legislative issues (i.e., public interest) which are part of the public order in 
any host state.
 215
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ix. Analogy of BITs with some principles of domestic 
administrative law  
 
The concept of a BIT as a treaty-contract and as a type of contract which has a public 
law nature requires an analysis of the current concept of a public law contract. To this 
end, it is of importance to highlight that even though there is the freedom of states to 
conclude public law agreements at international and national levels, e.g., treaties and 
public contracts, respectively, these agreements should not be considered private law 
agreements for a variety reasons, for example the fact that the prerogatives of states are 
not relinquished by their subscription to these BITs, as will be seen later on.
216
  
 
The main argument is, as already mentioned, that these non-private-law agreements are 
governed by principles of public law. In fact, the contractual nature of BITs can be 
integrated into to the public law nature and features of other public contracts belonging 
to the state, e.g., administrative and government contracts. (See Graph 4). This is 
particularly so if these BITs are being used to create or justify a secondary BIT 
relationship, i.e., a state/investor relationship.  
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Unlike private law contracts of the state (i.e., those concluded in its private capacity), 
public law contracts mainly refer to those agreements that are concluded by the state 
but in the exercise of its public capacity and on the grounds of national public interest.  
 
This freedom to conclude public contracts, and its effects, are mainly governed by 
public law principles, especially by domestic public (administrative) law principles as 
seen in Chapter II. Moreover, the existence of domestic administrative law can be 
connected to the argument which declares that the application of this law prevents 
states from concluding contracts in accordance with a foreign law.
217
  
 
It is also important to point out that, despite the already mentioned limit of this research 
to notions of private and public law contracts, it needs to be said that, under the 
principles of both legal systems used in this research, there exists the institution of 
public law contracts. That is to say; those contracts that (i) are signed in accordance 
with the public capacity of the state; (iii) are signed on the grounds of the national 
public interest; and (iii) govern the regulatory relationship between the state and a 
given individual (see Chapter II).  
 
For example, under the French system, these public contracts are mainly called 
administrative contracts;
218
 whereas under the British system, they are mostly referred 
to as government contracts,
219
 (see Graph 4). In both cases, despite their different 
classification, these contracts are used to control the domestic contractual/regulatory 
                                                 
217
 Ibid., on page 35. 
218
 See L. Neville Brown and J. Bell, French Administrative Law (Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, UK 
2003), pages 202-212. See also R. Badell Madrid, Régimen Jurídico del Contrato Administrativo (Rafael 
Badell Madrid, Caracas – Venezuela 2001) and Brewer-Carias, supra note 91. 
219
 See Davies, supra note 75; P. Benson, The Theory of Contract Law – New Essays (Cambridge University 
Press, UK 2001); and Wheeler and Shaw, supra note 48. 
 172 
relationship between the state (the executive branch) and individuals (national and 
foreigners), e.g., concessions and licences.  
 
Similarly, these contracts also represent the regulatory submission of individuals to the 
state legal system. Curiously, the regulation of this internal state/individual relationship 
looks very similar to the regulation of the ‘alleged’ state/investor relationship that is 
derived from and protected by a given BIT.
220
 For example, in Total v Argentina 
(2010),
221
 it was stated that: 
[S]ignatories of [BITs] do not… relinquish their regulatory powers nor limit 
their responsibility to amend their legislation in order to adapt it to change and 
the emerging needs and requests of their people in the normal exercise of their 
prerogatives and duties. Such limitations upon a government should not lightly 
be read into a treaty which does not spell them out clearly nor should they be 
presumed. (Emphasis added).  
 
Conversely, in Perenco v. Ecuador (2009), the arbitral tribunal stated the opposite by 
saying that: 
[In] ICSID arbitration one of the parties will be a sovereign State, and where 
provisional measures are granted against it, the effect is necessarily to restrict 
the freedom of the State to act as it would wish.
222
 
 
In the case of BITs, the factors highlighted by the Total v Argentina arbitral tribunal are 
analogous the principle of domestic law that establishes that the prerogatives of the 
state or the Crown to exercise the freedom of executive action cannot be disadvantaged 
by a contract.
223
 This simply means that the regulatory power of the state cannot be 
hampered, even in the case of concluding public-law and private law contracts. This 
premise is applicable at both national and international levels, despite the argued 
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contractual and private law nature of a BIT as a lex specialis and the application of the 
principles of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) and of party autonomy. 
BITs should be considered to have legal effects similar to any another domestic act to 
which private individuals are subject. In fact, it should be considered that BITs are 
contracts of public interest. 
 
In this regard, it may be assumed, therefore, that the state/investor relationship is 
largely a regulatory relationship that also involves the incorporation of internal 
economic policies that may affect not only the economic activity of national 
individuals, but also foreign individuals.
224
 This effect upon an individual’s interest can 
produce some fundamental changes in circumstances in relation to the relationship 
between the host state and individuals.
225
 Under the internal regulatory state/individual 
relationship, as in international contractual relations, a legal responsibility is created 
when the legal interest of one of the parties is affected. Nonetheless, this responsibility 
is determined chiefly in accordance with the principles developed in domestic public 
law.
226
  
 
Another element of relevance is related to interpretation of domestic administrative law 
principles and the notion of public contract law. It has been pointed out that under both 
systems used in this research, the same public law contract may produce different 
interpretations.
227
 For example, under the French system (civil law tradition), the public 
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law interest prevails over the private interest.
228
 Conversely, under the British system 
(common law tradition) this dividing line is unclear, despite the fact that it is argued 
that the private law notion (Diceyan view) takes priority over the public law one.
229
  
 
These two different approaches may also affect the interpretation of treaty-contracts at 
the international level.
230
 For example, it has been said that ‘the common law [British 
system] and civil law [French system] approaches to interpretation produce conflicting 
understandings of the substantive obligations of international law.’231  
 
In summary, the analogy of BITs to domestic public law instruments helps to determine 
the nature of the legal relationship, not only between contracting states but also the 
regulatory relationship between a contracting state and its individuals, including foreign 
investors. Despite the different approaches that can derive from one system to another, 
there are legal elements that are common to them. These are (i) the public capacity in 
which the state acts when signing a BIT; (ii) the public interest that is involved when 
concluding this type of international agreement; (iii) the mandatory submission of 
individuals to this regulatory framework; and (iv) the non-relinquishing of the 
regulatory power of the contracting states by subscribing to these public law 
instruments. 
 
d. Substantive principles of international investment law  
 
BITs, like any contractual agreement, contain a set of conventional principles or 
standards of treatment that contracting states must guarantee between them and to the 
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national investors of the other contracting party. Similarly, in accordance with the 
notion that BITs are treaty contracts, it is important to indicate that BITs imply the 
existence of the sovereign (bargain) power of the contracting parties to assume 
international responsibilities (obligations). This sovereign exercise of power also limits 
the immunity belonging to the contracting states. It is for this reason, that state-state-
agreed-standards can be considered as international and reciprocal commitments 
between traditional public law subjects.  
 
This sovereign power is mainly founded on the idea that there is not a superior 
international authority that can impose rules and obligations. As was pointed out 
before, these conventional obligations are adopted due to the lack of a centralized 
international legislative authority. 
 
Within the bargaining power and the mutual consent of the contracting states, 
reciprocal obligations (also referred to as duties, rights, principles, or standards of 
treatment) are established for both states. Some authors have argued that these 
obligations might be based on the theory of obligations.
232
 
 
To re-emphasize, these obligations are destined to promote and protect investments 
from and to the contracting parties. The performance of these obligations is mainly 
governed by the provisions of the Vienna Convention. 
 
With reference to the direct beneficiaries of BITs, it has been agreed through the BIT 
definition of investment, that they are those individuals who undertake investments 
within the territory of one of the parties (i.e., the host state). As was previously pointed 
out, breach of these international obligations by the host state gives rise to state 
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responsibility. In particular, if it is argued that the breach has caused damage to the 
other party’s nationals (i.e., to the foreign investor).233  
 
In other words, it can be generally assumed that the domestic regulatory conduct of the 
host state is not only subject to internal standards of conduct but also subject to external 
standards of conduct. The question therefore becomes, to what extent these external 
standards are completely isolated from the internal standards established by the 
domestic constitutional and administrative law when the regulatory power of the state 
is under review at the international level. Here consideration must be given to the fact 
that the performance of these international obligations is closely connected to the 
domestic regulatory behaviour of the contracting states. This is to say, the exercise of 
the host state’s regulatory power is carried out in accordance with the accomplishment 
of its internal standards and also along with the principle of legality and other related 
principles. 
 
It is true to state that these standards are consensually incorporated into a given BIT to 
treat and protect foreign investments from the possible abuse of power by the host state. 
However, it is also true that these external standards are also conceived to protect the 
regulatory power of the host state.
234
  
 
Many of these obligations have emerged from previous arbitral practices (e.g., Neer v 
Mexico (1926)) and have been recently integrated into the main body of a BIT. 
However, even though there has been an increasing tendency to codify these 
obligations within BIT provisions as international minimum standards,
235
 it has been 
stated that the determination and limitation of their contents has not been an easy task 
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for public law adjudicators,
236
 due to the non-static nature of these standards and the 
law in general.
237
 Moreover, it has been said that the creation of these international 
minimum standards has been made in order to minimize the discretionary powers of 
investment arbitrators at the moment of judging the contracting state’s conduct.238  
 
Nonetheless, this sub-section generally describes the main standards of treatment to 
foreign investments that have been internationally developed. It is the most common 
international obligations that are being recognized in a BIT as minimum standards 
acceptable to international law.
239
 It is therefore worth mentioning the following 
obligations:  
  
i. Fair and equitable treatment 
 
The principle of fair and equitable treatment represents one of the most important 
international commitments of a host state, this is due to its controversial and vague 
nature in international (and national) law and is also related to the fact that this standard 
is usually linked to the transparency, consistency and stability of the manner in which a 
host state acts.
240
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This standard consists of the host state’s promise to guarantee fair and equitable 
treatment within its territory to the investments of national investors from the other 
contacting party.
241
 Such a commitment also includes the obligation not to affect the 
basic expectations that were considered by the foreign investor at the time he/she 
undertook the investment.
242
 In other words, it has been assumed that the host state 
should act in a predictable and transparent manner to avoid being considered in breach 
of this standard.
243
  
 
Similarly, this standard has been perceived to be a mechanism to protect a foreign 
investor from abrupt changes to the host state’s regulatory and contractual 
framework.
244
 This fair and equitable treatment principle is incorporated into most 
BITs.
245
 In fact, this principle is of such importance that its breach implies the breach of 
other related standards. For example, where it has been omitted from a certain BIT’s 
provisions, it has been argued that ‘[this] standard is likely to be applicable based on 
the MFN clause.’ 246 
 
Supporting this proposition, article 1105, numeral 1 of the NAFTA
247
 establishes that 
‘[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security’ (emphasis added). With regard to this article, it has been 
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argued to have given grounds for intense discussion about the relationship between this 
fair and equitable standard and customary international law.
248
 
 
Additionally, it is important to note that it has been stated that violation of this standard 
may also imply violation of other standards, such as national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment.
249
 In this regard, it has been said that ‘[i]n modern treaties, a 
fair and equitable standard of treatment is to be provided to investors and investments 
in addition to the international minimum standard and full protection and security’.250 
 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the content and meaning of this standard is not 
clear at all.
251
 On the contrary, it pretty much depends on the specific wording of each 
treaty and each investment arbitrator’s interpretation. Additionally, there is the fact that 
the content and meaning of this standard is constantly evolving, even though this 
standard constitutes the main foundation for numerous BIT claims.
252
 
 
On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that the application of this standard is 
also connected to the reasonable regulatory conduct of the host states.
253
 Therefore, the 
mutual promise of the contracting parties, to promote and protect investments within 
their territories, is intimately connected with the behaviour in which the states treat and 
regulate the investments and investors in question. That is to say, even though these 
kinds of international obligations are mainly governed by principles of international 
law, it cannot be denied that the performance of these international obligations (in 
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particular this FET standard) should also be based on the principles of domestic 
administrative law relevant to each contracting party’s regulatory conduct. 
 
It is at this point that the main concern arises as to when it is necessary to determine the 
equilibrium between the interpretation of the reasonable regulatory behaviour of a state, 
in accordance with the notion of fair and equitable treatment at the international level, 
and the notion of fair and equitable treatment at the national level, i.e., the 
interpretation of this investment law principle in accordance with the principle of 
legality and other related principles of administrative law. 
 
Within this context, it has been said that it seems like ‘notions of fairness and equity 
remain too malleable and chameleon-like to be useful, and could lend themselves to 
mischief, at least from the host state’s perspective’.254 For this reason, the evolution of 
this principle, along with some of the principles of domestic administrative law, should 
be taken into consideration in order to mitigate the previous perception. Accordingly, 
this exercise can help the development of the notion of fair and equitable treatment, as 
it has already been stated that ‘[the application of] the whole body of principles of 
administrative review into the arbitration of investment disputes through the fair and 
equitable standard is a visible factor’.255 
 
ii. National treatment 
 
The national treatment principle represents the mutual and pre-entry-phase international 
commitment of the contracting parties to refrain from giving investors (from the other 
party) within their territory less favourable treatment from that given to the host state’s 
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national investors and their profits.
256
 The purpose of this standard is ‘to create a level 
playing field between foreign and domestic investors in the relevant market.’257 
 
This obligation has also been assimilated into the Calvo Doctrine
258
 which states that 
‘aliens who establish in a country are entitled to the same rights of protection enjoyed 
by nationals; they cannot expect to have extended protection’.259 
 
However, it has been said that ‘the exact scope and application of national treatment 
varies from one IIA to another’.260 Indeed, due to widespread knowledge of this 
obligation and the dynamic practice of the BITs, it has been said that ‘the concrete 
jurisprudence… may end up posing a serious threat to developing countries’ 
sovereignty and independence [i.e., the majority of host states]’.261 Similarly, it has 
been argued that this threat may also ‘lead to either equality or inequality [between the 
contracting states]’.262 
 
On the other hand, the interpretation of this international obligation may also depend on 
economic or legal perspectives. These perspectives provide a group of sub-obligations 
such as (i) the equality of competitive opportunities; and (ii) the equality before the 
law.
263
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Furthermore, it has been said that the task of identifying these obligations and sub-
obligations is based on four ‘central elements of national treatment’.264 That is to say, 
they are based on (i) the non-discrimination between foreigners and nationals; (ii) ‘the 
applicable subjects must be in like situations’; (iii) the same legal status for both the 
businesses of foreign investors and domestic investors; and (iv) the unsettled legal 
nature of the national treatment.
265
 
 
Finally, the last central element regarding the unsettled legal nature of national 
treatment may be associated with the idea that ‘the BIT network must achieve an 
acceptable equilibrium between investments and the public interest’.266 For this 
purpose, upgrading the Calvo Doctrine through the introduction of the notion of 
national treatment as the ‘BIT-as-developed-countries-constitutional law-and-no-more 
[clause]’ has been proposed.267 In other words, the definition of this standard of 
treatment must take into account the notion of equality under the domestic law of 
developed nations in order to avoid the application of a higher standard than that 
granted by the home state to its own nationals.
268
 
 
iii. Most-favoured-nation treatment 
 
The scope of this international obligation (MFN treatment) is very similar and 
comparable to the notion of national treatment.
269
 In fact, they both apply the same 
foundations, but this MFN treatment includes the standard given to third-state 
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nationals’.270 This obligation represents the mutual commitment of the contracting 
parties to abstain from treating investors belonging to other contracting parties less 
favourably than those from a third state, its national investors and their profits.
271
 It has 
been said that the main purpose of this standard is to ensure that ‘there is equality of 
competitive opportunities between investors and investments from different states’.272  
 
Despite the above-mentioned similarity between national treatment and MFN 
treatment, some differences have been pointed out.
273
 For example, the notion of 
national treatment implies (i) the application of the most favourable state measures 
adopted by the host state to the benefit of local investors and foreign investors; and (ii) 
the recognition that some protectionist state measures do not benefit some foreign 
investors (i.e., ‘reserve’ or ‘publicatio’274) (an exception to the sub-obligation of 
equality in competitive opportunities).
275
  
 
Conversely, the MFN treatment, as a relative standard, infers a necessity on the part of 
a foreign investor to compare and scrutinise domestic measures that have been adopted 
by the host state in order to identify those different standards that may benefit nationals 
of a third state.
 276
 This has been referred to as the process of ‘borrowing treaty 
provisions from other treaties’.277 
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Concerning this latter point, the inclusion of this type of treatment into BIT provisions 
represents the necessity of considering whether or not such ‘borrowing treaty 
provisions’ is suitable for the context of other treaties. As it has been said, it can be ‘a 
potent ratchet by which obligations assumed or concessions made in negotiations may 
raise the stakes in the obligations of the host state under the BIT in question’.278  
 
Finally, the application of this standard to private individuals of a state that is not party 
to a given BIT, can be a ‘riling point’ for the contracting states due to the simple reason 
that the third state neither expressly participated nor agreed – in written form – to be 
bound by the treaty in question.
279
 In order to support this latter idea, consideration of 
the international principle regarding the legal equality of the contracting states should 
be taken into account. This principle is enshrined in article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention and expressly states that ‘a treaty does not create either obligations or 
rights for a third State without its consent’. 
 
iv. Full protection and security treatment 
 
The scope of this treatment has been constantly evolving, i.e., from a physical 
protection to legal protection of foreign investments.
280
 Similarly, it has been said that 
‘the drafting of [this] clause varies widely’.281 Following this concept, in practice, two 
basic clauses related to the scope of this treatment can be found.  
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The first basic clause is contained within the majority of BITs. It establishes the full 
protection and security of foreign investment within the territory of the other 
contracting party.
282
 The second basic clause is a rare case within the BIT network. It 
establishes ‘full protection and legal security’.283 (Emphasis added).  
 
Regarding these two clauses, it is also necessary to point out that they may be located 
in the same article and even in the same paragraph of the fair and equitable treatment 
principle. This two-in-one-standard article has given rise to different interpretations of 
these two standards. 
 
In this respect, despite the fact that this standard is scarcely applied, there has been a 
debate on ‘a possible emerging consensus’ with regard to the scope of this obligation. 
This debate has been centred on (i) whether it is only limited to physical protection or 
whether it goes beyond this type of protection.
284
 With regard to the second broader 
point, it has been discussed (ii) whether or not this treatment overlaps with other 
standards or whether it is already incorporated into the scope of fair and equitable 
treatment or into the scope of the umbrella clause.
285
 
 
In any case, either under the physical protection approach or under the legal protection 
approach, or possibly under both approaches, it is of paramount importance to bear in 
mind that this international standard of protection and security of foreign investments is 
conceived to be the general provision and obligation that has been mutually consented 
to by the contracting parties (i.e., public law subjects). Hence, there should not be any 
                                                 
282
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doubt about the coexistence of this principle with principles of administrative law, such 
as the principle of legality, the principle of the administration’s discretionary power, 
the principle of proportionality, the principle of equality before the law, and the 
principle of the public administration’s good faith (see Chapters II and V). 
 
Finally, attention must be given to the fact that, according to the principle of legality 
(recognized by all legal systems), the performance of this standard of protection and 
security within the territory of a host state is a priority governed by principles of 
domestic administrative law. In other words, it is this specialized branch of domestic 
public law that is in charge of delimiting or controlling the host state’s regulatory 
power. It is this regulatory power that, finally, may or may not affect the foreign 
investors’ interests.  
 
v. Access to justice, fair procedure, and denial of justice. 
 
This standard has been introduced through article 5 (2) (a) of 2004 USA Model BIT 
which expressly states that the ‘“the fair and equitable treatment” includes the 
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory 
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal 
legal systems of the world...’. In practice, this treatment was textually adopted by the 
USA-Uruguay BIT in 2005. 
 
One of the main reasons for incorporating this standard into the BIT network is to 
guarantee what has been called the ‘three stages of the judicial process’.286 These are: 
(i) the right to bring a claim, (ii) the right of both parties to fair treatment during the 
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proceedings, and (iii) the right to an appropriate decision at the end of the process.
287
 
This judicial process also applies to actions of all branches of a government.
288
 
Additionally, it is argued that this standard is also incorporated as a tacit element of the 
standards of fair and equitable and the full protection and security of foreign 
investors.
289
  
 
Unlike the substantive side of this principle, the incorporation of this obligation is proof 
of the procedural side of the concept of the minimum standard of international law, i.e., 
what has been known as the procedural minimum standards.
290
 Furthermore, such 
incorporation has been interpreted as a mechanism to vindicate and enforce the 
investor’s rights before the maladministration of justice with regard to a foreign 
investor.
291
 
 
Nevertheless, as part of the notion of fair and equitable treatment within the legal 
system of a given state, it is important to point out that the standard at issue should also 
be connected to one of the fundamental objectives of a democratic state, i.e., the 
guarantee of administrating justice. This objective is also connected with one of the 
most popular constitutional principles of any legal system which is the right to defence.  
 
This constitutional right is connected with the guarantee of having a transparent judicial 
process. Further to this, one of the most important administrative law principles to 
guarantee this process of defence is the principle of the duty to give reasons. In other 
words, this refers to the reaffirmation of the well-known legal principle of ‘due 
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process’. This principle represents a fundamental pillar within the host state machinery 
of administering justice.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that it has been argued that, within the 
judicial system of a state, the arbitration mechanism has been conceived to be an 
alternative and amicable mechanism to settle disputes which does not escape the 
application of the principle of due process.
292
 
 
vi. Transfer of Funds  
 
The obligation of allowing a free transfer of funds in or out of a given host state is also 
included within BIT provisions. These treaties assume the obligation of ensuring that 
all transfers related to a given foreign investment can be done freely and without delay 
into and out of the host state (i.e., the main objective of all foreign investments).
293
  
 
For example, most of the BITs establish this obligation, more or less, under the same 
premises, i.e., ‘each contracting party shall permit all transfers related to an investment 
to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory’.294 
 
With regard to this obligation, an enumeration of the transactions that it covers are 
given.
295
 For example, it refers to (i) returns; (ii) compensation; (iii) payments arising 
out of an investment dispute; (iv) payments made under a contract, including 
amortization of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan 
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agreement directly related to an investment; (v) proceeds from sale or liquidation of all 
or any part of an investment; and (vi) additional contributions to capital for the 
maintenance or development of an investment.  
 
With regard to this obligation, as a part of the minimum standards of treatment, it is 
important to point out that the right to repatriate funds can be limited as part of the 
‘monetary sovereignty’296 of the host state (i.e., the right to control and regulate its own 
currency).
297
 This limitation can vary from one treaty to another.
298
 Such a limitation is 
mainly based on the restriction of the right to transfer funds during periods of financial 
crisis.
299
 This limitation has also been recognized globally through international 
monetary, trade and investment law.
300
 
 
Notwithstanding , it has also been said that ‘if transfer restrictions are so severe that the 
funds are frozen within the host state for an extended period, the transfer restrictions 
might be expropriatory’.301 This may lead to the question of whether this freezing 
measure has been taken on grounds of a general public interest policy of the host state 
or if it has been an isolated measure.  
 
In both cases, it may be a necessity to consider this obligation on a case-by-case basis 
rather than based on a general assumption. This may also take into consideration the 
possibility that the host state has to argue the clause of rebus sic stantibus (things thus 
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standing) due to the circumstances that have arisen, making it impossible to guarantee 
an absolute right to repatriate funds.
302
  
 
vii. Expropriation303 
 
The idea of what constitutes an expropriatory measure has been an object of discussion 
at the international level for the last few decades.
304
 The regulation of this state action 
was originally created and governed by principles of domestic public law through 
direct expropriation as an institution of public law.
305
 Nonetheless, during this time, the 
idea of assimilating and considering some state regulatory measures as tantamount to 
expropriation, i.e., indirect expropriation, has arisen.
306
  
 
Despite the variation of wording from one BIT to another, modern BITs model the 
clause that regulates to expropriation at the international level as follows:  
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or 
indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization 
(‘expropriation’) except for a public purpose; in a non discriminatory manner; 
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in 
accordance with due process law and the general principles of treatment…307 
(Emphasis added).  
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With regard to the context of this clause, it has been said that this type of clause 
‘refer[s] to three types of taking of foreign property: [i] direct; [ii] indirect and [iii] 
anything “tantamount to a taking” or anything “equivalent to a taking”.’308  
 
Similarly, it has been pointed out that this clause has been influenced by the content of 
article 11 of the NAFTA, in relation to which it has been stated that ‘[t] the NAFTA 
litigation has certainly caused some concerns as to whether investment protection has 
gone too far.’309 
 
This expropriation clause also establishes four prerequisites that must be fulfilled 
cumulatively in order to consider a governmental expropriatory measure as lawful 
conduct.
310
 That is to say, the governmental measure must be taken: (i) for a public 
purpose; (ii) in a non discriminatory manner; (iii) upon prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation;
311
 and (iv) in accordance with legal due process. 
 
Despite the diverse academic discussions on the distinction of various types of 
expropriation as general, small-scale, lawful, unlawful, de facto, disguised, 
consequential, creeping, and regulatory expropriations,
312
 the main concern arises when 
the standard at issue raises the necessity of distinguishing between the two main types 
of expropriations, e.g., direct expropriation and indirect expropriation.
313
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In this regard, direct expropriation has been understood as ‘direct forms of 
expropriation in which the state [legally,] openly and deliberately seizes property, 
and/or transfers title of private property to itself or a state-mandated third party.’314 
Conversely, indirect or creeping expropriation has been conceived as ‘indirect forms of 
expropriation in which a government measure, although not on its face affecting a 
transfer of property, results in the foreign investor being deprived of its property or its 
benefits.’315 
 
Within this context, it is important to highlight that the former type of expropriation 
does not represent an immense concern since it represents an objective, limited, 
justified, legal and specified state measure. Direct expropriation is primarily undertaken 
in accordance with the principles of domestic public law. In particular, it is based on 
the principles of legality, opportunity and the administration’s discretionary power. 
Nonetheless, it is also important to point out that in the case of direct expropriation an 
international problem arises if an agreement between the host state and the foreign 
investor on the amount of compensation has not been reached. 
 
However, indirect expropriation does represent the most important legal concern at a 
national and international level; since it is a difficult task to determine when a 
government measure can be considered to amount to expropriation
316
 (i.e., the conflict 
between the notion of indirect expropriation and a state’s right to regulate317). In the 
last years, international arbitrators have been in entrusted with carrying out this task in 
accordance with the obligations contained within a given BIT and with principles of 
international law.  
                                                 
314
 See Newcombe and Paradell, supra note 104, on page 323. 
315
 Ibid., on page 323. 
316
 Ibid., on page 322. 
317
 See for details Reinisch, supra note 245, pages 165-166. 
 193 
 
Similarly, it is important to stress that the determination of what constitutes a direct 
expropriation, or what constitutes indirect or creeping expropriation, should be 
primarily undertaken in accordance with the principles of domestic administrative law, 
particularly if regulatory disputes are at stake. As, at the end of the day, these principles 
are the legal foundations of the state’s regulatory conduct as well as its national 
independence and its economic development.
318
  
 
Obviously, this exercise represents a priori a legal and doctrinal conflict between those 
principles of international investment law and those principles of domestic 
administrative law when regulatory disputes are taken into consideration. Nevertheless, 
in any case, the discovery of a common ground between these two potential conflicting 
issues is part of the main objective of this research. 
 
e. Summary 
 
International investment treaties are legal instruments of public law. They are 
concluded by sovereign contracting states through the exercise of their public capacity. 
They should also be considered to be contracts of public interest. Similarly, the public 
law nature of BITs also finds support in the public-law subject-matter of these public 
law instruments which formalize the reciprocal intentions of the contracting states to 
promote economic cooperation to their reciprocal benefit.  
 
Furthermore, the commitment of the contracting parties, the acquisition of mutual 
international obligations (standards of treatment) and the performance of these 
obligations are embodied within this type public law document. Similarly, it is 
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important to highlight that the regulatory power of the contracting states may not be 
relinquished by their subscription to these types of public law instruments. 
 
Additionally, the contracting states, the document (i.e., the BIT), and the mutually 
agreed international obligations, including the chosen mechanism to resolve potential 
disputes, should be subject to principles of public international law and to some 
principles of domestic administrative law when the administrative action of the host 
state needs to be reviewed by investment arbitrators at the international level.  
 
The application of public international law does not exclude the application of the 
principles of domestic administrative law, being the principles that govern the 
regulatory behaviour of the contracting states. This is especially the case if it is 
accepted that there are two types of public law relationships within international 
investment arbitration, i.e., the primary relationship between the contracting parties 
(contractual relationship) and the secondary relationship between the host state and 
nationals of the other contacting party (primarily a  regulatory relationship). 
 
Finally, the question which now must be asked concerns the (i) the legal nature of 
treaty-based investor-state arbitration as a mechanism to adjudicate regulatory issues in 
accordance with the scope of international obligations; and (ii) the application of some 
principles of administrative law to international regulatory disputes through the 
application of the FET standard. These questions involve essential public law elements 
with regard to the sovereign right of the state to regulate national economic activities 
on grounds of its public interest, and the determination of a host state’s international 
responsibility for the possible breach of international (investment) obligations. This 
issue will be addressed in detail in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INVESTOR-STATE TREATY ARBITRATIONS – PUBLIC LAW 
ADJUDICATORY MECHANISMS 
 
a. Introduction 
 
Investment treaty-based controversies between private individuals (e.g., foreign 
investors) and sovereign states – at the international level – are a relatively new 
phenomenon within the classic notion of public international law.
1
 Nonetheless, it is 
noteworthy to mention here that analogous legal disputes between host states and 
private individuals – at the national level – are not a novel concept in public domestic 
law. In fact, this practice of private individuals bringing actions against the state 
through its public administration has existed within the major legal systems of the 
world for over seventy-five years.
2
 Perhaps, due to this reason, it has been argued that 
the scope of these new investor-state controversies originally fell within the 
competence of national courts and therefore they may be in conflict with the 
competence of the courts.
3
  
 
The international relationship between a host state and a foreign investor is mainly 
created by and based on the parameters and provisions established by a certain IIT, as 
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was emphasized in Chapter III. It is within these parameters and provisions where the 
incorporation of a non-classic public international law element can be found. That is to 
say, the incorporation of a private individual’s rights to sue sovereign states before ad 
hoc international tribunals, into the contemporary notion of public international law. 
This private right compromises the privilege belonging to private individuals to take 
legal action against a sovereign state – at the international level – for the breach of an 
IIT’s provisions. The direct beneficiary of this right is the national of the other 
contracting party to a BIT, who is defined as ‘a foreign investor’.4  
 
This right of a foreign investor is mainly guaranteed and protected by various 
alternative mechanisms that range from consultation to arbitration (see Chapter III). 
This protection is mainly activated when the foreign investor has decided to carry out 
an investment in a certain host state and this host state breaches a given BIT provision 
in the performance of its domestic regulatory conduct.  
 
Among the alternative mechanisms in place to resolve legal disputes, there is a main 
mechanism which is used to try and resolve a disagreement arising from a particular 
BIT. This particular mechanism is known as investor-state treaty-based arbitration.  
 
Curiously, the protection and exercise of this contemporary public international law 
right, its consequences and proceedings have been considered to be analogous mostly 
to those elements derived from regulatory controversies between the public 
administration and its citizens.
5
 That is to say, this latter relationship has been protected 
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by equivalent domestic legal remedies such as the administrative and judicial review of 
acts derived from the governmental conduct of a host state. It has been said that 
investor-state treaty-based arbitrations (particularly regarding the review of regulatory 
issues at the international level) are a kind of an ‘international judicial review’6 and for 
this reason; this type of arbitration should be considered to be analogous to the 
functions of national (administrative) tribunals and courts.
7
 
 
With regard to these analogies, it could prove difficult for investment arbitrators to 
easily determine the scope of these analogies with clarity. This difficulty may also be of 
particular relevance when there is a need to take into consideration the argument which 
states that the rules governing the regulatory conduct of the host state have not yet been 
codified, either internationally or nationally.
8
  
 
A similar concern arises for investment arbitrators if there emerges the need to deal 
with the variation between the protection of commercial acts (i.e., those acts that may 
include Acta Jure Gestionis) and investments acts (i.e., those acts that may include Acta 
Jure Imperii). The potential problem is that this exercise may include the sensitive task 
of judging investment acts, considered as the types of act that involve acts of state 
sovereignty, such as acts deriving from the use of a state’s regulatory power and acts 
concerning its public interest. This area traditionally has been reserved for the 
jurisdiction of domestic courts. 
 
Consequently, these acts of state may require consideration of the application of some 
principles of (constitutional and administrative) law when judging regulatory issues at 
the international level. In simple terms, the review of these acts require the application 
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of domestic legal principles that have been taken into consideration by national 
tribunals or courts when responding to a similar regulatory situation as that being dealt 
with in ISTA. 
 
As was mentioned in Chapter III, this colossal job can be even more difficult if 
investment arbitrators need to take into account aspects such as the increasing influence 
of domestic legal principles upon international law which has not been previously 
experienced, and the lack of expertise on the part of some international lawyers to deal 
with these domestic tools.
9
  
 
It has recently been asserted that: ‘[t]he cure [to the ongoing investment arbitration 
problems] would seem to lie in the administrative [law] culture’.10 This is true, in 
particular, if the current practice of investment arbitrators dealing with regulatory 
disputes at the international level is taken into consideration. Hence, the fact that all 
investment arbitrators act as international judges and the fact that their roles may be 
contributing to the argued uncertain future of the investment legal system should be 
taken into account.
11
 
 
This chapter is directed towards emphasizing the public law nature of this treaty-based 
mechanism and, subsequently, providing basic ideas and tools that investment 
arbitrators can use as legal references in legal situations similar to those that have 
already taken place within the major domestic legal systems of the world over the last 
fifty-five years. In addition to this, this chapter will highlight the main similarities 
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between ISTA and domestic mechanisms that are used to resolve regulatory disputes 
between the public administration and private individuals.  
 
b. Investor-state treaty arbitrations  
 
The increase in IITs and the consequent explosion of treaty-based investor-state 
arbitrations as quasi-judicial methods which predominantly resolve regulatory disputes 
has constituted a new development in international investment law. The emergence of 
this practice has given rise – during the last two decades – to concerns and elemental 
questions from diverse sectors of society (see Chapter VI). These concerns and 
questions refer to the legal nature and functions of these international treaties and their 
quasi-judicial methods that mainly consider issues arising from regulatory disputes 
between a host state and nationals of the other contracting state. These elemental 
questions are developed in the following sub-section, based on the following premises: 
 
 It has been said that this mechanism represents a derogation of the principle of 
state immunity from jurisdiction due to the submission and consent of the host 
state to arbitral tribunals that have been agreed within IIT provisions.
12
 This is 
especially so if the original theory, stating that the conflicts between a given 
state (i.e., its public administration) and an individual are normally settled by 
the host state’s national courts, is taken into account. 
 
 The main difference between this expanding system of solving investor-state 
disputes at the international level and the classic system solving state-individual 
disputes at the national level is related to the question of how international 
adjudicators deal with the notion of an ‘unlawful’, ‘discriminatory’ or 
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., H. Rondon de Sanso, Aspectos Jurídicos Fundamentales del Arbitraje Internacional de Inversión 
(Editorial Ex libris, Caracas, 2010). 
 200 
‘arbitrary’ regulatory measure of a host state.13 In particular, it is relevant 
whether this alleged ‘unlawful’, ‘discriminatory’ or ‘arbitrary’ regulatory 
conduct was carried out by an act or omission of the host state, in accordance 
with its domestic law but in disagreement with international legal obligations 
consecrated within an IIT, particularly in the context of fair and equitable 
treatment.
14
  
 
 Finally, there must be consideration of the fact that this expanding legal 
mechanism is argued to be a neutral and confident forum destined to guarantee 
impartial justice.
15
 
 
Within the context of the above observations, it is opportune to analyze the main 
elements of ISTA as an adjudicatory public law mechanism in the following sub-
section. 
 
i. Origin. 
 
One of the origins of treaty-based investor-state arbitration can be found in Article 11 
of the first modern investment treaty concluded by Germany and Pakistan in 1959. The 
main idea of this international agreement was to give rise to the creation of the 
individual’s private rights of action against sovereign states due to the lack of standing 
private individuals had in international law.
16
 This right was created under the premise 
of providing private individuals with direct access to international tribunals in order to 
protect their rights and properties in accordance with the principles developed in 
                                                 
13
 For a detailed study on the relevant distinction between the terms ‘arbitrary’ and ‘discriminatory’; see C. H. 
Schreuer, Protection against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures in C. Rogers, and R. Alford, The Future of 
Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press, UK, 2009), pages 183-198. 
14
 See S. Rosenne, Breach of Treaty (Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge 1985), on page 49. 
15
 See M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment (Second Edition, Cambridge University 
Press, UK 2004), on page 250. 
16
 See Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on pages 2, 28-36. 
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customary international law.
17
 This innovative arbitral mechanism was the result of the 
unsatisfactory method of resolving international investor-state disputes through 
diplomatic protection.
18
 This was exemplified in the case filed by Belgium against 
Spain before International Court of Justice on September 15, 1958 (better known as the 
Barcelona Traction case, 1970).  
 
Furthermore, there was a concern on increasing consideration for the treaty-based 
arbitration system as a quasi-judicial method which was more efficient and reliable at 
enforcing a private individual’s rights compared to domestic legal courts.19 This new 
arbitral practice was later followed by the ICSID Convention as was illustrated by early 
cases such as Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v. Egypt (1988) and Asian 
Agricultural Products Ltd v. Sri Lanka (1990). The International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established in 1966.
20
 This centre was 
created with the idea of building a neutral forum and facility to resolve disputes 
between contracting parties and private individuals.
21
 
 
In addition, this right of a private individual was also created in accordance with the 
contracting state’s consent which was manifested through their subscription to 
international investment agreements. Within the provisions of these agreements, there 
are mechanisms which have been incorporated to mainly resolve (i) disputes between 
                                                 
17
 See Sornarajah, supra note 15, on page 10. 
18
 See Sheppard and Hunter, supra note 3, on page 164; and I. Marboe, State Responsibility and Comparative 
State Liability for Administrative and Legislative Harm to Economic Interests, in S. W. Schill, International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, UK 2010), on page 381. 
19
 P. Moremen, ‘Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of International Regimes’ (2006) Temp. L. Rev.; 
quoted by Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on page 13. 
20
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the 
ICSID Convention) Washington, 18 March 1965; 4 ILM 524; entered into force 14 October 1966. 
21
 See C. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch, and A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention – A Commentary 
(Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2010), on page 1.  
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the contracting parties; and (ii) disputes between one of the contracting parties and 
nationals of the other contracting state for the breach of an IIT’s provisions.22 
 
Within this context, the consent of investors to submit themselves to these mechanisms 
of settling disputes is given after they sign such agreements. In fact, foreign investors 
do not exercise any ‘direct’ bargaining power at the moment of negotiating and 
concluding these investment treaties due to the already-mentioned lack of standing on 
the part of private individuals in international law.  
 
A curious procedural fact that arose from the existence and functions of these treaty-
based mechanisms to resolve disputes between a host state and individuals was their 
coexistence with the role of administrative bodies and/or national courts to protect 
individuals’ rights.23 In this respect, it has been stated that ‘[e]ach of these methods has 
national institutional counterparts which function in much the same way’.24 Perhaps 
this is why it was stated that there could be concurrent jurisdiction between national 
courts and investment tribunals – specifically in relation to the protection of private 
individuals’ rights that are under the same legal risk of violation.25 For further 
explanation on this point, see sub-section vii) Analogy of ISTAs with some principles 
of domestic administrative law. 
 
ii. Definition 
 
In relation to the definition of treaty-based investor-state arbitration, some essential 
elements of law need to be emphasized from the outset: firstly, the public-law nature of 
the contracting parties (e.g., sovereign states) and the private-law nature of foreign 
                                                 
22
 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2008), on page 608. 
23
 See Adaralegbe, supra note 3, pages 2 and 28-36. 
24
 See T. Buergenthal, and S. D. Murphy, Public International Law (Thomson West, USA, 1990), on page 67. 
25
 See Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on page 1. 
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investors (e.g., private individuals, corporations); secondly, the public-law nature of the 
bilateral investment agreement (i.e., the BIT) derived from the legal nature of the 
contracting parties who are the main subjects of public law vis-à-vis sovereign states. 
This element includes the performance of the state’s sovereign will which is exercised 
in their public law capacity; thirdly, the public-law nature of the subject-matter of these 
international treaties, since they are conceived to cover those aspects and areas related 
to the contracting parties’ economic interests and public policy matters,26 and, lastly, 
the express intention and consent of the contracting parties of, within treaty provisions, 
a clause related to the methods to resolve disputes between (i) contracting parties or (ii) 
one of the contracting parties and a national of the other contracting state. It is within 
this clause the contracting states create a list of mechanisms to resolve disputes in 
favour of, and at the decision of the other contracting party’s investor.  
 
For example, in the USA-Argentina BIT, article VII (2) establishes that:  
[I]f the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned 
may choose to submit the dispute for resolution: (a) to the courts or 
administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; or (b) in 
accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-settlement 
procedures; or (c) in accordance with terms of paragraph 3 [i.e., ICSID, 
UNCITRAL or any other arbitration institution]. (Emphasis added). 
 
It is by virtue of this list of options that the contracting parties expressly consent to 
submitting to an international tribunal, i.e., to a treaty-based investment tribunal. This 
submission represents a limitation to the contracting states’ immunity from jurisdiction. 
Such a list enumerates different legal mechanisms quoted above, i.e., conciliations, 
negotiations, national courts and international arbitrations as non-judicial, judicial and 
                                                 
26
 See, e.g., Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), supra note 8. 
26
 See Slaughter, supra note 9, on page 19. 
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quasi-judicial methods to deal with the possible breach of an IIT’s provisions by a host 
state.  
 
In this regard, it is important to highlight that, for whatever reason a dispute arises 
between a host state and a foreign investor, it will remain the same no matter which 
level or dispute resolution mechanism the investor selected (from the above-mentioned 
list) to address its claim. Furthermore, it is true to state that the contracting parties, at 
the moment of concluding a given IIT (which includes a clause for solving disputes), 
are aware of the fact that they are creating a kind of temporary international forum that 
will be in charge of dealing with a public-law matter and/or regulatory issues that are 
normally within the competence of national courts. Subsequently, the contracting states 
should be conscious of the fact that the creation of an international tribunal may result 
in a duty for international arbitrators to refer to principles of contemporary public 
international law in order to weigh up the state’s regulatory behaviour at the 
international level.
 27
  
 
One articulation of treaty-based investor-state arbitration is found in article 24 (2) of 
the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas as: 
A dispute between a Party and a national or company of the other Party arising 
out of or [i] relating to an investment agreement or [ii] alleged breach of any 
right conferred, created or recognized by this Treaty with respect to a covered 
investment.
 28
 (Emphasis added).  
 
From this definition, there are two main motives that can be distinguished which 
activate treaty-based arbitration. The first is derived from the breach of the provisions 
of the investment agreement as a whole, which includes issues of the investor’s 
                                                 
27
 See Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on page 5. 
28
 Quoted by Doak Bishop, J. Crawford, and W. Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes – Cases, 
Materials and Commentary (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2005), on page 137. 
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contractual performance (i.e., a  purely contractual dispute). For example, article 8 of 
the Venezuela-Belarus BIT advocates that ‘[a]ny dispute that derives directly from an 
investment agreement between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
contracting party [can be settled through arbitration]...’ 29 (Emphasis added). The 
second motive results from the sole breach of those obligations created by the 
investment treaty’s provisions and their interpretation and application (i.e., a 
legal/regulatory dispute).
30
 An example of this case can be found in article 11 of the 
Colombia-Switzerland BIT which establishes that ‘If an investor of one [contracting] 
Party considers that any measure applied by the other [contracting] party is inconsistent 
with one obligation of this Agreement, and this [measure] causes any damage or loss to 
him/her or to his/her investment, he/she can [opt for arbitration]
’
.
31
 (Emphasis added).  
 
In practice, treaty-based investor-state arbitration can either be related to both motives 
simultaneously or only related to one of the motives separately, as a mechanism to seek 
legal remedies under the IIT.
32
 With the objective of keeping the scope of the present 
study limited, this research will focus on the second motive (i.e., legal/regulatory 
disputes). Treaty breach will be discussed in the following section.  
 
iii. Legal nature and purpose 
 
Consideration of the nature and purpose of treaty-based investor-state arbitration has 
moved from purely economic aspects to legal grounds; and thence from economic-legal 
aspects to socio-economic considerations (including the consideration of issues arising 
from regulatory disputes). This legal shift has been expanding in a parallel manner 
                                                 
29
 This article has been translated into English by the Author.  
30
 See E. Fernandez Masia, Tribunales Nacionales, Arbitraje Internacional y Proteccion de Inversiones 
Extranjeras (Marcial Pons, Madrid, Barcelona, Buenos Aires, 2008), on page 49. 
31
 Translated into English by the Author. 
32
 See Sornarajah, supra note 15, on page 13. 
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along with the idea of considering ‘[i]nvestment treaty disputes [as] fundamentally 
contractual in nature’.33 In this respect, and regarding the legal nature of this type of 
arbitration, it is important to draw attention to the following examples which provide 
three different reasons for a treaty-based state-investor dispute. 
 
Firstly, there is a small group of treaties, such as the Bulgaria-China BIT
34
 and the 
China-Bahrain BIT,
35
 which establish, within their provisions and in their separate 
clauses, a mechanism to settle disputes between the host state and a given investor 
when they disagree on the amount of compensation (i.e., an economic dispute).  
 
Secondly, there is a bigger group of treaties, such as the Venezuela-Barbados BIT;
36
 the 
Colombia-Switzerland BIT;
37
 and the Colombia-Spain BIT;
38
 which provide for a 
mechanism to resolve investor-state disputes, but only when there is exclusively a 
breach of a treaty provision (i.e., a legal/regulatory dispute). 
 
Finally, there is a much larger group of treaties, such as the Venezuela-Vietnam BIT;
39
 
the Venezuela-Belarus BIT;
40
 the USA-Argentina BIT,
41
 the USA-Ecuador BIT;
42
 the 
Colombia-Peru BIT;
43
 the Colombia-UK BIT,
44
 and the Colombia-Chile BIT,
45
 that 
stipulate the same dispute settlement mechanism but apply it when there has been a 
violation of an investment contract and of a treaty provision (i.e., a kind of a socio-
economic dispute that could also involve the host state’s national interest). 
                                                 
33
 See Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on page 88. 
34
 Article 9. 
35
 Article 9 (3). 
36
 Article 8. 
37
 Article 11. 
38
 Article 10. 
39
 Article 8. 
40
 Article 8. 
41
 Article VII. 
42
 Article VI. 
43
 Article 12. 
44
 Article 10. 
45
 Article IX. 
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Under any of these three scenarios, two main players can be identified: e.g., a public-
law subject (i.e., the host state) and a private-law subject (i.e., a foreign investor). This 
common denominator implies that the basis for this dispute is not a private-law-
instrument based investor-state dispute. Rather, it is a public-law-instrument based 
investor-state dispute (that also involves the performance of actions of the state and its 
law in general). That is to say, these latter aspects indicate that the international 
investor-state dispute should be mainly judged in accordance with principles of public 
law. 
 
Generally, it can be assumed that private individuals benefit from this public-law nature 
mechanism for solving a dispute. To reiterate, this mechanism is based on a public-law 
instrument, such as an IIA, which has been signed with the objective of promoting 
economic cooperation between the contracting parties for their reciprocal benefit. This 
means of cooperation has been called the creation of ‘conditions favourable to the flow 
of investment’.46 
 
In such cases, the state’s behaviour, unlike the exercise of its private law capacity, is 
mainly subject to the application of principles of public law (i.e., including principles 
of domestic administrative law). In this respect, as will be seen in the sub-section 
entitled ‘Scope of causes’, this arbitral function involves, directly and/or tacitly, 
elements of public (constitutional and administrative) law principles such as those used 
in the domestic mechanisms to resolve a state/individual dispute. 
 
                                                 
46
 See Brownlie, supra note 21, on page 61. 
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Finally, as was mentioned by the Azurix Corp. v. Argentina’s tribunal,47 the purpose of 
treaty-based investor-state arbitration can be deduced from the scope and function of an 
arbitral tribunal. Scope and function issues summarise the purpose of the treaty-based 
investor-state arbitration as the settlement of a ‘legal controversy’.48 In fact, this 
tribunal states that this ‘legal controversy’ must arise from the breach of a treaty 
obligation which is different to those claims based on and settled in accordance with 
the provisions of the contract.  
 
Moreover, the tribunal in Azurix Corp. v. Argentina clarified the difference between a 
‘legal controversy’ and a ‘conflict of interests’. To this end, the arbitral tribunal quoted 
the Board of Directors of the World Bank with regard to the meaning of a ‘legal 
controversy’. A ‘legal controversy’ refers to ‘“the existence or scope of a legal right or 
obligation, or the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for breach of a legal 
obligation, and is more than a mere ‘conflict of interest.”’  
 
Within this context, it is important to highlight that such a legal controversy is also 
derived from the host state’s regulatory behaviour which is mainly governed by 
principles of public law, including constitutional and administrative laws. These 
principles should be used as a legal reference for arbitral judges when dealing with 
international regulatory disputes, owing to the fact that some of these principles may 
have been underdeveloped and not readily available in international law
49
 – as was 
                                                 
47
 See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. la Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) December 8, 2003 – 
Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 58.  
48
 In the Mavrommatis case, the Permanent Court of International Justice defined a controversy as ‘a 
disagreement over a legal or factual question, a conflict of legal points of view or a conflict of interests 
between two persons’. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece-UK), Permanent Court of 
International Justice, Decision No. 2, 20 August 1924, P.C.I.J. Collection of Judgements, Series A, No. 2 
(1924), on page 6.  
49
 See Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on page 88. 
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pointed out by the tribunal in Mobil Corporation et al v. Venezuela in their decision on 
jurisdiction.
50
 
 
iv. Types and main characteristics 
 
The regular content of an IIT’s provisions includes two types of treaty-based 
arbitrations: (i) state-state arbitration and (ii) investor-state arbitration.
51
  
 
The treaty-based state-state arbitration is conceived by the contracting parties to be a 
mechanism to resolve differences that derive from the interpretation or application of 
the treaty and in accordance with the rules of international law. In other words, this is a 
settlement mechanism that is considered to resolve any legal controversy between two 
subjects of public international law. It is imperative to state that this legal controversy 
must derive from the breach of provisions of an IIT.  
 
In this respect, article VIII (1) of the USA-Argentina BIT states that:  
Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Treaty which is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic 
channels, shall be submitted, upon the request of either Party, to an arbitral 
tribunal for binding decision in accordance with the applicable rules of 
international law. (Emphasis added). 
 
However, treaty-based investor-state arbitration is additionally regarded, by the same 
public-law contracting parties, to be a mechanism to resolve the differences between 
one of the contracting parties and the national of the other.  
 
An essential element of this settlement instrument is that the contracting parties should 
consent, a priori, to include some of the following aspects in IIA provisions: ranging 
                                                 
50
 The arbitral tribunal in this case stated that ‘rules governing a State’s unilateral acts in international law have 
never been codified and remain controversial on a certain number of points.’ See paragraph 87. 
51
 See Sornarajah, supra note 15, on page 296. 
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from the simple solution of economic issues such as the determination of a fair 
compensation (e.g., article 9 of the Bulgaria-China BIT), to complex issues that require 
the application or interpretation of some treaty provisions (e.g., article 10 of the Spain-
Colombia BIT), and possibly to even more complicated issues such as those regarding 
any type of investment celebrated under the scope of a given IIT (e.g., article VI of the 
USA-Ecuador BIT).  
 
As was mentioned above, in many of these cases, it must be noted that the host state’s 
regulatory conduct is involved. Under these cases, the host state involvement should 
not only represent the monitoring of its regulatory conduct in accordance with rules of 
international law, but also the due observance of some rules of domestic public law. 
 
Why should such a consideration be taken into account? Because, as was stated in the 
separate opinion of Professor T. Wälde in the case Thunderbird v. Mexico, ‘investment 
arbitration… does not set a system of resolving disputes between presumed equals as in 
commercial arbitration, but a system of protection of foreign investors that [are at a 
disadvantage due to their] exposure to political risk, lack of familiarity with and 
integration into, an alien political, social, cultural, commercial, institutional and legal 
system.’ 52 
 
The arbitral tribunal in this case also referred to the necessity of taking into 
consideration the division of international arbitrations in commercial and investment 
arbitrations. Therefore, some scholars have pointed out that commercial arbitrators tend 
to see investment arbitration as just another type of commercial dispute between two 
                                                 
52
 See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – Separate Opinion, supra note 5, on paragraph 12. 
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equal parties; conversely other authors have considered them to be two different types 
of arbitration.
53
    
 
In addition, it is of vital significance that investment arbitrations are largely related to  
regulatory disputes between a host state for the exercise of its administrative power and 
a foreign investor for the consequent infringement of its rights; whereas commercial 
arbitrations are related to private contractual disputes either between private parties or 
between public entities and private parties.
54
 For this reason, despite the fact that 
investment arbitration has some similar characteristics to commercial arbitration, it has 
been stated that ‘investment arbitration is fundamentally different from international 
commercial arbitration’.55 
 
Consequently, a question has been raised concerning the real legal nature of this 
international mechanism. In this regard, and based on the previous mentioned aspects, 
in his recent doctoral thesis (2009), Dr. Adebayo Adaralegbre drew attention to the fact 
that ‘[i]t is possible that the system [investment legal system] manifests very strong 
features of an administrative enforcement procedure in domestic administrative law, or 
such other enforcement systems…’ 56  
 
Finally, there exists – in scholarly literature on the subject – a tendency to allocate or 
identify this type of arbitration within the traditional classification of arbitrations.
57
 In 
other words, there is a tendency to allocate this type of arbitration within the 
                                                 
53
 See Van Harten, supra note 5, on page 6.  
54
 See S. Wilske, M. Raible, and M. L. Markert, International Investment Treaty Arbitration and International 
Commercial Arbitration – Conceptual Difference or only a “Status Thing”? 1 Contemp. Asia Arb. 213 (2008) 
<HeinOnline> (Last visit 29/10/2009), on page 215. 
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 See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – Separate Opinion, supra note 5, on paragraph 12. See also 
Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on page 149. 
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 See also Adaralegbe, supra note 3, on page 149. 
57
 Article 116 del Decreto Colombiana Numero 1818 de 1998, quoted by E. Silva Romero, and F. Mantilla 
Espinosa, El Contrato de Arbitraje (Universidad del Rosario – Legis, Colombia 2008), on page 204. See also 
B. Sanso de Ramirez, Del Arbitraje Comercial en Venezuela in Ciclo de Conferencias sobre El Otro Lado del 
Arbitraje Internacional de Inversiones, Julio 2009, published by PDVSA La Estancia, pages 101-121. 
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classification of arbitrations where there is independent arbitration (known as the one 
in which the parties autonomously agree on the rules of procedure applicable to that 
controversy
58
), institutional arbitration (known as the one in which the parties agree to 
be submitted to a procedure established by a centre of arbitration
59
), and legal 
arbitration (known as the one in which, in case of the absence of these agreements, the 
arbitration is carried out in accordance with the law in force
60
).  
 
Within this classification, it is important to note that the majority of treaty-based 
investor-state arbitrations can be classified as institutional arbitrations since most of 
investment treaties provide for the ICSID as the preferred forum to resolve this type of 
investment dispute. 
 
v. Consent of the host state to arbitrate 
 
One of the legal aspects of treaty-based investor-state arbitration which has been the 
cause of controversy among many scholars is the determination of the host state’s 
consent to arbitrate.
61
 This debate has been based on the determination of the parties’ 
offer and the acceptance with regard to arbitration.
62
 In this regard, it has been said that 
investor-state treaty arbitration mechanisms are ‘creatures of consent’.63 As a 
preliminary comment, it is noteworthy to indicate that, even though the discussion of 
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 Silva Romero and Mantilla Espinosa, supra note 57, on page 204. 
59
 Ibid., on page 204. 
60
 Ibid., on page 204. 
61
 See, e.g., Rondon de Sanso, supra note 12, on page 123; and Sornarajah, supra note 15, on page 251. 
62
 See, e.g., A. Sanabria Gómez, La formación del consentimiento con relación al contrato de arbitraje in 
Silva Romero and Mantilla Espinosa, supra note 57, pages 153-172.  
63
 See Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press, UK, 2009), 
pages 69-72 and on page 74. 
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the offer-acceptance aspect is beyond the scope of this research, such consent must be 
free of legal vices or defects, i.e., free of fraud, error or duress.
64
 
 
Regarding the scope of this research, it is of relevance to mention that there is even a 
debate about whether the host state’s consent has to be written, formal and authentic or 
whether tacit consent is sufficient.
65
 In this respect, there is a general principle which 
asserts that there must be express, clear and unambiguous consent given by the parties 
in order to arbitrate.
66
 Therefore, this consent is considered as an elemental prerequisite 
to arbitration.
67
 In fact, most of IIA arbitration clauses refer to the ICSID Convention 
which requires – in article 25 – the existence of written consent from both parties to the 
dispute.  
 
On this topic, it can be pointed out that there are two groups of treaties that contain 
different clauses which validate the existence of a contracting party’s consent in 
different ways.  
 
The first group is created by those treaties that do not require further interpretation 
regarding a state’s consent since their provisions clearly establishes the host state’s 
consent to arbitration in advance. For example, article I (1) (b) of the USA-Panama BIT 
Amendment
68
 states that ‘[e]ach Party hereby consents to the submission of an 
investment dispute in accordance with the choice of the national or company…’ 
(Emphasis added).  
                                                 
64
 See, e.g., Desert Line Projects LLC v. The Republic of Yemen (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17) February 6, 
2008 – Final Award in which the arbitral tribunal discussed the element of good faith when considering the 
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 See A. Jaffe Carbonell, Derecho Internacional Publico (Academia de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales, Serie 
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 Protocol Amending the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
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Such a situation can also be found in treaties that have similar wording, such as article 
VI (2) of the USA-Ecuador BIT which states:  
[I]f the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned 
may choose to submit the dispute, under one of the following alternatives, for 
resolution: [(a) to a national courts or (b) to a previously agreed dispute-
settlement procedures (i.e., arbitration)]. (Emphasis added).  
 
An even clearer case can be found in article 8 of the Venezuela-Barbados BIT which 
expressly states that:  
[D]isputes between one Contracting Party and a national or company of the 
other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the former under this 
Agreement in relation to an investment of the latter shall, at the request of the 
national concerned, be submitted to [arbitration]. (Emphasis added).  
 
On the other hand, there is another group which is created by investment treaties that 
make reference to the necessity of concluding a separate agreement to arbitrate. In such 
a case, the agreement must be concluded between the parties involved, i.e., the host 
state and the investor, any time after the IIA has entered into force.
69
  
 
For example, article 8 (2) of the Venezuela-Vietnam BIT
70
 states ‘[i]f consultations do 
not provide a solution within six months from the date of claim’s reception, the investor 
may submit the dispute, by mutual consent, to: [arbitration]’ 71 (Emphasis added). 
 
With regard to these types of clauses, there is a recent decision by an arbitral tribunal 
that makes reference to the consideration of national investment law as a unilateral 
                                                 
69
 In Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), supra note 8, the arbitral tribunal made a clear statement about the Claimant’s 
claims and its timing in raising a violation of an IIT provision. The tribunal decided to take into consideration 
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that were protected by The Netherlands-Venezuela BIT.  
70 
A similar example can be found in article 8 (2) of the Venezuela-Belarus BIT which states ‘[i]f the dispute 
has not been solved within the three (3) months from the date in which it was notified by written, for mutual 
consent, the dispute can be submitted to: [arbitration]’ (Emphasis added). 
71
 Translated into English by the Author. 
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offer by the host state to arbitrate, i.e., a separate document to support the Claimant’s 
request for arbitration.  
 
An illustration of such a case is the Mobil Corporation et al v. Venezuela.
72
 In this 
instance, the arbitral tribunal states that: 
[C]onsent can be given through direct agreement between the host state and the 
investor. Under ICSID case law, consent may also result from a unilateral offer 
by the host State, expressed in its legislation or in a treaty, which is 
subsequently accepted by the investor.
 73
 (Emphasis added).  
 
In this case, Venezuela argued that its national investment law ‘does not provide the 
requisite clear and unambiguous consent to arbitrate for [said] dispute’.74 In response to 
this particular issue, the arbitral tribunal, after analysing the case in detail, concluded 
that the Venezuelan Investment Law (i.e., article 22) ‘does not constitute consent to 
jurisdiction with respect to any of the Claimants…’ 75 Finally, the arbitral tribunal 
declared that it had jurisdiction over the claims based on the treaty provisions, i.e., 
article 9 of The Netherlands-Venezuela BIT. 
 
As a final remark regarding state consent or regarding the contracting parties’ 
intentions, it is significant to draw attention to the wording contained in some 
investment treaties clauses:  
 
1) Article 10 (1) of the Colombia-Spain BIT states: ‘[r]egarding administrative 
acts, for submitting a claim to domestic forum or to arbitration provided under 
this Section, it will be indispensable to exhaust previously the governmental 
                                                 
72 
See Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), supra note 8. 
73 
Ibid., on paragraph 64. See also Schreuer, Malintoppi, Reinisch, and Sinclair, supra note 21, on page 89. 
74 
See Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), supra note 8, on paragraph 26. 
75 
See Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), supra note 8, paragraph 141. This position was confirmed by CEMEX 
Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II Investments B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15) December 30, 2010 – Decision on Jurisdiction and by Brandes v. Venezuela 
(2011), supra note 65 
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remedies when the legislation of the Party requests so.’76 (Emphasis added); 
and,  
 
2) Article 11 (2) of the Colombia-Switzerland BIT states ‘[a]ny issue that has not 
been solved within a period of six months from the written request’s date to 
consultations, may be referred to administrative courts or tribunals of the 
involved Party or to international arbitration’77 (Emphasis added).  
 
 
The idea of quoting these two clauses is to highlight, by way of reference, the intention 
of the contracting parties to resolve regulatory issues through arbitration proceedings. 
In these cases, the contracting states expressly waive their immunity from jurisdiction 
by establishing – at the same level – the domestic administrative court or tribunal’s 
functions with the investment tribunals’ functions.78 This is materialized through the 
incorporation – in advance – of public law matters into these two interchangeable 
treaty-based mechanisms to settle an investor-state dispute. Nonetheless, it has been 
said that such a waiver of immunity does not represent an extension of these functions 
to measures of execution.
79
 Furthermore, it has also been said that ‘a restriction of the 
state’s sovereignty could not be construed in the absence of an express agreement to 
that effect.’80  
 
Finally, given the tendency of removing the duty to exhaust local remedies from BIT 
provisions and the analogy which exists between ISTAs and domestic administrative 
tribunals/courts in reviewing the regulatory conduct of the state (at the international and 
                                                 
76
 Translated into English by the Author. 
77
 Translated into English by the Author. 
78
 See Brownlie, supra note 22, on page 340. 
79
 Ibid.  
80
 See R. Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. 
J. Int’L L. & Pol. 953 (2006), on page 966. 
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national levels, respectively) and the consent of the host state to arbitrate public-law 
matters, it may be opportune to mention here that the main role of these two public-law 
adjudicatory mechanisms is to control the legality of the state’s regulatory conduct. In 
this regard, these two parallel mechanisms of which review the regulatory conduct of 
the state should carry out the control of legality in order to find out whether the state’s 
administrative action was also performed in accordance with the public interest and in 
accordance with the those administrative law principles that rule the regulatory conduct 
of the state (e.g., the principle of legality; principle of the public administration’s 
discretion power; principle of proportionality; principle of equality before the law, 
etc.). Indeed, in reviewing the regulatory conduct of the state at the international level, 
the application or consideration of the above-mentioned principles could be carried out 
through the interpretation of the FET standard. Even, these principles can be applied to 
international regulatory disputes when there has been a denial of justice at the national 
level which leads to intervention by an international tribunal in order to vindicate and 
enforce private-individuals rights before the maladministration of justice on part the 
host state.  
 
vi. Scope of causes 
 
The scope of treaty-based investor-state arbitration is determined by the contracting 
states’ consent as was pointed out previously. This scope can vary from (i) 
controversies regarding the amount of compensation to (ii) controversies on the 
interpretation of the regulatory conduct of the host state in accordance with the 
provisions of a given IIT and/or (iii) controversies related to any issue derived from an 
investment carried out under the obligations contained in an IIT’s provisions. Within 
these three main scopes, many investment arbitrations have been submitted with the 
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intention of seeking compensation under the treaty provisions. The following sub-
sections will address, in a simple and general manner, the four most popular causes that 
have been used as grounds to activate the use of the investment arbitration system. 
 
o Reluctance to accept the host state’s regulation 
 
One of the principle motives that activates the investment arbitration system is the 
reluctance of foreign investors to accept the host state’s regulation, understanding 
‘reluctance’ in this context as the disagreement on the part of an investor with some of 
the host state domestic regulatory measures. This is particularly so if these domestic 
regulatory measures directly affect investors’ interests. Thus, one obvious preliminary 
question is to what extent does the host state’s regulatory conduct represent a real loss 
or reduction to the investors’ rights or profits?81  
 
In relation to this study, it is important to emphasize that the majority of host state’s 
regulatory conduct is based on the principle of legality and its public interest. It is 
rarely based on the defective performance of foreign investors’ responsibilities 
contained within a given investment contract.
82
 For this reason, one may ask what 
regulatory conduct constitutes a host state’s breach of the provisions of an IIT? Or, 
what can be considered to be a good reason to adopt such regulatory measures?
83
  
 
There is a problem with these two questions from the perspective of international law 
and national law. The problem is related to the way in which treaty obligations or 
standards are drafted, since particular wording may represent a tacit limitation of the 
                                                 
81
 In this context, Prof. Sornarajah draws attention to foreign investment contracts which have become too 
onerous to perform. See Sornarajah, supra note 15, on page 85. 
82
 Ibid., on page 13. 
83
 Ibid. 
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host state’s regulatory power.84 Evidence of this tacit limitation of the regulatory power 
of the state is the incorporation of the FET standard within the provisions of an ITT and 
the incorporation of administrative law rights or acts within the definition of 
investment. These administrative law rights or acts have been considered as essential 
elements for the operation of any investment.
85
 Examples of the inclusion of 
administrative acts within the definition of investment can be found, amongst other 
treaties, in article I (1)(a)(v) of the USA-Argentina BIT
86
 and article 2 (e) of the 
Colombia-Spain BIT.
87
  
 
An unfavourable situation is created when there is a risk that minimum regulatory 
standards adopted by a host state are considered to constitute a breach of an IIT 
obligation and, subsequently, giving rise to a state’s international responsibility.88 It is 
in such a situation that the scope of the domestic legal principle of legality may be in 
conflict with the scope of the principle of legality under international law. This is so 
because a host state must act in accordance with its domestic principle of legality. 
However, it is also possible that such conduct may imply some features of the abuse of 
power or illegality under international investment standards, particularly when the FET 
standard is taken into consideration.
89
  
 
                                                 
84
 See G. Lysen, State Responsibility and International Liability of States for Lawful Acts – A Discussion of 
Principles (Iustus Forlaf Juridiska Foreningen I Uppsala, Sweden 1997), on page 15. 
85
 See Sornarajah, supra note 15, on page 170. 
86
 This treaty includes within its definition of investment, ‘any right conferred by law or contract, and any 
licenses and permits pursuant to law…”. 
87
 This treaty includes within its definition of investment, ‘[c]oncessions granted by law, by an administrative 
act or by a contract, including concessions to explore, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources…”. (This 
has been translated into English by the Author).  
88
 See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – Separate Opinion, supra note 6. See also Lysen, supra note 84, on 
page 170. 
89
 In this regard, the arbitral tribunal in Azurix Corp v. Argentina (2003), supra note 47, paragraph 391, agreed 
‘with the interpretation made by the Claimant that a measure needs only to be arbitrary to constitute a breach 
of the BIT.’.  
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This is where arbitral tribunals play a key role within the investment arbitration system 
since investment arbitrators mostly act as public-law adjudicators.
90
 It is also at this 
point that it is important to consider the host state’s legal principles since they should 
not be isolated from international law principles when evaluating the alleged ‘unlawful 
regulatory conduct’ by the host state.91 
 
There are arbitral tribunals that have directly reviewed, analyzed and weighed up the 
regulatory conduct of the host state’s government and its administrative entities in 
accordance with international rules.
92
 For example, in Metalclad Corporation v. 
Mexico
93
, the arbitral tribunal (i) judged the performance of a public entity of the 
Mexican state
94
 and (ii) acted as an administrative court.
95
  
 
Similarly, in Waste Management Inc v. Mexico,
96
 the arbitral tribunal (i) declared that 
there was doubt about the legal nature of a Mexican public entity’s (i.e., 
BANOBRAS)
97
 and (ii) considered the regulatory conduct of each Mexican entity 
involved in the case.
98
  
 
                                                 
90
 See Chapter V for more details. 
91
 It must be taken into account that ‘unlawful’ in this context can be assimilated into the notion of ‘illegal’. 
See paragraph 10.3. (a), International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States 
(UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) January 26, 2006 – Final Award. 
92
 See, for more, Van Harten and Loughlin, supra note 5; See also Van Harten, supra note 5.  
93
 Metalclad Corporation v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1) August 30, 2000 – 
Final Award. 
94
 See,e.g., Metalclad v. Mexico (2000), supra note 93, paragraph 86, when the tribunal states that the conduct 
of the Council to grant a permit was ‘inadequate’  
95
 Ibid., paragraphs 93 and 106 where the tribunal states that the refusal of the Municipality to grant Metalclad 
a construction permit did not have a proper foundation and, therefore, the Municipality acted outside its 
authority. Metalclad v. Mexico (2000), supra note 93. 
96
 See Waste Management, Inc v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3) April 30, 2004 
– Final Award. 
97
 Ibid., oparagraph 75 where the tribunal states that ‘the mere fact that a determined entity is owned by the 
state or the state has a majority control of this entity does not convert it ipso facto into a state organ’ 
(Translated by the Author). Waste v. Mexico (2004), supra note 96. 
98
 See, e.g., Waste v. Mexico (2004), supra note 96, paragraphs 100-117.  
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In Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador,
99
 the tribunal stated 
that:  
[The investment] environment was changed as matter of policy and legal 
interpretation, thus resulting in the breach of fair and equitable treatment. This 
breach relates to the effects of both revoking the Granting Resolutions and 
denying further VAT refunds. (Emphasis added).  
 
In Tza Yap Shum v. Peru,
100
 the tribunal forced or misconstrued an interpretation of the 
Peruvian state’s intention to conclude the Peru-China BIT in order to benefit an 
investor.
101
  
 
Finally, there is the case of Compañía de Desarrollo Santa Elena v. Costa Rica
102
 where 
the tribunal weighed the private interest over the public interest when it stated that 
‘[e]xpropiatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and beneficial to 
society as whole – are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that 
a state may take in order to implement its policies…’103 (Emphasis added).  
 
These examples, amongst many others, include, in one way or another, a reluctance of 
both foreign investors and arbitral tribunals to recognize the application of domestic 
administrative law principles (i.e., the host state’s classic law) to these disputes through 
the application of the FET standard. This is perhaps where the regulatory conduct of the 
host state and existence of administrative law principles clash or conflict with 
international rules.  
 
                                                 
99
 See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador (London Court of 
International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467), July 1, 2004 – Final Award. 
100
 See Tza Yap Shum v. Republica del Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6) June 19, 2009 – Decision on 
Jurisdiction. 
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 Ibid., on paragraphs 122, 128, 188 and 213. 
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 See Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID No. ARB/96/1) 
February 17, 2000 – Final Award. 
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 Ibid., paragraph 72.  
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Nonetheless, the good news is that some arbitral tribunals have already recognized the 
inadequacy of some principles of international law to properly cope with and address 
treaty-based regulatory disputes between a host state and private individuals. In this 
context, the arbitral tribunal in Mobil Corporation et al v. Venezuela,
104
 recognized that 
‘[r]ules governing a State’s unilateral acts in international law have never been codified 
and remain controversial on a certain number of points’.  
 
Similarly, the arbitral tribunal in Waste Management Inc v. Mexico (quoting the ADF 
Group Inc v. United States of America Final Award), stated that ‘both customary 
international law and the minimum standard of treatment of aliens it incorporates 
[referring to article 1105(1) of the NAFTA], are constantly in a process of 
development.’105 And finally, this latter tribunal also stated that ‘bilateral investment 
treaties are not an insurance policy against bad business decisions.’ 106  
 
o Economic and social stability of the host state 
 
Another aspect of the legal synergy between a host state and investor’s interests is the 
protection and guarantee of the host state’s economic and social stability and the 
increase of foreign investments.
107
 It is at this point that the host state often faces a 
dilemma between what can be a balanced-legal-socio-economic measure to protect the 
national public interest and how to protect the foreign investors’ interests at the same 
time.
108
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See, e.g., Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), supra note 8, paragraph 87. 
105
 See Waste v. Mexico (2004), supra note 96, paragraph 92. 
106
 Ibid., paragraph 114 and 177.  
107
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and London, 2002). 
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It has been said that this governmental dilemma may represent a risk to foreign 
investments since such uncertainty may result ‘…from either regime changes or 
changes to the existing political and economic policies of the host state’.109 In 
particular, if the host state has to take into account its socio-economic development and 
its national welfare. Consequently, this is why it has been argued that there is a need to 
consider the factors of social stability and economic circumstances which should 
exercise a strong influence on the manner of promoting investments.
110
 It is perhaps for 
this reason that it has been highlighted in this context that ‘the best form of stabilisation 
is an equitable deal’. 111  
 
Some arbitral tribunals have timidly referred to the difficult economic situation that 
some host states have faced during the performance of foreign investors’ activities 
within their territories. For example, in Azurix Corp. v. Argentina (Final Award), 
Argentina requested the arbitral tribunal to take into consideration the fact that ‘… 
during the period under review the country was undergoing the worst economic, social 
and institutional crisis in its history.’112 The arbitral tribunal positively and negatively 
took elements related to Argentina’s economic crisis into consideration113 by 
recognizing that ‘[t]he Tribunal understands that governments have to be vigilant and 
protect the public health of their citizens…’.114 However, on the other hand, 
determining that the performance of Argentina’s provincial authorities ‘… contributed 
to the crisis rather than assisting in solving it.’115 
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 See Sornarajah, Supra note 15, on page 76. 
110
 Ibid., on page 217. 
111
 G. Kahale III, The Upoar Surrounding Petroleum Contract Renegotiations, 82 Oxford Energy Forum 
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Another example of this timid arbitral practice can be found in Waste Management Inc 
v. Mexico (Final Award), where the arbitral tribunal also made a reference to another 
country’s economic situation. In this case, reference was made to Mexico’s financial 
crisis of December 1994. The tribunal considered this aspect as ‘… an important part of 
the background to the case…’ 116 Thus, the tribunal recognized that this financial crisis 
affected the financial plans of Mexico as well as those of the Claimant.
117
 In reaching 
this conclusion, the arbitral tribunal simultaneously analyzed the conduct of the 
Mexican authorities concerned in order to determine the exoneration of Mexico’s 
international responsibility.
118
  
 
Lastly, a similar example can be found in Aucoven v. Venezuela (Final Award)
119
 
where the arbitral tribunal made reference to Venezuela’s social crisis in 1989. The 
tribunal stated that ‘… the impact of the tragic events of the 1989 Caracazo cannot be 
underestimated.’120 This consideration was emphasized by the tribunal to determine 
Venezuela’s contractual responsibility regarding the breach of concession agreement 
obligations that were agreed upon with Aucoven. 
 
The problem between the consideration of the host state’s social and economic aspects 
within the arbitral proceedings and the consideration of the host state’s social reality by 
national courts is that investment arbitrators may not be fully aware of these socio-
economic circumstances. In fact, this problem may induce investment arbitrators to de-
contextualize the host state’s socio-economic reality or status when they traditionally 
base their decision on the facts provided by the disputing parties.  
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 See Waste v. Mexico (2004), supra note 96, paragraph 101. 
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 Ibid., paragraph 112.  
118
 Ibid., paragraph 100. 
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As was already mentioned, the risk of considering minimum regulatory behaviour of 
the host state as a breach of an IIT obligation, along with the failure of investment 
arbitrators to contextualize the host state’s conduct, may represent irreparable damage 
to the host state’s economic and social stability.121  
 
A good example of this risk, as well as of a de-contextualized decision, can be found in 
Mobil Cerro Negro Limited v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.
122
 where a British Court 
needed to set aside a freezing order previously granted by Teare J. on 24 January 2008 
under section 44 of the British Arbitration Act 1996. In this case, the Claimant 
attempted, through a worldwide freezing injunction commonly applicable to serious 
international fraud for the ‘dissipation of assets’, to freeze the assets of the Venezuelan 
National Oil Company for the amount of US$ 12 billion because the Venezuelan 
government decided to re-nationalize its oil industry and the government was in risk of 
not honouring the commitments assumed with the Claimants. Obviously, if this order 
had succeeded, the Venezuelan financial situation would have been seriously affected 
since states work with fixed budgets.
123
 
 
A final concern is that there is a collision not only between principles of administrative 
law (applicable to the state’s regulatory conduct) and international rules, but also 
between the international rules themselves. This is so because there seems to be a 
conflict between the international principle which states that ‘[a state] may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’,124 
and the international principle that recognizes a host state’s right to change economic or 
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other policies. This latter principle is embodied in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.
125
 
 
o Expropriation and compensation 
 
Expropriation and the subsequent compensation are the two most common motives that 
have been used by foreign investors in order to activate the ISTA. In this regard, 
arbitral cases range from the simple determination of the amount of compensation (e.g., 
Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica
126
) to more complex issues 
regarding the evaluation of the host state’s regulatory conduct to determine or define 
what has been known as ‘indirect expropriation’ (e.g., Metalclad Corporation v. 
Mexico
127
). Both scenarios mainly involve, in one way or another, the assessment of 
the host state’s regulatory conduct by investment arbitrators.  
 
It is necessary to highlight that these scenarios are encompassed with the host state’s 
socio-economic situation since the host state’s public policy requires taking actions to 
regulate certain industrial activities that are fundamental for the sustainable 
development of the state (i.e., through the nationalization
128
) or may require taking 
actions to deregulate the domestic market due to the need of cash flow on the part of 
host state (i.e., through the privatization).  
 
Professor P. Stevens’s article on Oil Wars: Resource Nationalism and the Middle East 
is worth mentioning here. This article identifies a ‘cyclical phenomenon’ that 
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summarizes the host state’s regulation and deregulation activity in the oil sector (see 
Graph 5 for illustration).
129
 
 
 
Source: Graph elaborated by the author with information collected from P. Stevens, Oil Wars (2007) 
 
Graph 5 illustrates the historical moments when states have been required to take 
restrictive regulatory actions and/or take investor friendly regulatory actions in order to 
guarantee their national development. This cyclical phenomenon is not only useful to 
illustrate the oil sector’s world cycle but is also useful to illustrate and allocate the 
economic events from other states such as the Argentinean economic crisis of 1999 and 
the Mexican financial crisis of 1994. Within the ups and downs of the cycle a wave of 
nationalistic and expropriatory measures were undertaken.
130
 Nonetheless, it is 
important to emphasize that there may be other expropriatory activities that are not 
necessarily framed within the above cycle. 
 
With regard to compensation, a good example of an investor-state dispute on the 
determination of a fair amount of compensation for the expropriatory actions taken by 
the host state can be found in Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa 
Rica.
131
 In this case, an economic-technical issue of determining the fair level of 
compensation was converted into a general review of the Costa Rican government’s 
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administrative actions. In this context, Costa Rica’s government expressly expropriated 
the Claimant’s property known as ‘Santa Elena’ and offered the Claimant an amount of 
approximately US$ 1,900,000 by way of compensation; whereas the Claimant claimed 
an amount of approximately US$ 6,400,000. The expropriatory measure was based on 
aspects of national interest (i.e., the maintenance of the environmental equilibrium) and 
it was carried out by a Presidential Decree (i.e., an administrative act). Both parties 
expressed their consent to the expropriatory measure, but disagreed on the amount of 
compensation.  
 
The arbitral tribunal took the following points into consideration in order to determine 
the fair market value of the property: (i) the consideration of principles of American 
law into the arbitral process (i.e., the Claimant’s law);132 (ii) the forced consent of the 
Costa Rican Government to international arbitration based on the pressure of the 
receiving a loan of US$ 175,000,000 from the Inter-American Development Bank;
133
 
(iii) the application of Costa Rican law and the role of international law;
134
 (iv) the 
priority of private interests over public interests;
135
 (v) the legal evaluation of the 
expropriatory measure itself;
136
 and (vi) making the property’s formal registration 
(protocolization) subject to the full payment of the amount of the award.
137
 Ultimately, 
the Costa Rican government was ordered to pay an amount of US$16,000,000. 
 
With regard to these various points, one should ask: Why did the arbitral tribunal 
evaluate the regulatory conduct of the Costa Rican government, although the parties did 
not disagree on the adoption of the measure? Why did the arbitral tribunal not consider 
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the forced consent of the Costa Rican government? Why, after deciding to apply the 
Costa Rican law, did the arbitral tribunal inject principles of American law into the 
process? Why did the arbitral tribunal weigh private individual interests over the 
national public interest? Why, after deciding to apply the principles of international 
law, did the arbitral tribunal ignore the content of Resolution 3.281 (XXIX)(1974) of 
the UN General Assembly that refers to national law in order to determine the amount 
of compensation?
138
 Do international arbitrators have to acknowledge the principle of 
iuris novit curia (the court knows the law)? The answers to these questions will 
continue to remain unclear to many public law lawyers for the foreseeable future. 
 
In relation to expropriatory actions, there are more complex decisions. These decisions 
not only involve an indirect evaluation of the host state’s regulatory conduct but also a 
direct evaluation of the state’s conduct as well as the definition and support of an 
international legal aspect that has never existed within the domestic legal system of any 
country. This legal aspect is the notion of ‘indirect expropriation’.  
 
A controversial example of this is seen in Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico (Final 
Award).
139
 In this case, the Claimant alleged that Mexico, through its local authorities’ 
regulatory behaviour, interfered with the development of its business (i.e., local 
operation of a hazardous waste landfill). It also alleged that Mexico breached article 
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(Last visit 24/01/2010). 
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 See Metalclad v. Mexico (2000), supra note 93.  
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140
 of the NAFTA (expropriation and compensation). Mexico denied these 
allegations.  
 
The arbitral tribunal made the following observations: (i) the consideration of the 
Ecological Decree’s legal nature was within its jurisdiction;141 (ii) the evaluation of the 
Municipality’s conduct as ‘improper’;142 (iii) the judgement of the Mexico’s domestic 
administrative proceedings in accordance with principles of international law
143
; (iv) 
the criticism as to the lack of technical motivation (i.e., lack of ‘construction aspects or 
flaws of the physical facility’) of the Municipality’s act;144 (v) the determination of 
Mexico’s Federal Government competences;145 and (vi) the consideration of the 
Municipality’s regulatory conduct as a behaviour ‘outside its authority’.146 Ultimately, 
the arbitral tribunal considered that all these administrative law points were an 
interference with the use of Claimant’s property and they therefore constituted indirect 
expropriation without compensation.
147
  
 
As can be seen, issues presented to arbitral tribunals not only involve the consideration 
of technical issues such as the determination of a fair amount of compensation, but also 
increasingly involve aspects related to the state’s regulatory behaviour. This latter 
practice has been the main role of domestic courts and the function of administrative 
law principles.  
                                                 
140
 This article states that ‘[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
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such an investment ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in 
accordance with the due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 through to 6.’. North American Free Trade Agreement (Texas, 17 December 
1992, entered into force 1 January 1994). <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp> (Last visit 
15/08/2010). 
141
 See Metalclad v. Mexico (2000), supra note 93, paragraph 69. 
142
 Ibid., paragraph 86.  
143
 Ibid., paragraph 88.  
144
 Ibid., paragraph 69.  
145
 Ibid., paragraph 105.  
146
 Ibid., paragraph 106.  
147
 Ibid., paragraphs 103 and 112.  
 231 
 
o Renegotiation of long-term investment contracts 
 
Recently, some governments such as those of Canada,
148
 Venezuela,
149
 Ecuador,
150
 
Bolivia
151
 and Kazakhstan
152
 have opted for reviewing, through renegotiations, a group 
of long-term investment agreements, their terms and conditions and/or the applicable 
fiscal regimes.  
 
This practice has been adopted despite the tendency to consider the international law 
principle of the sanctity of the contract. This principle denies the state’s right to 
unilaterally change the conditions of an investment agreement, instead of considering 
these long-term investment contracts as state’s contracts (i.e., administrative contracts 
or government contracts).
153
 Curiously, this practice has mainly included hydrocarbon 
agreements due to their importance to the host state’s socio-economic development.  
 
Additionally, this non-contentious measure of renegotiating long-term investment 
agreements has been taken on grounds of changed circumstances. For example, 
whether the contracts have been too onerous for the country or the contracts did not 
comply with the public objectives of the government in power, i.e., including the 
objectives of the protection of national welfare as well as the adoption of nationalistic 
measures.
154
 The latter point primarily represents the conflicting interests that arise 
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between a private company and a state national company acting as representative of the 
host state’s interest.155  
 
Moreover, throughout the duration of these long-term investment agreements, 
governments may change and so many their public aims.
156
 Here it is important to re-
emphasize that each country has the right to change economic or other policies.
157
  
 
It has been argued that ‘these agreements were entered upon at a time when the host 
country was politically or economically weak, or was badly advised…’158 Therefore, as 
soon as the new political regime realizes the problem, it seeks renegotiations.
159
 This 
exercise has not been well received
160
 by foreign investors. Foreign investors have 
opted to reject this idea or, in some cases, have made complaints at an international 
level through arbitration.
161
 Nonetheless, it has been admitted that renegotiation ‘is 
today an “integral feature of foreign investment process”’.162 
 
For example, in the case of Venezuela, during the implementation of its new oil policy 
known as ‘Plena Soberania Petrolera’,163 the Venezuelan government successfully 
reached renegotiations with almost all international oil companies that had a petroleum 
businesses in Venezuela. However it failed to do so with two of them (ConocoPhillips 
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 See Kroll, supra note 156, on page 46.  
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Venezuela (First Edition, Epsilon Libros, Venezuela 2008), pages 411-426. 
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and ExxonMobil
164
). These two companies, despite the re-negotiation process, decided 
to opt for both investment and commercial arbitrations to pursue their compensatory 
petitions.  
 
One of the risks for host states with this type of practice is that investment arbitrators at 
the moment of evaluating an arbitral case– may ignore the facts underlying the 
renegotiation.
165
 Therefore, they may jump to a de-contextualized conclusion, for 
example the declaration of an indirect expropriation as a violation of any treaty-based 
obligation.
166
 
 
vii. Analogy of ISTAs with some principles of domestic administrative law 
 
Based on the previous sub-sections, it is necessary to draw attention to the analogy of a 
treaty-based investor-state adjudication in particular when dealing with regulatory 
disputes with some institutions and principles of domestic administrative law. This 
exercise can be based either on the public-law functions of ad hoc tribunals or on the 
public-law nature of the contractual treaty. Both of these features have some important 
similarities with (i) the functions and (ii) public-law legal nature of British 
administrative tribunals (including, in some instances, the functions of ordinary courts 
                                                 
164
 ConocoPhillips requested arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (against the 
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when dealing with judicial reviews) and French administrative courts (i.e., the function 
of its contentious-administrative jurisdiction). 
 
In other words, firstly, both domestic legal systems provide internal mechanisms to 
deal with the legal differences caused by regulatory measures between the state (i.e., 
public administration) and private individuals. Secondly, both national and 
international public law adjudicatory mechanisms are created in accordance with the 
intention of the state (i.e., they are created through specific legal acts, e.g., legislative 
acts and international contractual treaties (IITs), respectively). For better picture about 
the analogies of ISTAs with some domestic legal remedies see Annex B. 
 
Thus, as was previously pointed out, the idea of creating an investor-state adjudicatory 
mechanism at the international level corresponds with the idea of creating an 
international neutral forum, i.e., a kind of temporary supranational public-law tribunal 
to mainly review the host state’s regulatory conduct.167 Additionally, as has been said, 
‘one of the purposes of investor-State arbitration is to avoid local courts’.168 If this 
premise were untrue, states would not have agreed on subscribing to and ratifying the 
ICSID Convention or any other investment treaty. 
 
Article 13 (2) (a) of the Germany-Trinidad and Tobago BIT
169
 states that ‘[i]f the 
dispute cannot thus be settled within six months following the date on which the 
dispute has been raised by either party, it shall be submitted, upon request of a national 
or company, either [1] to the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose 
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territory the investment was made, or [2] to international arbitration…’ (Emphasis 
added). This quotation reflects the intention of the contracting states in creating, 
through an IIT dispute-settlement clause, the alternative possibility of choosing – at the 
request of foreign investors – between national courts and international arbitrations 
(known as ‘the-fork-in-the-road clause’).  
 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned practice also reflects that contracting parties are 
conscious of the fact that they are waiving their immunity from jurisdiction in favour of 
the creation of a temporary public-law state-state-agreed international tribunal. Clearer 
evidence of this argument can be found in article 11 of the Colombia-Switzerland BIT 
which expressly states that ‘any dispute that cannot be settled within a period of six 
months… can be referred to the administrative courts or tribunals of the involved 
Contracting State or to international arbitration.’170 (Emphasis added). Through this 
clause, it is clear that the contracting state is expressly recognizing the public-law 
function of these two mechanisms to settle regulatory disputes between the state and 
private individuals. Moreover, special attention should be drawn to the evidence related 
to this practice that is also found in those treaties in which contracting states have 
consented to include, within the definition of ‘investment’, rights granted by 
administrative acts such as licences, permit, concession, etc.
171
 
 
It is obvious that contracting states of a BIT are (consciously or unconsciously) giving 
their consent to create this kind of temporary supranational tribunal. For this reason, it 
can be a healthy exercise to refrain from isolating such functions from the application 
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of some domestic (administrative) law principles since these are the legal principles 
that govern the regulatory behaviour of the state as well as the relationship between the 
state and private individuals (including foreign investors) at the national level. As 
already emphasised, given the analogy between ISTAs and domestic administrative 
tribunals/courts in reviewing the administrative action of the state, in addition to the 
consent of the host state to arbitrate public-law matters, it is noteworthy highlight that 
the main role of these two public-law adjudicatory mechanisms is to control the legality 
of the state’s regulatory conduct. In this regard, these two parallel mechanisms of 
reviewing the regulatory conduct of the state should carry out the control of legality in 
order to find out whether the state’s administrative action was also performed not only 
in accordance with the those administrative law principles that rule the regulatory 
conduct of the state (see sub-section f of chapter II), but also in accordance with the 
public interest. 
 
Support for this proposition can be found in International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v. Mexico where, in a separate opinion, Professor T. Wälde stated that ‘… 
investor-state arbitration are [analogous to the]…judicial review relating [to] 
governmental conduct – be it international judicial review (as carried out by the WTO 
dispute panels and Appellate Body, by the European – or Inter-American Human 
Rights Courts or the European Court of Justice) or national administrative courts 
judging the disputes of individual citizens’ over alleged abuse by public bodies of their 
governmental powers.’ 172 (Emphasis added). 
 
In this respect, slowly but surely, there is a growing need to take public law principles 
into consideration in treaty-based state-investor arbitrations . This can be illustrated by 
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 See, e.g., S. W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University 
Press, UK 2010). See also C. A. Rogers, and R. P. Alford, The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford 
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the fact that since 2000  arbitral tribunals, in relation to regulatory disputes started to 
take into account public law principles due to the consideration of the FET standard in 
investment arbitrations. This necessity is making its way to the top of the current 
discussion on the legitimacy of the investment treaty arbitration system.
173
 Moreover, 
the author is of the opinion that this approach of considering some principles of 
domestic administrative law in international regulatory disputes represents a temporary 
measure to achieve a fairer balance between the host state’s and foreign investor’s 
interests at the international level. 
 
Finally, this analogical practice can be the reason why administrative law principles can 
be constantly in conflict with principles of investment law
174
 as was pointed out in sub-
section (v).
175
 This is so because both are legal principles that are created in accordance 
with the state’s intention and related to the state’s regulatory conduct. The risk of 
applying this proposal to regulatory disputes may create a conflict of principles that 
may be interpreted and applied by international arbitrators who may be inexperienced 
in public-law matters.
176
 This lack of public-law practice results in taking a short-cut 
with regard to considering domestic law principles as facts alleged by the parties.
177
 
 
viii. Analogy with administrative justice. 
 
The introduction of treaty-based investor-state arbitration within a state’s public-law 
apparatus, as a mechanism to administer justice, represents the reality of finding a 
solution to the overcrowded national judicial system. However, the administration of 
                                                 
173
 See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – Separate Opinion, supra note 5, on paragraph 13. 
174
 See F. G. Jacobs, and S. Roberts, The effect of Treaties in Domestic Law (United Kingdom National 
Committee of Comparative Law, Sweet & Mexwell, London 1987), on page 58. 
175
 See for more details the next sub-section (b) regarding ‘Applicable Law’. 
176
 See, e.g., Wälde, supra note 9, on page 28, in which Professor Wälde pointed out that ‘there are few if any 
experts in comparative public law…’  
177
 See, e.g., Z. Douglas, Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 
Methanex, Arbitration International, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2006), on page 45. 
 238 
justice cannot be discarded from the main objective of the state’s judicial function 
which is to guarantee the correct application of the principle of legality and the due 
observance of the law, including the control of those legal acts performed by the 
state.
178
 The judicial control of state acts (i.e., administrative acts) and its interaction 
with private individuals is part of what has become domestically known as 
‘administrative justice’.179 
 
Regarding this latter point, there may be a growing concern in the public-law sector 
about the judicial control of these types of state acts by arbitral tribunals and how this 
affects the competence of national tribunals and courts.
180
 This concern may be due to 
the main aim of the state’s judicial control which is to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
principle of legality. This idea may also embrace the idea on the ‘democratic 
legitimacy’ of arbitral practises regarding the review of state regulatory actions at an 
international level.
181
 
 
In addition, there is also the fact that it is only through the application of this principle 
that the equilibrium between public authorities and private individuals can be 
reached.
182
 The application of this principle is the safety tool to control the public 
authorities’ powers at an international level and to determine the state’s 
reasonability.
183
 In particular, the different manners of how the state (i.e., public 
administration) can substantiate its will through administrative acts are taken into 
consideration. Hence, the substantiation may imply a breach of an IIT’s provisions.  
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In this context, it is noteworthy to highlight the role of judges on the positioning of 
investment treaties within a state’s legal system (see Chapter III). In this respect, unlike 
the French Legal system, under the British Legal system, treaties do not have a special 
position,
184
 i.e., treaties and legislation are ‘on the same level’.185 This latter 
observation may represent an important legal challenge for domestic courts when 
dealing with the interpretation of treaties at the local level. 
 
Finally, it has been highlighted that within the ‘the new supranational projections [of a 
state], especially those regarding economic aspects, there has arisen new views on the 
public law [functions] in order to avoid that such a public law framework becomes an 
obstacle for the development and regional integration.’186 In this respect, it has been 
argued that these supranational actions of the state have to be in line with the principles 
of domestic law and international law, in which case the state must ensure the 
incorporation of a mechanism to judicially control the state’s regulatory behaviour 
within a given treaty’s provisions.187 
 
c. Applicable Law  
 
Generally, within BIT provisions, the applicable law to investor-state disputes 
(including regulatory disputes) is established in an express clause/article which 
determines the contracting states’ election of the appropriate law. For example, in 
article 9(5) of the Venezuela-Netherlands BIT, it was stated that an arbitral award 
should be based on (i) the law of the contracting party concerned; (ii) the provisions of 
the BIT and other relevant agreements between the contracting parties; (iii) the 
                                                 
184
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provisions of special agreements relating to the investments; (iv) the general principles 
of international law; and (v) such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties to the 
dispute. 
 
The majority of the investor-state dispute clauses incorporated into an IIT by the 
contracting states include a list of alternative arbitral institutions and rules to settle a 
possible legal controversy between the two parties. This list of alternatives mostly 
either refers to the rules of (i) the ICSID Convention; (ii) the Additional Facility of the 
ICSID; (iii) the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL); and (iv) any other arbitration institution as agreed by the 
parties to the dispute.
188
 
 
The two most popular institutions and rules chosen by the conflicting parties are the 
ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL rules. In fact, nowadays, the most popular one to 
deal with investment treaty disputes is the ICSID Convention
189
 since it has been said 
that its jurisdiction must be founded on an IIT.
190
 In this regard, the applicable 
substantive law to any treaty-based investor-state legal controversy mainly refers to, 
and is based on, the rules contained in article 42 of the ICSID Convention.
191
 
 
Article 42 of the ICSID Convention states: ‘The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of 
such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the 
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dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law 
as may be applicable.’ (Emphasis added). 
 
Thus, as can be seen in article 42, a hierarchical order can be deduced to determine the 
applicable law to a given treaty-based controversy.
192
 Firstly, the duty of applying the 
law agreed by the parties, e.g., through an IIT or an investment contract (based on the 
principle of party autonomy and freedom of choice). Secondly, there is the duty of 
applying by default the law of the contracting party to the dispute (i.e., the host state’s 
law) and rules of international law ‘as may be applicable’. Under both cases, the most 
frequent arbitral practice has been the application of the law of the state party to the 
dispute together with international law.
193
 It has been said in this regard that Article 42 
(1) of the ICSID Convention allows (confirms) the application of various sources of 
law to resolve the issues in dispute.
194
 
 
Nonetheless, it is of significance to draw attention to the fact that the drafters of the 
ICSID Convention have just referred to ‘law’ in a general manner and as a general 
concept. They neither specify nor classify the host state’s law in either applicable 
principles or non-applicable principles. Hence, it has been said that the ICSID 
Convention ‘does not provide substantive rules for the relationship between host States 
and foreign investors’195 as well as that ‘Article 42(1) leaves open the circumstances in 
which national law is to be applied’.196 For this reason, it can be assumed that the 
exercise of applying principles from domestic law to international regulatory disputes 
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has been left to the discretion and expertise of investment arbitrators (arbitral 
tribunals).
197 
 
 
For example, the arbitral practices in determining the rule of law for particular arbitral 
cases
198
 range from (i) the simple application of the host state’s law199 to (ii) the 
combined application of host state’s law and international law;200 and to (iii) the sole 
application of international law.
201
 
 
This serves to emphasize that in current arbitral practice, there does not seem to be a 
homogeneous criterion used to determine the applicable law to the investor-state 
dispute. In practice, there is wide discretion on the arbitrators’ side.202 It has been said 
that ‘[an arbitral] tribunal is competent to apply the stipulated sources of law’ as well as 
that ‘[the arbitral tribunal has the power] to apply different rules from different legal 
sources to different issues in dispute’.203 The presence of such discretion seems to 
discard a priori some legal tools that may be used as a good reference to help solve an 
international regulatory controversy.
204
This is supported by the fact that these 
international arbitrators do not refer sufficiently to domestic law, including its legal 
principles and the years of experience that the main legal systems have in dealing with 
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regulatory disputes between the public administration (i.e., the state) and private 
individuals (i.e., including foreign investors). In particular, if one takes into 
consideration the facts asserted in sub-section (vi), the analogy that exists between 
these kinds of domestic state-private individual disputes and those international treaty-
based regulatory disputes. This particular consideration serves to infer that the former 
can be used as a legal reference to help arbitrators to deal with latter type of regulatory 
dispute. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘law’ as ‘a rule or system of rules recognized 
by a country or community as governing the actions of its members.’ and the Oxford 
Dictionary of Law further refers to it as ‘[t]he enforceable body of rules that govern any 
society.’ Based on these two definitions of ‘law’, it could be asked whether the notion 
of ‘law’ mentioned by the ICSID’s drafters may also include the application of or 
reference to general principles of law that have been developed domestically through 
case law and applied to investor-state arbitration practices which deal with  
international regulatory disputes. This particular point has a special importance within 
this study due to the case law nature that international investment law has (which is 
similar to the case law nature of domestic administrative law).
205
 
 
Under both the British and French legal systems, these domestic legal principles have 
been used as a good reference by administrative tribunals and courts in an attempt to 
deal with the legal/regulatory differences that have arisen between the public 
administration and private individuals for over seventy-five years. It is worth 
mentioning here that the similarity between the case law natures of both the domestic 
                                                 
205
 J. P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration – A Citation Analysis of a Developing 
Jurisprudence, Journal of International Arbitration 24 (2); 129-158 (2007), on page 132. 
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administrative law and investment law principles ought to make domestic 
administrative law principles more relevant for ISTA.  
 
Additionally, there is the fact that arbitral tribunals have taken account of the increasing 
necessity of relying on, or referring to, domestic law principles as kind of legal 
guideline to try to resolve the dispute.
206
 The question that may be asked is whether 
these legal principles can be a useful reference for investment arbitrators when dealing 
with a treaty-based regulatory dispute. Particularly, if this practice is considered to be a 
mechanism that may help to minimize the risk of nullity of the resulting award,
207
 as 
well as to increase the legitimacy of the investment arbitration system.
208
 Furthermore, 
it recently has been stated that ‘[t]he future evolution of [BIT] jurisprudence will 
mainly depend upon the methodology… [that arbitral] tribunal[s] use to apply the 
relevant rules of investment law’.209 
 
d. Principles of Administrative Law as a legal reference for Investment 
Arbitrators 
 
In the exercise of determining the applicable law relevant to a particular investor-state 
regulatory controversy, investment arbitrators have recently started (from around the 
year 2000 onwards) to look for and rely more on non-international rules and principles 
to carry out this task of judging the regulatory conduct of the host state at the 
international level due to the application of the FET standard in investment arbitration. 
These non-international sources have mainly been found in, and taken from, domestic 
legal sources such as legislative and administrative acts,
210
 i.e., from the domestic 
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regulation of the host state.
211
 In many arbitral proceedings, the most popular and 
traditional practice of relying on such domestic acts has come to pass through the use of 
legal experts declarations and affidavits.  
 
It is important to emphasize, in recent arbitral awards, some investment tribunals, along 
with some arbitrators, have already started to expressly recognise the need of solving 
investor-state regulatory controversies by resorting to domestic law and its principles. 
This growing need has mainly been based on the fact that there is a lack of rules 
governing the unilateral acts of states in international law
212
 and also on the fact that 
customary international law and international investment law are both constantly 
evolving.
213
 This constant evolution is not only apparent in these two areas of law; it is 
also found is any democratic society and its domestic administrative law. 
 
For example, in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, in a 
separate opinion referring to legitimate expectations, one of the arbitrators, Professor 
Tomas W. Wälde asserted that ‘[t]he common principles of the principal administrative 
legal systems are in [his] view an important point of reference for the interpretation of 
investment treaties to the extent investment treaty jurisprudence is not yet firmly 
established.’ 214 (Emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, the decision on jurisdiction in Mobil Corporation et al v. Venezuela 
emphasized that ‘[r]ules governing State’s unilateral acts in international law have 
never been codified and remain controversial on a certain number of points.’ It is 
important to stress that the uncodified rules regarding a state’s regulatory conduct are 
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not only of international legal concern, but also of national concern. This is why, for 
decades, domestic legal systems such as the British and French administrative legal 
systems have relied on case law when dealing with domestic individual/state 
legal/regulatory disputes.  
 
Both the French and British administrative legal systems currently lack a determined 
administrative law code. Instead they are based on legal precepts that are dispersed in 
various legislative and administrative acts which are used and interpreted on a case-by-
case basis. As was described in Chapter II, the lack of an administrative law code may 
be based on the idea of freely promoting the host state’s public interest, in addition to 
giving the public administration a certain flexibility to adapt its activities to cope with 
the vivid, dynamic and changing realities it has to face, particularly in cases that could 
not have been foreseen in advance. 
 
With regard to the possible occurrence of unforeseen domestic changes in a host state, 
the final award in MTD v. Chile is relevant. In this case, the arbitral tribunal expressly 
recognised that ‘[an IIT provision] does not entitle an investor to a change of the 
normative framework of the country where it invests. All that an investor may expect is 
that the law be applied.’215 (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal is 
simply referring to freedom of the host state to adopt new policies but with due 
observance of the law (i.e., subject to the principle of legality). Finally, the arbitral 
tribunal concluded that the freedom to adopt new policies was not contained by any 
provision of the BIT. 
 
It is important here to highlight the proposal formulated by W. Burke-White and A. 
Von Staden on the need to consider public law standards of review in investor-state 
                                                 
215
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arbitration as ‘a margin of appreciation standard of review’ before the existing strict ‘no 
other means available’ approach applied in the current arbitral practice.216  
 
The practice of investment arbitrators to refer to administrative law principles in 
international regulatory disputes may help to mitigate the risk of considering a host 
state’s regulatory conduct as a potential international breach of an IIT provision. An 
example of such a risk can be found in Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, where the 
arbitral tribunal stated that ‘a unilateral and unjustified change in the exclusivity 
obligation could have amounted to an expropriation’.217 Again, the evaluation of the 
host state’s regulatory conduct represents a legal conflict between international and 
national principles, owing to the fact that the disputed host-state measure can be 
completely legal and justified under its national legal system but may not be under the 
minimum international standards of treatment.  
 
Hence, the role of investment arbitrators as public-law adjudicators is crucial in 
assessing the state’s regulatory conduct. This is particularly so if this regulatory 
behaviour also contains elements or aspects of the host state’s administrative, labour, 
monetary, and penal law.
218
 The main concern here will be the fact that many of these 
areas are constitutionally reserved to the host state and cannot be waived 
contractually.
219
  
 
The words of the sole arbitrator Professor Jan Paulsson in the case of Pantechniki S.A. 
Contractors & Engineers may be influential to the application of administrative law 
principles to international investor-state regulatory disputes. In this respect, Professor 
                                                 
216
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Jan Paulsson reflected on the risk of transforming arbitral tribunals into ‘policy-makers’ 
when dealing with the definition of the ‘foreign investment’. He further recognized that 
there was a risk of introducing, to the analysis of the case, elements of ‘subjective 
judgment’ when dealing with characteristics of investment such as ‘sufficient duration 
or magnitude or contribution to economic development’.’220  
 
It can be stated that Professor Jan Paulsson’s observations serve as evidence of the 
investment arbitrators’ awareness of their role as public-law adjudicators and their task 
of dealing with issues related to the host state’s public policy and regulatory power 
when attempting to resolve an investor-state legal dispute. This exercise represents 
legal grounds either to get deeper into the analysis and solution of the case or to simply 
declare that the investment tribunal lacks the necessary jurisdiction.   
 
Similarly, consideration must be given to the undeveloped mode of application of the 
principle of restrictive immunity.
221
 This is based on government’s acts known as Acta 
Jure Imperii (i.e., sovereignty/acts of authority) and government’s acts by right of 
management that belong to the state known as Acta Jure Gestionis (i.e., 
private/commercial acts).
222
 
 
Obviously, it is also of importance to draw attention to the fact that the exercise of 
referring or resorting to domestic law principles to attempt to resolve international 
investor-state regulatory controversies does not mean that the arbitral tribunal is going 
to review decisions deriving from the domestic courts (i.e., as an international De Novo 
Review). Reference to these legal principles can be carried out when the investor has 
opted for international arbitration and has decided to abandon the option of going to a 
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national court to claim a breach of an IIT’s provision or when there has been a denial of 
justice on the part of the host state. Finally, it must be stressed that the present idea will 
not be very practical or useful if the disputing parties have agreed to resolve their 
controversy through ex aequo et bono (according to equity and good conscience) 
basis.
223
 
 
e. Stages of the arbitration process 
 
Once the foreign investor has opted for international arbitration as a forum to resolve a 
legal dispute with a host state, the investor, in most cases, chooses the ICSID 
Convention (i.e., an institutional arbitration). Such a choice includes the submission of 
both disputing parties to this institution’s rule.  
 
In accordance with the ICSID Convention, its rules can be divided and allocated into 
two main stages.  
 
The first stage can be referred to as ‘the cognitive stage’. This stage includes all the 
steps prior to the final award being delivered and that are destined to obtain a complete 
understanding of the case. This cognitive process is undertaken by means of the 
following steps (i) request for arbitration;
224
 (ii) constitution of the Tribunal;
225
 and (iii) 
powers and functions of the Tribunal.
226
  
 
The second stage can be referred to as ‘the enforcement stage’. This phase is made up 
of all the steps destined to guarantee the final result – the proper administration of 
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justice. The main phases of this stage are: (i) the award;
227
 (ii) interpretation, revision 
and annulment of the award;
228
 and (iii) recognition and enforcement of the award.
229
 
 
One of the most relevant or important phases of arbitration proceedings is the 
recognition and enforcement of the award due to the fact that it represents the final 
stage of any international legal dispute.
230
 The ICSID Convention states, in article 54, 
that its awards have to be recognized as though they were final judgements of the host 
state’s national court and, therefore, they may be considered to be insulated from 
revision by any host state’s domestic court.231  
 
To this respect, article 54 establishes that:  
[E]ach contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Convention as biding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgement of a court in that 
State.  
… 
Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution 
of judgements in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought. 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Upon reading the provision contained in article 54, it can be clearly deduced that the 
intention and subsequent consent given to the ICSID Convention by the contracting 
parties (i.e., the states) was to give recognition to any ICSID’s arbitral award as if it 
were rendered by their national courts. This recognition is a ‘distinctive feature’232 of 
the ICSID Convention and represents, as was emphasized by Professor Gus Van Harten 
and Professor Martin Loughlin in their article on ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
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Species of Global Administrative Law’,233 the overcoming of previous enforceability 
obstacles (such as issues related to a host state’s immunity), as well as representing ‘an 
exceptionally powerful method of enforcement’ due to the fact that this provision, in 
conjunction with the content of the New York Convention, was ratified by 
‘approximately 165 states’.234 Nonetheless, it has been argued that the execution of an 
arbitral award is still subject to national law, including immunity defences.
235
 In this 
particular regard, it has been distinguished from the enforcement and the execution of 
arbitral awards.
236
 Due to the size of the present research, the study of this latter point is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and consequently will not be addressed.  
 
f. Summary 
 
Treaty-based investor-state arbitration is a mechanism used to adjudicate public-law 
issues and fulfils the intention of the contracting states to create a special international 
forum to resolve disputes that arise from a treaty-based disagreement between a 
contracting state and a national of the other contracting party. Recently, one of the main 
reasons for investor/state treaty arbitration is the review of the administrative actions of 
the host state at the international level. The review of administrative actions of the host 
state gives ISTAs the characteristic of being considered as international regulatory 
disputes. 
 
The analogy of investor-state arbitration mechanisms with institutions and principles of 
domestic administrative law creates a new point of legal reference for those investment 
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arbitrators that are currently dealing with international regulatory disputes. Such 
reference should not only be based on the existing similarity between the characteristic 
functions of investor-state arbitration tribunals and domestic administrative tribunals 
and courts, but also on the approach that these domestic tribunals and courts take in 
dealing with similar regulatory situations that coincidentally involve the state (through 
its public administration) and private individuals (including foreign individuals).  
 
It is of paramount importance to reiterate that the British and French administrative 
legal systems have more than seventy-five years of rich experience dealing with this 
type of regulatory dispute. During these years of experience, a large number of 
principles have subsequently been developed and expanded upon through case law (for 
some of them see Chapter II). This proposal (of referring to principles of administrative 
law)  seems to have no legal impediment which would prohibit its application, it should 
be considered by investment arbitrators when they are reviewing the regulatory conduct 
of the host state at the international level in accordance with the FET standard.  
 
Moreover, reference to these institutions and principles can bring more legitimacy to 
the growing system of investment arbitration. This is particularly so if the public law 
principles that govern the regulatory conduct of the state have not been well developed 
and made available in international law.
237
 Lastly attention may be drawn to the well-
known principle which establishes that contracting states have the duty to ensure and 
guarantee the state of law either by investment tribunals or by domestic courts. This 
duty also compromises the consideration of those principles of law that give grounds to 
the state’s regulatory behaviour either at the national level or at the international level. 
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Based on the previous observations, it is opportune to highlight that the aim of next 
chapter will be to identify those situations, by reviewing a sample of arbitral awards, 
where the arbitral tribunals have referred to or have missed (directly or indirectly) the 
opportunity to refer to those principles developed domestically. This exercise is carried 
out in order to demonstrate how investment tribunals have dealt with these principles of 
domestic law when considering the regulatory power of the host state at the 
international level, particular attention will be given hose cases that are largely 
concerned with the above-mentioned FET standard. 
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CHAPTER V 
INVESTOR-STATE TREATY ARBITRATION AND PRINCIPLES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – AN ARBITRAL PRACTICE REVIEW 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the international task of reviewing a state’s 
regulatory conduct through treaty-based investor-state arbitration is a relatively new 
phenomenon and a growing area within the contemporary notion of public international 
law.
1
 The features and functions of this new regulatory dispute resolution mechanism 
between private individuals and sovereign states have been considered analogous to 
those carried out by domestic institutions, e.g., national tribunals and courts.
2
  
 
Traditionally, and for a significant period of time, these domestic institutions have 
resolved such regulatory disputes between the state and private individuals through the 
application of a set of domestic legal principles.
3
 To reiterate, these domestic 
institutions and their set of principles have existed in the major legal systems of world, 
namely the common law and civil law systems,
4
 for over fifty-five years.
5
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It is of significance to draw attention to the fact that the analogy between the features 
and functions of these domestic legal review mechanisms and the mechanisms which 
deal with international regulatory disputes have only recently been identified.
6
 The 
relevance of this academic comparison has emerged as a legal consequence of elevating 
the private rights of action of individuals to the international law forum through the 
conclusion of more than 2,750 BITs
7
 worldwide.
8
  
 
The growth in the number of BITs, in addition to the incorporation of investor-state 
arbitration clauses therein, has given rise to the constant scrutiny of the host state’s 
regulatory conduct by international investment arbitrators. However, there is a point of 
concern between this international mechanism and traditional domestic mechanisms. 
This concern is based on the assumption that domestic public-law issues have been 
entrusted to and carried out by non-traditional or non-tenured public-law adjudicators, 
i.e., international investment arbitrators.
9
 
 
Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that both national and international dispute 
resolution methods have been entrusted to judges and arbitrators by sovereign states. 
These judges and arbitrators have been regarded as public-law adjudicators
10
 to 
directly (and, sometimes, indirectly) assess the host state’s regulatory conduct. Both 
mechanisms have been designed to determine and contextualize the legality and 
fairness of a given regulatory measure in accordance with the provisions of the relevant 
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municipal law, the standards established by a certain BIT, and also with provisions of 
the law in general.  
 
The problem with these separate (parallel) levels of review, as will be seen later, is the 
fact that both national and international levels are operating in a disconnected manner 
with regard to reviewing the regulatory power of a state.  
 
For this reason, it is important to emphasize that, despite this disconnection, these 
national and international public-law adjudicators refer to and interpret the general 
principles of law in a similar way. For example, under both dispute resolution practices, 
through a similar methodology of interpretation e.g., case law,
11
 adjudicators adopt 
different interpretations of these sets of legal principles, which have been considered to 
be essential legal references, in mainly attempting to resolve a particular 
individual/state regulatory dispute. Examples of these sets of principles are the 
substantive principles of administrative law (see Chapter II) and the substantive 
principles of international investment law (see Chapter III).  
 
This similarity arises, from the fact that the rules governing the state’s regulatory power 
have not been consistently codified either at the national level or international level.
12
 
Therefore, public-law adjudicators have been required to resort to these legal principles 
and to their various interpretations in their decisions as well as interpretations of 
previous tribunals and courts. For example, in some cases, investment tribunals have 
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expressly resorted to previous arbitral decisions,
13
 as well as to domestic tribunals and 
courts within their territory.
14
 An apparent point of reconciliation between these two 
sets of legal practices is that, in recent arbitral practices from around the year 2000 
onwards, domestic law principles have been increasingly referred to by arbitral 
tribunals as legal guidance to resolve the investor-state regulatory dispute, albeit in a 
conservative manner.
15
 
 
Nevertheless, the main content of these sets of legal principles and their interpretations 
has been created through two separate (parallel) manners and scenarios, despite their 
similar main objective (i.e., to help public-law adjudicators in the process of assessing 
the regulatory conduct of a similar public-law subject such as the state). The two 
separate (parallel) manners refer to treaty-based arbitrations and national tribunals or 
courts, respectively.
16
 The two different (parallel) scenarios refer to: at the international 
level, judging the state as a contracting party of an IIT (i.e., as a subject of public 
international law); and, at the national level, judging the state (through its public 
administration) as the tortfeasor (i.e., a subject of public domestic law). 
 
Based on the previous idea, it may be affirmed – at first glance– that the separate 
emergence of these two sources of interpretation of the sets of principles create an 
apparent conflict between the legal principles of international investment law and those 
principles of national (constitutional and administrative) law e.g., the conflict between 
                                                 
13
 See Commission, supra note 11. 
14
 See, e.g., Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 5, pages 175-177; and Bradley and Ewing, supra note 5, pages 
723-758.  
15
 See, e.g., Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), supra note 12, on paragraph 81; Azurix Corp. v. la Republica 
Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) July 14, 2006 – Final Award, paragraph 67; Occidental Exploration 
and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador (London Court of International Arbitration 
Administered Case No. UN 3467) July 1, 2004 – Final Award, paragraphs 58 and 137; Pantechniki S.A. 
Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21) July 30, 2009 – 
Final Award, paragraph 69. Moreover, it is of relevance to draw attention to the fact that that some arbitral 
awards have made repeated references to the principle of legitimate expectations.  
16
 Many arbitral tribunals have emphasized that domestic court decisions are not binding on them. 
 258 
some principles of domestic administrative law and the FET standard when dealing 
with international regulatory disputes. This conflict is possibly one of the reasons of 
why it has been argued that the legitimacy of the investment arbitration system could 
be at ‘risk’.17 Specifically, if it is taken into consideration that these legal reviewing 
practices compromises, to some extent, the state’s responsibility when foreign 
investment rights have been compromised by a governmental measure.
18
 
 
Perhaps, the arbitral reluctance to jointly refer to these two sources of legal principles 
when dealing with regulatory disputes is considerably affecting the way in which 
investment law principles are interpreted. This reluctance is affecting and 
compromising the process of assessing the host state’s regulatory behaviour at the 
international level and, consequently, the host state’s international responsibility (i.e., a 
kind of limitation to the freedom of the state to exercise its sovereign regulatory 
power). To a greater extent, it is compromising and discarding a priori the fact that the 
state must act in accordance with its constitutional and legal precepts which cannot be 
ignored under any circumstance.  
 
This concern acquires another special legal connotation if account is taken of the 
possible emergence of doubts with regard to how the scope of the substantive principles 
of international investment law can coexist with the scope of some principles of 
domestic administrative law. In this respect, it is important to stress that this legal clash 
                                                 
17
 See, e.g., M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment 
(Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa) <http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/pdf/papers/sornarajah.pdf> (Last visit 
07/04/2009). See also P. Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under 
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, ICLQ vol 55, July 2006, pp 527-558. <www.HeinOnline.com> 
(Last visit 29/10/2009/), on page 557. 
18
 The activation of these two legal systems, the French or British legal systems, is mainly based on the effect 
that a particular regulatory measure (taken by a host state) may have on the rights of private individuals or 
corporations. 
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also creates certain political concerns from developing countries about the current 
investment arbitral practices (see Chapter VI).
19
  
 
Domestic public-law principles and practices, developed by domestic institutions, are 
not significantly taken into consideration by international arbitrators when dealing with 
the legal consequences produced by the adoption of a host state’s regulatory measure. 
Thus, a particular concern could arise when investment tribunals are faced with the 
need of addressing an individual/state regulatory dispute in accordance with the 
‘state/state-agreed’ international treaty standards such as the FET standard.  
 
The author is of the view that, referring to domestic law principles
20
 cannot only bring 
a source of well-established points
21
 of reference to deal with the regulatory conduct of 
the state – in a more transparent and predictable way; but it can also bring a higher 
level of legitimacy to the highly criticized but expanding system of investment treaty 
arbitration. Nonetheless, the author considers it prudent to emphasize that the 
discussion on the specific conflict and coexistence of international and national legal 
principles is beyond the scope of the present study and perhaps could be the objective 
of another thesis. 
 
As far as this research is concerned, the author’s intention is to identify and describe, 
through the review of arbitral awards, those factual cases where arbitral tribunals have 
referred (directly and/or indirectly) to factual situations that may be framed within the 
scope of the main principles of domestic administrative law. This academic exercise 
will be undertaken through the methodology explained in the following sub-section.  
                                                 
19
 Republic of South Africa’s Government Position Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework 
Review – June 2009 <http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-lateral_policy.pdf> (Last visit 03/10/2009).  
20
 See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – Separate Opinion, supra note 2, paragraph 28, where the 
dissenting arbitrator stated that ‘The common principles of the principal administrative law systems are in my 
view an important point of reference for the interpretation of investment treaties…’  
21
 See Wälde, supra note 9. 
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b. Review of Arbitral Awards – Methodology 
 
One of the most complex legal tasks for any public-law lawyer is to determine, with 
clear precision and through a precise list, the full inventory of domestic administrative 
law principles and their relevant scopes. The difficulty of this task is due to the fact that 
most of these principles are dispersed into many legislative, judicial and administrative 
acts. Conversely, this same difficulty does not exist in international investment law, 
owing to the fact that the substantive principles are listed, identified and defined in 
advance by the contracting states throughout the full text of any BIT.  
 
However, despite this difference, a common concern emerges regarding the scope and 
interpretation of each independent principle belonging to each set of (administrative 
and investment law) principles, due to the separate (parallel) manners and scenarios 
surrounding their interpretation, in addition to the varied types of interpretations that 
exist on the content and scope of each principle. This latter legal complexity could 
become more difficult when a legal or academic need arises which requires a clear 
determination of the boundaries and scopes of each principle. Hence, this difficulty 
does not only exist within the realm of domestic administrative law principles, but also 
within the realm of international investment law principles.  
 
Perhaps the main reason for this legal or academic complexity is not only due to the 
existence of an interconnection between legal principles, which happens at both the 
national and international levels, respectively, but also due to the existence of a great 
variety of interpretations that have been given to the scope of each principle through 
various legal decisions, both at the national and international levels respectively. The 
variety of interpretations of each principle serves to infer that many of these principles 
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are still not recognised as ‘stand alone’ grounds for the legal review of the regulatory 
conduct of a state, either at the national or international level. 
 
Bearing these ideas in mind, the author has decided to undertake the present research 
by grouping the most relevant principles of domestic administrative law into three main 
groups. The structural sequence of these groups of principles conforms to the idea of 
identifying the existence of some arbitral practices where investment arbitral tribunals 
have referred (directly and/or indirectly) to factual situations that can be framed within 
the scope of some principles of domestic administrative law. This exercise also 
includes those cases where the arbitral tribunal has missed the opportunity to address or 
to refer to such domestic administrative law principles.  
 
The first group of arbitral awards to be analyzed will deal with awards where arbitral 
tribunals seem to be referring to the principle of legality. The second group will refer to 
awards where arbitral tribunals have addressed factual situations that can be framed 
within the scope of the principle of the public administration’s discretionary power. 
Within this second group, other related principles have also been considered due to the 
interconnected nature of these principles. These related principles are: (i) the principle 
of proportionality; (ii) the principle of equality before the law; (iii) the principle of the 
public administration’s good faith; and, (iv) the principle of the duty to give reasons. 
Finally, the third group embraces the principle of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations. The reason for not incorporating this latter group into the previous two 
groups of principles, and leaving it to the end of this chapter, conforms to the 
assumption that many arbitral tribunals have taken this principle (in particular) to be the 
only existing principle of domestic (constitutional and administrative) law and have 
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therefore considered it to operate in an isolated manner from the rest of the domestic 
administrative law principles.
22
 
 
This exercise will be undertaken through a review of a sample of approximately forty 
arbitral awards
23
 (including preliminary and final awards) which have been selected by 
taking into the manner in which arbitral tribunals deal with the exercise of the host 
state’s regulatory power at the international level in accordance with international 
investment standards such as the FET standard. However, it is not the intention of the 
author or of this chapter to undertake a detailed study of how principles of 
administrative law and principles of investment law coexist. Conversely, the intention 
of this chapter is to provide an academic exercise that can help public-law adjudicators 
to carry out the sensitive task of administrating justice in a predictable and transparent 
manner; and perhaps, by doing so, it may bring more legitimacy to investment arbitral 
decisions, as well as to the investment arbitral system. 
                                                 
22
 See, e.g., E. Snodgrass, Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing and Delimiting a 
General Principle, Vol. 21. No. 1 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal (Spring 2006), pages 1-
58.  
23 
Tecmed v. Mexico (2003) Final Award; CMS v. Argentina (2005) Final Award; Mobil v. Venezuela (2010) 
Decision on Jurisdiction; Nova Scotia v. Venezuela (2010) Decision on Jurisdiction; Nova Scotia v. Venezuela 
(2010) Laudo sobre Costas; Aconquija and Vivendi v. Argentina (2010) Decision on the Argentine Republic’s 
Request for Annulment of the Award rendered on 20 August 2007; Occidental et al v. Ecuador (2007) 
Decision sobre Medidas Provisionales; MTD et al v. Chile, Decision on the Respondent’s Request for a 
Continued Stay of Execution (Rule 54 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules); Waste v. Mexico (2004) Final Award; 
Tza Yap Shum v. Peru (2009) Decision on Jurisdiction; Metalclad v. Mexico (2000) Final Award; Empresa 
Eléctrica del Ecuador v. Ecuador (2009) Final Award; Enron v. Argentina (2008) Decision sobre la solicitud 
de la Republica Argentina de mantener la suspension de la ejecucion del Laudo (Regla 54 de las Reglas de 
Arbitraje del CIADI); Santa Elena v. Costa Rica (2000) Final Award; Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) Final 
Award; Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) Separate Opinion; Corn v. Mexico (2008) Decision sobre 
Responsabilidad; Aucoven v. Venezuela (2003) Final Award; TSA v. Argentina (2008) Final Award; Bayview 
v. USA (2006) Contrademanda sobre Jurisdiccion; Perenco v. Ecuador (2009) Decision sobre Medidas 
Provisionales; Siemens v. Argentina (2004) Decision on Jurisdiction; Brandes v. Venezuela (2009) Decision 
sobre las excepciones opuestas por la demanada en virtud de la Regla 41 (5) de las Reglas de Arbitraje del 
CIADI; Azurix v. Argentina (2003) Decision sobre Jurisdiccion; Azurix v. Argentina (2006) Final Award; 
Glamis V. USA (2009) Final Award; MTD v. Chile (2004) Final Award; Occidental et al v. Ecuador (2008) 
Decision on Jurisdiction; Occidental v. Ecuador (2004) Final Award; Aconquija et al v. Argentina (2000) 
Final Award; Desert Line v. Yemen (2008) Final Award; Bayview et al. v. USA (2007) Final Award; Helnan 
v. Egypt (2008) Final Award; Phoenix v. Czech Republic (2009) Final Award; Aguaytia v. Peru (2008) Final 
Award; Piero Foresti et al. v. South Africa (2010); Pantechniki v. Albania (2009) Final Award; Murphy v. 
Ecuador (2010) Laudo sobre Jurisdiccion; Global Trading et al v. Ukraine (2010) Final Award; Rachel S. 
Grynberg et al. v. Grenada (2010) Final Award; CDC v. Seychelles (2003) Final Award; Lucchetti et al. v. 
Peru (2005) – Final Award; Joy Mining v. Egypt (2004) Award on Jurisdiction; Malaysian Historical Salvors 
v. Malaysia (2007) Award on Jurisdiction; Telenor v. Hungary (2006) Final Award; and, Mihaly v. Sri Lanka 
(2002) Final Award. 
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The author is aware that this academic task requires a much more in-depth research; 
however this has been precluded due to the size of the present study. Thus, the reader 
may consider some of the ideas expressed within this chapter and, perhaps, in this 
entire research, to be over-generalized. The objective of this chapter is not only to 
provide the readers with an introduction to an emerging public-law concern: applying 
principles of administrative law to international regulatory disputes; but also to sow the 
seeds which may encourage further complementary studies.  
 
c. Principle of legality 
 
This sub-section refers to the principle of legality. This principle is considered to be the 
main pillar of any legal system because it governs, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
‘state of law’ of a given society. Thus, it implies the assumption of legality of any 
regulatory conduct of the state. Furthermore, it can be said that other related principles 
derive from its application as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.  
 
Nonetheless, the scope of this principle can be summarized largely as the due 
observance of the law by any individual (including natural and legal persons). In terms 
of this research, it can be said that this principle requires the submission of the state 
(i.e., public administration) to the law in order to thereby guarantee a private 
individual’s legal status and in consequence their legal certainty.24  
 
Additionally, it has been stated that such submission involves the duty of all public 
authorities, that together make up the powers of the state, to act with the due 
observance of the legal principles enshrined within a constitution, legislation and the 
                                                 
24 
See A. R. Brewer Carias, Principios del Procedimiento Administrativo en America Latina (Universidad del 
Rosario, Editorial Legis, Colombia 2003), on page 3. 
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law in general.
25
 The exercise of such powers, including the executive (administrative) 
power, must conform to the legal limits that have been granted to the government 
officers as well as to the aims for which they were granted.
26
  
 
It can be stated that there are some arbitral awards that, despite their main aim of 
assessing the host state’s regulatory conduct in accordance with the international 
investment standards established within an IIT, also make frequent references to some 
domestic law sources and principles in support of their decisions. 
 
In the following sample of cases, it can be seen how different international arbitral 
tribunals refer to domestic law principles as a legal source to analyze and evaluate the 
regulatory conduct of the host state in accordance with the principle of legality. 
 
viii. Mobil Corporation et al v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(ICSID Case ARB/07/27) June 10, 2010 – Decision on 
Jurisdiction  
 
This dispute arose out of two petroleum agreements for the exploration and production 
of oil and the alleged violation of the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT provisions for the 
implementation of a new petroleum policy and law in Venezuela.
27
 Throughout the 
analysis of the parties’ positions to determine the jurisdiction of the tribunal regarding 
the breach of Venezuelan investment law, the arbitral tribunal made references to some 
domestic law sources to help it to determine and clarify Venezuela’s consent to 
arbitrate. For example, the tribunal cited the Constitution of Venezuela;
28
 the 
Venezuelan Investment Law
29
 and the Venezuelan Law on Commercial Arbitration.
30
  
                                                 
25 
Ibid. 
26 
Ibid. 
27
 A request for arbitration was made on 6 September 2007 against Venezuela for their adoption of a new oil 
law and policy which was said to have amounted to a breach of the 1999 Venezuelan Law on the promotion 
and protection of investments, as well as a breach of the 1993 bilateral investment treaty between the 
Netherlands and Venezuela. 
28
 See paragraphs 126 and 127. 
29
 See paragraphs 93, 101, 102, 103, 105, 119 and 140. 
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Through this arbitral exercise, the tribunal decided to resort to the principle of legality 
in order to determine whether the conduct of the Venezuelan government (i.e., its 
unilateral offer to arbitrate) was or was not performed in accordance with and in 
submission to the principles of domestic law, alongside the principles of international 
law. Before this legal task was carried out, the tribunal referred to the premise which 
states that ‘… when tribunals interpret unilateral acts, they must have due regard to the 
intention of the state having formulated such acts. In this respect domestic law may 
play a useful role.’31 (Emphasis added).  
 
Based on this premise, the tribunal interpreted the text of article 22 of the Venezuelan 
investment act in an exhaustive manner
32
 and found, apart from Venezuela’s rights to 
adopt regulatory measures,
33
 that ‘…Article 22 does not provide a basis for jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal… [and it] does not constitute consent to jurisdiction with respect to any 
of the Claimants’.34  
 
ix. Waste Management, Inc v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3) April 30, 2004 – Final Award 
 
This case arose out of a concession for the provision of waste disposal services in the 
city of Acapulco, State of Guerrero, Mexico and the consequent violation of NAFTA 
provisions.
35
 In its analysis of the case, the arbitral tribunal decided to consider and 
assess the regulatory conduct of some public entities of the Mexican Government as 
                                                                                                                                              
30
 See paragraph 128. 
31
 See paragraph 96. 
32
 Nonetheless, a different approach was taken by another arbitral tribunal in Tza Yap Shum v. Republica del 
Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6) June 19, 2009 – Decision on Jurisdiction. In this case, the tribunal simply 
opted to assume its jurisdiction based on wide interpretations of the facts and concluded that Peru had 
consented to include a certain type of national within the scope of the China-Peru BIT. 
33
 For example: the right to adopt measures to protect national security; the conservation of natural resources 
and the integrity and stability of the Venezuelan financial system. See paragraph 122. 
34
 See paragraphs 140 and 141. 
35
 See paragraph 40. 
 266 
well as their administrative actions separately.
36
 This evaluation was carried out in 
order to determine Mexico’s responsibility for the alleged violation of the NAFTA 
provisions (i.e., Chapter Eleven).
37
 
 
When the arbitral tribunal assessed the conduct of the various Mexican entities in order 
to determine whether or not there was a violation of the ‘minimum standard of 
treatment’ (in this case, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security 
provided for in Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA), it asserted that when referring to the 
legal nature of BANOBRAS, ‘[t]he mere fact that a separate entity is majority-owned 
or substantially controlled by the state does not make it ipso facto an organ of the 
state.’38 (Emphasis added). In this particular situation, the tribunal missed the 
opportunity to resort in depth to domestic Mexican law (i.e., the act that creates 
BANOBRAS, e.g., Ley Orgánica del Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos) in 
order to clarify this legal doubt since it is well known that the structure and legal nature 
of any entity belonging to the public administration is determined by administrative law 
principles such as the principles of hierarchy, decentralization, coordination, etc.  
 
Curiously, despite this legal doubt, the arbitral tribunal decided to reject later ‘the claim 
that Mexico was in breach of Article 1105(1) by reason of the conduct of Banobras’.39 
It is important to emphasize that the tribunal found no violation of Article 1105(1) of 
the NAFTA by the Mexican entities involved.  
 
A similar situation can be found when Mexico ‘objected to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal on the ground, inter alia, that the Concession Agreement was an administrative 
                                                 
36
 See paragraph 100. 
37
 A request for arbitration was submitted against Mexico on 27 September 2000, ‘for the actions of various 
state organs concerning the Claimant’s investment in an enterprise to provide waste management services to 
the City of Acapulco in the State of Guerrero.’ See paragraph 1, on page 3. 
38
 See paragraph 75. 
39
 See paragraph 104. 
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act governed by public law…’40 and when the tribunal considered the unilateral acts 
(i.e., legislative acts) of the state as amounting to an expropriation.
41
  
 
Moreover, when the tribunal evaluated whether Acaverde was expropriated by the 
Municipality of Acapulco, it quoted Article 1110 of the NAFTA which basically states 
that an expropriation may not be performed except ‘(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a 
non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law [
42
] and Article 
1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 
through 6.’ 43 (Emphasis added). In this respect, the tribunal stated that the declaration 
of the Mayor, after the concession was in force, was the nearest outright repudiation of 
the Acaverde.
44
 
 
Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal also took the opportunity to point out that ‘…a 
unilateral and unjustified change in the exclusivity obligation could have amounted to 
an expropriation…’.45 Within this statement, the arbitral tribunal mentions two 
different adjectives (e.g., ‘unilateral’ and ‘unjustified’) to determine whether a change 
can amount to an expropriation. Obviously, these two adjectives may have different 
meanings in international law and in national law, respectively. The question here will 
be whether these adjectives have to be evaluated separately in accordance with 
international law or national law, or jointly. Nonetheless, the arbitral tribunal did not 
take into consideration any legal source of Mexican law to determine whether the 
Mexican regulatory conduct was performed in accordance with its domestic law. 
 
                                                 
40
 See, e.g., paragraph 120. 
41
 See, e.g.,paragraph 161. 
42
 In the Spanish version, it states ‘con apego al principio de legalidad’ (in accordance with the principle of 
legality). 
43
 See paragraph 104. 
44
 See paragraph 161. 
45
 See paragraph 161. 
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x. Metalclad Corporation v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1) August 30, 2000 – Final Award 
 
The dispute concerned the alleged interference by Mexican local authorities with the 
activities of Metalclad to develop and operate a hazardous waste landfill.
46
 The arbitral 
tribunal, in relation to this issue, most notably highlighted two points: (i) the 
requirement of having all required permits for the operation of the landfill (including 
the municipal construction permit); and (ii) the responsibility of the public authorities 
involved for the adoption of their administrative conducts.  
 
Regarding these two points, the arbitral tribunal, in order to evaluate the administrative 
legal limits of the municipality of Guadalcazar, took into consideration some principles 
of Mexican law such as article 115 of the Mexican Constitution
47
 and Mexico’s 
General Ecology Law of 1998.
48
  
 
Similarly, the arbitral tribunal stated, in relation to the alleged violation of the Article 
1105 of the NAFTA (i.e., the Fair and Equitable Treatment), that (i) ‘the denial of the 
permit by the municipality by reference to environmental impact considerations… was 
improper,…’49 (emphasis added); (ii) ‘[t]he absence of a clear rule… amounts to a 
failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by the NAFTA.’50 
(Emphasis added); (iii) ‘… the construction permit was denied without any 
consideration of, or specific reference to, construction aspects or flaws of the physical 
facility’51(emphasis added); and, (iv) ‘Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and 
                                                 
46
 A request for arbitration was submitted against Mexico on 2 January 1997 for the breach of the provisions of 
Article 1105 of the NAFTA. Metalclad had in particular alleged violations of fair and equitable treatment; full 
protection and security; and expropriation with compensation. 
47
 See paragraph 81. 
48
 See paragraph 82. 
49
 See paragraph 86. 
50
 See paragraph 88. 
51
 See paragraph 93. 
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predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment.’52(Emphasis 
added).  
 
Furthermore, in relation to the alleged violation of Article 1110 of the NAFTA and 
regarding whether the Mexican authorities’ actions were equivalent to an indirect 
expropriation,
53
 the arbitral tribunal established that ‘the Municipality acted outside its 
authority’54 and that ‘[the Ecological Decree] had the effect of barring forever the 
operation of the landfill.’55  
 
Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal, based mainly on the above-mentioned premises, 
concluded that these administrative actions of the Mexican authorities were the 
equivalent of an indirect expropriation in violation of article 1110 of the NAFTA.
56
  
 
With respect to the outcome of this award, it may be important to draw attention to the 
fact that even though the arbitral tribunal took into consideration some legal sources of 
Mexican law, in order to determine the responsibility of Mexico, surprisingly it did not 
directly consider some Mexican legal principles, such as the principle of legality or the 
principle of proportionality, which could have helped the tribunal to determine whether 
the administrative conduct of the Municipality of Guadalcazar was within the main 
legal provisions of the Mexican law. In this case, if the investors direct legal rights 
were affected by any legal act of the state, the investor could have sought the 
reestablishment of the legal situation infringed or perhaps compensation before the 
competent national court.  
 
                                                 
52
 See paragraph 99. 
53
 See paragraph 106. 
54
 See paragraph 104. 
55
 See paragraph 106. 
56
 See paragraphs 107 and 112. 
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xi. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United 
Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) January 26, 
2006 – Final Award 
 
This dispute was related to the alleged breach of the Claimant’s legitimate expectations 
of obtaining the respective government permits to carry out a business of operating 
gaming facilities.
57
 The arbitral tribunal in this case referred to the Claimant’s intention 
of requesting an official opinion regarding the legality of its proposed gaming 
operations (i.e., skill machines)
58
 as well as the SEGOB’s answer to it, where it was 
stated that ‘…the provisions established under the Federal Law of Games and 
Sweepstakes [there] are enforceable legal dispositions that specifically prohibit 
gambling and luck related games [i.e., coin-swallowers, token-swallowers or slot 
machines] within the Mexican territory…’59  
 
When the tribunal analyzed the merits of the case, particularly the aspect related to the 
role of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA in the case, it found that ‘…under Mexican law, 
specifically the Ley Federal de Juegos y Sorteos of 31 December 1947, gambling is an 
illegal activity.’60 (Emphasis added). Similarly, the tribunal found, following the same 
context, that ‘[i]t cannot be disputed that Thunderbird knew when it chose to invest in 
gaming activities in Mexico that gambling was an illegal activity under Mexican law’.61  
 
Nonetheless, the tribunal decided to go ahead in its assessment by stating that it was its 
role to ‘…examine whether the conduct of Mexico and the measures employed by 
SEGOB in relation to the EDM entities were consistent with Mexico’s obligations 
                                                 
57
 A request for arbitration was submitted on 1 August 2001 against Mexico for the breach of its obligations 
under Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA, breach of national treatment; most-favoured-nation treatment; minimum 
standard of treatment; and expropriation and compensation was alleged. See paragraph 6, on page 4. 
58
 See paragraph 48. 
59
 See paragraph 55. 
60
 See paragraph 124. 
61
 See paragraph 164. 
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under Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA.’62 (Emphasis added). Within this context, the 
tribunal recognized the right belonging to Mexico to change its regulatory policy as 
well as its discretion to adopt such a policy through regulation and administrative 
conduct.
63
 Despite this recognition the tribunal established that ‘[t]he international law 
disciplines of Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110 in particular, only assess whether Mexican 
regulatory and administrative conduct breached these specific disciplines. The 
perspective is of an international law obligation examining national conduct as a 
“fact”.’64(Emphasis added).  
 
Thus, it is important to stress that when the tribunal evaluated the violation of the 
minimum standard of treatment, it referred to the conduct of Mexico by stating that 
such a performance did not breach this international principle.
65
 The question that 
public law lawyers will ask here will be whether one can consider the regulatory 
conduct of the state as a ‘fact’ whilst disregarding the main principles of law that gave 
origin to that regulatory conduct (i.e., the administrative law principles). Moreover, 
from this case, it can be suggested that the disregard of the domestic principle of 
legality could undermine the sovereignty of a state, owing to the fact that an activity 
which is expressly prohibited by a country’s legal framework could be legitimized by 
an arbitral decision. This is an illustration of extreme cases in which ISTA could 
conceivably lead to the legitimatization of illicit activities such as the trafficking of 
drugs, prostitution and corruption at international level for considering them as a part of 
an investment. 
 
                                                 
62
 See paragraph 127. 
63
 See paragraph 126. 
64
 See paragraph 127. 
65
 See paragraph 195. 
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To conclude, the tribunal later found that the SEGOB’s answer did not create a 
legitimate expectation under Articles 1102, 1105 and/or 1110 of the NAFTA.
66
 
Additionally, the tribunal also evaluated whether the conduct of a Mexican entity 
created a legitimate expectation or not, in favour of the Claimant. This latter point will 
be expanded upon further in the sub-section related to the principle of legal certainty 
and legitimate expectations. However, it has been referred to, due to the fact that a 
separate opinion was issued in this case, the following sub-section will analyze the 
separate opinion as far as the principle of legality is concerned, leaving the issue of 
legitimate expectations to be developed later in this chapter. 
 
xii. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United 
Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) December 2006 
– Separate Opinion 
 
In this separate opinion, the dissenting arbitrator concurred with the other two 
arbitrators in relation to ‘several significant issues of the case’,67 however he disagreed 
with the approach adopted towards the principle of legitimate expectations in the 
particular context of an investment promotion and protection treaty.
68
 He drew 
attention to the necessity of discussing how ‘both normative and contours of the 
legitimate expectation concept are shaped as should be construed under Art. 1105 of 
the NAFTA and their significance in the particular factual context.’69 
 
Within the context of the discussion, the dissenting arbitrator emphasized the following 
points: (i) the exposition of foreign investors to the sovereign and regulatory power of 
the host state and the regulation of this relationship through the investment arbitration 
                                                 
66
 See paragraph 165. 
67
 Agreement was reached on the following: jurisdiction; admissibility; control and waivers; the rejection of 
the expropriation claim; the rejection of the ‘denial of administrative justice’ claim; the rejection of the 
NAFTA government positions regarding the direct intention of harming the foreign investor; and the general 
view that principle of legitimate expectations formed part of the duty give fair and equitable treatment. See, 
e.g., paragraph 1. 
68
 See paragraph 4. 
69
 See paragraph 3. 
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system;
70
 (ii) the conflict between international and domestic interpretations and 
applications with regard to the notion of legitimate expectations;
71
 (iii) the priority of 
the international interpretation and application over the domestic one (i.e., over ‘any 
dominant interpretation of applicable Mexican law on the legality of the 
operation…’);72 (iv) the duty of the host state to act in a diligent and an unambiguous 
manner when emitting official communications;
73
 and, (v) the responsibility of the host 
state to ensure that foreign investors have clearly understood the content of certain 
official communications.
74
 
 
The dissenting arbitrator also highlighted the importance of determining, with sufficient 
clarity, the gravity and materiality of the effect upon legitimate expectations since the 
minor conduct of any public official may give jurisdiction to a treaty tribunal.
75
 For this 
reason, he emphasized the existence and recognition of this principle, within and by 
many developed administrative law systems and proposed in consequence that a 
comparative study on the ‘common principles of the principal administrative law 
systems’ be undertaken which could be used as a good reference to interpret treaty 
provisions.
76
  
 
Nevertheless, the arbitrator concluded that since the ‘solicitud’ (written request) did not 
come ‘out of the blue’, the combination of this document with the subsequent conduct 
of the SEGOB (including the ‘oficio’) should have been considered as a ‘green light’77 
                                                 
70
 See paragraph 12. 
71
 See paragraph 26. 
72
 See paragraph 26. 
73
 See paragraph 4. 
74
 See paragraph 6. 
75
 See paragraph 14. 
76
 See paragraph 28. 
77
 See paragraph 85. 
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(i.e., equivalent to an administrative permit) and therefore considering this act 
constituted a violation of ‘legitimate expectations under the NAFTA Art. 1105’.78  
 
Finally, he stated that under both international and comparative administrative law, 
there is an assumption of the legitimacy of official acts and such an assumption should 
be a burden on the host state as a kind of risk.
79
 Nonetheless, throughout this case, the 
arbitrator ignored the fact that the public law principle of legality is connected to the 
principle of competence. This well-known principle of public law states that officials 
are entitled only to perform those activities that are authorised by law. This compares 
with the situation in private law where the principle of capacity allows individuals to do 
everything that is not forbidden by law. This principle adjusts the breadth of 
discretional power of public officials. For this reason, the fact that an official expressly 
pointed out that a given gaming activity was prohibited does not imply that he was 
recognizing or authorizing a determined right. This observation serves to illustrate the 
impact that the consideration of these domestic law principles may have on the 
outcome of a case.  
 
xiii. Corn Products International, INc. v. Los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01) January 15, 2008 
– Decision on Responsibility 
 
This dispute concerned the imposition of a tax at 20% on any drink which used a 
sweetener not made from cane sugar.
80,81 
The following points are made clear 
throughout the case: (i) the introduction of the tax was an initiative of and approved by 
the Federal Congress of Mexico;
82
 (ii) the Mexican Executive Power tried to suspend 
                                                 
78
 See paragraph 23. 
79
 See paragraph 91. 
80
 See paragraph 3. 
81
 A request for arbitration was submitted on 21 October 2003 against Mexico for the breach of its obligations 
under Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA. The breach of national treatment; performance requirements; and 
expropriation and compensation were alleged. See paragraph 5. 
82
 See paragraph 41 and 43. 
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the application of the tax but it was forced to apply the tax by the Supreme Court, due 
to the lack of Executive authority, to suspend the application;
83
 (iii) the adoption of the 
tax was a countermeasure taken by Mexico in response to prior violations of the 
NAFTA by the United States;
84
 and (iv) the allegation that the tax was adopted to 
protect the Mexican sugar industry.
85
 
 
When the arbitral tribunal rejected the alleged violation of Article 1110 of the NAFTA 
(Expropriation and Compensation), it stated that even though some government 
measures can be considered discriminatory it does not necessarily mean that they equal 
expropriation unless they affect and destroy the business in question.
86
  
 
In this case, it seems like the investor did not seek the protection of his/her rights by 
exercising any domestic legal remedy, such as the nullity of this tax law. Moreover, if 
the adoption of this act would have been illegal, this illegality should have been 
recognized by the respective national court. However, in this case, the arbitral tribunal 
with its analysis is substituting the duty of the investor to challenge the legality of a 
given domestic act before the competent national tribunal or court. 
 
xiv. Perenco Ecuador LTD v. Republica del Ecuador and Empresa 
Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6) May 
8, 2009 – Decision sobre Medidas Provisionales 
 
The dispute in this case was a consequence of two petroleum contracts, the imposition 
of a new Ecuadorian Petroleum tax and the subsequent violation of the France-Ecuador 
BIT provisions.
87,88
 Throughout the case, the arbitral tribunal drew attention to the 
following aspects: (i) the Ecuadorian Congress amended the Hydrocarbon Law (Law 
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 A request for arbitration was submitted on 30 April 2008 against Ecuador for the breach of these contracts 
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42) to introduce a new tax of at least 50% on the extraordinary income generated by the 
‘difference in price’;89 (ii) the Ecuadorian Supreme Court declared that such 
amendment was constitutional;
90
 (iii) the Ecuadorian Executive discretionally increased 
this tax to 99%;
91
 (iv) Perenco decided to withhold the payment required under both the 
legislative and administrative acts;
92
 (v) Perenco proposed to transfer ‘the disputed Law 
42 payments into an escrow account maintained by an independent escrow agent in a 
neutral location pending resolution of the dispute’;93 (vi) this proposal was refused by 
Ecuador;
94
 (vii) Ecuador considered early termination of the petroleum contracts;
95
 
(viii) the Ecuadorian Government released three official communications requesting 
Perenco to pay US$ 327 million;
96
 and, (xix) an Ecuadorian Court ordered Perenco’s 
assets to be seized, i.e., crude oil in Ecuador, until the above-mentioned amount was 
fully paid.
97
 
 
It is within this background that Perenco requested provisional measures in order to 
preserve its rights,
98
 whilst Ecuador argued that it had the sovereign power and duty to 
apply ‘validly enacted laws’.99 However, the tribunal stated that even though a 
domestic law could be promulgated by a sovereign state, in accordance with its 
constitution, it does not mean that such sovereign power could hamper the power of an 
ICSID tribunal to grant provisional measures. In fact, it was suggested during the 
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course of submissions that the granting of such measures would have the effect of 
restricting ‘the freedom of the State to act as it would wish.’ 100  
 
Lastly, the tribunal stated that Perenco faced imminent ‘confiscation’101 of its assets102 
and subsequently recommended provisional measures in order to freeze Ecuador’s 
regulatory power and prevent it from demanding, instituting or further pursuing any 
legal or judicial action against Perenco. This included the adoption of any 
administrative action that may affect or alter, directly or indirectly, the legal status of 
Perenco as was ‘agreed upon by the parties’.103  
 
In this case, the arbitral tribunal dismissed the constitutional powers of Ecuador to 
adopt new laws to protect its sovereignty and its public interest. Perhaps more 
distressing is the fact that the investor used an arbitral mechanism to limit the 
constitutional powers of the state thus affecting the elemental notion of the principle of 
legality. This type of arbitral decision is an example of how a legal pretention which 
could not be satisfied by a domestic legal remedy could be challenged through an 
arbitral mechanism at the international level. 
  
xv. Azurix Corp. v. la Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12) July 14, 2006 – Final Award. 
 
The issue in this case related to the public services partnership that existed between 
Azurix Corp. and the Province of Buenos Aires to process and treat drinking water.
104
 
                                                 
100
 See paragraph 50. 
101
 Here, it is noteworthy to highlight that in the English version of this award, the tribunal used the word 
‘seizure’ whereas in the Spanish version it used the word ‘confiscation’. According to the Barron Law 
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just compensation…’. 
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 See paragraph 46. 
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 A request for arbitration was submitted on 19 September 2001 against Argentina for the breach of the 
Argentina-USA BIT obligations, specifically Expropriation without Compensation; Fair and Equitable 
 278 
Throughout the tribunal’s assessment of the case, the following points became relevant: 
(i) the alleged violation of the Argentina-USA BIT provisions by Argentina itself 
through its actions and omissions emanating from it political-territorial entities;
105
 (ii) 
the recognition in international law of the state’s responsibility for the acts of its 
organs/entities and its political-territorial entities;
106
 (iii) the ‘inexistent’ contractual 
relationship between Argentina and Azurix, but between the Province and Azurix 
Buenos Aires, S.A. (ABA), where Azurix assumed certain legal commitments;
107
 and 
(iv) the legal nature of the concession agreement and its subjection to a tariff regime 
that was also subject to the adoption of administrative actions by the Province as a 
public authority.
108
  
 
The tribunal examined the applicable law and it decided to judge the case mostly in 
accordance with the ICSID Convention, the BIT and the applicable international law, 
even though it was also stated that the Argentina law should not be disregarded.
109
  
 
Consequently, the tribunal evaluated the Province’s actions in order to determine 
whether they were adopted ‘in the exercise of its public authority or as a party to a 
contract.’110 Following this strategy, the tribunal scrutinized a series of administrative 
acts such as the Province’s administrative behaviour at the time of the takeover of the 
concession; the measures related to tariff regime; the Works in Circular 31(A); the 
Program for Optimizing and Expanding Service (POES); Circular 52(A) and Canon 
Recovery; and, the conduct of the Province after service transfer. In this context it is 
                                                                                                                                              
Treatment; Full Protection and Security; Taking Arbitrary Measures; Failing to Observe Argentina’s BIT 
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significant to emphasize that the review of these kinds of administrative acts is 
normally left to the competence of domestic courts. 
 
In addition, when the tribunal assessed the violations of the BIT’s provisions, it stated: 
(i) with regard to the expropriation without compensation, that ‘… the impact on the 
investment attributable to the Province’s actions was not to the extent required to find 
that, in the aggregate, these actions amounted to an expropriation…’;111 (ii) in relation 
to fair and equitable treatment, that ‘[c]onsidered together, [the Province’s] actions 
reflect a pervasive conduct of the Province, in breach of the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment.’;112 (iii) with regard to arbitrary measures, that ‘… [The measures 
taken by the Province] are arbitrary actions without a basis in Law or the Concession 
Agreement...’;113 and, (iv) in relation to the full protection and security, that ‘… the 
[existing] interrelationship [between the] fair and equitable treatment and the obligation 
to afford the investor full protection and security’ can give grounds, in conjunction with 
the incorporation of the word ‘full’, for Argentina’s responsibility for having breached 
this principle of full protection and security.
114
 
 
Thus, this case demonstrates that the arbitral tribunal examined the regulatory conduct 
of the state without making any reference to the domestic principle of legality which is 
considered the legal basis of any actions deriving from the state. Conversely, the 
arbitral tribunal could have justified its decision in terms of the principle of legality. 
Hence, legal justification is one of fundamental pillars of any administrative or judicial 
decision in the fulfilment and development of the principle of legality. 
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xvi. MTD Equity Sdn Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. The Republic of 
Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7) May 25, 2004 – Final Award 
 
This disagreement arose out of a foreign investment contract to build a large planned 
community near to Santiago and the following violation of the Malaysia-Chile BIT 
provisions.
115,116
 During this case the tribunal emphasized the following aspects: (i) the 
Claimant’s expectation that the Municipality of Pirque would initiate the change in 
zoning of Pirque area and the subsequent endorsement of it by the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Development (MINVU);
117
 (ii) the project’s endorsement by the Mayor of 
Pirque;
118
 and (iii) the rejection of MINVU to change the zoning of the area due to 
conflict of the project ‘with the existing urban development plan.’119 
 
Based on these matters, the tribunal decided to apply international law principles to the 
merits of the case despite the request made by Chile to apply Chilean law.
120
 Curiously, 
it stated that ‘[Chile] has the right to decide its urban policies and legislation’121 unless 
the exercise of this sovereign power contravenes the international obligations assumed 
through an IIT.
122
 However, this statement is evidence of a legal contradiction as the 
tribunal recognized Chile’s right to apply its urban policy and legislation but the 
tribunal decided to disregard these urban polices and legislation when considering 
international obligations. Obviously, this contradiction undermines the notion of the 
domestic principle of legality. 
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116
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BIT provisions, specifically ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’; ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’; 
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Moreover, when the tribunal analyzed fair and equitable treatment, it took the Chilean 
Foreign Investment Commission’s approval as an admission of the MTD to invest in 
the country and therefore it was used to determine that such conduct was ‘a breach of 
the obligation to treat an investor fairly and equitably.’123 In relation to the second 
hypothesis, the arbitral tribunal determined the state’s responsibility without taking into 
consideration any domestic legal principles that normally give grounds for the states 
regulatory conduct. An example of this reference is the existing causal link between the 
damage caused to a given individual and the public authority performed by the state. 
 
xvii. Occidental Petroleum Corporation et al v. The Republic of 
Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11) September 9, 2008 – 
Decision on Jurisdiction 
 
The dispute concerned a participation contract to explore and exploit hydrocarbons in 
the Ecuadorian Amazon and the consequent violation of the USA-Ecuador BIT 
provisions.
124,125
 The arbitral tribunal considered the following aspects to be of 
importance: (i) the existence of the operating agreements between OEPC and AEC in 
2000;
126
 (iii) the granting of a 40% economic interest from OEPC to AEC;
127
 (iii) the 
refusal on the part of the Ecuadorian government to approve the transfer of legal title in 
the year 2004;
128
 and (iv) the Ecuadorian government decision of 2006, to terminate the 
participation contract and the respective operating agreements through the declaration 
of ‘caducidad’ (caducity/annulment), based on: the lack of ministerial authorizations; 
the violation of the participation contract; as well as the violation of the Ecuadorian 
Hydrocarbon Law and regulations.
129
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The Claimant in this case originally sought the declaration of Ecuador’s responsibility 
for having breached its obligations under the contracts, the treaty, Ecuadorian law and 
international law; and also sought the declaration of the Ecuador’s Caducidad Decree 
as null and void and the reposition of its rights.
130
 However, the Claimant modified the 
petition and only pursued Ecuador’s breach of contract.  
 
Ecuador objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, it argued the presumption of legality of 
its administrative act (i.e., the Caducidad Decree). Ecuador also argued exclusivity of 
the Ecuadorian administrative court’s competence to deal with this kind of legal 
matter.
131
 This latter argument was based on an express provision in the Ecuadorian 
Constitution and of the Ecuadorian law on arbitration and mediation that excluded the 
revision of unilateral administrative acts of the state by international arbitration.
132
 
Moreover, the same exception was also included into and ratified by clause 22 of the 
participation contract.
133
 
 
Nonetheless, despite Ecuador’s Constitutional and legal argument about the exclusion 
and the subsequent contractual ‘unequivocal waiver of arbitrability’, the arbitral 
tribunal decided that the ‘caducidad-related dispute’ was under its jurisdiction. This 
decision was mainly based on the idea that any exception would require ‘clear 
language’ to this effect134 as well as the existence of the international principle which 
states that domestic law cannot be invoked in order to avoid an international treaty 
obligation.
135
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In this instance, the arbitral tribunal did not only disregard the provisions of the 
Ecuadorian constitution and its arbitration law regarding the review of the unilateral 
acts of the state, but it also dismissed the will of parties expressed in the participation 
contract. In other words, the arbitral tribunal ignored the scope of the principle of 
legality that governs any legal system to which the investor decided to be submitted. 
Due to this reason, the arbitral tribunal exceeded its functions by violating the principle 
of legality which happens to govern and limit the tribunal’s competences, i.e., the 
arbitral tribunal incurred an extra limitation of its competence.  
 
xviii. Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador (London Court of International Arbitration 
Administered Case No. UN 3467) July 1, 2004 – Final Award 
 
The problem in this case was related to a participation contract to undertake the 
exploration for and exploitation of oil in Ecuador, the reimbursement of Value-Added 
Tax (VAT) and the subsequent violation of the USA-Ecuador BIT provisions.
136,137
 
Throughout the assessment of the case, the arbitral tribunal highlighted the following 
points: (i) OEPC’s application for VAT reimbursements on a regular basis; (ii) SRI’s 
issuance of resolutions denying further reimbursements as they were included in the 
formula contract; (iii) OEPC’s seeking legal remedies through the Ecuadorian Tax 
Court; and, (iv) OEPC’s request for legal remedies under the USA-Ecuador BIT.138 
 
The tribunal, in attempting to resolve the problem between these two parties, rejected 
the objection to the ‘Fork In The Road’ clause. It pointed out that, in order to avoid the 
creation of ‘a situation of incompatibility’, the decisions adopted by Ecuadorian courts 
‘on matters of interpretation of the Ecuadorian Tax have been of great help to this 
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Tribunal in its own interpretation of both the Treaty and the relevant provisions of 
Ecuadorian law…’ 139 (Emphasis added). Furthermore, when dealing with the aspect 
related to the exclusion of matters of taxation, the tribunal stated that it was its duty to 
examine ‘a tax matter associated with an investment agreement’.140 For this reason, it 
decided that the merits were going to be judged in accordance with various sources of 
law, including Ecuadorian tax legislation. 
 
Thus, when the tribunal examined the ‘meaning and extent of Ecuador’s tax 
legislation’, it carried out a detailed analysis of Ecuadorian tax law and concluded that 
OEPC was entitled to the reimbursements.
141
 Further to this, the arbitral tribunal also 
found Ecuador responsible for having breached the USA-Ecuador international 
obligations relating to national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and full 
protection and security, and the minimum standard of treatment.  
 
Ultimately, in its final decision the arbitral tribunal ordered, amongst other points, (i) 
that ‘[e]xcept for the amount of compensation and interest determined in this Award, 
all requests for refund submitted to the SRI, shall in future follow the normal 
administrative procedures of the Ecuadorian law’ (emphasis added); and that ‘[t]he 
Claimant [was] entitled to retain all amount of VAT reimbursed by the SRI and the 
resolutions ordering the return of such amounts are without legal effect.’142 (Emphasis 
added).
 
 
 
The arbitral tribunal in this case was contradictory in its own arguments due to the fact 
that it recognized the application of domestic law, but it disregarded those decisions 
that were adopted in accordance with domestic law. The tribunal did this in order to 
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give grounds to the Claimant’s international petition. Thus, there seems to be a 
contradiction between the action of an arbitral tribunal and the scope of the principle of 
legality because it appears that the tribunal respects domestic law but simultaneously 
ignores national law in favour of the Claimant’s petition.  
 
xix. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) 
November 21, 2000 – Final Award 
 
This case arose out of a concession agreement to provide sewage and water services to 
the Province of Tucuman, Argentina and the following violation of the Argentina-
France BIT provisions.
143,144 
In an attempt to resolve the dispute, the arbitral tribunal 
established the following facts: (i) the omission of Argentina to undertake actions to 
avoid the Tucuman Province from taking certain regulatory actions that could be in 
prejudice to the concession agreement; (ii) the mutually-agreed and ‘exclusive’ 
jurisdiction (Clause 16.4. of the concession contract) given to Tucuman administrative 
courts to interpret and apply the agreement; (iii) the legal meaning of this forum-
selection clause in light of the BIT and ICSID Convention’s provisions; (iv) the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to evaluate the alleged violations of the Argentina-
France BIT provisions; and (v) the tribunal’s decision to decline its competence due to 
the parties’ duty of solving their legal differences through the administrative courts of 
the Tucuman Province.
145
 
 
In reaching a conclusion on Argentina’s international responsibility, the tribunal took 
into consideration the relationship between Tucuman’s administrative acts and the 
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144
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performance of the parties under the concession agreement.
146 
The tribunal evaluated 
the province’s acts that ‘resulted in a fall in the recovery rate under the concession 
contract’;147 ‘acts that unilaterally reduced the tariff rate’;148 ‘abuses of regulatory 
authority’;149 and, ‘dealings in bad faith’.150  
 
Finally, the arbitral tribunal stated that it was difficult for it to determine Argentina’s 
international responsibility.
151
 This was due to (i) the difficulty in determining which 
actions were adopted by the province as a sovereign authority and as a contracting 
party
152
 and (ii) the fact that the Claimant did not exhaust local remedies as agreed 
upon in the concession agreement.
153
 For the tribunal, this latter point represented a key 
issue within the process since there was no evidence of a refusal of ‘procedural’ or 
‘substantive’ justice by Argentina and therefore it did not constitute a violation of the 
respective BIT provisions.
154
  
 
Consequently, it can be said in this case that the arbitral tribunal recognized the 
jurisdiction of the domestic courts (i.e., internal forum) to settle any legal dispute 
derived from the performance of the concession agreement. Furthermore, it can be 
suggested that this tribunal reaffirmed the public law concept by respecting the 
principle of legality that reigns in any legal system including the application of this 
principle to its functions. In other words, the principle of legality was applied to 
determine the tribunal jurisdiction. In addition, the fulfilment of this principle is a sine 
que non requisite for any claimant to resort to an international jurisdiction. 
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xx. Desert Line Projects LLC v. The Republic of Yemen (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/17) February 6, 2008 – Final Award 
 
This dispute originated from an oral agreement and several written contracts for the 
construction of asphalt roads in Yemen and the consequent violation of the Yemen-
Oman BIT provisions.
155,156
 The following facts were made clear to the tribunal during 
the course of submissions: (i) the disagreement of the contracting parties on the 
amounts due for the works executed;
157
 (ii) the Claimant’s request for arbitration 
against Yemen before the Yemeni commercial court requested, amongst other issues, 
the payment of the amounts due;
158
 (iii) the rendering of the commercial court award 
that recognized, amongst other points, the Claimant’s entitlement to receive certain 
amounts of money;
159
 (iv) the disagreement of the Claimant with the calculation award 
carried by the commercial court
160
 (v) the Respondent’s request for and the Claimant’s 
opposition to the annulment of the commercial award before Yemeni courts based on 
the award’s invalidity and violation of due process;161 (vi) the Respondent’s proposal, 
of the parties’ signature to and the Yemeni court’s endorsement of a ‘settlement 
agreement’ as a final settlement of the dispute including an offer of payment;162 and 
(vii) the Claimant’s intention to challenge the validity of the ‘settlement agreement’ 
and its subsequent decision of rescinding this agreement to consequently seek ICSID 
arbitration.
163
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Within this context, the Claimant sought through ICSID arbitration, apart from its 
pecuniary request, the declaration of Yemen’s international responsibility for breaching 
the Yemen-Oman BIT provisions as well as declaration of the ‘settlement agreement’ 
as ‘null and void and/or rescinded’.164 In dealing with the Respondent’s argument about 
the legal nature of the Claimant’s investment, the arbitral tribunal not only referred to 
the BIT provisions, but also to Yemeni investment law in order to consider the legality 
of the said investment in accordance with Yemen law.
165
 
 
Furthermore, the tribunal stated that the ‘settlement agreement’ was signed under 
duress.
166
 Subsequently, it also concluded that, owing to the fact that the agreement was 
in contradiction with the Respondent’s BIT obligations, the agreement was 
internationally ‘ineffective’.167  
 
Conclusively, the tribunal seems to have acted as a De Novo review tribunal by 
reviewing the Yemeni Arbitral Award. This tribunal ordered the entire implementation 
of this award.
168
 However, the tribunal did not mention the right of the parties to resort 
to the domestic forum to resolve the argument surrounding the validity or legality of 
the settlement agreement. Conversely, the tribunal ignored the content of the settlement 
agreement by declaring its international ineffectiveness and also by ignoring the 
principle of legality that rules the domestic forum. It is well-known in public law that 
any state entity can conclude a settlement agreement, however this is only possible if 
there is an express authorization to do so in law.  
 
xxi. Helnan International Hotels A/S v. The Arab Republic of Egypt 
(ICSID Case No. 05/19) July 3, 2008 – Final Award 
 
                                                 
164
 See paragraph 58. 
165
 See paragraphs 103 and 106. 
166
 See paragraph 190. 
167
 See paragraph 194. 
168
 See paragraph 205 and point 3 of the disposition. 
 289 
The disagreement related to this case, arose from a management contract relating to the 
the Shepheard Hotel in Cairo, Egypt and the following violation of the Egypt-Denmark 
BIT provisions.
169,170 
The arbitral tribunal took the following details into account: (i) 
HELNAN (the management service provider) and EGOTH (the Hotel owner) signed a 
management contract in 1996 for 26 years; (ii) through an amendment of the contract, 
EGOTH was authorized to sell the hotel in which HELNAN was also allowed either to 
continue providing its services or give up its rights in return for sufficient 
compensation; (iii) the hotel was downgraded (from 5 to 4 stars) by the Egyptian 
Ministry of Tourism after several inspections; (iv) an arbitration request was submitted 
by EGOTH before a national arbitral tribunal wishing the termination of the contract 
due the downgrade; (v) the arbitral tribunal decided to declare the contract terminated 
due to the impossibility of execution; (vi) HELNAN was ordered to be compensated, 
the compensation was paid, and HELNAN was forced to discontinue with the 
management of the hotel;
171
 (vii) HELNAN’s argument about the effects of Egyptian 
government’s regulatory conduct and its ‘orchestrated’ administrative decisions 
effecting the interests of HELNAN;
172
 and (viii) the violation of Egypt’s obligations 
under the Egypt-Denmark BIT.  
 
In dealing with the question of the applicable law, the tribunal emphasized that in order 
to determine whether a violation of the treaty was committed, it needed to consider 
whether the violation also involved the ruling of a domestic issue by a national court. In 
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such a case, it required that the interpretation and application of such a domestic issue 
is ‘primarily’ within competence of the host state’s courts.173  
 
Nonetheless, the tribunal considered the possibility of discarding the rule of res 
judicata to explore the possibility of making a De Novo review ‘in the light of the 
requirements of fair and equitable treatment’.174  
 
Furthermore, the tribunal quoted the CME v Czech Republic Final Award (2003) to 
support this idea. This award was cited to emphasize the idea which states that ‘the fact 
that one tribunal is competent to resolve a dispute does not necessarily affect the 
authority of another tribunal to resolve the same dispute; res judicata always requires a 
previous decision by a competent authority’.175 
 
Furthermore, the tribunal highlighted the need to consider the Egyptian government’s 
actions in order to determine whether these actions affected the existence of the 
management contract and therefore constituted a violation of the treaty’s provisions.176 
In this regard, the tribunal not only summarized HELNAN’s position by drawing 
attention to the fact that (i) Egypt made an improper and abusive use of its authority;
177
 
and (ii) the Ministry’s (of Tourism) inspections were unlawful due to the lack of 
conformity with accepted policy and practice (customary practice);
178
 but the tribunal 
also assessed the conduct of the Ministry by considering the number of officials 
carrying out the inspections, the time to send the inspections report, the content of the 
Ministry’s communications, and the downgrading decree.  
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Finally, the arbitral tribunal decided that the regulatory conduct of the Egyptian 
government did not constitute a violation of the treaty provisions.
179
 Additionally, the 
tribunal recognized the need to challenge the legality of the Ministry’s downgrading 
decision before the Egyptian administrative courts.
180
 
 
In this case, the arbitral tribunal recognized the jurisdiction of the domestic courts (i.e., 
internal forum) to settle any legal dispute arising from the acts of an organ belonging to 
the state, such as the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism. This tribunal reaffirmed the public 
law theory which states that the principle of legality must reign in any legal system to 
facilitate the determination of the legality of a state’s conduct. Thus, the application of 
this principle should be considered by any arbitrator to decide upon the jurisdiction of 
an arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it can be affirmed that the fulfilment of this principle is a 
sine que non requisite for any claimant in order to resort to an international jurisdiction 
when she/he feels that her/his personal rights have been affected can claim the 
reestablishment of his/her legal situation infringed before the respective authority.  
 
xxii. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The 
Republic of Albania (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21) July 30, 2009 
– Final Award 
 
This dispute arose out of two contracts to carry out works on bridges and roads in 
Albania and the consequent violation of the Albania-Greece BIT provisions.
181,182 
The 
tribunal in this case considered the following points before arriving at a conclusion: (i) 
the severe civil disturbances in Albania during March 1997; (ii) the theft and 
destruction of the Claimant’s equipment; (iii) the acceptance of responsibility for the 
risk of losses due to civil disturbance by the Albanian Government, through a 
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contractual provision; (iv) the Claimant’s request of losses in money; (v) the agreement 
between the parties concerning the amount of compensation; (vi) the written request 
made by the Albanian Minister of Public Works to the Minister of Finance requesting 
the payment of the amount agreed by the parties; (vii) the rejection by the Minister of 
Finance to make the payment due to the fact that the Ministry ‘“cannot carry out the 
obligations of [other public institutions] as a result of their contractual relations, unless 
funds are approved for that purpose by the Council of Ministers.’;183 (xix) the period of 
10 years without payment from the minister of finance; (x) the rejection by the 
Albanian Court of the Claimant’s expectation of payment based on the alleged 
declaration by the Minister of Finance; and (xi) the Claimant’s appeal of the Albanian 
Court’s decision to the Supreme Court and the subsequent abandonment of this appeal 
action.  
 
In assessing the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal drew attention to the need for 
challenging the Minister of Finance’s rejection as ‘an arbitrary act’.184 Additionally, the 
tribunal stated that ‘[t]he [Albanian] courts did not deny the [Claimant’s petition] on 
the grounds that the Minister’s posture was legally justified… [but]… the risk of loss 
was unenforceable.’ 185  
 
Moreover, the tribunal stated that ‘[t]he Ministerial veto was apparently not an 
impediment to recovery [of the money] in the courts.’186 Finally, the tribunal asserted 
that once a legal conflict has been taken to national courts, its fundamental basis cannot 
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be used ‘as the foundation of a Treaty claim [due to the fact that the same contention it 
is no] longer permitted to be raised before ICSID.’ 187 
 
In relation to the merits of the case, namely the international standards of full security 
and protection and denial of justice, the tribunal found that there was confusion 
between the breach of treaty provisions and the failure to provide a remedy.
188
 In this 
respect, the tribunal held that ‘[i]nternational courts and tribunals would have to make 
ad hoc assessments based on their evaluation of the capacity of each state at a given 
moment of its development’ otherwise international law would not provide incentives 
‘for a state to improve’.189 For this reason, the tribunal deliberated on the formation of a 
state’s legal system in accordance with the rule of law.190  
 
The tribunal finally concluded that it was not permitted, at the international level, to 
expound upon the alleged national denial of justice due the fact that the matter had not 
been previously taken to the host state’s highest court.191 
 
This case serves as evidence – once again– of an arbitral tribunal recognising the 
jurisdiction of the domestic courts (i.e., internal forum) to settle the legal disputes 
derived from the acts belonging to an organ of the state, such as the Albanian Ministry 
of Finance. Furthermore, this tribunal also reaffirmed the public law theory regarding 
the adherence to the principle of legality which should rule in any legal system, 
including the application of this principle to the arbitral tribunals’ functions. In other 
words, this suggests the application of the principle of legality in order to determine the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. In summary, the fulfilment of this principle should be 
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considered a sine que non prerequisite for any potential claimant before resorting to an 
international jurisdiction. 
 
d. Principle of the public administration’s discretionary power and 
other related principles 
 
This sub-section largely refers to the principle of the public administration’s 
discretionary power. The principle of discretionary power can be understood in this 
context as ‘the possibility that is given by law to an official, to adopt measures in 
accordance with his/her appreciation of the opportunity and convenience, where he/she 
can normally adopt various decisions, that in accordance with the appreciation of the 
facts and with the finality of the norm, all, if they are applied, could be equally fair.’192 
(Emphasis added).  
 
Perhaps, it is also fitting to revisit and re-iterate that one of the main objectives of this 
domestic principle is to provide the state (i.e., public administration) with certain 
flexibility to adapt its performance to those vivid, dynamic and changing realities that it 
has to face in order to protect and promote both the public interest and national welfare. 
This flexibility also includes the state’s ability to adapt and deal with cases/situations 
that it could not have foreseen.
 193
 
 
This principle is one of the most controversial principles of administrative law in terms 
of its scope, and, for which, its application simultaneously some principles of 
international investment law seems to cause an issue. One of the reasons for this 
controversy, for example, could be due to the fact that the scope and application of this 
principle of administrative law is frequently in conflict with international investment 
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law standards of treatment, in particular with the principle of fair and equitable 
treatment.  
 
This legal conflict is also fuelled by taking into consideration the international legal 
notions of abuse of power and unlawful, arbitrary or discriminatory regulatory conduct 
of the host state.
194
 Thus, in this situation, the consideration of the regulatory conduct 
of the state as an arbitrary or unlawful conduct could not only be connected with the 
legal provisions of domestic public law, but also with the legal provisions of public 
international law.  
 
Therefore, this legal conflict arises from the dual-role of the state under a given 
investment situation, i.e., due to its role as a contracting state to a BIT and due to its 
role as the head of its public administration. 
 
The importance of this legal conflict is also evident when this domestic legal principle 
and international law principles and notions are considered in treaty-based regulatory 
disputes. Consequently, this arbitral mechanism implies a revision of the state’s 
regulatory conduct, only in accordance with the scope and provisions of a given BIT 
(i.e., it creates a possible conflict between the host state and foreign investor’s 
interests).  
 
However, it is well known in public domestic law that the scope and interpretation of 
this domestic principle cannot be isolated from the obligatory reference to the principle 
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of legality. This latter principle provides the necessary legal grounds for the correct 
exercise of such discretionary power by any national official. Hence, in cases 
concerning the absence of these legal grounds, the exercise of this discretionary power 
by any official could be quashed and declared illegal or nullified by a domestic court.  
 
As already mentioned, the problem arises when the exercise and the legal consequences 
of this discretionary power/function need to be reviewed by an international investment 
tribunal, as there could be a risk of de-contextualizing this exercise from the social-
economic reality of a state.
195
 Perhaps it can be argued that this is one of the reasons 
why this practice may be creating a sense of political reluctance – at different levels– to 
the current international investment arbitration system by developing countries (see 
Chapter VI). 
 
In summary, it is significant re-iterate that this principle is not only interconnected with 
the principle of legality but also with other principles of administrative law. Generally 
speaking, these other related principles can be identified as proportionality (i.e., a 
balance between ‘the administrative measure taken and the end to be achieved’196); 
equality before the law (i.e., the same legal status of individuals established by the 
law
197
); the public administration’s good faith (i.e., mutual administration/individuals 
respect
198); and, the duty to give reasons (i.e., ‘any administrative decision must be 
accompanied by reasons’ to guarantee the private-individual right of defence199). 
 
Based on the foregoing ideas of this sub-section, consideration will be given as to how 
different international arbitral tribunals refer to factual situations that could also be 
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encapsulated within the scope of the principle of the public administration’s 
discretionary power and, in some cases, within the ambit of some other related 
principles of administrative law, when the regulatory conduct of a host state is required 
to be reviewed by public law adjudicators. 
 
i. Waste Management, Inc v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3) April 30, 2004 – Final Award 
 
In this case, when the tribunal analyzed the impact of the governmental measures 
adopted by Mexico in relation to Acaverde’s assets, in the scope of the standard 
contained in article 1110 of the NAFTA (i.e., the determination of whether Mexico’s 
conduct was equivalent to an expropriation), it took into consideration the content of a 
public declaration given by Acapulco’s Mayor. The Claimant had argued that this 
declaration ‘effectively repealed the law’.200 However, the tribunal disagreed with this 
argument.  
 
It is crucial to emphasize that – at the international level– there is an assumption that an 
official’s declarations unequivocally give rise to legitimate expectations.201 In relation 
to the legal value of a declaration given by a public official, it is important to stress 
that, in administrative law, this type of declaration does not necessarily constitute a 
legal act equivalent to a formal administrative act (i.e., an act of legal effect); unless it 
has been expressly established by law. Consequently, based on the principle of legality, 
the adoption of an official act must follow the legal procedural steps set out in a 
domestic law system in order to acquire general or particular legal effects. 
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This international idea concerning official declarations arises from the different 
concepts on this issue which vary from one jurisdiction to another. For example, under 
the French administrative legal system, an official act will only constitute an 
administrative act if it has followed the steps established by law. This compares with 
the situation under the British administrative legal system in which an assurance made 
by an official may give rise to legitimate expectations.
202
  
 
 An official’s freedom, as a part of his discretionary power, to deliver public speeches 
and opinions related to a particular investment (even in the exercise of his/her public 
functions) needs to be considered by arbitral tribunals with special awareness of the 
fact their arbitral decisions on this issue may affect the exercise of the sovereign power 
of the state as well as its international responsibility.  
 
A reflection on this issue is found in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion, when it stated: 
‘[i]ndividual statements of this kind made by local political figures in the heat of public 
debate may or may not be wise or appropriate, but they are not tantamount to 
expropriation unless they are acted on in such a way as to negate the rights concerned 
without any remedy.’203 (Emphasis added). Moreover, it has been stated that 
‘[e]ncouraging remarks from government officials do not of themselves give rise to 
legitimate expectations.’204 
 
ii. Metalclad Corporation v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/97/1) August 30, 2000 – Final Award 
 
In considering the application of Article 1105 of the NAFTA (i.e., fair and equitable 
treatment), the tribunal emphasized the administrative law conflict of competences 
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between the federal and municipal governments to grant construction permits, and in 
particular to authorize the construction and operation of hazardous waste landfills, that 
was at issue in this case.
205
  
 
According to this decision, the tribunal indicated that this administrative law conflict of 
competences also represented a limitation on the discretionary power of both federal 
and municipal governments in relation to the scope of their environmental powers. 
Finally, the tribunal reached the conclusion that ‘… the exclusive authority for siting 
and permitting a hazardous waste landfill resides with the Mexican federal 
government.’206  
 
Normally, a conflict related to the competences of different government entities is 
addressed by the highest national court (i.e., the supreme court or tribunal). 
Nevertheless, the tribunal reached the conclusion that the municipality had acted 
outside its authority and therefore Metalclad was not fairly or equitably treated (and 
subsequently, was indirectly expropriated
207
) due to the denial of the required permit by 
the municipality of Guadalcazar.
208
 In addition, the tribunal stated that ‘the 
municipality’s insistence upon and denial of the construction permit in this instance 
was improper’209 and ‘Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and predictable 
framework…’210 (Emphasis added). 
 
As a result of this case, it is important to stress that the fact that the public 
administration exercises its discretionary power does not mean that an investor is not 
compelled to comply with the legal framework of a state. Furthermore, legal security is 
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always guaranteed by the state when the investor complies with the regulatory 
framework of that particular state. For example, with regard to the construction and 
operation of hazardous waste landfills, the state guarantees the investor that, once they 
have carried out all required administrative procedures, the necessary legal security will 
be given by guaranteeing the investor that a different business (e.g., houses, hotel, etc) 
will not be allowed to be established on the same area of construction.  
 
iii. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican 
States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) January 26, 2006 – Final Award 
 
In evaluating the role of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA in this case, the tribunal 
affirmed that Mexico: (i) had an ample ‘space’ for regulation; (ii) can permit or prohibit 
any form of gambling; and (iii) had ‘a wide discretion with respect to how it carries out 
[gambling] policies by regulation and administrative conduct.’211 The tribunal further 
found that these observations did not contradict the NAFTA provisions.  
 
Although the arbitral tribunal in this case did acknowledge the discretionary power of 
the state, it did not make any further reference to the scope of this domestic principle. 
On the contrary, the tribunal opted to consider the national conduct of the state as a 
‘fact’ rather than exploring the scope of this principle of discretionary power of the 
state which has been extensively investigated under domestic law.
212
  
 
Similarly, the arbitral tribunal wasted the opportunity of making a reference to one of 
the related principles of discretionary power, i.e., the principle of equality before the 
law, when it dealt with the notion of national treatment as established by Article 1102 
of the NAFTA.
213
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Furthermore, in spite of the recognized illegality of the business in question, the 
tribunal still considered the allegation made by the Claimant of having received less 
favourable treatment compared to those national investors in the same area of 
investment. In this context, it stated that ‘Thunderbird [had] not sufficiently established 
– not even on a prima facie basis – that the EDM investments were treated, in like 
circumstances, worse than those of Mexican nationals.’214 (Emphasis added).  
 
Consequently, it must be stated that the tribunal missed out on a great opportunity to 
make a reference to the domestic principle of equality before the law. If this principle 
had been applied in this circumstance it would have advocated the same legal status for 
both national and foreign investors: (i) before the law, and (ii) with regard to the legal 
circumstances and conditions received. Moreover, it is also important to mention here 
that the investor cannot use a right based on an illegal activity carried out either by 
national or international investors. 
 
iv. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican 
States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) December 2006 – Separate Opinion 
 
 The dissenting arbitrator through the long-text of this separate opinion, stated that the 
‘three inter-related and consecutive measures of SEGOB’ (e.g., solicitud, oficio, and 
subsequent conduct) constituted a violation of legitimate expectations under Article 
1105 of the NAFTA.
215
 The arbitrator argued that public authorities should respect 
legitimate expectations that were created for individuals, in particular if they were the 
basis for an investment.
216
  
 
He continued his opinion by arguing that the same public authorities should also refrain 
from reversing an administrative measure after such a measure was taken into 
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consideration in carrying out a given investment.
217
 This serves to suggest that the 
arbitrator was proposing a kind of international limitation on the discretionary power of 
the state to carry out changes to its domestic public-policy.
218
 Thus, the arbitrator 
overlooked the subject matter of the principle of discretionary power since he did not 
take into consideration the flexibility that is granted to the public administration to 
regulate in unforeseen situations. Although, to his credit, he did acknowledge that the 
law (both national and international) is not static.  
 
The arbitrator expressly stated that the scope of administrative law principles and its 
implications were not ‘well established’ and were contradictory.219 However, he did 
recognize the importance of referring to the common principles in the main 
administrative law systems for the interpretation of BITs.
220
 
 
In evaluating the scope of the legitimate expectations principle, in accordance with 
international law standards, the arbitrator, despite the already acknowledged illegal 
nature of the investment according to the Mexican law, insisted that the Claimant had 
received less favourable treatment in comparison to other national investors in the same 
field and who were subject to the same circumstances and conditions. It is important to 
re-emphasize that an investor should not be allowed to argue a right based on an illegal 
activity. 
 
Finally, the arbitrator made references to the notion of the principle of equality before 
the law, by stating ‘…the domestic investor… was… “best treated” by the integral 
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Mexican (administrative and judicial) system.’221 Nonetheless, such a reference was not 
further considered and expanded upon by the arbitrator throughout his analysis. He did 
however further state that ‘[it was difficult] to know what happens exactly in the “black 
box” of government administration, in particular in sensitive matters and where 
domestic competitors are linked with government services against foreign 
competitors.’222 With regard to this observation made by the arbitrator, it can be noted 
that he failed to make any reference to the principle of the public administration’s good 
faith. On the contrary, his observation infers bad faith on the part of the state, without 
any supporting evidence. However, curiously, he did state that the principle of 
legitimate expectations formed part of the international principle of good faith
223
. 
 
v. Corn Products International, INC. v. Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
(ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01) January 15, 2008 – Decision sobre 
Responsabilidad 
 
In this case, the arbitral tribunal made references to two principles of administrative 
law, namely the principle of the administrations discretionary power, and equality 
before the law.  
 
Firstly, with regard to the principle of the administration’s discretionary power, the 
arbitral tribunal acknowledged Mexico’s discretionary power to adopt fiscal measures 
in order to protect the Mexican sugar industry ‘by encouraging increased consumption 
of sugar’.224 The tribunal stated that detrimental and discriminatory governmental 
measures did not necessarily constitute an expropriation, unless their intention was to 
destroy the investment.
225
 Despite these significant observations, the tribunal did not 
make any further reference to the content of this principle within the analysis of the 
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case, apart from the acknowledgement of the situation suffered by the Mexican sugar 
producers.
226
 
 
Additionally, it is of significance to note that when the tribunal considered the national 
treatment claim under article 1102 of the NAFTA, it made reference to Mexico’s 
argument on the necessity and discretion of adopting governmental measures in order 
to alleviate and resolve the impact of the financial crisis on the national sugar 
industry.
227
 Hereafter, the tribunal did not make any further reference to this principle, 
except when it asserted that (i) ‘[t]he problem with [Mexico’s] argument is that it 
confuses the nature of the measure taken with the motive for which it was taken’228 and 
(ii) that the measure could be equivalent to a violation of the article 1102. 
Conclusively, the tribunal completed by stating that ‘[d]iscrimination does not cease to 
be discrimination… because it [was] undertaken to achieve a laudable goal or because 
the achievement of that goal can be described as necessary.’229 
 
Lastly, the tribunal frequently referred to the principle of equality before the law. Most 
significantly, this reference was made when the tribunal evaluated the scope of national 
treatment in accordance with Article 1102 of the NAFTA, as it distinguished between 
‘non-discrimination in matters of trade’ and ‘non-discrimination in matters of 
investment’.230 In this context, the tribunal pointed out three factors that needed to be 
taken into consideration in order to determine whether an investment has been 
discriminated against by a host state. These factors were (i) the host state’s treatment, 
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(ii) ‘in like circumstances’, and (iii) a less favourable treatment compared to that 
accorded to the comparator.
231
  
 
Furthermore, when the arbitral tribunal evaluated the alleged violation of Article 1102 
of the NAFTA (National Treatment), it took into consideration whether the investor 
was in a similar circumstance to the Mexican sugar producers through the exercise of 
comparing foreign and national investors that operated in the same business or 
economic sector.
232
 In this regard, the tribunal reached the conclusion that the purpose 
of the tax was ‘avowedly’ to alter the terms of competition between these two 
competitors.
233
 
 
vi. Perenco Ecuador LTD v. Republica del Ecuador and Empresa Estatal 
Petroleos del Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6) May 8, 2009 – 
Decision sobre Medidas Provisionales 
 
The arbitral tribunal in this decision expressly recognized its power to limit the 
discretionary power of the state. In this regard, it pointed out that an ICSID tribunal is 
empowered to restrict the sovereign freedom of the state to act as it wished. Therefore, 
the tribunal in this case considered that it was empowered to grant interim measures to 
restrain a host state: (i) from enforcing a law; or (ii) from enforcing or seeking a local 
judgment.  
 
The main argument to be taken into consideration is that despite the sovereign power of 
the state to enact laws, it did not inhibit the arbitral tribunal to exercise its faculties to 
grant interim measures.
234
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Ultimately, the tribunal recommended interim measures against Ecuador, including the 
imposition of a restriction on the state from taking any legal actions against Perenco 
and a further restriction on the state to refrain from unilaterally amending, rescinding, 
terminating, or repudiating public-law contracts (i.e., the participation contracts).
235
 
Obviously, in the analysis of this award, the arbitral tribunal did not take the principle 
of legality into consideration or any other administrative law principles such as the 
principle of discretionary power of the state, which may have influenced it to reach a 
different outcome.  
 
vii. Azurix Corp. v. la Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) July 
14, 2006 – Final Award 
 
Throughout this award, the arbitral tribunal made references to the content of some 
principles of administrative law, e.g., discretionary power and proportionality. With 
regard to the former principle, the tribunal analyzed the conduct of various Argentinean 
public authorities. It decided to assess the regulatory conduct of the Buenos Aires 
Province in order to determine which actions were performed: (i) in the exercise of its 
public authority or (ii) as a party to a contract.
236
 The tribunal, despite considering that 
most of the controversial matters were mainly based on the interpretation of the 
concession agreement,
237
 stated that the conduct of the provincial authorities had 
contributed to the algae crisis.
238
 The tribunal established that the Province had 
performed its actions in the exercise of its public authority.
239
 Finally, the tribunal 
expanded on its understanding of the discretionary power of the state and its 
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commitment to take care of and protect the national public interest (i.e., the public 
health).
240
     
 
In respect to the principle of proportionality, when the tribunal evaluated the effect, 
intent and duration of the expropriation measures adopted by Argentina, it put emphasis 
on the need to assess whether a legitimate governmental measure could give rise to a 
compensation claim, even if it was taken to serve a public purpose.
241
 In reaching a 
verdict on whether the Argentinean measures were expropriatory, it cited the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in terms of proportionality. The 
tribunal consequently stated that a governmental measure should keep ‘a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realized’.242 However, the tribunal did not provide a further explanation of the scope of 
this principle.  
 
The tribunal simply submitted that (i) this proportionality would not exist if a person 
concerned bears an individual and excessive burden and (ii) nationals should support a 
greater burden of the public interest than non-nationals due to the fact that non-
nationals do not participate in the election of the country’s leaders.243 
 
viii. MTD Equity Sdn Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. The Republic of Chile (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/7) May 25, 2004 – Final Award 
 
In this award, when the tribunal drew attention to the preliminary considerations of its 
final decision, it expressly recognized the discretionary power of the Chilean 
government to grant permits and also to decide on its urban policies and legislation.
244
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In evaluating the claimant’s submission concerning Chile’s failure ‘to grant necessary 
permits’, the tribunal asserted that ‘[a]ll that an investor may expect is that the law be 
applied’.245  
 
With this statement, the tribunal established that (i) the modification of the PMRS was 
entirely within Chile’s discretionary power,246 and (ii) by not changing the Chilean 
PMRS, Chile did not breach the BIT’s provisions.247 
 
ix. Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of 
Ecuador (London Court of International Arbitration Administered Case 
No. UN 3467) July 1, 2004 – Final Award 
 
In considering ‘the claim of impairment’ submitted by the Claimant, the tribunal 
resorted to a definition of arbitrariness as a way to assess the discretionary power of 
the state to modify the tax regime. The tribunal quoted the Lauder tribunal which 
referred to a definition of ‘arbitrary’ from Black’s Law Dictionary. This definition in 
relation to an arbitrary act describes this type of act as being ‘…founded on prejudice 
or preference rather than on reason or fact.’248 Based on this definition, the tribunal also 
acknowledged that there may be some forms of arbitrariness even in the case when 
there is no intention on the part of an administrative entity.
249
  
 
In addition, the tribunal referred to the administrative principle of law known as the 
principle of equality before the law. Thus when dealing with the ‘the claim to no less 
favorable treatment’, it stated that ‘“in like situations” cannot be interpreted in the 
narrow sense advanced by Ecuador’.250 This statement was made in response to the 
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Claimant’s allegation of the violation of the National Treatment obligation251 which 
was refused by Ecuador owing to the fact that it considered that the Claimant was not 
‘in [a] like situation to companies in the same sector’ and the ‘whole purpose’ of the 
VAT was to ensure conditions of competition but only between companies in the same 
sector.
252
  
 
x. Helnan International Hotels A/S v. The Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID 
Case No. 05/19) July 3, 2008 – Final Award 
 
In addressing the issues in this case, the arbitral tribunal made references to two 
principles of administrative law, namely the principle of the public administration’s 
discretionary power and the principle of the public administration’s good faith.  
 
On the subject of the first principle, the arbitral tribunal made references to the state’s 
discretionary power to downgrade the Shepheard hotel status through the Ministry of 
Tourism. The Claimant had argued on this point that the use of this discretionary power 
was ‘an improper use of its authority’, as well as describing the act as 
‘discriminatory’.253 Additionally, the Claimant alleged that in consequence Egypt had 
violated the Egypt-Denmark BIT provisions.
254
 It must be stressed that the arbitral 
tribunal did not make any broad comment on this principle; except to acknowledge it. 
The tribunal considered that Egypt had the right to downgrade the hotel.
255
 With this 
declaration, the tribunal limited itself to state that the Claimant did not ‘challenge the 
downgrading before the competent Egyptian administrative courts.’256 
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In relation to the second principle, the arbitral tribunal summarized the Claimant’s 
argument concerning the suspected bad-faith action by Egypt to affect its investment. 
The Claimant argued that Egypt was ‘deliberately abusing its sovereign powers’.257 
Similarly, the arbitral tribunal expressed its doubts about the good faith behind Egypt’s 
inspections, which were carried out before downgrading the hotel’s status.258 The 
tribunal asserted its doubts on the good faith of Egypt by asserting that in its opinion 
Egypt had ‘played a significant role in the implementation of a plan aiming at 
terminating the management contract’.259     
 
xi. Aguaytia Energy LLC v. Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/13) 
December 11, 2008 – Final Award 
 
In analysing the ‘developments between 1996 and 2005 in the parties’ contractual 
relationship, the tribunal referred to Article 39 of the Peruvian Legislative Decree of 13 
November 1999. This article stated that judicial stability agreements ‘cannot be 
unilaterally amended or terminated by the State’.260 The tribunal considered that, 
despite the fact that a stability agreement can constitute a state’s guarantee against 
future changes of law, the level of protection given to foreign investments will ‘be 
resolved solely by the Peruvian authorities in applying the non-discrimination 
provisions of the Constitution and the specific laws applicable…’.261 
 
Thus, it can be suggested that the arbitral tribunal not only referred to the principle of 
discretionary power of the state, but also to the interconnected principle of equality 
before the law. In support of this inference, the arbitral tribunal also referred to Article 
2 of the Peruvian Legislative Decree 662. This article stated that foreign and national 
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investors have the same rights and obligations before the law, except for those 
limitations and exceptions established in the Peruvian constitution.
262
  
 
Finally, in spite of the Claimant’s argument concerning the alleged constitutional 
discrimination, the arbitral tribunal found that a stability agreement guarantees ‘the 
constitutional right to equality before the law’ between foreign and national 
investors.
263
 
 
xii. Piero Foresti et al. v. The Republic of South Africa (ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/07/1) August 4, 2010 – Final Award 
 
In summarizing the arguments of the parties in this award, the arbitral tribunal missed 
the opportunity to make references to some principles of administrative law. Hence, the 
tribunal also missed the opportunity to support its decision by referring to the principle 
of discretionary power of state when it addressed the ‘fair and equitable treatment and 
national treatment claims’. Within this context, the tribunal summarized the Claimant’s 
argument concerning the risk of being affected by the state’s discretional measures 
regarding mineral rights and ownership, without elaborating on this matter.  
 
In relation to this issue, the Claimant declared that if the tribunal accepted such a 
discretionary power, a state may escape its international obligations towards investors. 
For this reason, the Claimants further submitted that a state should be restricted from 
‘the possibility of rectifying [its] actions by an uncertain measure at an uncertain 
date’.264 
 
The tribunal also wasted the opportunity to address two other principles of 
administrative law that were indirectly referred to by the parties. For example, the 
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Respondent refers to principle of proportionality by arguing that ‘the government 
action in question is a rational and proportional means of pursuing legitimate public 
regulatory purposes’.265 On the opposing side, the Claimant appeared to refer to the 
restriction of the principle of opportunity by arguing, as already mentioned, that the 
state should be refrained from ‘the possibility of rectifying [its] actions [to avoid 
accountability] by an uncertain measure at an uncertain date’.266    
 
xiii. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of 
Albania (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21) July 30, 2009 – Final Award 
 
The sole-arbitrator tribunal in this case refers to the principle of discretionary power of 
the state owing to the fact that when it evaluated the jurisdiction and admissibility 
aspect of the case, it referred to the discretionary power of the Albanian Minister of 
Finance to veto a foreign investor’s payment unless the said payment had specific 
budgetary approval.
267
  
 
Furthermore, in relation to the international standard of ‘full protection and security’, 
the tribunal held that ‘international courts and tribunals would have to make ad hoc 
assessments based on their evaluation of the capacity of each state at a given moment 
of its development’.268  
 
xiv. Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. et al. v. La Republica del Peru (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/4) February 7, 2005 – Final Award 
 
In this case, the arbitral tribunal decided that it was not necessary to take into 
consideration the reasons surrounding the adoption of certain administrative measures 
by Peru in order to protect its public interest (i.e., environmental protection policy).  
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The tribunal declared that only the fact that these administrative measures affected 
Lucchetti’s investment interests was of relevance.269 Although the tribunal held that it 
did not have jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case, it could have taken the 
principle of discretionary power into consideration in order to understand the legal 
nature of the administrative measures adopted by Peru and to therefore contextualize 
these measures in accordance to the Peruvian government’s policy and actions. 
 
e. Principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations 
 
This principle has been understood domestically as ‘the foundation of the legal relation 
between the [Public] Administration and individuals’.270 It is considered to be the 
foundation of this relationship due to the fact that this principle establishes: (i) the 
necessary protection of the individual’s rights against any unlawful act of the 
administration,
271
 and, (ii) the private-individual expectation that the administration 
would not suddenly change its regulatory framework ‘with immediate effect’ and 
‘without transitional provisions’, to their disadvantage.272  
 
This unique principle has been simultaneously assimilated into the international arena 
as the most important domestic law principle to interpret the regulatory conduct of state 
in accordance with the international obligation of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
enshrined in many BIT provisions.
273
 Therefore, the majority of arbitral decisions make 
a constant and repeated reference to this principle as though this principle operates in 
an isolated manner from the rest of administrative law principles. Furthermore, and 
somewhat worryingly, it has been said that there is a risk of considering this fair and 
                                                 
269
 See paragraph 29. 
270
 See Brewer Carias, supra note 24, on page 277. 
271
 See Chapter II, Sub-section e) iv. Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectation. 
272
 See Neville Brown and Bell, supra note 5, on page 236. 
273
 For a detailed study of this argument see Snodgrass, supra note 22, pages 1-58. 
 314 
equitable treatment standard as a substitute for stabilization clauses that were neither 
conceived nor agreed by the parties.
274
 
 
Thus, taking these observations into consideration, it may be affirmed that to determine 
the scope and limit of this principle could represent an interesting challenge for 
investment arbitrators. This is due to the fact that the application of this principle does 
not only require full consideration by arbitral tribunals but also has an added challenge, 
given that its scope has not been determined with any certainty at a national level. The 
unclear scope of this principle is therefore not an exclusive concern at the domestic 
level, as it also seems to be of concern at the international level due to the lack of a 
consolidated and consistent notion of this principle in arbitral practice.  
 
In relation to this principle, it has been said that ‘[foreign investors’] expectations, in 
order for them to be protected, must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness 
in light of the circumstances’.275 Furthermore, it has also been stated that ‘[n]o investor 
may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is 
going to remain totally unchanged.’276 Thus, it has been assumed that in order ‘to create 
legitimate expectations, state conduct needs to be specific and unambiguous… there 
must be an “unambiguous affirmation” or a “definitive, unambiguous and repeated” 
assurance.’277 
 
In summary, this sub-section analyzes the arbitral reference to this principle by treaty-
based investment tribunals, in the following arbitral awards:  
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i. Metalclad Corporation v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1) August 30, 2000 – Final Award 
 
This is an illustration of those cases where the arbitral tribunals make a reference to the 
principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations but in an indirect manner. In this 
case, the Claimant argued that he met the Governor of SLP to discuss his project of 
developing and operating a hazardous waste landfill and consequently had obtained the 
Governor’s support for the project.278 The Claimant also argued that he would not have 
bought COTERIN’s assets if the approval and support for the project by federal and 
state officials were not given.
279
 The project was terminated due to the absence of a 
municipal construction permit that was considered necessary by Mexico.
280
 After 
several attempts to resolve the dispute by amicable and judicial solutions, the project 
was finally frustrated by the issue of an Ecological Decree declaring the project area to 
be a natural area for the protection of a rare cactus (the Decree also embraced the area 
of the landfill).
281
 
 
In assessing the application of the fair and equitable treatment (Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA), the tribunal also referred to the principle of transparency mentioned in the 
introduction to the Treaty. By referring to this principle of transparency, it is reasonable 
to suggest that the tribunal was also indirectly referring to the principle of legal 
certainty and legitimate expectation. The tribunal stated: 
The Tribunal understands this [principle] to include the idea that all relevant 
legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and successfully 
operating investments made, or intended to be made, under the Agreement 
should be capable of being readily known to all affected investors of another 
Party. There should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters. 
Once the authorities of the central government of any Party (whose 
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international responsibility in such matters has been identified in the preceding 
section) become aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this 
connection, it is their duty to ensure that the correct position is promptly 
determined and clearly stated so that investors can proceed with all 
appropriate expedition in the confident belief that they are acting in 
accordance with all relevant laws.
282
 (Emphasis added). 
 
 
Based on this statement, the arbitral tribunal highlighted that ‘[t]he absence of a clear 
rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal construction permit, as well as the 
absence of any established practice or procedure as to the manner of handling 
applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to a failure on the part of 
Mexico to ensure the transparency required by the NAFTA.’283 Additionally, the 
tribunal stated that, despite the fact that the municipal construction permit had not been 
granted yet, the Claimant was ‘merely acting prudently’ and in ‘the full expectation that 
the permit would be granted’.284 
 
Finally, the arbitral tribunal held that Mexico failed ‘to ensure a transparent and 
predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment’.285 Therefore 
Mexico’s conduct amounted to an indirect expropriation in violation of Article 1110(1) 
of the NAFTA.
286
 
 
ii. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United 
Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) January 26, 
2006 – Final Award 
 
The arbitral tribunal, in reaching a conclusion in this case, devoted approximately thirty 
paragraphs to exclusively assess the principle of legitimate expectations under the 
scope of and in accordance with Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110 of the NAFTA. The 
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Claimant’s argument concerned its reliance upon the legitimate expectations generated 
by SEGOB’s answer (e.g., the Oficio) as an administrative act of government officials, 
and the responsibility of the state under international law for damages caused by these 
officials for the breach of its investment’s legitimate expectations.287 Conversely, 
Mexico denied the creation of a legitimate expectation through Oficio due to the 
advisory and not authoritative nature of the document in question.
288
 
 
Nevertheless, the tribunal decided to take its final decision based on (i) the face value 
of SEGOB’s answer, (ii) the lack of contemporaneous evidence; and (ii) the non-
reliance on presumptions or inferences.
289
 Consequently, the tribunal expressly 
recognised that reviewing the content of SEGOB’s answer ‘would interfere with issues 
of purely domestic law and the manner in which governments should resolve 
administrative matters’.290  
 
Regardless of this recognition, the tribunal affirmed that it had the competence to 
assess whether SEGOB’s answer gave rise to a legitimate expectation in favour of the 
Claimant in accordance with Mexico’s obligations under Chapter Eleven of the 
NAFTA.
291
 
 
Thus, before reaching a verdict on this issue, the tribunal considered it necessary to 
define a priori the concept of legitimate expectations, within the context of the NAFTA 
framework. To this end, the tribunal considered that there may be a legitimate 
expectation when there is ‘[a] situation where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates 
reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act 
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in reliance [of that] expectation’.292 Additionally, the tribunal stated that ‘a failure by a 
NAFTA Party to honour [the] expectations [created] could cause the investor (or 
investment) to suffer damage’.293 However, the tribunal later found that SEGOB’s 
answer did not create a legitimate expectation under Articles 1102, 1105 and/or 1110 of 
the NAFTA.
294
 
 
iii. International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United 
Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) December 2006 
– Separate Opinion 
 
In this separate opinion, the dissenting arbitrator, in a 135-page document, gave an in-
depth analysis of the principle of legitimate expectations under international law. His 
main argument was based on the idea that a combination of three ‘inter-related and 
consecutive measures of SEGOB’, i.e., (i) solicitud, (ii) oficio and (iii) subsequent 
conduct, constituted a legitimate expectation in favour of the Claimant, according to the 
scope of the fair and equitable treatment contained in Article 1105 of the NAFTA.
295
  
 
Furthermore, the arbitrator considered that such a combination of measures should have 
been considered a ‘green light’, i.e., the equivalent of an administrative act of the state 
(e.g., permits) giving the Claimant permission to carry out within Mexican territory, for 
their business activities, which were considered at the time to be illegal activities by 
Mexican law.
296
 
 
The arbitrator conceived a legitimate expectation to be ‘an expectation of the investor 
to be caused by and attributed to the government, backed-up by an investment relying 
on such expectation, requiring the legitimacy of the expectation in terms of the 
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competency of the officials responsible for it and the procedure for issuing it and the 
reasonableness of the investor in relying on the expectation’.297  
 
The arbitrator suggested that the concept of legitimate expectations and its normative 
scope should be constructed under the scope of Article 1105 of the NAFTA, with 
particular reference to the particular circumstances of a case, thus advocating a case-by-
case application.
298
 The arbitrator also recognized that foreign investors are exposed to 
‘the sovereignty, the regulatory, administrative and other governmental powers of a 
state’.299 Furthermore, it was suggested by the arbitrator that, due to the similarity 
between investor-state arbitration and national judicial review, a comparative analysis 
on the common principles of the main administrative law systems could be an 
important point of reference in relation to the interpretation of BITs.
300
  
 
Finally, the arbitrator acknowledged that the exact scope and application of this 
principle of legitimate expectations is not well established within the international 
arena. Additionally he also highlighted the contradiction that exists between the 
meanings of this principle at national and international levels.
301
  
 
iv. Azurix Corp. v. la Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12) July 14, 2006 – Final Award 
 
In this award, the arbitral tribunal devoted a complete sub-section to the principle of 
legitimate expectations.
302
 One of the legal issues in this decision was the issue of 
whether a governmental measure could have affected the investor’s legitimate 
expectation which was created by a contractual agreement.  
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In assessing the alleged breach of the Argentina-USA BIT provisions, particularly the 
expropriation without compensation claim, the tribunal stated that ‘frustration of the 
investor’s legitimate expectations [takes place] when a State repudiates former 
assurances, or refuses to give assurances that it will comply with its obligations, 
depriving the investor in whole or in part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of its investment’.303 Moreover, the tribunal pointed out that ‘[t]he 
expectations… are not necessarily based on a contract but on assurances explicit or 
implicit, or on representations, made by the State which the investor took into account 
in making the investment’.304  
 
The arbitral tribunal also considered this principle when it examined the fair and 
equitable treatment claim. Within the context of this international standard of treatment, 
the Claimant argued that ‘the basic touchstone of fair and equitable treatment is to be 
found in the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the parties’.305  
 
In response to this argument, the tribunal asserted that when the regulatory conduct of 
the state needs to be considered, it has to be taken by considering those elements that 
frustrated the ‘…expectations [of] the investor which [were] legitimately taken into 
account when it made the investment’.306  
 
v. MTD Equity Sdn Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. The Republic of 
Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7) May 25, 2004 – Final Award 
 
In this award, when the tribunal investigated the fair and equitable treatment claim, it 
took the Claimant’s consideration on the legal effect of the FIC’s approval into 
account. In this respect, the Claimant argued that the FIC’s approval constituted ‘the 
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[necessary] approval of the investment and of the project, at the described location’, 
which subsequently gave them the right to develop the site.
307
  
 
In response to this argument, the arbitral tribunal stated that it was the responsibility of 
the FIC to carry out a ‘minimum of diligence internally and externally’ to ‘give an 
investor the expectation that the project [was] feasible at that location from a regulatory 
point of view’.308  
 
Finally, despite the fact that tribunal stated that it was a responsibility of the investor 
‘to assure itself that it is properly advised, particularly when investing abroad in an 
unfamiliar environment’309 and that ‘[a]ll that an investor may expect [was] that the law 
be applied’310, the arbitral tribunal held that ‘[the] approval of an investment by the FIC 
for a project that [was] against the urban policy of the Government [was] a breach of 
the obligation to treat an investor fairly and equitably’.311 
 
vi. Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador (London Court of International Arbitration 
Administered Case No. UN 3467) July 1, 2004 – Final Award 
 
In this arbitral decision, the Claimant’s argument related to the refusal of the 
Ecuadorean government to allow OEPC to manage its investment and other connected 
rights. The Claimant submitted that ‘a legitimate economic expectation on which the 
investment was based has been undermined by the [tax] measures taken [by 
Ecuador]’.312 However, the tribunal was not persuaded by this argument when it 
analyzed the Impairment claim. The tribunal did however refer to it again when it 
evaluated the fair and equitable treatment and the full protection and security claim.  
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In this respect, the Claimant argued that ‘by revoking pre-existing decisions that were 
legitimately relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments and plan its 
commercial and business activities, Ecuador has frustrated OEPC’s legitimate 
expectations on the basis of which the investment was made and has thus breached the 
obligation to accord it fair and equitable treatment’.313  
 
In reaction to this argument, the tribunal submitted that ‘[t]he stability of the legal and 
business framework is thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment’.314 
Further to this, the tribunal asserted that ‘the framework under which the investment 
was made and operate[d] [had] been changed in an important manner by actions 
adopted by the SRI’.315 In other words, it can be evidenced that the tribunal was 
persuaded by the Claimant’s argument regarding the change in the tax law ‘without 
providing any clarity about its meaning’.316  
 
Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal held that Ecuador breached its obligations ‘to accord 
fair and equitable treatment under Article II (3) (a) of the [USA-Ecuador BIT]’.317  
 
An important academic reflection concerning this decision is that the arbitral tribunal 
not only assimilates the notion of legitimate expectations with the notion of fair and 
equitable treatment, but integrates it with the international-law requirements of 
‘stability’ and ‘predictability’.318 
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vii. Telenor Mobile Communications S.A. v. The Republic of 
Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15) September 13, 2006 – 
Final Award. 
 
In this case, the Claimant argued that the Hungarian regulatory measures affected its 
investment contract. It stated that the contract embraced, amongst other elements, its 
legitimate expectation that also included a fair and equitable treatment.
319
  
 
In response to this argument, the arbitral tribunal, without making further analysis on 
the alleged existence of the principle of legitimate expectations, stated that ‘it [was] 
well established that the mere exercise by government of regulatory powers that create 
impediments to business or entail the payment of taxes or other levies does not of itself 
constitute expropriation’.320 (Emphasis added). 
 
Finally, the tribunal held that ‘the interference with the investor’s rights must be such 
as to substantially deprive the investor of the economic value, use or enjoyment of its 
investment’.321 
 
f. Summary 
 
This chapter is evidence of the fact that arbitral tribunals do evaluate the domestic 
regulatory conduct of the state in order to determine its international responsibility 
mainly in accordance with the FET standard. The arbitral tribunals carry out this 
evaluation through the process of assessing the regulatory power of the state, which is 
carried out in a variety of ways. In more simple terms it has been shown that every 
tribunal has the freedom to establish its own methodology to analyze and decide a 
treaty-based investor-state dispute.  
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As a result of this flexibility, arbitral tribunals are also free to resort to different sources 
of law (i.e., national and international laws). Furthermore, this freedom entitles them a 
choice of whether to make reference to and consider some international law principles 
such as the FET standard in conjuction with some principles of domestic administrative 
law when international regulatory disputes are in the process of being resolved .  
 
Within this context, arbitral tribunals, through the process of evaluating the regulatory 
conduct of state, have made references to factual situations which could clearly be 
framed within the scope of some principles of administrative law, e.g., legality, 
discretionary power, proportionally, equality before law, legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations. Thus, this public law review of state regulatory conduct by arbitral 
tribunals can be evidenced throughout the text of this chapter, where arbitral tribunals 
address, each of these principles (separately or jointly in the same award) on case-by-
case basis. 
 
It is important to emphasize that despite the fact that arbitral tribunals do not make 
express and direct references to any of the names or scopes of the administrative law 
principles enumerated in Chapter II, they do discuss elements that lead to the inference 
that they are referring, in an indirect manner, to these principles. However, a unique 
exception to this indirect manner of referring to these administrative principle can be 
found when tribunals directly deal with the principle of legitimate expectations which 
has been considered (in their view) to be a part of the international fair and equitable 
standard of treatment.  
 
The indirect reference to principles of administrative law can also be evidenced by the 
manner in which arbitral tribunals evaluate the international obligations established by 
an IIT in conjunction with the domestic regulatory conduct of the state. Here it can be 
 325 
stated that these international obligations are in apparent conflict with the scope of 
administrative law principles due to their different purposes s i.e., resolving domestic 
regulatory disputes and resolving international regulatory disputes, respectively. This 
conflict could also be related to the dual role of state at the international and national 
levels. For example, at the international level, the state is viewed as a contracting state 
of a BIT, whereas at the national level, the state is the public administration, before 
private individuals. 
 
Finally, it can be inferred that the principles of administrative law are interconnected 
with one another, as are the principles of international investment. However, this 
interconnection not only exists between the domestic and international principles at 
their own respective levels, but also between these two levels of principles. These 
principles are interconnected, amongst other reasons, due to the unique and indivisible 
nature of the law as ‘one system of norms’ (Hans Kelsen’s school).  
 
These two sets of principles and their variety of interpretations conflict (when they 
should not) at the international level, particularly in treaty-based regulatory disputes. 
Consequently this could be to the detriment of the real interests of the contracting states 
of a BIT, i.e., it could be a disadvantage to their reciprocal intentions of promoting 
economic cooperation to their mutual benefit. This risk should be taken seriously in 
order for a good level of global governance to be achieved and guaranteed in the near 
future.  
 326 
 
CHAPTER VI 
REFLECTIONS ON THE INVESTOR-STATE TREATY 
ARBITRATION SYSTEM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING 
PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
a. Introduction  
 
During the last two decades, the international investment arbitration practice 
(particularly international regulatory disputes) has given rise to certain concerns and 
questions from some host states, particularly those from developing countries.
1
 These 
questions range from political, legal and academic concerns as will be seen later on.  
 
Within the context of these concerns and questions, it has been argued that the current 
arbitral practice has been compromising the legitimacy of the system itself due to the 
review of a state’s domestic public policy and regulatory power at an international level 
and to the determination of a state’s international responsibility arising out of the 
exercise of its public authority.
2
 It is reasonable to state that these various concerns and 
questions have also taken place due to the continuing restriction on the freedom of the 
state to exercise its sovereign regulatory power and to adopt new policies in the interest 
of its national welfare.
3
  
 
This alleged limitation upon the sovereign regulatory power of a state has been carried 
out by various heterogeneous arbitral interpretations of principles of international 
                                                 
1
 For example: Bolivia; Ecuador; Venezuela; Argentina and South Africa. However this list also includes some 
developed countries such as Australia and the European Union. 
2
 See M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment (Centre for 
Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa) <http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/pdf/papers/sornarajah.pdf> (Last visit 
07/04/2009).  
3
 See, e.g., Perenco Ecuador LTD v. Republica del Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/6) May 8, 2009 – Decision sobre Medidas Provisionales. 
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investment law
4
 – at an international level – on those sovereign rights allowing the state 
to regulate its domestic economy. These interpretations embrace different arbitral 
understandings, which have based on the various interpretations of obligations 
established in a given BIT, such as the interpretations of national treatment, and of fair 
and equitable treatment.
5
 This argument is of particular importance within the 
international investment arbitration system, if it is taken into consideration that the 
current arbitral practice is led by the idea of evaluating a state’s national regulatory 
conduct in accordance with international investment law principles mainly i.e., in 
particular, in accordance with the FET standard.  
 
Furthermore, it can be said that these concerns can also be based on the current arbitral 
practice of concluding a regulatory case without sufficiently resorting to domestic law 
principles to due the lack of consideration afforded to those legal elements that gave 
grounds to the adoption of a certain regulatory measure of the state, e.g., the 
consideration of domestic (constitutional and administrative) law principles. Instead of 
considering such legal grounds, arbitral tribunals have adhered to the idea that the 
national conduct of a state and its legal agenda should be as a ‘fact’.6  
 
The question that must now be asked is how a certain regulatory conduct of the state 
can be considered as a ‘fact’ when the legal nature of a BIT dispute should be taken 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic (2001) and Ronald S. Lauder 
v. The Czech Republic (2001); and SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan (2003) and SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. The Republic of the Philippines (2004), 
quoted by J. Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to be Addressed or a fact of life, in F. Ortino, A. Sheppard, 
and H. Warner, Investment Treaty Law – Current Issues Volume 1 (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, London 2006), pages 23-28. 
5
 See Siemens A.G. v. Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8) August 2, 2004 – Decision on 
Jurisdiction, paragraph 139. 
6
 See International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules) January 26, 2006 – Final Award, on paragraph 27. See also Z. Douglas, The International Law of 
Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press, UK, 2009), pages 69-72, pages 69-72. 
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into account.
7
 In this regard, it could also be questioned whether international and 
national laws are completely separate from each other in terms of reviewing the 
unilateral power of the state.
8
 
 
The current arbitral practice has given rise to a series of theories that have caught the 
state’s attention. These concerns are based on the following factors related to current 
arbitral practice: (i) the idea which suggests that BIT obligations guarantee a level of 
‘good governance’;9 (ii) the need to consider political aspects of a host state;10 (iii) the 
consideration of sensitive matters related to economic policy and foreign affairs policy 
by investment arbitrators;
11
 (iv) the international responsibility of a state derived from a 
BIT;
12
 (v) the consideration of not only investment matters, but issues relating to 
alleged corruption and criminal conduct by investment tribunals;
13
 (vi) the obligation of 
the investor to fulfil the commitments and intentions of the BIT;
14
 (vii) the risk of 
considering minimum misconduct by an official as a violation of a BIT provision;
15
 
(viii) the dynamic nature of international law;
16
 (ix) the need of complementing the 
public purpose criterion;
17
 (x) the alleged disproportional burden upon national 
individuals in comparison with foreigners, due to the fact that the foreigners do not take 
                                                 
7
 See Azurix Corp. v. la Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) July 14, 2006 – Final Award, 
paragraph 58. 
8
 See the dualism and monism theories in Chapter III. 
9
 See Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – Separate Opinion, supra note 6, on paragraph 56. See also Opinion of 
the Committee on Development; suggestion number 6. Report on the Future European International 
Investment Policy dated 22 March 2011 – European Parliament Website 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2011-
0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (Last visit 28/04/2011). 
10
 See Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/5) September 23, 2003 – Final Award, paragraph 124. 
11
 See Siemens v. Argentina (2004), supra note 5, paragraph 57. 
12
 Ibid., paragraph 139. 
13
 See Azurix v. Argentina (2006), supra note 7, paragraph 56. See also Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006), supra 
note 6.  
14
 See TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. La Republica Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5) December 
19, 2008 – Final Award, paragraph 70. 
15
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules) December 2006 – Separate Opinion, on paragraph 13. See also Azurix v. Argentina (2006), supra note 
7, paragraph 391. 
16
 Waste Management, Inc v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3) April 30, 2004 – 
Final Award, paragraph 92. 
17
 See Azurix v. Argentina (2006), supra note 7, paragraph 311. 
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part in elections;
18
 (xi) the state’s forced consent to arbitrate.19 These various factors 
therefore serve to illustrate from where the concerns have derived, and these factors are 
by no means exhaustive. 
 
Some actions have been taken recently by diverse sectors (mostly by states) to mitigate 
and prevent the negative effect which the current investor-state arbitration system has 
upon the interests of a host state at the national and international level. Examples of 
these actions which have been taken to mitigate the detrimental effects arising out of 
this arbitration system are as follows: 
 
b. State measures against the investor-state arbitration system 
 
The treaty-based investor-state arbitration system is currently under the legal and 
political scrutiny of some contracting states, particularly host states. A significant 
number of these host states have already taken actions or measures either to review the 
terms and conditions of their current BITs or to denounce or terminate them. Examples 
of these various state measures taken against investor-state treaty arbitration are as 
follows: 
 
Ecuador:
20
 The government of Ecuador decided: (i) to withdraw from the 
ICSID Convention,
21
 and (ii) to request from the approval of the National 
Assembly to terminate some BITs as they were ‘unconstitutional’.22 The 
Ecuadorean Constitutional Court found that the provisions of the Ecuador-USA 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., paragraph 311. 
19
 In this case, Costa Rica was forced to accept arbitration, otherwise it would not receive funds from an 
International Organization. See Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica 
(ICSID No. ARB/96/1) February 17, 2000 – Final Award. 
20
 Organization of American States – Foreign Trade Information System – UTRS Reports (Ecuador) < 
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/USA/USTR_Reports/2011/NTE/ECU_e.pdf > (Last visit 05/06/2011). 
21
 Ibid.,   the decision was notified to the World Bank in July 6, 2009 and became effective on January 7, 2010.  
22
 Ibid., See also H. Rondon de Sanso, Aspectos Jurídicos Fundamentales del Arbitraje Internacional de 
Inversión (Editorial Ex libris, Caracas, 2010), on page xii. 
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BIT were in conflict with Article 422 of the national constitution 2008,
23
 which 
establishes the principle of supremacy, thus the provisions of the BIT were 
considered to be ‘unconstitutional’.24 Finally, the Ecuadorean National 
Assembly authorized the Executive to terminate some of the BITs.
25
 
 
Bolivia: On May 2, 2007, the Bolivian government decided to withdraw from 
the ICSID Convention. This decision was based on the following ideas: (i) the 
argued bias on the part of ICSID tribunals in favour of foreign investors; (ii) the 
alleged antidemocratic nature of ICSID tribunals due to their closed-door policy 
and the non-appealable nature of their decisions; (iii) the concern about the high 
costs of ICSID facilities; (iv) the huge amounts of compensation awarded by 
ICSID tribunals in favour of foreign investors; (v) the criticized role of ICSID 
in trying to be both judge and jury in the same case; and (vi) the alleged 
violation of Article 135
26
 (i.e., violation of the principle of submission to 
Bolivian law) of the Bolivian National Constitution.
 27
  
 
                                                 
23
 Article 422 is part of the Title IX (Supremacy of the Constitution), Chapter First (Principles) of the 
Ecuadorian Constitution and states that ‘The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and prevails over any 
other legal regulatory framework. The standards and acts of public power must be upheld in conformity with 
the provisions of the Constitution; otherwise, they shall not be legally binding. 
The Constitution and international human rights treaties ratified by the State that recognize rights that are more 
favourable than those enshrined in the Constitution shall prevail over any other legal regulatory system or 
action by a public power.’ (Translated into English by the Author). 
24
 On November 24, 2010, the Constitutional Court ruled that Article 422 of the Constitution limits the State to 
cede its sovereign jurisdiction through by concluding BITs. Organization of American States – Foreign Trade 
Information System – UTRS Reports (Ecuador) < 
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/USA/USTR_Reports/2011/NTE/ECU_e.pdf > (Last visit 05/06/2011). 
25
 See, e.g., the Ecuador-Honduras BIT; the Ecuador-Dominican Republic; the Ecuador-Guatemala BIT; and, 
the Ecuador-Nicaragua BIT. Source: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores –Republica del Ecuador –Sistema de 
Tratados <http://web.mmrree.gob.ec/sitrac/Consultas/Busqueda.aspx> (Last visit 05/06/2011). 
26
 Article 135 of the 1967 Bolivian Constitution concluded that: ‘All companies established for operations, 
development or businesses within the country shall be considered as national and shall be subject to the 
sovereignty, laws and authorities of the Republic’. (Translated into English by the Author). This Constitution 
was derogated by the Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia of 2009. 
27
 Bolivia Decide Salir del CIADI – Alliance for Responsible Trade < http://www.art-us.org/content/bolivia-
decide-salir-del-ciadi> (Last visit 05/06/2011). 
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South Africa:
28
 The South African government prepared a report that contains 
its official position relating to its current BIT policy. Throughout this report, the 
government stated that: (i) North-South negotiations were undertaken in order 
to favour developed countries’ interests along with the interests of large, 
politically influential corporations; (ii) the imposition of damaging binding 
investment rules may affect the country’s development; (iii) the failure to 
encourage or enhance the country’s development under the application of those 
binding investment rules; (iv) the rights created by BITs which entitle foreign 
investors to seek compensation from a host state when a new regulatory 
measure is adopted by the latter, even if the adoption of the measure is done in 
the benefit of the public interest; and (v) the prevailing necessity of reviewing 
and scrutinizing BIT provisions in order to guarantee the country’s interest and 
to ensure the free implementation of legitimate social and economic priorities.  
 
Venezuela:
29
 The Venezuelan government announced its intention to withdraw 
from the ICSID Convention. This decision was officially formalized on 25
th
 
January 2012.
30
 Previously, the National Assembly had appealed to the 
Executive to do so on 2
nd
 February 2008.
31
 At this time, the government had 
also considered, in accordance with Article 25 of the Convention, the option of 
excluding from the jurisdiction of the ICSID Convention some sensitive 
national matters such as the review of the regulatory conduct of the state.  
 
                                                 
28
 See Republic of South Africa’s Government Position Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy 
Framework Review – June 2009 <http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-lateral_policy.pdf> (Last visit 03/10/2009). 
29
 See Rondon de Sanso, supra note 22. 
30
 Comunicado Oficial del 25/01/2012 titulado ‘Gobierno Bolivariano denuncia convenio con CIADI’. 
Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Exteriores, República Bolivariana de Venezuela Venezuela 
<http://www.mre.gov.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18939:mppre&catid=3:comunica
dos&Itemid=108 (Last visit 26/01/2012). 
31
 Acuerdo de la Asamblea Nacional sobre la Campaña de la Transnacional Exxon Mobil contra Petróleos de 
Venezuela, S.A. de fecha 02 de Febrero de 2008; publicado en la Gaceta Oficial de la Republica Bolivariana de 
Venezuela No. 38.869 de fecha 13 de febrero de 2008. 
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Additionally, Venezuela announced its intention to terminate some BITs, in 
particular the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT.
32
 This last announcement has been 
made due to the legal and political concerns on the abuse of the principle of 
legal personality by some foreign companies. Within this context, these 
concerns have been founded on the ‘strategic’ registration of foreign investors 
as Dutch companies in order to subsequently gain access to and protection from 
the BIT provisions.
33
  
 
Lastly, Venezuela has also been evaluating the possibility of amending the 
existing Venezuelan investment law or promulgating a new one in order to 
encourage economic national development. That is to say the promulgation of a 
new investment law which promotes foreign investments rather than only 
protecting them. 
 
Argentina: Between 2007 and 2010, the Republic of Argentina questioned the 
content of three arbitral awards given by ICSID tribunals.
34
 These cases 
concerned the Argentina-France BIT and the Argentina-USA BIT, 
respectively.
35
  
 
Argentina requested the annulment of these arbitral awards based mainly on the 
following arguments: (i) the tribunal was not constituted properly; (ii) the 
                                                 
32
 This BIT was denounced by Venezuela on 30 April 2008. 
33
 Venezuela denuncia tratado de Inversiones con Holanda – El Universal Website 
<http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/05/01/eco_art_venezuela-denuncia-t_01A1549161.shtml> (Last visit 
25/02/2011). 
34
 The first case was Compañía de Aguas de Aconquija, S.A. et al v Argentine Republic (ICSID No. 
ARB/97/3) August 10, 2007 – a decision on the Argentinean Republic’s request for annulment of the award 
which was delivered on 20 August 2007; the second case was Sempra Energy International v Argentine 
Republic (ICSID No. ARB/02/16), June 29, 2010 – a decision on the Argentinean Republic’s application for 
the annulment of the award; and the third case was Enron Creditors Recovery Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP 
v the Argentine Republic (ICSID No. ARB/01/3), July 2010, 30 – a decision on the application for annulment 
made by the Argentinean Republic.  
35
 The first case concerned the Argentina-France BIT, the other two cases related to the the Argentina-USA 
BIT.  
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tribunal stepped beyond its remit by not considering the applicable law; (iii) the 
tribunal did not deliver decisions with well-explained reasoning; (iv) the 
amount of compensation was wrongly calculated; (v) the lack of legitimacy 
surrounding one of the arbitrators; and (vi) the disregard concerning the argued 
state of necessity of Argentina caused by the financial crisis during the 90s.  
 
Ultimately, these three requests for annulment were acknowledged, processed 
and decided by ad hoc committees in which two out of three requests were 
decided in favour of Argentina and consequently annulled.
36
 
 
United States of America:
37
 On May 14, 2009, the Committee on Ways and 
Means of the U.S. Congress discussed some political concerns regarding the 
future IIT programme and the public interest of the country, in particular the 
legal effects derived from the investment obligations of the NAFTA. During the 
1
st
 Session of the 111th Congress House Hearing, the following points were 
highlighted: (i) the requirement of more regulatory and policy space; (ii) the 
revision of investment protections which have been drafted too broadly; (iii) the 
granting of equivalent rights to national and foreign investors; (iv) the exclusive 
jurisdiction of national courts to resolve foreign investment matters; (v) the now 
limited access to ISTA; and (vi) the misuse of the investor-state arbitration 
mechanism to challenge legitimate measures taken in the public-interest.
38
 
 
                                                 
36
 The first case was rejected by the arbitral tribunal and the other two cases were decided in favour of 
Argentina.  
37
 U.S. House of Representatives, 111
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Session, Transcript, Hearing on Investment Protections 
in U.S. Trade and Investment Agreements, May 14, 2009, Serial 111-20 <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:53473.wais> (Last visit 26/06/2011). 
38
 See Alvarez, J. E., Chapter Five: The Once and Future International Investment Regime, ITA Academic 
Council, Malibu, January 15-16, 2011, on page 1. 
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Australia:
39
 The Australian government decided to review its international 
trade policy in order to increase its national prosperity and sustainability by ‘the 
inclusion of reasonable labour and environmental standards in trade 
agreements’. For this reason, the government decided: (i) to ‘no longer pursue 
investor-state arbitration provisions in future economic agreements with 
developing countries’; and (ii) not to negotiate BITs that ‘confer [through 
investor-state dispute resolution provisions] [greater] legal rights on foreign 
businesses than those available to domestic businesses’.40  
 
Indeed, the current legal and political concerns surrounding the treaty-based 
investor/state arbitration practice do not exclusively arise from national states. 
Concerns are also expressed by various multilateral organizations such as the European 
Parliament, UNCTAD and OPEC. Examples of these concerns at the international level 
are further described in the following sub-section. 
 
c. International concerns regarding the investor-state arbitration 
system  
 
International organizations like states have also started to express their points of view, 
which are similar to the state’s legal and political concerns, regarding the current 
practice of treaty-based investor/state arbitration and the international investment law 
implications on the progressive economic development of the world. The following 
organizations have articulated their concerns under the following premises: 
 
                                                 
39
 Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – Australian 
Government < http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.pdf > 
(Last visit 05/06/2011). 
40
 In policy switch, Australia disavows need for investor-state arbitration provisions in trade and investment 
agreements – Investment Arbitration Reporter < http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110414 > (Last visit 
10/05/2011). 
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European Parliament (EP):
41
 On March 22, 2011, the Committee on 
International Trade of the European Parliament published a report on the future 
European international investment policy.  
 
This report draws attention to the following matters: (i) the conclusion of more 
than 1,200 BITs between EU member states and third states; (ii) the 
inconvenience of relying on a wide definition of ‘direct foreign investment’; 
(iii) the problems and different interpretations caused by the vague language 
used in BITs, in particular, leading to the possible conflict between private 
interests and the regulatory tasks of public authorities; (iv) the political concern 
about considering the acceptance of legislative acts as a potential violation of 
the principle of ‘fair and equitable treatment’; (v) the necessity of defining a 
European investment policy which meets the expectations of both the investors 
and host states; (vi) the importance of not only protecting investors, but also 
guaranteeing the protection of the state’s right to exercise its regulatory power 
through its public authorities in accordance with its policy coherence for 
development; and (vii) the need to draft a non-mandatory guideline to be used 
by the member states as a BIT model to enhance certainly and consistency.  
 
The committee also considered it necessary to define in a clear manner the 
investments to be protected as well as to clearly formulate the definition of each 
of the minimum standards of treatment, e.g., national treatment, most-favoured-
nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment.  
 
                                                 
41
 Report on the Future European International Investment Policy dated 22 March 2011 – European 
Parliament Website <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2011-0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (Last visit 28/04/2011). 
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The Committee further expressed its deep concern over ‘the level of discretion 
of international arbitrators to make a broad interpretation of investor 
protection clauses, thereby leading to the ruling out of legitimate public 
regulations’. (Emphasis added).  
 
The Committee also suggested the incorporation of a clause into a BIT that 
impedes EU member states from adjusting their social and environmental 
legislation in order to attract investment.  
 
Finally, the Committee considered that the current mechanisms to settle 
disputes (including investment arbitration) should be deeply reviewed in order 
to guarantee a higher level of transparency. It was also stated that this revision 
should also include the review and/or the amendment of the ICSID Convention 
and UNCITRAL rules, respectively. 
 
One last point of interest regarding the content of this document is found in the 
suggestions made by the Committee on Development to the Committee on 
International Trade. The suggestion is listed at number 4 of the list and states 
that ‘fairness in investment agreements entails allowing developing countries to 
discriminate between different investments on the basis of their contribution to 
development objectives’.42 (Emphasis added). 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): On 
May 2010, the UNCTAD published a report entitled ‘Investor-State Disputes: 
                                                 
42
 See, e.g., suggestion number 4, on page 14 of Report on the Future European International Investment 
Policy dated 22 March 2011 – European Parliament Website 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2011-
0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (Last visit 28/04/2011). 
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Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration’.43 Throughout this report, the 
UNCTAD highlighted the following concerns regarding investor-state 
arbitrations: (i) the increase of the already high costs of investor-state arbitration 
in recent years (including the higher amounts of compensation to be paid by the 
host state in addition to the high costs of arbitration proceedings); (ii) the 
‘significant increase in the average time frame for claims to be settled by a final 
award and executed subsequently’ (including the dilatory procedural strategies 
used by the parties such as separating jurisdiction from merits); (iii) the 
difficulty of managing investor-state disputes and the substantial loss of control 
over the procedure by the contracting parties of a BIT; (iv) the often hostile 
relationship between the investor and the state after the conclusion of the 
arbitral award; (v) the state fears ‘about frivolous and vexatious claims that 
could inhibit legitimate regulatory action by governments’; (vi) the crisis of 
legitimacy surrounding the treaty-based investor-state arbitration system (due to 
the conflicting arbitral awards and to the evaluation of the host state’s 
regulatory conduct); and (vii) the investor-state arbitration’s heavy emphasis on 
the payment of compensation as a unique solution to the dispute, whilst other 
possibilities for a solution between to the parties, such as reaching 
compensatory agreements, are left aside.  
 
Finally, the report concluded that ‘the current international investment law 
community finds itself at a crossroads concerning the use of appropriate 
methods to the resolution of international investment disputes’.44 
 
                                                 
43
 Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration – UNCTAD Series on International 
Investment Policies for Development – UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 2010 < 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf > (Last visit 12/04/2011). 
44
 For more documents published by the UNCTAD in this regard, the author recommends to visit 
<http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2340&lang=1>. 
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): As part of the 
implementation of the new Venezuelan oil policy, the Venezuelan government 
decided to ‘renationalize’ its oil industry.45 In achieving its aim, in 2005 the 
government initiated an amicable process with all international oil companies 
(IOCs) investing in the Venezuelan territory to renegotiate their petroleum 
agreements and subsequently transfer them to the new business scheme 
established within the new Oil Law (2001), i.e., the scheme of mixed companies 
(joint ventures with a majority participation of the state).  
 
However, during this transferral process, two IOCs did not accept the terms and 
conditions proposed by the government and therefore the government decided 
to expropriate their assets that were in the country.  
 
As a consequence of not reaching a mutual agreement on the amount of 
compensation for their assets within the country, the two IOCs decided to take 
legal actions against Venezuela through treaty-based investment arbitrations 
and contractually-based commercial arbitrations, before the ICSID and ICC, 
respectively.  
 
Before requesting a commercial arbitration, one of the IOCs decided to request 
more than four ex parte preventive measures – in various jurisdictions 
simultaneously – against the Venezuelan National Oil Company (PDVSA) for a 
total amount of approximately US$ 12,000,000,000.00.  
 
                                                 
45
 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see H. Rondón de Sanso, El Régimen Jurídico de los Hidrocarburos – 
El Impacto del Petróleo en Venezuela (First Edition, Epsilon Libros, Venezuela 2008). See also P. D. 
Cameron, International Energy Investment Law –The Pursuit of Stability (Oxford University Press, UK, 
2010). 
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As a government reaction to the disproportionate legal actions requested by this 
IOC against Venezuela’s interests, the Venezuelan government decided to take 
its concern to the OPEC Conference.  
 
Consequently, on March 5, 2008, the OPEC Conference published a press 
release through which Venezuela’s concern regarding international arbitration 
was addressed.
46
 The Conference (i) expressed its unanimous support of 
Venezuela and acknowledged its sovereign right over its natural resources; and 
(ii) ‘called for resolving [investor/state arbitration] through good faith and 
amicable negotiations’.  
 
This later submission was formulated with an additional suggestion by the 
conference to partake in investor/state arbitration. The suggestion was limited to 
highlighting that investor/state arbitration should be solved through the 
amicable negotiations, but ‘excluding ex parte pre-judgement measures which 
will make finding fair solutions more difficult’. (Emphasis added).  
 
To sum up, it can be stated that legal and political concerns regarding the current 
investor/state arbitration practice have transcended the frontiers of national states and 
international organizations to invade the sphere of academia. It is true to state that 
various academics have jointly expressed their views regarding this arbitral matter. 
This point is explained in the following sub-section which addresses what constitutes 
the first academic expression on this topic. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Press Release No 4/2008 – 148
th
 Meeting of the OPEC Conference, Vienna – Austria – OPEC Website 
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/961.htm> (Last visit 02/10/2010). 
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d. Academic concerns regarding the investor-state arbitration system  
 
On August 31, 2010, an academic concern was jointly expressed through the 
publication of the article entitled ‘Public Statement on the International Investment 
Regime’.47 The concern articulated in this publication on the current international 
investment system was shared by a significant group of scholars.
48
  
 
A declaration of the concern surrounding this arbitral system was first made by the 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada as it drew attention to 
the ‘harm done to the public welfare by the international investment regime’ and ‘[the] 
hampering of the ability of government to act for their people’. It can be stated that this 
                                                 
47
 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime dated August 31, 2010 – Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University (Toronto, Canada) – York University Website < 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/ > (Last visit 26/11/2010). 
48
 Gus Van Harten – Associate Professor of Law (Osgoode Hall Law School – York University); David 
Schneiderman – Professor of Law and Political Sciences (University of Toronto); Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah – Professor of Law (National University of Singapore); Peter Muchlinski – Professor of Law 
(University of London (SOAS)); Sol Picciotto – Emeritous Professor of Law (Lancaster University); Craig 
Scott – Professor of Law (Osgoode Hall Law School – York University); Kyla Tienhaara – Research Fellow in 
Environmental Governability (Australian National University); Obiora Okafor - Professor of Law (Osgoode 
Hall Law School – York University); Stepan Wood - Professor of Law (Osgoode Hall Law School – York 
University); Amanda Perry-Kessaris - Professor of Law (University of London (SOAS)); Kevin Gallagher - 
Associate Professor of International Relations (Boston University); Margot Salomon - Tenured Professor of 
Law (London School of Economics); A. Claire Cutler - Professor of International Law and International 
Relations (University of Victoria); Martin Loughlin - Professor of Public Law (London School of Economics); 
Barnali Choudhury - Associate Professor of Law (McGill University); Saskia Sassen - Professor of Sociology 
(Columbia University); Jennifer Clapp - Professor of Environmental Studies (University of Waterloo); Tom 
Faunce - Associate Professor of Law (Australian National University); Peter Drahos - Professor of Law 
(Australian National University); Peter Newell - Professor of International Development (University of East 
Anglia); Sheldon Leader - Professor of Law (University of Essex); Anne Orford - Professor of International 
Law (University of Melbourne); Julio Faundez - Professor of Law (University of Warwick); Paddy Ireland - 
Professor of Law (University of Kent); Emma Aisbett - Research Fellow in Economics (Australian National 
University), Jonathan Klaaren - Professor of Law (University of the Witwatersrand); James Gathii - Professor 
of International Commercial Law (Albany Law School); Ken Shalden - Associate Professor of Development 
Studies (London School of Economics); John Braithwaite - Federation Fellow in Regulation Institutions. 
(Australian National University); Harry Arthurs - Professor of Law (Osgoode Hall Law School); Stephen 
Clarkson - Professor of Political Sciences (University of Toronto); Ruth Buchanan - Associate Professor of 
Law (Osgoode Hall Law School); Martti Koskenniemi - Professor of International Law (University of 
Helsinki); Nico Krisch - Professor of International Law (Hertie School of Governance), Markus Krajewski - 
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document represents the first open academic expression against the current 
investor/state arbitration practice.
49
  
 
This academic declaration was headed by a list of general principles relating to the 
international investment regime in general. These principles are summarized as 
follows: (i) the promotion of public welfare; (ii) the access to an open and independent 
judicial system for the resolution of disputes; (iii) the governments’ responsibility to 
encourage the beneficial impacts of foreign investments whilst limiting the harmful 
effects of it; and (iv) the right of the state to regulate on behalf of the public welfare.  
 
Subsequently, the article also identifies some of the current problems with the 
international investment practice, such as (i) the overly expansive interpretations by 
international arbitrators of provisions contained in investment treaties, through their 
arbitral awards; (ii) the overriding interests of foreign investors over the right of the 
state to regulate on behalf of the public welfare; and (iii) the serious effect that some 
arbitral awards may have upon democratic choice and the capacity of governments to 
act in the public interest. 
 
Based on these three main criticisms of the current arbitral practice, it was suggested 
that: (i) municipal law should be the primary legal framework for the regulation of 
investor/state relations; (ii) investment treaty arbitration appears not to be a fair, 
independent and balanced method for the resolution of investment disputes; (iii) the 
possibility of giving society active participation in the process of taking decisions that 
affects its rights and interests should be considered; (iv) the idea of opting for the 
conclusion of investment contracts rather than investment treaties due to the possibility 
                                                 
49
 It has also been said that ‘[i]n some cases arbitral tribunals have gone too far one way, with the result that 
states have begun to step in and cut back on certain rights intended to protect investors’. See A. Sheppard,  and 
M. Hunter, Introduction: An Overview of the Relationship Between Courts and Investment Treaty Arbitration 
in Ortino, Sheppard and Warner, supra note 4, on page 165. 
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of the former to incorporate domestic law into the regulation of its investor/state 
relationship; (v) the idea of concluding investment contracts in accordance with the 
principles of public accountability and openness as well as the guarantee of preserving 
the rights of the state to regulate in good faith and for a legitimate purpose; (vi) the 
creation of a fair and balanced mechanism in the investment contract that allows the 
parties to renegotiate the interests at stake; and (vii) the problem of concluding 
multilateral investment agreements due to their lack of fairness, balance, basic 
requirements of openness and judicial independence.  
 
The group of scholars conclude by recommending that (i) states should review their 
BITs in order to withdraw from or renegotiate them to replace or reduce the use of 
investor/state arbitration; (ii) states should strengthen their domestic justice system; 
and (iii) international organizations and the international business community should 
refrain from promoting the international investment regime due to the serious risk that 
this regime poses to governments’ national interests.     
 
Finally, it can be asserted that this public statement draws attention to the increasing 
concern (from some developing countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Argentina) related to the interpretation of investment treaties made largely in favour of 
investors. It was emphasized that the current investment arbitral practice is significantly 
prioritizing the protection of investors’ properties and economic interests over the right 
of the state to regulate to protect its national welfare. It is therefore of importance to 
refer to the theory which suggests that this investment arbitral practice is affecting the 
balance between investors’ interests and public regulation in international law. 
Consequently, it can be affirmed that this unbalanced relationship between the state and 
investors seems also to be generating a conflict of interests and subsequently has a 
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negative effect on the legitimacy of the current international investment arbitration 
system. This latter concern is the main discussion in the next upcoming sub-section 
where this last point is developed. 
 
e. Seeking a balanced relationship between state regulatory power and 
investment protection  
 
Under the current international investment arbitration system, it has been established 
that foreign investors are initially at a legal disadvantage
50
 in comparison to the 
unilateral powers of the host state (e.g., exorbitant powers).
51
  
 
The main argument has been that these unilateral powers not only embrace the state’s 
ability to take legal measures towards the protection and promotion of its domestic 
economy and development, but these unilateral powers also have an unintentional 
effect of protecting the status quo of foreign investors’ interests. For example, it is has 
been said that this effect has created a kind of an ambivalent picture about the roles of 
the state regarding foreign investment since it wishes to attract investment but, on the 
other hand, it needs to control and regulate investments.
52
 
 
Furthermore, it has also been argued that this disadvantage has created an unequal legal 
relationship between investors and states at the international and national levels. In 
other words, the state has appeared as a powerful party in a BIT relationship rather than 
as a sovereign state empowered to adopt measures to protect and promote not only 
national investors’ interests, but also those of foreign investors. Therefore, it has been 
                                                 
50
 It has been stated that ‘the whole purpose and raison d’etre of international investment law is to provide 
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51
 See Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – Separate Opinion, supra note 15, on paragraph 104. See also T. W. 
Wälde, “Equality of Arms” in Investment Arbitration: Procedural Challenges in Arbitration Under 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), on 
page 162. 
52
 See Sheppard and Hunter, supra note 49, on page 165; and M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign 
Investment (Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, UK 2004), on page 101. 
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considered that foreign investors are individuals legally weak in front of the legal 
apparatus of the state.
53
  
 
Obviously, this opinion derives from the clash between the interests of the capital-
exporting states (e.g., developed countries) and the interests of the capital-importing 
states (e.g., developing countries) as well as from the adoption of economic measures 
by each of these global economic players on grounds of protecting their own economic 
interests.
54
 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that studies such as the present research 
can help to provide a mechanism to establish a framework of predictability and stability 
between states and investors.
55
 
 
In addition, another concern that has arisen is related to the concept of ‘interest’ or of 
‘common interest’ which seems to require more attention within the expanding 
international investment arbitration system due to the fact that its legal implications are 
currently vague at the international level and therefore, are ‘very slow to appear’.56  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that it has been pointed out that a BIT must 
not be interpreted in favour of or against investors.
57
 Conversely, it has been stated that 
‘[a] BIT itself [has to be interpreted as] an instrument agreed [by two contracting 
sovereign states] to encourage and protect investment’.58 That is to say, the contracting 
states are in equal positions in relation to each other, whereas the host state and foreign 
investors are not in equal positions in relation to each other under international or 
national law (see Chapter III). 
                                                 
53
 See Azurix v. Argentina (2006), supra note 7, paragraphs 311-313. See Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006) – 
Separate Opinion, supra note 15, paragraph 86. 
54
 See Sornarajah, supra note 52, on pages 5 and 35; and Sornarajah, supra note 2. 
55
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page 6. 
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 See Azurix v. Argentina (2006), supra note 7, paragraph 307.  
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 Ibid. 
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Within this context, it has been asserted that the private investor has been granted the 
opportunity to be temporarily in an equal position through the possibility of requesting 
a private right of action against sovereign states at the international level.
59
 This action 
has been qualified as the unilateral action of the foreign investor.
60
 This temporary right 
is created through the consent of the states to incorporate a clause, within a BIT’s 
provisions, to arbitrate public-law matters or regulatory issues arising from a violation 
of the BIT’s provisions, in particular the violation of the FET standard. 
 
Despite the difficulty of assessing the impact of the interaction between the forces of 
capital-exporting and capital importing states and their different sets of norms relating 
to investment protection, the encouragement and protection of investments sought by a 
given BIT implies – without doubt – the interplay of a wide range of economic, 
political and historical factors which have been shaping the development of 
international investment law.
61
 In simple terms, it has been the inevitable interaction 
between states and investors that has given rise to the existence of this new system of 
international investment arbitration.
62
 Therefore, this interaction should be considered a 
two-way relationship rather than a one-way relationship so that both players are part of 
the growing global solidarity.
63
 If this suggestion of considering some domestic 
administrative law principles when dealing with international regulatory disputes is 
implemented, the alleged legitimacy crisis
64
 of the current international investment 
                                                 
59
 See A. G. Adaralegbe, Concurrent Jurisdiction Between Treaty and Domestic Tribunals: An Examination of 
Jurisdiction-Regulating Mechanisms Within the Investor-State Treaty Arbitration System and Their 
Effectiveness (CEPMLP, University of Dundee, PhD Thesis, 2009), on page 154. 
60
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 Ibid., on page 5. 
62
 R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (1987), 33; quoted by Sornarajah, supra note 52, 
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63
 See Reuter, supra note 56, on page 3. 
64
 See B. Kingsbury, and S. W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State 
Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality in S. W. Schill, International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, UK 2010), on page 75. 
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arbitration system could be mitigated.
65
 Moreover, it can be considered to be the best 
form of stabilisation between the parties involved (e.g., reaching ‘an equitable deal’).66  
 
In fact, it has been argued that ‘[a] state seeks to balance [its competing functions of 
attracting investment and of controlling it] through its investment laws’.67 One of the 
manners to reach this balance is through creating ‘a nice balance of international 
interests in the protection of investment and the interests of the host state in regulating 
the process having its own benefits on mind.’68 
 
As was mentioned in Chapter V, one of the most difficult tasks for any public law 
lawyer is to determine with clarity the scope of the norms to be applied to international 
regulatory disputes in order to reach the above-mentioned investor-state balance. 
Obtaining this balance will subsequently guarantee the coexistence of international and 
national standards in a way that may be acceptable – in terms of international law – to 
both states and investors. Hence, the main challenge has been identified as the problem 
resulting from the application (separately or jointly) of some principles of international 
and national laws due to the non-static nature of the law that results in constant changes 
in both laws.
69
  
 
It can be suggested that one of the temporary solutions to this unbalanced investor-state 
relationship is the consideration of or reference to some principles of domestic 
(constitutional and administrative) law alongside international law in the current 
international investment arbitration regime (particularly the FET standard when 
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international regulatory disputes are at stake). This practice can be framed within the 
proposal formulated by W. Burke-White and A. Von Staden of considering ‘public law 
standards of review [into] investor-state arbitrations’ as ‘a margin of appreciation’.70 
Similarly, this practice could conceivably help investment arbitrators in their difficult 
tasks of assessing the regulatory conduct of a state at the international level. In 
particular, the fact that unilateral powers of states have not been codified at the 
international level has yet to be taken into account.
71
 Furthermore, it can be stated that 
the fact that administrative law rights have been currently included within the definition 
of foreign investment demonstrates the growing importance of administrative law 
within the expanding international investment arbitration system as an international 
mechanism to protect the subjective rights of the private individuals involved. 
 
This observation demonstrates the importance of international arbitrators to consider 
domestic law principles when carrying out the difficult task of assessing the regulatory 
control of a state over foreign investments. However, this practice implies the arbitral 
exercise of considering the regulatory conduct of the state in accordance with standards 
and principles that have not been fully developed yet. Nevertheless, this exercise at 
least provides a worldwide feeling that the rights and legal traditions of the states are 
being considered which can consequently serve to strike a fair balance between states 
and investors. Achieving this fair balance can also help alleviate the criticism 
concerning the legitimacy of the international investment arbitration system. 
 
In summary, it has been asserted that IITs ‘are an agreed set of rules that serve to attract 
foreign investment by reducing the space for unprincipled and arbitrary actions of the 
host state and thus contributing to good governance, which is a necessary condition for 
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 See Burke-White and Von Staden, supra note 67, on page 720. 
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 Mobil Corporation et al v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case ARB/07/27) June 10, 2010 – 
Decision on Jurisdiction. 
 348 
the achievement of economic progress in the host state.’72 Based on this idea, along 
with the lack of a set of guidelines to address the unilateral power of the state at the 
international level and the unbalanced relationship between states and investors 
interests,
73
 the following sub-section generally summarizes the main aim of this 
research. 
 
f. Principles of Administrative law  
 
It has been acknowledged by the UNCTAD that ‘international arbitration, alongside the 
resort to national courts of the host State, has been the most commonly used method for 
the settlement of international investment disputes’.74 (Emphasis added). This statement 
is supported by the fact that investor-state treaty arbitration cases amounted to 390 
cases by the end of 2010 which involved 83 different governments from both 
developed and developing countries.
75
  
 
This number of cases serves to reflect the indubitable importance of investor-state 
treaty arbitration within the (national and international) public law sphere due to the 
considerable evaluation and assessment of the domestic regulatory conduct of a host 
state to settle a certain international legal dispute transparently. This is particularly so 
when it has been emphasized that domestic law principles must be examined to 
determine whether a host state’s conduct has respected the obligations imposed by an 
IIT in particular in accordance with the provision containing the FET standard.
76
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A further issue of importance which ought to be emphasized is the increasing tendency 
of incorporating administrative law rights within the definition of foreign investment. It 
has been stated that this inclusion ‘greatly restricts the right of the state to exercise 
regulatory control over the foreign investment.’77 
 
The frequent use of these arbitral tribunals, along with the sovereign will of the 
contracting states to incorporate administrative law rights within the definition of 
investment in a certain BIT (to resolve any regulatory controversy between one of the 
contracting states and a national of the other contracting states), demonstrates the 
awareness on the part of these contracting states in creating a kind of temporary 
‘supranational tribunal’ to deal with matters of public law and policy and regulatory 
issues.  
 
It is true that the traditional concern in the public law and policy arena is that the 
practice of applying and interpreting the provisions of domestic administrative law, as 
already mentioned before, was an exclusive task of national courts and jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, the concurrent jurisdiction
78
  which exists between these two legal 
mechanisms to deal with regulatory disputes demonstrates and confirms the importance 
of dealing with public law matters at two different (parallel) levels (e.g., national and 
international).  
 
These two different (parallel) levels of resolving public-law disputes (particularly 
regulatory disputes) require the consideration of traditional sources of law including 
municipal and international laws. This need is more pressing due to the fact that under 
both of the most important administrative law systems (e.g., British and French) there 
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are analogous mechanisms to resolve private individual claims against their public 
administrations which have existed for more than seventy five years (see Chapter II). 
Particular consideration should be given to the French system, as there is a special 
jurisdiction which is known as administrative-contentious jurisdiction. This distinct 
jurisdiction was created with the objective of providing private individuals with a 
special forum to challenge the rights and prerogatives of their public administrations.  
 
Additionally, it is significant to emphasize, that under these analogous mechanisms, 
there is an established set of principles of (administrative) law which have been 
developed for over seventy five years. These principles have also been a frequent point 
of reference for domestic jurists to resolve this kind of regulatory individual-state 
controversy. This latter submission acquires more importance in the investment world 
if the way in which arbitral tribunals interpret and apply domestic law principles when 
considering the FET standard is taken into consideration.  
 
One of the problematic issues with the current investment arbitral practice and these 
two parallel levels of judging regulatory issues is the very restricted manner (known as 
the strict ‘no other means available’ approach79) in which the different sources of law 
(jointly or separately) are considered, when these sources should be considered to be 
all-in-one source of wisdom for any jurist. More precisely, it is true that there is a 
restricted approach in the consideration of these different sources of law, but it is also 
true that neither national nor international laws prohibit any administrator of justice 
from resorting jointly to those municipal or international mechanisms or sources of law 
which can expedite the administration of justice when dealing with regulatory disputes. 
 
                                                 
79
 See Burke-White and Von Staden, supra note 67, on page 695. 
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Thus, the present research proposes that international arbitrators particularly when 
dealing with regulatory disputes should resort or make reference to one of the sources 
of law, such as the principles of domestic (administrative) law, in a manner which 
imparts justice in a fair, transparent and equitable manner. The main objective of this 
proposal can be found in the following sub-section which basically summarizes the 
issues raised throughout this thesis. 
 
i. Principles of domestic administrative law as a source of 
reference for investment arbitrators 
 
Many BITs such as the USA-Argentina BIT
80
 and the USA-Panama BIT include within 
their definition of ‘investment’81 administrative law rights such as licences and permits. 
As already stressed, this inclusion implies the necessity of resorting to administrative 
law principles when resolving a BIT regulatory dispute. This is due to the fact that this 
inclusion seems to restrict the exercise of the sovereign power of the host state over 
foreign investment. Similarly, another group of BITs have included the term 
‘administrative acts’ in the clause related to the arbitration mechanism. An example of 
this is found in article 10 (1) of the Colombia-Spain BIT.
82
  
 
Furthermore, another group of BITs, such as the Colombia-Switzerland BIT and the 
USA-Ecuador BIT, have made a direct reference to national administrative courts to 
settle a treaty dispute, particularly in those cases where the contracting states have 
provided the investor with the option of either resorting to a domestic administrative 
court or resorting to an IIT’s arbitration in the case of a BIT dispute. 
                                                 
80
 This treaty includes within the definition of investment, ‘any right conferred by law or contract, and any 
licenses and permits pursuant to law…’. 
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82
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Additionally, it has been said that ‘[m]any treaties conserve the regulatory regimes of 
the host state by confining the scope of the treaty… to investments “made in 
accordance with the laws, policies and regulations” of the host state.’83 (Emphasis 
added). Examples of such a limitation are found in article 1; of the Bulgaria-China BIT; 
of the China-Bahrain BIT; and the Venezuela-Vietnam BIT. These types of articles 
serve to emphasize that the foreign investment has to follow the required domestic legal 
steps before it can be recognised as a protected foreign investment under a certain 
BIT’s provisions. 
 
Moreover, the majority of BITs refer to the ICSID Convention in order to determine the 
law applicable to an investor-state investment dispute. In this context, article 42 of the 
Convention states that:  
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may 
be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall 
apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules 
on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable. (Emphasis added).  
 
Thus, it is primarily up to the parties to determine the applicable law to the dispute by 
agreement. The Convention here does not classify or discriminate the sources of law. 
Conversely, this task is left to the discretion of international arbitrators as was 
mentioned in Chapter IV. However, as already mentioned, recent practice serves to 
illustrate that arbitral tribunals have taken account of the increasing necessity of relying 
on, or referring to, domestic law principles as a source of legal reference or a legal 
guideline to resolve regulatory issues.
84
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Thus, as highlighted in Chapter IV, the question arises as to whether these legal 
principles can be a useful reference for investment arbitrators when dealing with a 
treaty-based regulatory dispute. Especially, if this practice is considered to be a 
mechanism which may help to minimize the risk of nullity of the resulting award
85
 as 
well as a way of increasing the legitimacy of the investment arbitration system.
86
 It has 
been asserted that ‘the need for public law standards of review is… urgent, as arbitral 
tribunals are transformed into public law, quasi-constitutional adjudicators’.87 
 
Furthermore, it is important to take into account that some investment treatment 
standards have also been considered as relative standards par excellence.
 88
 Examples 
of these standards are fair and equitable treatment, national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment. 
 
A response to the question concerning the usefulness of referring to these domestic law 
principles in regulatory disputes can be found in the proposal formulated by Professor 
T. Wälde in his separate opinion in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v 
The United Mexican States (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2005). It was stated that 
‘[t]he common principles of the principal administrative law systems are… an 
important point of reference for the interpretation of investment treaties to the extent 
[that] investment treaty jurisprudence is not yet firmly established.’89 (Emphasis 
added).  
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Similarly, a more conservative answer to the same question can be inferred from 
certain statements which have been made in the academic arena. In this regard, it was 
expressed through the Public Statement on the International Investment Regime that 
‘municipal law should be the primary legal framework for the regulation of 
investor/state relations’.90 (Emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, as Professor M. Sornarajah stated, the viability of this proposal will 
largely depend on the establishment or, perhaps, acknowledgment of ‘common 
standards of procedural protection against the use of discretionary power of 
administrative bodies [which] may be discernible in trade and investment areas’.91 
 
Finally, it has been stated that ‘[an] arbitral tribunal may indeed have little choice but to 
adopt approaches that are similar to those adopted by domestic courts and other 
international courts and tribunals when faced with comparable [regulatory] conflicts 
between important interests that must all be weighed in the legal appraisal’.92 
 
ii. The use of domestic administrative law principles as a way to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the investor-state arbitration system 
 
During the last five years, legal and political criticisms have not only been expressed 
against the investor-state arbitration system but also against the host state’s power to 
regulate foreign investors/investments.  
 
These criticisms do not only come from various states, but also emanate from 
international organizations and academia, as discussed earlier in this chapter. These 
criticisms are affecting, in a way or another, the legitimacy of this emerging system. 
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These criticisms include the disapproval about ‘the lack of democratic control and 
accountability’ of this system.93  It is of importance to highlight that evidence of this 
legitimacy crisis is found in the constant conflict of interests between private 
individuals and the regulatory power of the state.
94
 At the international level, this 
conflict derives from the diverse natures of some of the investment treatment standards 
such as the FET standard, which play an important role within the area of public law 
and are considered relative standards per excellence.
95
  
 
It could be said that this conflict between private individuals and the regulatory power 
of the state has created theory which suggests that ‘the adoption of legitimate 
legislation [could lead to] a state being condemned by international arbitrators for a 
breach of the principle of “fair and equitable treatment”’.96 On the contrary, the 
adoption of such legislation/law as well as of some regulatory measures should instead 
be considered as acts made for the protection of the national welfare by the state. 
Within this context, the necessity of relying on a new legal investment law framework 
that can be used as mechanism to enhance certainty and coherence has been stressed.
97
 
 
Further evidence of this legitimacy crisis is found in the recent withdrawal of some 
Latin American countries from the ICSID Convention.
98
 In addition, a more serious 
example can be found in the current tendency of both developing countries and 
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developed countries to review, renegotiate or terminate their BITs (as was explained 
sub-section (b) of this chapter).  
 
Moreover, it is opportune to emphasize that one of the main concerns of host states 
regarding the current international investment system is the aspect related to the 
inclusion of a wider variety of disciplines into BITs which are also critical to their 
development. It has been argued that this inclusion is becoming increasingly complex.
99
 
In particular, this relates to the greater legal rights that are granted to foreign investors 
as compared to those rights given to domestic investors at the international level.
100
  
 
Nevertheless, the principal concern of host states is the preservation of ‘[o]ne of the 
most fundamental elements of state sovereignty [which] is both the right and the duty 
of governments to regulate economic activities and act in the broader public interest’.101 
This preservation is largely guaranteed by referring to those principles of law that have 
given rise to the particular administrative acts, i.e., by referring to the principle of 
domestic administrative law. Moreover, there is an additional element to this type of 
government action which is to ensure that national legitimate interests are not 
compromised.  
 
Consequently, it can be said that the performance of this administrative conduct will 
always be protected by the law of any democratic society and will be reinforced by the 
application of a consolidated and homogenous set of legal principles such as the 
principles of administrative law.  
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Conclusively, it is important to emphasize within the context of this research, the 
statement made by W. Burke-White and A. Von Staden in the article entitled ‘The need 
for public law standards of review in investor-state arbitrations’ which states that ‘any 
move by ICSID tribunals towards a consistent and coherent standard of review 
appropriate for the context of public law disputes… would increase the investor-state 
arbitration system’s overall legitimacy’.102 
 
g. Summary 
 
The investor-state treaty arbitration system has given rise to various political, legal and 
academic concerns. The criticisms made about the system increase every year,  
particularly on issues arising from regulatory disputes in investment arbitration. For 
this reason, it can be asserted that one of the chief reasons for these various concerns 
and criticisms is the assessment of a host state’s regulatory conduct and also the review 
of certain public-law matters by investment arbitrators at the international level.  
 
Additionally, with regard to the current practice of this arbitral system, another 
concerning issue from a legal point, which has been stressed repeatedly, is the existence 
of compromising and apparent international restrictions on the sovereign power of state 
to regulate, as it may violate some standards of international investment law such as 
fair and equitable treatment. Consequently, some states, in response to this apparent 
restriction on their sovereign power, have taken governmental and political actions that 
are affecting the legitimacy of this arbitral system. These actions range from the 
revision of the terms and conditions of BITs, to the consideration of denouncing or 
terminating these international agreements. For example, countries like Ecuador; 
Venezuela; Bolivia; South Africa; and Australia have already taken governmental 
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measures which could be seen as putting the legitimacy of this investment arbitration 
system at risk. Similarly, international organizations such as the European Parliament, 
UNCTAD and OPEC, in addition to a group of academics, have also expressed their 
concerns about this system.  
 
Despite the concerns and questions surrounding this system, there is a common 
intention, within the international arena, to find the right equilibrium between the 
interest of foreign investors and the regulatory power of the host state.  
 
A temporary solution to this current crisis of legitimacy is the consolidation of these 
two groups of interests by allowing reference to be made to some principles of 
domestic (constitutional and administrative) law in the current international investment 
arbitration practice through the application of the FET standard when international 
regulatory disputes are being resolved. It can be affirmed that this exercise can bring a 
certain level of transparency and fairness into the currently criticized dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
 
Adopting this solution becomes more important if it is taken into consideration that 
investment arbitration, apart from national courts, has been the most common 
mechanism used to resolve regulatory disputes between private individuals and states. 
The proposed solution of referring to administrative law principles is one of the most 
prompt cures to the argued lack of legitimacy surrounding the investment arbitration 
system. This practice requires investment arbitrators to rely more on their 
administrative law knowledge. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
a. Summary of the Problem 
  
The problem addressed throughout this research can be summarized as the constant and 
growing use of the investor-state treaty arbitration (ISTA) as a mechanism to judge 
regulatory issues of the host state at the international level without referring sufficiently 
to its domestic (administrative) law principles. This arbitral exercise raises the question 
of which principles of law are being applied or referred to by investment arbitrators 
when they face this kind of regulatory dispute. This question is of crucial importance as 
the regulatory conduct of the host state is, for the most part, carried out in accordance 
with its domestic principles of law. Consequently, it means that the host state has a dual 
role in the public law arena, i.e., as a subject of public (domestic) law when it adopts 
new policy and regulation, and as a subject of public (international) law when it either 
acts at the international level by concluding a treaty or breaches an international 
obligation as a consequence of the domestic regulatory behaviour it adopted as a public 
(domestic) law subject.  
 
The current arbitral practice has demonstrated that investment arbitrators have been 
faced with the dual public law role of a state. The particular problem with this duality 
has been the disappointing application of some domestic (administrative) law principles 
to international regulatory disputes at the international level which are implicit or 
connected to the domestic regulatory performance of the host state.  
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This arbitral approach has caught the political attention of some host states 
(particularly, from developing countries) due to the constant limitation placed on their 
sovereign power to adopt new policy and regulation for considering it to be a potential 
violation of BITs provisions. This attention has also been a result of the arbitral 
interpretation given to their governmental acts in accordance with international 
investment obligations, in particular with the fair and equitable standard of treatment.  
 
This practice of referring to international investment standards is creating a conflict 
between the scope of international investment obligations and the scope of some 
principles of domestic (administrative) law such as the principle of legality; the 
principle of discretionary power of public administration; and the principle of legal 
certainty and legitimate expectations. This conflict relating to the scope of these 
principles, in addition to the dual role that the state, is affecting the current legal status 
and legitimacy of the investor-state treaty arbitration system.  
 
It is due to this legitimacy problem that this research has proposed that reference be 
made to some administrative law principles which have existed within the two most 
important administrative legal systems of the Western world to deal with domestic 
regulatory disputes (i.e., the British administrative legal system as a representative of 
the common law tradition and the French administrative legal system as a 
representative of the civil law tradition). These administrative law principles have 
existed for over seventy-five years as ‘legal references’ to help public law adjudicators 
in their sensitive task of dealing with regulatory disputes.  
 
Thus, account should be taken of the years of experience that these administrative legal 
systems have gained from their domestic jurisdictions through countless long legal 
proceedings which have consequently served to develop the jurisprudence related to 
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regulatory disputes between private individuals and the state (public administration) at 
a national level.  
 
The proposed practice of referring to domestic administrative law principles in 
international regulatory disputes also becomes relevant if the analogous nature between 
ISTA and domestic administrative law institutions is taken into consideration, as well 
as the way in which international investment law and domestic administrative law are 
constructed, i.e., both are constructed on a case law basis. 
 
Finally, it can be asserted that this proposal can act as a temporary solution to the 
legitimacy crisis that the current international investment arbitration system is facing. 
Taking these domestic administrative law principles into consideration could possibly 
even result in achieving a fair and balanced relationship between the host state’s 
regulatory power and international investment protection. 
 
b. Main findings 
 
Throughout this research, the following findings have been highlighted: 
 
o In the British and French domestic administrative legal systems, there are 
mechanisms in place to solve regulatory disputes between private individuals 
and the state (i.e., public administration). For example, with regard to 
administrative review (internal review), there are British Administrative 
tribunals and French Administrative arbitrations; and in relation to judicial 
review (external review), the ordinary jurisdiction in the British system is used 
and the administrative-contentious jurisdiction in the French system is used. 
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Amongst these mechanisms, it can be stated that the treaty-based regulatory 
disputes are analogous to the role of administrative review. One of the 
similarities between treaty-based regulatory dispute and administrative review 
is the lack of self-enforcing power surrounding decisions. In particular, this 
international mechanism is even more similar to the functions and 
responsibilities of the British administrative tribunals and/or of the French 
administrative arbitration. This is partly due to the fact that both the British and 
French institutions exercise quasi-judicial functions, as does the ISTA. In other 
words, all three institutions hear and deal largely with regulatory disputes on a 
court-like basis. 
 
The existence of British administrative tribunals, French administrative 
arbitration and ISTA depend upon the promulgation of a given public law 
instrument. In the case of the British administrative tribunals and French 
administrative arbitration, an act of parliament is required before such 
mechanisms can be used. Similarly, in the case of ISTA, an act of state, i.e., a 
BIT is required before it can be enforced and in some cases, an additional act of 
parliament is also required (i.e., the Assembly or Congress’s approval). This 
latter requirement will depend on whether the contracting states have adopted a 
monist or dualist system.  
 
One of the main differences between these local mechanisms and the investor-
state treaty arbitration mechanism is that the latter is not part of the executive 
power of any country. It is important to mention that even though the arbitration 
mechanism is not part of any country’s executive power, it can be considered –
without a doubt – to be a part of the state apparatus to administer justice, i.e., a 
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part of the state’s administrative justice system. Hence, it can therefore be said 
that these mechanisms have the same main objective, which is to protect private 
individuals against unlawful or arbitrary acts of the government. 
 
On the other hand, the ISTA system is a kind of primary jurisdiction that 
requires a secondary jurisdiction in order to give the chance to parties to appeal 
the arbitral decision if they consider that their rights have not been fully 
guaranteed by the primary arbitral tribunal. That is to say, this latter point 
indicates the need of creating an international appellate body or a De Novo 
review mechanism that guarantees the right of defence of the parties involved. 
The creation of these second level mechanisms can bring more transparency and 
fairness to the current arbitral practice and reinforce the legitimacy of the 
investment arbitration system. Perhaps this can be one of reasons why it has 
been pointed out that there is a need to create an investment appellate body or 
an investment international court.  
 
Arbitral tribunal awards lack self-enforcing power due to the fact that the 
monopoly of coercive power is reserved for the state. This latter feature is also 
similar to the lack of self-enforcement that public administration has when an 
administrative tribunal or administrative arbitration decision needs to be 
enforced. In this situation, both institutions have to go before a local judge in 
order to make their decisions enforceable. 
 
o Due to the lack of a centralized legislative authority at the international level, 
BITs are concluded by sovereign states through their express consent which 
subsequently leads to a restriction on their immunity from jurisdiction. BITs are 
contracts of public interest. Like those local acts of parliament that create the 
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above-mentioned domestic administrative and judicial review mechanisms, 
BITs similarly serve as a state’s act or instrument to create mechanisms, in 
accordance with the intention of both contracting parties, to solve any legal 
dispute that may arise from the violation of a BIT’s provisions.  
 
Within these provisions, the creation of an international right in favour of 
private individuals to sue sovereign states at the international level is found. 
This mechanism is known as ‘investor-state treaty arbitration’. This particular 
mechanism is mainly created with the idea of protecting private individuals 
(particularly foreign investors) from the possible unlawful or arbitrary acts of 
the host state, as well as to guarantee that the host state does not exceed certain 
limits of law or put others in danger.  
 
Nonetheless, despite the fact BITs are contractual agreements (in terms of 
state/state relationship) that are governed by the private law principles of party 
autonomy and pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept); BITs are 
interpreted in accordance with a public law instrument such as the Vienna 
Convention. For this reason, it can be inferred that a BIT protection is granted 
to private individuals as a legal benefit rather than a contractual one. This latter 
point is emphasized due to the fact that BITs, as any public law agreements, are 
also subject to the socio-economic-political changes of both contracting parties. 
The state’s ability to make changes to the BIT in the interest of their national 
welfare is protected by the international principle of rebus sic stantibus (things 
thus standing). Thus, it can be said that this international principle also 
embraces the sovereign ability of the state to adopt new policy and regulation. 
In fact, the main aim of BITs is to materialize the reciprocal intentions of the 
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contracting states in order to promote the economic cooperation for their 
reciprocal benefit. It can be said that the promotion of their economic 
cooperation is to their reciprocal benefit, i.e., the involvement of issues of 
public interest of the contracting states (as part of the BITs’ subject-matter). 
Additionally, the main purpose of BITs is also to address specific needs 
between contracting states (mainly, issues of public interest). 
 
It is due to these various reasons that BITs mostly provide a regulatory 
relationship between one contracting state (the host state) and the national of the 
other contracting state. This regulatory relationship also provides protection to 
foreign investors and their investments against the unlawful or arbitrary conduct 
of the host state. Nonetheless, this particular protection is more of a regulatory 
protection (in terms of investor/state relationship) than a contractual protection 
which is proper for and derived from the state-state BIT relationship. Hence, 
BIT protection is not a contractual protection for foreign investors; on the 
contrary, it is a legal/regulatory protection for foreign investors, that has to exist 
alongside the rest of norms that are part of host state legislation. Therefore, 
foreign investor protection embraces the regulatory submission of foreign 
investors to the BIT’s provisions and to international law provisions which may 
also allow the application of some principles of domestic administrative law 
when the FET standard needs to be taken into consideration in a regulatory 
dispute. This premise acquires a special connotation when a BIT has been 
adopted and incorporated into the legal system of host state (dualism theory).  
 
This regulatory feature of BITs and their provisions do not relinquish the 
prerogative powers of the host state. On the contrary, the host state maintains its 
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freedom to adopt new policy and regulations in accordance with the substantive 
principles of international investment law which aim to minimize the 
discretionary power of contracting states at the moment of adopting these new 
policies and regulations. Evidence of this tendency can be found in the 2012 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty; in the Asean Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA) (2012); in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Draft Investment Chapter (June 2012) and in the Draft Model Norwegian 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (2007) where regulatory areas belonging to the 
state, such as, health; labour; safety; environment; public morals; public order; 
protection of human, animal or plant life; taxes; protection of national treasures 
of artistic, historic and archaeological value; conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources and financial services; are excluded from the scope of application of the 
above-mentioned documents. 
 
Similarly, it should be said that these substantive administrative law principles 
have been conceived to also minimize the investment arbitrator’s discretion in 
assessing the regulatory conduct of any infringing state. This point creates a 
conflict between the dual public-law role of the state within the national and 
international law sphere. In other words, it creates a conflict between the scope 
of national law principles and the scope of international investment law 
principles when dealing with regulatory disputes. However, the detailed 
analysis of this particular point is beyond the scope of this research. 
 
o Investor-state treaty arbitration is a new concept in public international law. 
This mechanism is a mechanism of quasi-judicial effect that has largely been 
used to resolve regulatory issues derived from the interpretation and application 
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of a certain BIT and review of the regulatory conduct of the host state at the 
international level. This mechanism is not a private-law-contract based investor-
state arbitration. On the contrary, it is a public-law-contract based investor-state 
arbitration in relation to which the foreign investor is also subject to its legal 
effects in general. It can be given a public law nature due to the public law 
nature of one the parties, who acts in its public law capacity (i.e., the host state), 
to the public-law nature of the BIT itself which establishes this arbitral 
mechanism: and, to the public law nature of the subject-matter relating to the 
dispute, e.g., the evaluation of the regulatory conduct of the state or of issues of 
public policy. 
 
The fact that the investor-state treaty arbitration clause is created in favour of 
and at the option of the national of the other contracting party does not mean 
that the foreign investor is automatically part of the state-state international 
contractual agreement. Nonetheless, it is true that when contracting states 
conclude BITs, they are also creating an option for the foreign investor to 
choose the jurisdiction of a national court or the jurisdiction of an international 
arbitration (this option is known as the ‘fork-in-the-road’ clause). In this 
respect, the issue here is the aspect related to the intention of the contracting 
parties in creating this alternative choice. They should be aware that by creating 
this option they are submitting their public-law matters and regulatory issues to 
any of these jurisdictions.  
 
In the USA-Argentina BIT, the contracting parties expressly clarify which local 
courts will be in charge of solving the BIT’s dispute, i.e., they mention the 
administrative tribunals of the contracting parties. This clarification is evidence 
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of the awareness of the parties that they are submitting their regulatory disputes 
to any of the above-mentioned jurisdictions. A similar example is found in the 
case of the Colombia-Switzerland BIT where the contracting parties make an 
express reference to their administrative courts. Both of these examples 
demonstrate the intention of the contracting parties of placing administrative 
tribunals/courts and investor-state arbitration at the same level and granting the 
same subject-matter jurisdiction.  
 
Overall, it can be said that the investor-state arbitration practice represents a 
limitation to the contracting parties’ sovereign immunity of jurisdiction. Indeed, 
the contracting parties are conscious of fact that they are creating a temporary 
international forum to resolve regulatory disputes. The controversial issue is to 
what extent these international tribunals can deal extensively with matters of 
Acta Jure Imperii. It seems that the primary intention of the contracting parties 
is to give jurisdiction to these arbitral tribunals to deal with matters related to 
Acta Jure Gestionis (i.e., acts by right of management of the state/private-
commercial acts).  
 
The contracting states, by the inclusion of alternative choices, also seem to be 
expressing their will of incorporating their sets of domestic law principles into 
the investor-state treaty-based regulatory disputes due to the simple fact that 
these principles are the classic rules that govern the state’s domestic regulatory 
behaviour. It is for this reason that the consent of the state to arbitrate plays an 
import role in activating the system as a mechanism to adjudicate regulatory 
matters. An example of this intention can be found in the Colombia-Spain BIT 
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where the contracting parties expressly incorporated their consent to review 
administrative acts by investment arbitration. 
 
The investor-state treaty arbitration mechanism, as a type of public law 
adjudication, has not only been used as an instrument to oppose or resist the 
regulatory power of the host state, but also as an instrument to review the socio-
economic stability of the host state as well as to review the adoption of any 
governmental decision to expropriate. Additionally, this mechanism has also 
been used as an instrument to avoid the renegotiation of long-term contracts. 
 
Owing to these factual reasons and also due to the analogy that exists between 
international regulatory disputes and some domestic mechanisms which are 
responsible the review of the  regulatory conduct of the state, principles of 
domestic law are a constructive exercise for the future of this international 
arbitration system. Unless otherwise agreed to by the contracting parties of a 
BIT, nothing (BITs, ICSID, and UNCITRAL) impedes or prevents investment 
arbitrators from referring to some principles of administrative law as part of the 
law in general when they are attempting to resolve regulatory disputes and  
when  they are applying the FET standard. Obviously, it will largely depend on 
the discretionary power of the investment arbitrators; however recent practice 
(particularly since 2000) has shown that domestic law principles have been 
increasingly referred to in an attempt to resolve regulatory disputes. The 
exercise of referring to administrative law principles can also be based on the 
case law nature which is a common feature of both domestic administrative law 
and international investment law. This common feature becomes significantly 
more important due to the fact that ISTAs, as a regulatory adjudication 
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mechanism, also needs to apply, to some extent, questions of administrative 
policy (i.e., those points that do not contravene the public interest and public 
welfare) to the controversy.  An example of this particular situation can be 
found in Pantechniki v Albania (2009) where the sole arbitrator expressed his 
opinion about his role as a public law adjudicator.    
     
o In the current arbitral practice, the regulatory conduct of the state has been 
considered and judged in various manners and from different approaches 
through multiple arbitral awards. That is to say, this practice has given rise to 
different interpretations about the regulatory conduct of the state and the 
standards established in a BIT (particularly in accordance with the FET 
standard). Hence, it is assumed that this arbitral criterion is not homogeneous. 
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy to mention here that this lack of homogeneity is 
not only a typical characteristic of investment arbitral practice; it is also typical 
of the local administrative law practice due to uncodified nature of both 
branches of law. The difference between these two branches of public law is 
that under domestic law, this lack of homogeneity has been more consolidated 
thanks to more than of seventy-five years of experience within the major 
administrative legal systems of the Western world.  
 
The responsibility of imparting justice has been granted by sovereign states to 
local judges and international arbitrators as public law adjudicators to mainly 
review the regulatory conduct of the state. The problem here is that these public 
law adjudicators have to face the fact that neither domestic administrative law 
nor international investment law has been consistently codified either at the 
national level or at the international level. For this reason, these public law 
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adjudicators have found it increasingly necessary to resort to previous cases 
(case law precedent) to resolve this kind of regulatory dispute. Many of these 
case law precedents have been consolidated through the years of applying these 
legal principles which act as guidance in assessing the unilateral power of the 
state at the national and international level. These public law adjudicators have 
to confront the two different and disconnected levels (national and 
international) of case law to judge to the same regulatory conduct of the host 
state. Consequently, arbitral tribunals have recently started resorting to domestic 
law principles in an increasing, but also conservative, manner as legal sources 
to provide legal guidance in international regulatory disputes. 
 
As was mentioned before, this arbitral practice seems to be creating a conflict 
between the scope of some principles of administrative law and the scope of 
some principles of international investment law. The principles of international 
investment law are a slightly different version  of some principles of domestic 
(administrative) law but this time at the international level. In fact, this 
assumption is more credible due to the fact that BITs only enunciate the 
principles of international investment law and do not extensively explain their 
respective scopes.  
 
These two sets of principles come from the same branch of law, i.e., from 
public law and are destined to regulate the conduct of the state at the national 
level and international level, respectively. Perhaps, this is why these principles 
are conflicting and therefore, cause some concerns in the host states. Once 
again, the detailed study of this conflict or clash between the principles is 
beyond the main scope of this research. 
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Nonetheless, the necessity of defining these standards and reducing the above-
mentioned conflict has been left to the discretion of the investment arbitrators 
and to investment case law. In any case, it must be acknowledged that 
constitutional and administrative law principles of the host state should not be 
discarded at all from the arbitral arena since they have given grounds to the 
infringing regulatory conduct of the state which is being judged at the 
international level. Therefore, it is only by accepting this latter premise that the 
regulatory conduct of a state can be judged by international arbitrators in 
accordance with the standards agreed to by the contracting parties to a BIT.  
 
For example, under the current arbitral practice, some arbitral tribunals have 
made references (directly and indirectly) to some principles of domestic 
administrative law when dealing with the regulatory conduct of the host state, 
mainly in accordance with principles of international investment law. This 
practice has been carried out, in some cases, in accordance or in conflict with 
some principles of international investment law such as the FET standard and 
the National Treatment and Full Protection and Security standards. The 
following references have been made: 
 
 Principle of Legality: Mobil v. Venezuela (2010), reference was made 
to Venezuelan legislation in order to determine the state’s consent to 
arbitrate and to its right to adopt regulatory measures; Waste v. Mexico 
(2004), the assessment of the regulatory conduct of some governmental 
entities was carried out in accordance with the fair and equitable 
standard and full protection and security as established by the NAFTA 
without referring to domestic law; Metalclad v. Mexico (2000), 
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reference was made to Mexican legislation and to the fair and equitable 
standard in evaluating the regulatory conduct of Mexico; Thunderbird v. 
Mexico (2006), the national conduct was considered as a ‘fact’; 
Thunderbird v. Mexico (Separate Opinion, 2006), an assessment was 
carried on a number of local acts of state as they were in violation of 
legitimate expectations according to NAFTA provisions; Corn v. Mexico 
(2008), an evaluation of the sovereign fiscal conduct of the state was 
carried out in accordance with NAFTA provisions; Perenco v. Ecuador 
(2009), ICSID’s power to hamper the constitutional powers of Ecuador 
was demonstrated; Azurix v. Argentina (2006), evaluation of the 
domestic conduct of Argentina and its entities was undertaken in 
accordance with international law, specifically, in accordance with 
expropriation without compensation; fair and equitable treatment; 
arbitrary measures; and full protection and security; MTD v. Chile 
(2004), international law was applied (fair and equitable treatment) 
despite the agreement of the parties to apply Chilean law; Occidental v 
Ecuador (2008), Ecuador’s law to review the unilateral acts of the state 
was disregarded; Occidental v. Ecuador (2004), there was consideration 
of Ecuador’s tax legislation in accordance with the national treatment, 
fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security; and minimum 
standards of treatment; Aconquija v. Argentina (2000), the Claimant did 
not exhaust local remedies; Desert Line v. Yemen (2008), the tribunal 
acted as a De Novo review tribunal; Helnan v Egypt (2008) and 
Pantechniki v. Albania (2009), the need of reviewing the legality of the 
governmental conduct by local courts was emphasized.  
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 Principle of the public administration’s discretionary power: Waste 
v. Mexico 2004), consideration was given to the public officials’ 
discretion to give a public speech; Metalclad v. Mexico (2000), 
assessment of the fair and equitable treatment and limitation on the 
discretionary power of the state was carried out; Thunderbird v. Mexico 
(2006), discretionary power of the state was acknowledged; Thunderbird 
v. Mexico (Separate Opinion, 2006), it was established that the 
discretionary power of the state could constitute a violation of legitimate 
expectations under Article 1105 of the NAFTA; Corn v. Mexico (2008), 
reference was made to the discretionary power of the state to adopt 
fiscal measures; Perenco v Ecuador (2009), there was a limitation on the 
discretionary power of the state; Azurix v. Argentina (2006), there was 
acknowledgment of the discretionary power of the state; MTD v. Chile 
(2004), there was acknowledgment of the discretionary power of the 
state to adopt new urban policies; Occidental v. Ecuador (2004), there 
was an evaluation of the discretionary power of the state to modify its 
tax regime; Helnan v. Egypt (2008), reference was made to the 
discretionary power of the state to downgrade a hotel’s (stars) status; 
Aguaytia v. Peru (2008), there was acknowledgment of the 
constitutional discretionary power of the state to protect foreign 
investments and adopt new laws; Piero Foresti v. South Africa (2010), 
there was acknowledgment of the discretionary power of the state to 
manage its mineral rights and ownership; Pantechniki v. Albania (2009), 
there was acknowledgment of the discretionary power of the Albanian 
Ministry of Finance to veto some payments; and Lucchetti v. Peru 
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(2005), the tribunal ignored the principle of discretionary power of the 
state. 
 
 Principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations: Metalclad v. 
Mexico (2000), indirect reference was made to this principle in 
conjunction with the principle of fair and equitable treatment; 
Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006), direct reference was made to this 
principle alongside the NAFTA provisions, without any reference to any 
other domestic law principle; Thunderbird v. Mexico (Separate Opinion, 
2006), there was an interpretation of this principle in accordance with 
the fair and equitable standard; Azurix v. Argentina (2006), the effect of 
this principle created by a contractual agreement was considered and its 
evaluation was carried out in accordance with the standards of 
expropriation without compensation and fair and equitable treatment; 
MTD v. Chile (2004), assessment of the effect of a local entity’s 
decision was carried out in accordance with the international standard of 
fair and equitable treatment; Occidental v. Ecuador (2004), the effect of 
this principle was evaluated and its consideration was carried out in 
accordance with the standards of fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security; and Telenor v. Hungary (2006), indirect 
reference was made to this principle of legitimate expectations.  
 
o This current investor-state treaty arbitration practice, and in particular 
international regulatory disputes are giving rise to some political, international 
and academic concerns and questions from various sectors. Consequently, these 
concerns and questions are compromising the legitimacy of the current 
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international investment arbitration system itself. These concerns are related to 
the assessment which is carried out on a host state’s domestic public policy and 
public law matters such as regulatory issues at this international level, and also 
in the determination of the state’s international responsibility for the exercise of 
its public authority. This practice is restricting the free exercise of the sovereign 
power of the state to adopt new regulations and policies in favour of its national 
welfare. 
 
The various concerns are based principally on the limitation of the sovereign 
exercise of state regulatory power, which is a consequence of multiple 
heterogeneous arbitral awards and their interpretations on the principles of 
international investment law, particularly through their application of the FET 
standard. This practice, apart from resulting in different decisions on matters of 
the same legal nature (public law and regulatory matters), is contradictory in 
terms of arbitral awards outcomes.  
 
Despite the express selection by contracting parties of an applicable law to a 
dispute arising from a BIT, investment arbitrators seem to favour the 
application of principles of international (investment) law to the investor-state 
treaty dispute in order to determine the applicable law. This practice shows 
disregard for the express selection of a law, which not only ignores the will of 
the parties, but also overlooks the potential application of some other sources of 
law, such as municipal principles of law (that have given origin to the 
regulatory conduct of the host state) to international regulatory disputes. Thus, it 
becomes relevant to determine whether or not international (investment) law 
and domestic (constitutional and administrative) law are completely 
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disconnected from each other, especially taking into account their common 
public law origin and objective which is to control the regulatory conduct of the 
state and to protect private individuals.  
 
This arbitral practice has given rise to particular situations which have caught 
state attention. This is due to various reasons, for example it has been said that 
investment arbitrators have (i) ruled on the legality of state domestic conduct; 
(ii) evaluated the fairness of governmental decision-making; (iii) determined the 
appropriate scope and content of property rights; and (iv) allocated risks and 
costs between business and society.
1
  
 
Consequently, this arbitral practice has also obliged states to take governmental 
actions and/or measures to review BIT terms and conditions, or to even 
terminate them due to the following main reasons: (i) the argued 
unconstitutionality and illegality of some BITs in accordance with national law; 
(ii) the bias nature of some ICSID tribunals in favour of foreign investors; (iii) 
the high costs of arbitration facilities; (iv) the abuse of the legal personality 
principle by some foreign investors, in order to gain access to a particular BIT’s 
provisions; (v) the conflict regarding the future BIT programme and the public 
interest of the state; (vi) the requirement of more regulatory and policy space; 
(vii) the exclusive jurisdiction belonging to the national courts to resolve 
foreign investment matters; (viii) the misuse of ISTA to challenge public-
interest measures; (ix) the restricted access to ISTA; (x) the granting of equal 
legal rights to foreign businesses and domestic businesses; (xi) the concern 
about the wide definition of ‘direct foreign investment’; (xii) the vague 
                                                 
1
 See G. Van Harten, and M. Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law, EJIL (2006) Vol. 17 No. 1, 121-150, on page 147.  
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language of some BITs; (xiii) the conflict between private interests and the 
regulatory tasks of public authorities; (xiv) the risk of adopting new legislation 
which may breach the ‘fair and equitable’ international standard; (xv) the 
necessity of not only protecting foreign investors, but also guaranteeing the 
state’s right to adopt new legislation and policies; (xvi) the need of defining – in 
a clear manner– the international investment law standards; and (xvii) the 
suggestion of primarily applying municipal law to the regulation of ISTA.  
 
The current arbitral practice is, without a doubt, creating a conflict of interests 
between foreign investors and host states, which is also affecting the legitimacy 
of this arbitral system. This increases the necessity of finding a balanced 
relationship between the state’s regulatory power and investment protection. In 
this regard, one of the temporary solutions to the problem in this arbitration 
system is the joint consideration of or reference to some of the principles of 
domestic (constitutional and administrative) law, together with international law 
principles when resolving international regulatory disputes. The fact that 
domestic (constitutional and administrative) law, international investment law 
and the law in general are not static and are constantly evolving to adapt the 
constant changes of any democratic society should obviously be taken into 
consideration. Ultimately, account should be taken of the fact that states are 
guarantors of national welfare, as well as guardians ensuring the protection of 
private individuals.  
  
c. Conclusions 
 
Given the analogy between the public law functions of the investor-state treaty 
arbitration mechanism and the domestic legal remedies, it can be said that both have 
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been designed to mainly resolve regulatory disputes between the state and private 
individuals. Both parallel levels of state regulatory review have also been designed to 
protect private individuals from the unlawful or arbitrary conduct of the host state. In 
this context, it can also be said that this arbitration system has mainly been designed as 
a temporary forum to provide private individuals with a special tool to challenge the 
domestic rights and privileges of the host state at the international level. This particular 
point shows, amongst other aspects, that investment arbitrators are arbitrators of law 
rather than arbitrators of equity since they are required to assess the domestic regulation 
of the host state in accordance with the applicable law chosen by the BIT’s contracting 
parties in order to determine the state’s international responsibility. 
 
Nonetheless, the problem is that the current evaluation of domestic regulatory conduct 
and public law matters of the host state is mainly being taken in accordance with 
principles of international (investment) law. Thus, principles of domestic 
(administrative) law and more than seventy-five years of experience on domestic state-
private-individual-relationships are not being sufficiently considered by investment 
tribunals due to the application of the well-known international principle which asserts 
that a state may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty.  
 
The application of this principle is a variation of the principle contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties which is applicable to traditional subjects of 
public international law, i.e., sovereign states. It should be stressed that the treaty-based 
relationship between a host state and a given foreign investor is mainly a regulatory 
relationship. This is largely due to the lack of bargaining power private individuals 
have to conclude treaties and to the freedom of the state to adopt new policies and 
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regulations. Based on the treaty-based regulatory relationship between a host state and 
a foreign investor and on the analogous nature between ISTA and domestic 
administrative review institutions, the question now becomes: which principles of law 
should be applied by investment arbitrators to an international regulatory dispute 
between a state and a private individual?  
 
In this respect, the autonomy of the contracting parties plays an important role as, 
frequently, the contracting (sovereign) states will establish the law applicable to a 
possible regulatory dispute in advance. Many contracting states do this through the 
body of a BIT or in default, they leave it to the ICSID Convention or UNCITRAL 
rules. The general rule is that the parties agree on application of the law of the 
contracting state party to the dispute, i.e., the host state’s law (lex situs) in conjunction 
with the applicable provisions of international law. However, it must be noted that 
these applicable law provisions do not expand upon what sources of law should or 
should not be applied to the treaty-based dispute. BIT provisions, ICSID Convention 
and UNCITRAL rules only make reference to the law of the contracting state party to 
the dispute which leaves the relevant sources of law to be determined by a particular 
international investment tribunal. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, in determining the applicable law to an investor/state 
regulatory dispute, investment arbitrators have been recently starting to look for and 
rely on non- international rules and principles to carry out this entrusted task. These 
non- international sources have been mainly found in, and taken from, domestic legal 
sources such as legislative and administrative acts, i.e., the domestic regulation of the 
host state. In this regard, it has been said that ‘[t]he most fertile, but underutilised, 
source of principles for developing coherent conceptions of investment protection 
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standards are general principles of law recognised in municipal legal systems’.2 It is 
important to draw attention to the fact that in many arbitral proceedings, the most 
popular and traditional practice of resorting to these domestic acts has been through the 
opinion of legal experts and affidavits.  
 
Nevertheless, through recent arbitral awards, some investment tribunals and some 
arbitrators have already started to expressly recognise or point out the necessity of 
resolving investor/state regulatory disputes by resorting to domestic law and domestic 
law principles, particularly when applying the FET standard. This necessity has been 
mainly based on the fact that there is a lack of rules governing the unilateral acts of 
states in international law and is also due to the fact both customary international law 
and international investment law are both constantly evolving as is the (administrative) 
law of any democratic society. 
 
Furthermore, it can be asserted that neither a BIT nor the ICSID nor the UNCINTRAL 
rules impede or prevent investment arbitrators from applying some principles of 
domestic (administrative) law belonging to a host state that essentially form part of the 
host state’s natural law when dealing with regulatory disputes. A guideline on what 
domestic (administrative) law principles should be applied to a certain investor-state 
regulatory dispute does not exist in international law. Hence, this task is left to 
international arbitrators as was mentioned in Chapters IV and VI. 
 
This suggested practice of referring to domestic (administrative) law principles as ‘a 
margin of appreciation standard of review’3 can help investment arbitrators in their 
                                                 
2
 See Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press, UK, 2009), on 
pages 69-72, on page 89. 
3
 See W. Burke-White, and A. Von Staden, The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-State 
Arbitrations in S. W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University 
Press, UK 2010), on page 720. 
 382 
difficult task of assessing the regulatory conduct of a state at the international level. 
This is particularly so if account is taken of the fact that the unilateral powers of the 
states have not yet been codified at the international level and ‘[i]nternational law is 
insufficiently mature compared to domestic legal systems’.4 Furthermore, it has been 
asserted that ‘the integrity of the law of the host state is also a critical part of 
development and a concern of international investment law’.5 It therefore seems that 
reference by investment arbitrators to administrative law principles may help to 
mitigate the risk of considering the regulatory conduct of the host state as a potential 
international breach of an IIT provision. Finally, this suggested practice may also help 
to prevent public law adjudicators from relying on their own subjective opinion too 
much.
6
 
 
The fact that administrative law rights have been recently included within the definition 
of foreign investment also demonstrates the increasing importance that administrative 
law principles have in the growing investment arbitration system as an international 
mechanism to protect the subjective rights of the private individuals involved. 
 
However, the suggested practice of referring to domestic administrative law principles 
means that the arbitral assessment of the regulatory conduct of the state is carried out in 
accordance with standards and principles which have not yet been fully developed. In 
particular, the fact that ‘the law itself is not a body of rules, but a stream of 
authoritative decisions’ is taken into account.7  
 
                                                 
4
 C. B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l 
L. 1083 (2008), on page 1119. 
5
 Fraport v. Philippines (Preliminary Objections), paragraph 402, quoted by Douglas, supra note 2, on page 72.  
6
 See Douglas, supra note 2, on page 90. 
7
 See A. M. Slaughter, and S. R. Ratner, The Method is the Message 36 Stud. Transnat’l Legal Pol’y 239 
(2004), on page 244. 
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Despite the minor negative aspect related to the undefined scope of the principles, it 
can be stated that the exercise of resorting to domestic administrative law principles 
could at least provide a worldwide feeling that the rights and legal traditions of states 
and their juridical frameworks are being carefully considered in this arbitral system. 
This may therefore serve to strike a fair balance between states and investors. This fair 
balance can also mitigate the criticism surrounding the legitimacy of the international 
investment arbitration system. 
 
One of the problems with the current investment arbitral practice seems to be the 
application of a very restricted decision-making method (known as the strict ‘no other 
means available’ standard8) to consider (jointly or separately) the different sources of 
law. Thus, it is true to state that a restricted decision-making approach has been 
adopted, but it is also true to state that neither national nor international laws prohibit 
any arbitrator from resorting to those municipal or international mechanisms or sources 
of law when dealing with regulatory disputes. This latter proposal can facilitate the task 
investment arbitrators have, of administrating justice.  
 
Due to the lack of any prohibition in applying such principles, this research encourages 
international arbitrators to resort or refer to sources of law such as the principles of 
domestic (administrative) law in international regulatory disputes as a way to impart 
justice in a fair, transparent and equitable manner. In particular, if it is taken into 
account that ‘the sui generis character of international law is an increased reliance on 
existing domestic legal systems for development of substantive international law’.9 
 
                                                 
8
 See Burke-White and Von Staden, supra note 3, on page 695. 
9
 See Picker, supra note 4, on page 1092. 
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The reluctance of investment arbitrators to refer to this particular source of law can be 
regarded in the long term as a contribution to the current crisis of legitimacy that the 
international investment arbitration system is facing. Vivid examples supporting the 
existence of this crisis are found in the recent withdrawal of some Latin American 
countries from the ICSID Convention, as well as the revision, renegotiation or 
termination of some BITs by various (developed and developing) states. 
 
Taking all these factors into account, it could be said that now is the right time to 
initiate the practice of referring to these sets of domestic (administrative) law principles 
in international regulatory disputes due to the current concerns and questions 
surrounding the current arbitral system. There is a common intention, within the 
international arena, to achieve the right balance between the interests of foreign 
investors and the regulatory power of the host state. As already mentioned, the 
temporary solution to this legitimacy crisis is the consolidation of these two groups of 
interests by allowing reference to be made to some principles of domestic 
(constitutional and administrative) law in conjunction with principles of international 
law within international investment arbitration practice. Nevertheless, it must be 
emphasized that the application (separately or jointly) of international and national laws 
is not an easy task due to the reality that the law is not static, this therefore means that 
there is constant changes in both laws. 
 
Recently, it has been emphasized that ‘there is little in international law that is 
permanent’.10 Thus, it is recommended that international law and national law must be 
read and interpreted in an evolutionary manner in order to accommodate the application 
of domestic (administrative) law principles to give room to a state’s (i.e., IIA’s 
                                                 
10
 Picker, supra note 4, on page 1097. 
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contracting parties) natural law with regards to  the adoption of administrative actions. 
Furthermore, it can generally be affirmed that this exercise will bring a certain level of 
transparency and fairness to the currently criticized legal mechanism. 
 
Finally, the problem with the domestic administrative law institutions and ISTA is that 
both parallel levels which carry out the review of the regulatory power of the state are 
operating in a disconnected manner. Nonetheless, the proposed temporary solution to 
this problem can be found in the common ground between these two (parallel) levels of 
review which is based on their similar methodology used to resolve a dispute between 
the state and the private individual, i.e., the case law methodology.  
 
Moreover, it could be said that principles of international investment law are also 
principles of administrative law but at the international level. In fact, the content of the 
some principles of international investment law are drafted in BITs in a wider and more 
generic manner. Consequently, it may possibly be assumed that these international 
principles, such as the FET standard, could be usurping typical areas belonging to the 
traditional principles of domestic (administrative) law, but also other elemental 
precepts of municipal law in general. Once again, the solution to this regulatory 
problem is the consolidation of these sets of principles which belong to the same 
branch of law, i.e., public law. This exercise can also be achieved as a result of the 
increased cooperation between these two (parallel) (national and international) levels 
which will in turn lead to a more harmonious existence between national and 
international laws principles.  
 
d. Main contribution of this research to existing knowledge 
The present research was structured on the argued analogy between ISTA as a 
mechanism to deal with regulatory disputes and domestic administrative law (Chapters 
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I and II). This study went further to examine whether this analogy was certain and 
viable. During the execution of this thesis, it was established that some principles of 
domestic administrative law were applicable to this analogy.  
 
Based on the scarcity of scholarly literature on this topic in the international investment 
arbitration world, the author decided to study the analogy from the perspective of the 
two most important legal traditions of the Western world, e.g., the British 
administrative legal system and the French administrative legal system (Chapter II). 
This particular and detailed approach, taken in an attempt to evaluate the current 
investor-state treaty arbitration mechanism (particularly, international regulatory 
disputes), has not previously been carried out. 
 
These legal systems were selected for this study due to their irrefutable prestige around 
the world and the unquestionable influence that they have had on some other countries 
including their former colonies. Under these two legal systems, there are administrative 
law institutions and principles that are common to both systems, which are intended to 
resolve regulatory disputes between the state and private individuals in procedures such 
as administrative reviews and judicial reviews.  
 
One of the main differences between these two domestic mechanisms (administrative 
and judicial review) and the international mechanism (arbitration), is that the former 
mechanisms have existed within the legal systems of many countries for more than 
seventy-five years on average, e.g., these domestic mechanisms have existed for over 
one hundred years in the French administrative legal system and over fifty years in the 
British administrative legal system. During these periods, a considerable number of 
legal principles have been developed domestically. Many of these legal principles are 
similar in their scope and meaning under both legal systems. These principles are: the 
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principle of legality; the principle of the administration’s discretionary power; the 
principle of proportionality; the principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations; 
the principle of equality before the law; the principles of the public administration’s 
good faith; and, the principle of the duty to give reasons. All of these principles have 
been domestically developed with the intention of controlling the regulatory power of 
the state and its unilateral prerogatives (Chapter II). 
 
However, in the international arena, through the international investment arbitration 
system, another set of principles have emerged and have been developed for the same 
purpose of mainly controlling the regulatory power of the state, but this time at the 
international level. These principles are mainly known as fair and equitable treatment; 
national treatment; most-favoured-nation treatment; full protection and security; access 
to justice, fair procedure and denial of justice; transfer of funds; and expropriation. 
(Chapter III). 
 
Under the current arbitral practice, it has been demonstrated that the domestic 
regulatory power of the host state has been evaluated by investment arbitrators largely 
in accordance with these international sets of principles such as FET standard (chapter 
V). Thus, although the domestic regulatory power of the state is being assessed at the 
international level, many principles of domestic (administrative) law are not being 
afforded significant consideration, despite the fact that these domestic law principles 
have given grounds for the regulatory behaviour of the host state.  
 
Consequently, after considering and highlighting the most relevant public law elements 
of the investor-state treaty arbitration mechanism (Chapters III and IV), this research 
suggests that international investment arbitrators should resort to or make reference to 
sources of law such as principles of domestic (administrative) law as a way to impart 
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justice in a fair, transparent and equitable manner when resolving international 
regulatory disputes. In fact, it has been found through this research that neither BIT, 
ICSID nor UNCITRAL rules impede investment arbitrators from adopting this 
particular proposal, unless  a stabilization clause has been previously introduced by the 
contracting states in order to freeze the regulatory power of the host state for a certain 
period of time. This latter point can give grounds for further discussion but it goes 
beyond the scope of this research. 
 
The proposal suggested in this research will not only serve to fulfil what is an arbitral 
need which has originated from the legitimacy crisis surrounding this investor-state 
arbitration system (Chapter VI), but the proposal has been formulated in a manner to 
overcome something which is a legal taboo in the international arena, i.e., the reference 
to domestic administrative law principles in international regulatory disputes.  
 
Finally, in the existing scholarly literature, there is a gap which exists due to the lack of 
a set of guidelines which attempt to resolve the unilateral power of the state at the 
international level and the unbalanced relationship between states and foreign investors. 
Hence, this research contributes to the academic debate by way of a coherent and 
consistent analysis of this gap. In fact, the body of this research has served to illustrate 
that this gap in literature has been rapidly acquiring an increasing level of importance 
within the public law realm, most notably since 2000. The proposal made throughout 
this research can be viewed to be as a fair way to achieve a balanced relationship 
between the state’s regulatory power and foreign investment interests.  
 
e. Limitations 
Throughout the development of this research, a number of limitations were identified. 
These limitations were limitations of form and some were limitations of substance. For 
 389 
example, the present study is restricted due to the limits established by the University 
regulation, i.e., the limit of 100,000 words to present a comprehensive thesis discussing 
a large and complex topic such as the topic of this research. Additionally, time also 
constrained the author in producing a deeper and more detailed analysis of this topic as 
over three or four years of investigation would be required to produce a fully 
comprehensive thesis.  
 
On the other hand, there were some limitations of substance that precluded a deeper 
discussion of the topic of this research. This is due to the fact that both the scope of 
domestic administrative law principles and the scope of international investment law 
principles are significantly wide and would require more than one doctoral thesis in 
order to ascertain their respective limits. Similarly, the apparent interconnection 
between these sets of principles, at a national and international level, also represents an 
additional challenge which would require further time and space to be addressed in a 
detailed manner. Thus, it can be said that many of the ideas and observations expressed 
throughout this study run the risk of being considered over-generalized or over-
simplified by any public law lawyer.  
 
Overall, this thesis mainly refers to the current arbitral practice (with particular 
emphasis on regulatory disputes) and arbitral awards which can be framed within the 
scope of some principles of domestic administrative law. Most significantly, this thesis 
introduces a proposal which is the exercise of resorting to these domestic principles in 
international regulatory disputes as alternative way of imparting justice at the 
international level. However, the great number of arbitral awards renders it impossible 
to examine every single award in relation to their application or non-application of 
domestic administrative law principles. 
 
 390 
Thus, it is crucial to emphasize that the present research should not be taken, under any 
circumstance, as a detailed study of each principle of domestic administrative law or 
each principle of international investment law. Furthermore, this research is not a study 
concerning the coexistence between principles of domestic administrative law and 
principles of international investment law.  
 
Finally, due to the diversity and vast number of national court decisions and investment 
tribunal awards, as well as the uncodified nature of administrative law, it was not 
possible to carry out a deeper analysis on the interaction between these two sets of 
domestic and international principles of public law. 
 
f. Further research 
 
The main objective of this study was to identify those common institutions and 
principles of domestic administrative law which can be applied to ISTAs (as 
mechanisms that largely deal with regulatory disputes) due to their argued similarity 
with domestic administrative mechanisms. In accomplishing this objective many other 
topics became relevant.  
 
Some of these topics require further research into their academic importance along with 
determining their significance to the investment arbitration system. This exercise could 
consequently help to address the main topic of this research. For example, research on 
the coexistence between each principle of domestic administrative law and each 
principle of international investment law would significantly contribute to a greater 
understanding of this research. Similarly, the further analysis of arbitral awards, their 
use of domestic administrative law principles and international investment law 
principles would produce a considerable contribution to this study. Another interesting 
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area of enquiry which would add to the main scope of this thesis is the possibility of 
applying domestic (constitutional and administrative) law principles to the prescribed 
FET standard. 
 
Lastly, other related areas may also require some attention, such as the further 
clarification of some arbitral matters, including: the limitation of arbitration for public 
order reasons (nationalization and legal reserve); establishing international investment 
arbitration as a real friendly mechanism to solve disputes; the development and future 
of the international investment arbitration system (will this system be consolidated in 
the future?); the current arbitral interpretation of international investment principles and 
the risk of considering them as a tacit stabilization clauses; etc. 
 
g. Final reflection 
 
The idea of this research was not only to provide the readers of this thesis with an 
introduction to a contemporary emerging public-law concern; but also to ignite the 
interest of the reader to undertake complementary studies.  
 
Additionally, this thesis should also invite the readers and public law adjudicators to 
take into consideration the coexistence of public law and public policy as a way of 
guaranteeing an adequate level of ‘good governance’.  
 
Thus, it is of crucial importance to highlight that despite the legal maxim of ubi jus, ibi 
remedium (i.e. where there is a right, there must be a remedy), the main task of any 
public law adjudicator is ‘setting standards of good governance’;11 by using their 
judicial discretion.
12
 Furthermore, it must be taken into consideration that ‘the basic 
                                                 
11
 Jean Rivero, quoted by L. Neville Brown and J. Bell, French Administrative Law (Fifth Edition, Oxford 
University Press, UK 2003), on page 288. 
12
 See A. W. Bradley, and K. D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Fourteenth Edition, Pearson 
Longman, England 2007), on page 726. 
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purpose of administrative adjudication is to protect the interests of individuals without 
unduly hindering the promotion of social goals’.13  
 
Finally, perhaps, the task of setting good standards of governance may overlap with 
theories belonging to the political and social sciences, due to the fact that the civil 
servants who are in charge of applying the law could apply it in a way that pursues a 
different objective than the one for which the law was conceived. 
 
**************o************** 
                                                 
13
 See P. Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2009), on page 13. 
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Annex A 
 
METHODOLOGICAL ROADMAP 
AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
 
 
Methodological Roadmap
and Analytical Approach
State State
BIT
Investor-State Treaty 
Arbitration
Influence from 
Commercial Arbitration
British Adm. Leg. System
(Common Law Tradition)
Public System Analogous Domestic Administrative Law
French Adm. Leg. System
(Civil Law Tradition)
Comparative analysis between 
French and English Adm. Legal 
Systems
Debate this academic 
assumption
Institutions and Principles which are 
common in both systems can be of reference 
for Investment arbitrators
Equilibrium between states and 
investors
- Basic questions
1, To what extent  Yes or not
2. Which way  Comparative
3. Why  Deductive
Applying Principles of Administrative Law to Investor-State Treaty 
Arbitrations. 
Regulatory Dispute
Emergence of Global 
Adm. Law (GAL)
Old tendency New tendency
One of the main sources 
of Public International 
Law
1
2
3
Treaties
?
Principles of International 
Investment Law
Regulatory Dispute
A supra national 
tribunal?
Administrative 
Review? Or
Judicial Review?
*
*
*
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Annex B 
 
 
Analogies of ISTAs with Institutions of 
Administrative Law
18
Characteristic ISTA Adm. Review Jud. Review
Court-like basis Yes Yes Yes
Three judge members Yes Yes Yes/No
Private individual/state disputes Yes Yes Yes
Use of adversarial system Yes Yes Yes/No (Inq)
Protection against abusive/unlawful state conduct Yes Yes Yes
Quasi-judicial functions Yes Yes No
Creation by acts of state/parliament Yes Yes Yes
Public law legal nature Yes Yes Yes
Law is not static Yes Yes Yes
Use of case-law methodology Yes Yes Yes
Lack of self-enforcement Yes Yes No
Part of the state’s apparatus of justice Yes Yes Yes
*
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Annex C 
 
 
Common principles of Administrative Law
 Principle of legality
 Principle of the public administration’s discretionary power
 Principle of proportionality
 Principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations
 Principle of equality before the law
 Principle of the public administration’s good faith
 Principle of the duty to give reasons (motivation)
*
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Annex D 
 
Equilibrium between states and investors
States
 Principle of legality
 Principle of the public 
administration’s discretionary power
 Principle of proportionality
 Principle of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations
 Principle of equality before the law
 Principle of the public 
administration’s good faith
 Principle of the duty to give reasons 
(motivation)
Investors
 Fair and Equitable Treatment
 National Treatment
 Most-favoured-nation Treatment
 Full Protection and Security
 Access to justice, fair procedure, and 
denial of justice
 Transfer of funds
 Expropriation
*
 
